Note: This article is based on english trascription of the original podcast by .tyzden in slovak language. You can listen to it in a form fo podcast here:

Security radar of General Pavel Macko – 151st edition – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

Moderator: Welcome, Pavel.

General Pavel Macko: Thank you very much, warm greetings to the listeners. We also have the Munich Security Conference in the headlines, unfortunately I’m not there this year, but we’ll bring its conclusions on the pages of Týždeň magazine and evaluate it next time.

Fog of War

Moderator (Eugen Korda): As always, what is the security situation in Ukraine?

General Pavel Macko: Very bad. We see the continuation of that tragedy, as we announced – intense fighting is ongoing, intense bombardment. The Russians are trying to keep the Ukrainians in winter and darkness. We see that infrastructure in Kyiv is seriously damaged, but this is happening across the entire country. When I evaluate it overall, the front has hardly moved. The fighting was extremely intense, especially in Donbas. The Russians carried out the largest drone attack last weekend and then we saw yesterday again a large drone and missile attack. They are concentrating on destroying Ukrainian infrastructure. Ukraine also struck energy facilities in Belgorod and Ukrainian command is dealing with air defense problems. Russia is trying to gain and improve its tactical position before the spring season. We see the same from Ukraine’s side.

Moderator: And what’s happening on the front?

General Pavel Macko: When I take it, let’s do a quick overview. In the east, the biggest fighting concerns Bakhmut, Chasiv Yar, Kramatorsk – there the Russians continued pressure west of Bakhmut. Near Chasiv Yar, they are trying to push toward Slovyansk. The most intense fighting was near Klishchiivka, Ivanivske and Kalynivka. When we look at Kharkiv region, the Russians slightly advanced in this Kharkiv region.

Going back to this Donbas, there was also intense fighting on the Avdiivka, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove direction – on this section. There the Russians tried to expand control southwest of Avdiivka. Ukrainian command states that the attacks are massive but ineffective. The reality is that we really haven’t seen any major movement of that line.

If we look further south, there is also intense fighting. We saw such tactical counterattacks by Ukrainians, especially after Starlink went down, so the Russians lost contact. It’s not something significant, it’s more about equalizing positions and showing the reality on the battlefield, because the Russians were using tactics where they infiltrated, settled somewhere and then it looked like they controlled the area. Now this actually allowed them to say that they really no longer control it.

There’s a nice tidbit for listeners – when they lost those Starlink connections, the Russians tried to find Ukrainians who would give them access codes. It’s like with us – these are our satellites, they blackmailed them. But they didn’t know this was tapped, that actually a Ukrainian division created fake accounts and a call and lured about 2,500 Russian accounts, from which they discovered their location and coordinates. And this is probably also visible in that tactical success.

Moderator: Overall picture?

General Pavel Macko: The overall picture, as I already indicated, is not moving in any fundamental way. The situation is stable, but the number of clashes is enormous. Of course, these are smaller units, but the number of clashes is enormous. When I evaluate it overall, the Russians are still slowly advancing. Over the past month they had about 150 to 300 square kilometers of territorial gains, but nothing suggests that one side or the other would have any major fundamental breakthrough.

Moderator: How do you assess Russian missile and drone attacks deep into Ukraine?

General Pavel Macko: It’s an outrage, it continues and here it must be said that whether in the attack of February 7th or now in the latest one – the Russians combine, they learned this over those four years. They combine hypersonic missiles, cruise missiles and drones are added to that, using the fact that they modernized those drones and today they can attack even moving targets. This means, if they have sufficient information from some collaborators on the Ukrainian side or their agents, they can attack moving targets. It’s something Ukraine must deal with. Ukrainian air defense was engaging, destroyed a large number of drones, but still the strikes were strong, cyclically plunging Ukraine into darkness, also damaging Ukrainian production, because obviously for large military production you need a lot of energy.

Moderator: Good, and what about the Ukrainians?

General Pavel Macko: So the Ukrainians also attacked. They attacked Belgorod and Bryansk, there they also attacked those energy facilities. We witnessed an attack with five Flamingos, those are their large missiles. It looks like they’re good. Russia claimed it shot down all five, but despite that we saw secondary explosions in the area. This was attacking a facility of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate, or glavnoe raketno-artilleriyskoe upravlenie (GRAU). These are also large warehouses. It’s in Volgograd region about 350 kilometers, 320 kilometers from the battle line and state border in Russian depth. Overall, Ukrainian strikes are aimed mainly at energy, logistics and ammunition depots. Their goal is to weaken the Russian rear before the spring combat season, similar to what the Russians are trying to do.

Moderator: But I read that Zelensky quite criticized that defense.

General Pavel Macko: Yes, because obviously Ukrainian air defense hasn’t undergone any fundamental changes since 2022. It was successful, but it’s being exhausted. Now I read that Germans will provide 35 Patriot missiles. So for yesterday’s attack they would need about 80. And on top of that they would need to operate against drones. So it’s clear there’s a disproportion. This confirms that, if we look at it in a broader context, the West hesitated for a long time and actually blocked Ukraine and didn’t want to supply them with those longer-range weapons, when that was the only thing that could be done. Not catching every missile, every drone, but destroying those sources from where they come.

But of course, air defense also needs to be improved and there were failures, mainly in those multiple regions. Zelensky criticized this leadership and ordered immediate changes. In some regions, air defense is being rebuilt practically from scratch. We’re talking about those small observer teams, those small strike units up to that large air defense – they had to be restructured, the layers are changing, tactics and command methods are to be changed. And at the same time Zelensky ordered to accelerate drone and weapons supply, supplement personnel and made some personnel changes toward those regional leaders, because this also belongs to territorial defense. And mainly there, where reaction to attacks failed – basically it’s the largest reorganization of Ukrainian air defense since 2022.

However, we won’t analyze this in detail, nor are the information available, because obviously even the Ukrainians won’t reveal everything to open media and won’t give Russians instructions on how to overcome it again.

Moderator: And Zelensky sent a message to the world that for me was almost incredible, that there could be elections and a referendum there.

General Pavel Macko: I take it as part of negotiating tactics. The United States is brutally pressuring Zelensky, they jumped on that Russian propaganda and question Zelensky’s legitimacy. Not all of them, but there are those American hawks, mainly from that MAGA movement. So Zelensky made a clear tactical move, where he said fine, so potentially there could be elections in April, and a referendum on peace agreement and territorial changes, which would create conditions for concluding that peace. And of course the next day came the correction after this caused a wave of displeasure in Ukraine, where he said clearly – provided we reach a ceasefire, because it’s clear that under those bombs and missiles you see day and night, we won’t and cannot hold elections. But we have good will, we’re ready for it. But it’s in the hands of the Ukrainian people to decide, but when you shoot at them and drop bombs, they can’t decide about anything.

Moderator: Gaza and Israel, are there any changes?

General Pavel Macko: Not any major ones. I must say that over the past week tension continued directly in Gaza, it’s still a fragile ceasefire, regularly disrupted by Hamas activities and then retaliatory Israeli strikes and raids. In that past week, no major ground operations were reported, but those air and drone strikes against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) infrastructure continued. This is actually a continuation of those tensions that are there. Simply put, Hamas is still quite strong.

Moderator: Good, what about the rest of Israel? West Bank? By the way, Jews no longer want to call the West Bank the West Bank, but I think Samaria, according to the historical name.

General Pavel Macko: Yes, it’s historical. After all, those who go to church sometimes hear in those biblical texts some references to this territory. But there’s that trend, it’s also subject to criticism. So first, operation Iron Wall continues there, which are actually raids and elimination of those various terrorist cells and groups. But second, there is quite – and this is due to the composition of Netanyahu’s government, where there are also representatives of those more radical streams in Israeli society – and actually expansion of settlements is taking place there. This of course meets with displeasure of that Palestinian population. They are also targets of criticism from outside, even the United States said they should restrain this activity.

Of course, we don’t know now to what extent the real situation is such that it looks like they’re preparing new annexation of the West Bank, because this is what mainly Arab sources suggest, and what is only consolidation of that situation and an attempt to ensure security and at the same time moderate even those most radical voices in Israel.

I also looked at how Israeli media see this. A broader spectrum starting with Haaretz ending with Jerusalem Post and there the summary is that they report on Gaza as precise strikes by Israeli security forces. The topic of hostages still dominates and those echoes on the West Bank. There’s emphasis on Israeli security forces‘ raids and political tension. Internal political crisis is still being communicated and if we look at southern Lebanon, there’s such dry technocratic stating that there’s occasional exchange of fire, but it’s controlled escalation.

Moderator: And how did the creation of technocratic administration in Gaza progress?

General Pavel Macko: Laconically, if I had to say it, I would say that the technocratic government for Gaza exists only on paper, in the field there’s really a vacuum. And now actually – there exists that international plan. We mentioned it here, including that former minister who is supposed to be the head there, he’s ready, but Hamas doesn’t want to disarm. Based on that, Israel then blocks actually this activity and the result is that it’s all on paper. But really nothing fundamental is succeeding. This means we’re still in that position where it’s a good plan, super plan that looks like something worthy of Nobel Prize, but really it can’t be set in motion.

The United States is therefore already pushing a more moderate model, talking about something like demilitarization under supervision, but Israel considers this too soft. Hamas is weakened but not defeated. It still has tunnels, has weapons, has support from part of the population. As we said last time – those who were killed are being replaced by new recruits. And real disarmament is so far only a political declaration, but we don’t see any process heading toward that.

Strategic Background

Moderator: Last week there was a meeting of NATO defense ministers. What did they agree on?

General Pavel Macko: It’s a regular meeting, so-called ministerial. Two weeks ago there was a ministerial of foreign ministers, now defense ministers and next will follow a summit on July 7th and 8th, if I remember correctly, in Ankara. This is such a regular cycle, these ministerials happen at least twice a year and always one is such big, working one, one is more social also with those social activities and team building. In this case it was a working meeting.

At such a ministerial, the agenda for the upcoming summit is also communicated. This means, that level of foreign ministry gives such political guidance, those big political agreements and at such defense ministerial it’s already transformed or translated into the language of numbers, into the language of concrete measures. So at this summit there were several main points.

Monitoring or reporting of progress in fulfilling the two percent GDP for defense commitment was done. Then they talked about building those capabilities, so-called national goals, which are determined within those puzzle pieces or that mosaic that NATO must assemble to be able to defend itself. These are those goals we also have – mechanized brigade and similar. So this was discussed. They talked about strengthening deterrence and defense. They also talked about international projects and some agreements were signed between groups of these members. For example, on joint procurement and technology development, including deep precision strikes, those are mainly long-range missile fires, ballistic protection, protection of underwater infrastructure, so-called Task Force Baltic. And the NATO-Ukraine council also convened. A separate meeting took place with Ukraine’s defense minister.

If we look at it, there was agreement on some issues. Potential disagreement is maybe more in the area of pace of increasing weapons production. Some allies object that we still focus on increasing that GDP percentage, but the increase is not followed by sufficient production, meaning production needs to be accelerated. Rutte openly said that NATO needs more production, faster and in larger quantities. There are also differences in the pace of fulfilling two percent, some countries are already significantly ahead, but for example Germany announced that while it won’t reach those percentages, but actually compared to previous years it’s already going to double its defense budget. This means that real, physical increase is one hundred percent.

Moderator: I heard about operation Arctic Sentry, which translates as Arctic Guard. What is this supposed to be and has it been approved somehow?

General Pavel Macko: It hasn’t been approved yet. I’ll remind listeners that after there were those incidents in the Baltic Sea and cables were cut, so we have Baltic Sentry or Baltic Guard or Baltic Watch, maybe I would translate it that way. The same happened then after those attacks or incursions into Polish and Estonian airspace, where so-called Eastern Sentry was created, that’s increased air space patrolling, air space monitoring on the eastern flank. And now Arctic Watch is being considered.

It relates to the discussion about Greenland, relates to the discussion about increased movement and influence of Russians and China in this space, relates to how northern sea routes are gradually opening up. This means that allies, to satisfy Trump, to also ensure their security, are considering operation Arctic Watch. So far it’s in that position where there were such two exercises – Cold Response and another name that escapes me now, which are to be consolidated. And now it’s being considered in various forms how those increased operations would actually be carried out.

Basically it’s about monitoring the entire Arctic space, more detailed monitoring of that strait or that open maritime space that connects actually the Arctic space, where Russians are very strong and built massive infrastructure in recent decades, where China is also starting to assert itself, occupying or creating its Arctic fleet, even though it’s not directly an Arctic country. And this is actually the space between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom. Otherwise this was space that was always monitored. During World War II it was key space for supporting Europe.

In case of any larger conflict, it’s space that is absolutely critical for the alliance, so that Americans and Canadians can approach Europe. It’s space where when patrolling increases, it will be possible to monitor more, and this happened during the Cold War too, e.g. Russian nuclear submarines sailing from Kola Peninsula, where Russians have their main base.

I’ll say it’s not yet an approved operation, but planning instructions have been issued at the level of Supreme Allied Commander, SACEUR, or SHAPE, that allied command in Mons. And at the same time it’s said that there should be countries there, that those forces would be diverse, there would be naval groups – United Kingdom, United States, Norway, Canada, air capabilities, ground units, mainly from Finland and Norway, and intelligence assets.

Moderator: I heard that Americans released some command positions in NATO to Europeans. What’s happening? Are they leaving, or how should I explain this?

General Pavel Macko: Those are two things, several people asked me about this, and it needs to be explained. Those are two things. The first one is such superficial, that the United States actually said they’re handing over command of JFC in Norfolk, Joint Force Command Norfolk, that they’ll hand it over to a European general and also command in Naples, where traditionally since NATO’s creation and since that command’s creation the United States commanded. And as if they’re withdrawing. On the other hand, we see that the United States still retains command of that SHAPE, that Supreme Commander in Europe – SACEUR and has control over that Mons (SHAPE). And conversely, they take over command for transformation – ACT in Norfolk, which also sits in the same region. And at the same time Europeans would take over those other commands.

Here I’ll say just one thing – no need to worry, because these are multinational integrated commands. Only the flag of the officer from the country that commands that command changes, but these commanders are under international jurisdiction. And when I was in those structures, when I was commander in Bydgoszcz, I answered directly to superior commander in Norfolk, that ACT. And I reported to NATO Military Committee, meaning all our activities were always directed by North Atlantic Council. It doesn’t fall under national rules.

Moderator: And you weren’t accounting three times?

General Pavel Macko: I didn’t account three times. And the truth was that the only thing countries have in this is that salaries and personnel orders are issued nationally, all other activities are performed under international jurisdiction. But the second thing is, and this is true, NATO announced basically the largest reform of command structure of the North Atlantic Alliance, meaning those commands themselves, since 2011.

I’ll just remind listeners that there were three such changes. The biggest was in 2004, when I was starting in Heidelberg, where there was significant reduction of commands down to one third. Those were peace dividends. In 2011 this was somewhat corrected and there was further relocation of these NATO commands. And now we see opposite trend. New challenges came, new security environment. Quietly in between, in 2020 a third joint forces command was created in Norfolk, because before there were two in Brunssum and Naples.

Those formerly had geographically divided north and south. Then after that reform in 2004 they were interchangeable and alternated to those commands those NATO rapid reaction forces across regions. And now, to summarize what should happen. First – there should be higher agility, meaning ability of these commands to intervene faster. The Norfolk command is being strengthened, which gets more tasks in protecting precisely that Arctic space we mentioned in connection with that Arctic Sentry. The Brunssum command also changes those flags, where it will have more geographical responsibility for that entire northern part, basically above the Alps northward.

Moderator: And will there also be an eastern flank HQ?

General Pavel Macko: There will be, there will be. And I’ll finish that Brunssum, that it also geographically integrates Sweden and Finland. Then a new regional command east should be created, probably in Poland, command for the eastern flank. I don’t want to reveal, it’s not officially approved, where it could be. But the point is that already the commander of Multinational Corps in Szczecin, of which there are ten altogether by the way, has been saying for longer that such geographical competence should be given. Because if it’s on the eastern flank, we need quick reaction, so we can’t wait for that traditional process where forces start being assigned to commands later.

Interestingly, maybe for others, an allied command for cyber defense and hybrid threats is also being created, about which it’s also not known, which should bring NATO into the 21st century. All this serves the fact that after a period of slowing down these structures, as if slowing their reaction, now the opposite process is happening. We have regional defense plans, forces are created for them and now this should also complete the command structure. Greater weight should be on Europeans, but as we said a moment ago, it doesn’t mean Americans leaving these structures.

Moderator: Slovakia and Hungary will be visited this Sunday by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. What can be expected from this visit?

General Pavel Macko: Rubio is coming to Bratislava according to me not only because of nuclear energy and NATO, but also to have Washington verify where Slovakia belongs. Whether it’s closer to Warsaw or to Budapest.

Moderator: And what will he find out?

General Pavel Macko: Well, I’ll comment on that next week. But when I look at that official program that was there, when I look at that broader security, energy and political context, several things emerge for me. Rubio is now at the Security Conference in Munich and then immediately, if it ends 15th-16th he goes to Bratislava and Budapest. I think the primary goal of this trip is supporting Viktor Orbán. Despite Rubio being perceived as more moderate, he is a faithful cheerleader of President Trump. We saw this in that joint US Congress session, that with Vance and Hegseth these are big cheerleaders and unconditional supporters of President Trump. He is very loyal to Trump as well, but is more digestible for European partners.

So primarily it’s really to give support in Hungary before elections to Orbán. This will also be communicated by Fidesz and Viktor Orbán as great American support for his policy. It’s also a signal toward Central European allies and allied populists. And we actually now find ourselves having to decide where we’ll be more. Whether with that Viktor, or with Poland, which is becoming a significant player.

And when we talked about that command structure, for example one change in Brunssum is that long-term there was British-German command, that Germans always commanded and British were deputy. Then it was German-Italian, where commanders alternated like this and now it’s newest – and Poles already officially announced this – it will be Polish-German command. Thus we see how Poland’s reach is growing. Because in between, that responsibility of that Brunssum also significantly increased. It’s actually responsibility for half the Alliance, operational command. And a significant four-star Polish general will be stationed there as commander.

When I quickly look at Slovakia, security and NATO will probably also be a topic. There will be discussion about harmonizing those security interests. There will definitely be pressure for a clearer line from Slovakia in NATO and toward Ukraine. And confirmation whether we’re a reliable ally, Rubio will definitely ask about our NATO commitments. Short-term we’ll tell him everything is fine and long-term he won’t be able to check. And of course they’ll continue that communication and cooperation in nuclear energy.

360 Degrees

Moderator: How does tension between USA and Iran continue? This morning I caught news that the largest American aircraft carrier is heading to the Persian Gulf.

General Pavel Macko: The crisis between USA and Iran is deepening. Those negotiations and communication exchanges failed and thus Donald Trump as president tightened sanctions and rhetoric and talks about something very hard. The United States are thus considering and now it already looks like they decided to deploy another carrier strike group, because it’s not just an aircraft carrier. Those are cruisers, those are other platforms, submarines, mine sweepers. It’s always such purpose-built strike group. It’s not just protective wall around that aircraft carrier, but it’s also additional strike force. So they’re apparently setting this in motion.

Iran meanwhile brutally suppresses its protests. Both sides are in stalemate where the biggest risk is excessive escalation. The United States are escalating pressure but don’t want a big war. Because this is still not preferred in that Trump strategy – he would most like to have that big hammer, like in that movie with Thor, that I bang there, it shakes and everyone lines up. But President Trump definitely doesn’t want to go into any ground operations. We see those risks and tensions for those their forces that are in the region.

Moderator: And what are those risks?

General Pavel Macko: Well, an incident in Persian Gulf could be such trigger, whether attack on tanker, drone attack. It could close actually that Strait of Hormuz. And we know that large amount of hydrocarbons goes from there, that surroundings and Europe depend on it… It’s like when you have cardiovascular system, you have important artery, you squeeze it and you have problem. And it doesn’t have to be just that carotid or directly pulmonary, but it can be also somewhere, for example that femoral. It always makes big imbalance or disrupts that organism. This means this would be very dangerous.

An attack on American forces in Iraq or Syria could also happen, which are not invulnerable and Iran has these capabilities. Or Iran could proceed to that escalation in the region. Or that high concentration of forces could occur and unintentional escalation could happen. So we’ll watch this carefully. Trump bet on increasing economic and military pressure. Iran on the other hand shows hard line outwardly, but mainly does repressions at home. But those diplomatic channels are weak.

Closing Quote

General Pavel Macko: So last time we talked about negotiations and now we see also security conference, allied negotiations, we see Marco Rubio’s visit. So if you allow, I’ll give another quote also about negotiations.

„European negotiations are like making love to elephants. Everything happens at high level, a lot of dust is stirred up and it takes very long before anything comes of it.“

Said Willy Brandt, German politician and German chancellor from 1969 to 1974.

The post Security radar of General Pavel Macko – 151st edition appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

In the first decade of the third millennium, the American drone RQ-170 Sentinel allegedly flew deep into Chinese airspace on a secret surveillance mission. What’s shocking is that it returned unnoticed. This stealth drone, nicknamed the Beast of Kandahar, was designed to avoid radars. It gathered intelligence information including about nuclear facilities. The mission was classified for years and no one officially confirmed it. It showed how invisible drones can be – even to a superpower.

Rarely do you have the luck in life to not only observe but also be part of a great change. Drones were known in armies for a relatively long time. A narrow group of intelligence and reconnaissance specialists or experts in fire destruction worked with them. When I took office as chief of operations staff of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2007, such a change occurred.

We began to use drones more intensively not only for reconnaissance, but also directly for conducting combat from the air. The complex mountainous terrain of vast Afghanistan directly demanded such innovations. We began to use the already known MQ-1 Predator more massively. The drone was already modified – capable of carrying two Hellfire missiles or other ammunition. Suddenly we had a multifunctional tool at our disposal. While one drone maintained situational overview over the battlefield, with the second we could execute a quiet and effective air strike. We could immediately evaluate live the effectiveness of the executed strike – so-called battle damage assessment.

Such missions are classified to this day. But much has changed. During the mission in Afghanistan, I began exceptionally allowing the display of live footage from drones monitoring ongoing operations on one of the large screens at the operations center. Some soldiers were scandalized. They were bothered by the live display of combat. Today on social networks and the internet you can find plenty of footage from drones or FPV drone strikes from Ukraine.

In autumn 2007 we received significant reinforcement – the MQ-9 Reaper drone. It was larger than the Predator, lasted longer in the air and could carry more than ten times the combat payload. It could monitor the situation on the ground for entire hours from great height, transmit data to intelligence officers and then strike massively.

In civilian life few people suspected it, but soldiers from ISAF command knew about the use of Predators and Reapers. Besides that, another story was also unfolding out of sight of most ISAF members. At the end of 2007, grainy photographs began spreading on the internet showing a mysterious aircraft with bat wings parked at Kandahar airport in Afghanistan. Aviation enthusiasts were confused. The US Air Force remained silent. Only in December 2009 did it officially acknowledge the existence of the RQ-170 Sentinel, a stealth reconnaissance drone developed by Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works division.

One of its most dramatic roles? The RQ-170 allegedly flew over Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistani Abbottabad during Operation Neptune’s Spear in 2011. It transmitted live video to American commanders and to the White House. It provided oversight over how Navy SEALs executed the raid in which the world’s most wanted terrorist died.

The mystique around the drone deepened later that same year. Iran claimed it captured the RQ-170 intact. According to the Iranians, the drone was flying 140 miles inside their airspace. It was probably monitoring nuclear facilities. They claimed they hacked into its control systems and forced it to land. The US rejected this claim, but footage of a seemingly undamaged drone appeared on Iranian state television.

Pentagon Shaken by $26 Hack

At the end of 2008, American soldiers in Iraq arrested a Shiite militant. In his laptop they discovered something unexpected – hours of live video recordings from American Predator drones. The footage was captured using SkyGrabber software for $26. It was developed by a Russian company for downloading satellite television and media streams. One teenager came up with this trick.

The insurgents didn’t hack into the drone’s control systems. They simply intercepted unencrypted video channels. Information from these channels was transmitted from drones to ground stations and command centers. Because they weren’t encrypted, anyone with the right satellite antenna and software could tune into them.

The breach was first reported by The Wall Street Journal in December 2009 and later confirmed by CNN and other media. It turned out that the military had known about the vulnerability since the 1990s, already during operations in Bosnia. Encryption had been removed from many channels at that time to prevent latency problems with real-time monitoring.

The Pentagon reacted quickly after the hack information was published. Encryption protocols on UAV platforms were updated. The military began modernizing the ROVER system – Remote Operated Video Enhanced Receiver, which was used to share footage from drones with soldiers on the ground. Officials acknowledged that solving the problem was not trivial, because almost every drone in the fleet used similar connection for downloading information.

Although no missions were compromised, the incident was a wake-up call. It showed how low-tech solutions can exploit high-tech systems and how even the most advanced military tools can be vulnerable to digital espionage. This story shows that drone development is not just about engineering, but also about playing cat and mouse in cybersecurity and electronic warfare.

Aerial Torpedoes

According to Cambridge Dictionary, a drone is an aircraft or small flying device that has no pilot but is remotely controlled by someone on the ground. It is used for monitoring, filming or dropping payload. Key characteristics include the absence of an onboard pilot. It can have various propulsion systems such as battery, combustion engine and similar.

A drone is often part of unmanned aerial systems – UAS or Unmanned Aerial System, which include the drone itself, ground control station and communication equipment. Today the designation drone is no longer tied only to flying devices, but also to remotely controlled ground, surface and underwater devices.

Most people associate drones with the advent of digital technologies that enabled more precise remote control as well as live image transmission. But the history of drones begins much earlier, already during World War I.

The stalemate in trench warfare forced armies to look for innovative ways to attack enemy positions without risking pilots‘ lives. One idea was to develop aerial torpedoes – essentially flying bombs that could autonomously deliver explosives across enemy lines. These early concepts were predecessors of glide bombs, guided missiles and modern UAVs.

Several key initial projects got underway. One of the first was Britain’s Aerial Target project from 1917. It was a radio-controlled aircraft designed by A. M. Low, intended for intercepting German airships. Although the machine never entered combat, it represented pioneering effort in remote-controlled aviation. Low is often called the father of radio guidance systems.

Americans came up with the Kettering Bug in 1918. It was developed by Charles Kettering and the US Signal Corps. It was a small biplane powered by a four-cylinder engine. It used gyroscopes and a mechanical timer for flight guidance and payload dropping. It had a range of up to 120 kilometers and was supposed to be a disposable flying bomb.

At that time, digital technologies or devices for image capture and transmission were not available. Using such flying devices to destroy targets meant great technological challenges. Navigation was the biggest one. It was based on gyroscopes, barometers and mechanical counters. Remote control was in its infancy and reliability was low. Most prototypes were experimental and were never deployed in combat operations.

They left behind a legacy that paid off later. These initial efforts laid the foundation for future development of guided missiles, kamikaze drones and eventually reconnaissance UAVs. They proved the feasibility of pilotless flight, even though technology was not sufficiently advanced at that time for wide use. The idea of a pilotless aircraft for dangerous missions was revolutionary in World War I and remains central to UAV philosophy today.

Military strategy also began to change. These first attempts proved that risk-free reconnaissance and attacks were possible, which influenced the development of unmanned aircraft during the Cold War and modern doctrines such as persistent surveillance and targeted strikes. Every military conflict brings a revolutionary leap to the evolution of technologies. During World War II and the Cold War, these ideas matured into combat drones, spy aircraft and eventually combat UAVs like the Predator and Reaper.

Today’s UAVs use artificial intelligence, GPS and real-time data connections. But the main mission – performing tasks too risky or tedious for humans – remains unchanged. The connection between the Kettering Bug and the Tomahawk cruise missile is direct. Both are unmanned long-range weapons, precisely guided.

Secret Cold War Missions

After the end of World War II, the Cold War began between East and West. The competition moved from land, seas and air also to space. It continued intensively also in the field of unmanned vehicle development. The competing sides suspected each other and wanted to know what secrets the other side was hiding. Espionage and deep reconnaissance over enemy territory became a strategic task. The Ryan Firebee and Lockheed D-21 were two of the most important early American drones. Each represented a different philosophy of unmanned aircraft development during the Cold War.

The Ryan Firebee became a versatile workhorse. The first flight took place in 1952, a year later it was introduced into service. It was a response to the US Air Force’s request to develop a jet-powered target. Originally it was thus a target drone for fighter pilot training and testing missile anti-aircraft systems. Later it was modified into reconnaissance variants – the Model 147 series – during the Vietnam War and Cold War. It was used for electronic warfare, surveillance and even decoy missions.

It was equipped with jet propulsion, capable of reaching speeds close to Mach 0.96 and altitude over 18,000 meters. It could be launched from aircraft like the B-26 Invader, or from the ground with RATO – Rocket-Assisted Take-Off boosters. The RATO booster provided short-term but powerful thrust that allowed the drone to quickly leave the launch ramp. After fuel exhaustion, the RATO booster detached and the drone continued flight using its own turbojet engine. It was controlled by radio connection and equipped with parachutes.

Modified Firebees flew over China and North Vietnam and collected intelligence without risking pilots‘ lives. Some were destroyed by enemy defenses, but many missions were successful and helped shape UAV doctrine.

After the shooting down of the American U-2 spy plane over the USSR came the Lockheed D-21 spy drone. Its development began in 1962, the first flight took place in 1964. It was in active military service only briefly, from 1969 to 1971. It was intended for deep reconnaissance over enemy territory, mainly China and the USSR. It could fly at Mach 3.3 speed at altitude of approximately 27,400 meters.

It had a high-resolution camera and inertial navigation system. The drone was launched from M-21 Blackbird aircraft and later from B-52 bombers. After completing the reconnaissance mission, the machine could drop a film capsule and then proceed to self-destruct so enemies couldn’t capture it. Its use was accompanied by problems. One M-21 launch aircraft crashed during drone startup, killing a crew member. Operational missions over China were unsuccessful, leading to program cancellation in 1971.

During the Cold War, the US and Western countries developed and used several other types of unmanned aircraft, such as the Ryan Model 147 Lightning Bug, Lockheed Q-Star, and at the end of the Cold War, the Teledyne Ryan RQ-2 Pioneer.

The Ryan Model 147 was a reconnaissance drone derived from the Firebee. They used it for flights over North Vietnam, China and North Korea. It was equipped with cameras and radar sensors. Interestingly, it was launched from a DC-130 aircraft and after the mission recovered in the air using a C-130 with a hook.

The Lockheed Q-Star or Compass Cope was an experimental UAV for long-term reconnaissance. They developed it in the 1970s as an autonomous reconnaissance system with the ability to return to the launch site. The Teledyne Ryan RQ-2 Pioneer served for tactical reconnaissance. It was used by the US Navy and Marine Corps during Operation Desert Storm. It was one of the first UAVs used in combat conditions.

Soviets Respond

Countermeasures to American development also came from the Soviet bloc. After the U-2 incident in 1960, when pilot Gary Powers was shot down over Soviet airspace, the USSR realized the threat posed by high-altitude reconnaissance. The Soviets began developing unmanned systems that would match US capabilities and reduce dependence on vulnerable manned aircraft.

The key Soviet UAV was the Tupolev Tu-123 Yastreb. It was introduced in 1964 and intended for strategic reconnaissance over NATO territory. The drone was equipped with supersonic jet propulsion and had a preprogrammed flight path. It carried cameras and electronic reconnaissance equipment on board. It was a one-time mission, after which the machine dropped a film capsule and then self-destructed.

Later the Soviets introduced the Tupolev Tu-143 Reis for tactical battlefield reconnaissance. It was introduced into armament in the early 1970s. It was a subsonic machine with short range, a parachute was to serve for its rescue and recovery. It was used in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. In the former Czechoslovak Socialist Republic it was introduced under the designation VR-3 Reis. Its use was more similar to the Firebee and was used to obtain real-time battlefield information. It was introduced to Czechoslovakia in 1985 and used until 1995. Its role was photographic and television reconnaissance, radiation situation assessment, target tracking at depths of 60 to 70 kilometers.

During a 1988 incident, one of these drones fell by parachute into a kindergarten area in Prague, causing a stir. Officially it was then covered up by designating the VR-3 as meteorological apparatus. The drone was launched from a mobile launcher and could be used up to five times. One VR-3 specimen is now displayed at the Aviation Museum in Kbely and another in Lešany.

The Tu-143 drone went through several modifications and renewals. The M-143 was a target drone version introduced in the mid-1980s. The Tu-243 Reis-D was an improved version with longer range and improved engine. The Tu-300 Korshun was a further refined model with modern sensors and optional ammunition – development renewed in 2007. The Tu-143 system was deployed in Afghanistan by Soviet forces. Syria used it during the 1982 Lebanon War for reconnaissance of Israel. Ukraine during the 2022 war converted it into substitute cruise missiles or for revealing air defense.

Like the Americans, the Soviets also needed target drones for training their pilots and testing missile anti-aircraft systems. The solution was the Lavochkin La-17. They introduced it in 1950. It had a jet engine and was radio-controlled. Later the Soviets developed it into reconnaissance variants.

However, the Soviets faced several technological challenges. Their drones often relied on film cameras, which limited real-time intelligence. Navigation systems were less advanced than American ones and relied on inertial guidance. Recovery or extraction after mission was difficult, especially for dynamic missions or missions with deep penetration over enemy territory.

Soviet unmanned aircraft enabled surveillance over NATO forces and border areas. They were extensively used in Warsaw Pact exercises and some were exported to allies like Syria and Iraq. These programs laid the foundation for modern Russian UAVs including the Orlan-10 and Forpost.

Conclusion

After the end of the Cold War, few suspected what would come. With digitalization came enormous drone development and it continues to accelerate. In the next part we will look at four generations of modern drones, activities of key countries and drone diplomacy.

The post Evolution of Military Drones – Part One appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Note: The article was originally published in the journal .týždeň

The End of the Rules-Based System

Since the end of World War II, we have had an international rules-based system built on the foundation of the UN Charter. This was never ideal, but the powers competed only in proxy conflicts and avoided direct confrontation. The foundations of the UN were laid as early as January 1, 1942, when 26 countries in Washington signed the „Declaration by United Nations.“ The name „United Nations“ was coined by F.D. Roosevelt and was also the official name of the war coalition that committed to defeating the Axis countries and not agreeing to a separate peace.

From August to October 1944, a USA-UK-USSR-China conference was held in the USA, which created a proposal for the UN structure – General Assembly, Security Council, great power veto rights, International Court of Justice. This laid the technical foundation of the UN, which was politically confirmed by the great powers at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. The USA, UK and USSR agreed on the final form of the UN Security Council, confirmed veto rights and agreed on entry conditions for members. On June 26, 1945, in San Francisco, 50 states signed the UN Charter and after ratification by all great powers on October 24, 1945, the UN was officially established.

Unfortunately, as soon as World War II ended, the Cold War began. The world split into two competing blocs and a massive bloc of non-aligned countries. These were silent observers of the competition between the main blocs, objects of their efforts to win them to their side, and occasionally the scene of proxy wars. The USA and USSR led or managed their blocs, kept each other in check and avoided direct confrontation. The UN never functioned as its founders envisioned in 1945. During the Cold War it was paralyzed, after its end it had a brief golden era and today it is again overshadowed by great power rivalry. It is not a guarantor of peace, but an administrator of global chaos.

In Europe, the principle of immutability of post-war borders prevailed for a long time. This was further strengthened by the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act and the creation of the OSCE. The Helsinki Final Act was a paradox: in the short term it stabilized post-war borders and confirmed the Soviet sphere of influence, but at the same time it inserted principles into the system that eventually decomposed the Soviet bloc from within. Helsinki was thus both the peak of the post-war rules-based system and the beginning of its transformation. The 1975 Act was a „grand bargain“ between East and West. The OSCE became the institutionalized guardian of this order, until Russia began systematically destroying it after 2014.

All of this definitively fell on February 24, 2022, when Russia began a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and embarked on a path of revision and attempts to restore the former Soviet sphere of influence through brutal military force. Rules suddenly don’t apply, Ukraine is to cease to exist. The UN Security Council was paralyzed and unable to take a position and act against the aggressor. The EU, NATO, G7 and the democratic community condemned Russian aggression, military aggression cannot be a tool for revising state borders or liquidating their sovereignty. However, they did not find the strength and courage to end the aggression.

Powers like China and India were unable to take a clear stance on the aggression, and Iran or North Korea openly support Russia. North Korea directly joined the war. A shock comes from the USA with the advent of Donald Trump. He replaces the previously cautious principled stance with transactional pragmatism and acceptance of the use of military force. This thinking is based on the principle „everything is allowed if you have the cards.“ US leadership believes that peace is an enforced state based solely on force regardless of moral issues, legitimacy and justice.

A Dangerous Multipolar World

President Trump told the New York Times that he doesn’t need international law and that the only limit to his global power is his own morality. This is a fundamental departure from American post-war tradition and a serious signal for allies who rely on a rules-based world. This departure was formally expressed by the USA in its new security strategy and confirmed by the strike on Venezuela and the kidnapping of President Maduro. Despite Maduro’s depravity and his regime, such an operation has no place in international law. Trump used the law of the stronger and gave arguments to defenders of Russian aggression, as well as motivation to China and other potential aggressors.

The international rules-based system that the USA painstakingly built when putting together the United Nations is paradoxically collapsing thanks to the current US leadership. Current threats of violent takeover of control over Greenland also threaten key alliances that ensured that all of Europe did not fall into the hands of USSR-led communists. President Trump justifies considerations about taking over Greenland with US national security needs. This is an unacceptable argument similar to Vladimir Putin’s arguments and factually doesn’t fit. Arctic space security is vitally important not only for the USA, but also for their NATO and EU allies. Compared to the Cold War, only that China is more active in this space today has changed. But the basic military premises and arguments remain unchanged.

American presence in Greenland is neither new nor symbolic. The USA has been operating there since World War II. During the greatest threat from the USSR, the USA, by agreement with Denmark and in accordance with NATO interests, built a network of military bases in Greenland. The most important of them, today’s Pituffik Space Base, is still active and is among the key sensors for early warning against missiles and space monitoring. It operates based on a valid agreement with Denmark, within NATO, and is the northernmost American base.

Besides it, Americans had other large facilities in Greenland. Sondrestrom was a transit and meteorological base that the USA used until 1992. Narsarsuaq was important during the war for transatlantic flights and naval operations. And then there is Camp Century – an experimental city built in the glacier, even with a small nuclear reactor. All this shows that the USA had enormous possibilities in Greenland, which they later reduced themselves when their strategic priorities shifted elsewhere.

If Washington claims today that Greenland is necessary for American national security, then first it must be said that legal mechanisms already exist. The USA has a valid defense agreement, has a base, has access to infrastructure and can expand it in cooperation with Denmark and the Greenlandic government. Therefore, it is very difficult to defend rhetoric about annexation or military pressure against an ally. The United States does not need to own Greenland – it is enough for them to use the possibilities they already have, and which they themselves did not fully utilize in the past.

A US attack on Greenland would not be just another NATO crisis, but a systemic break: an alliance built on trust would lose its meaning. A world would emerge in which Europe would have to quickly learn to be a great power. Not out of ambition, but out of compulsion.

In reality, the world began changing as early as 2008. Authoritarian models began returning and gradually asserting themselves. Although the Communist Party rules politically in China, authoritarian capitalism has established itself in the country. Russia was taken over by revisionism and military imperialism. Theocratic expansionism is asserting itself in Iran. These models don’t want to be liberal democracy, are capable of surviving and cooperating. Power politics gradually began returning and manifested itself in the annexation of Crimea, the war in Syria, the war in Ukraine, Chinese expansion in the Indo-Pacific. There is an increasingly sharp competition for the Arctic, Africa, or Latin America. Spheres of influence are returning to the scene. Russia wants to forcibly control the post-Soviet space, China the Indo-Pacific, Africa and Latin America. The USA wants to control Latin America, Europe and the Pacific. Regional power projects of Turkey, Iran and India are joining these main powers.

Ideological competition has also returned. It is no longer about the competition between communism and capitalism, but liberal democracy and authoritarian capitalism compete, open society and closed society, rule of law and power state. These are today’s decisive ideological clashes that define the new multipolar world in which military force is again becoming a key tool of competition and advancing interests. Powers compete for their spheres of influence using military force, technology and economics.

Competing Powers and Their Ambitions

In a multipolar world, powers strive for a redistribution of the world. It is about defining not only new spheres of influence in a geographical sense, but mainly power, economic and technological influence. With increasingly sharp competition, the role of military potential grows and the willingness to actually use it to advance one’s interests or protect one’s sphere of influence. Not only arms races are beginning, but also the risk of serious military conflicts. Let’s look at what the main poles and powers are in the new multipolar arrangement, what their goals are and the main military development trends.

USA – Striving for Dominance

The first Trump administration still talked about great power competition. The second, however, moved to a doctrine that has no equivalent in post-war US history: unilateralism that relies on an aggressive reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The attack on Venezuela and threats against Greenland show that the USA is no longer talking about competition, but about dominance. And this changes the entire global system.

President Trump comes with a shocking demand for a military budget of $1.5 trillion. This would be a year-on-year increase in defense budget by 66%. This is more of a political signal than a realistic budget. Congress will probably reduce it, but it will still be the largest increase since the Korean War.

The goal of the USA is dominance in oceans, technologies and in the Western Hemisphere. The USA can realistically achieve dominance in the Western Hemisphere, which is their traditional sphere of influence that Washington considers „untouchable.“ The USA will want to maintain the largest projection of power at sea and the position of leader in technological standards in the field of AI, chips, cloud services and software. They will want to maintain their dominant influence in the Anglophone sphere – UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand. They will compete with China over the Indo-Pacific region. Europe can, according to the development of American politics, be either a solid ally or a zone of some kind of delegated security.

The USA is today undergoing the largest transformation of armed forces since the end of the Cold War. The goal is to prepare for conflict with an equal adversary, especially China. The Pacific is the main battlefield of the 21st century. The USA wants to reduce vulnerability to hypersonic weapons, move from a „heavy“ army to an „intelligent“ one.

Military dominance is to be ensured by key modernization projects. Americans are striving for a missile defense and space revolution. Golden Dome (new missile defense against hypersonic and ballistic threats) represents a massive project to create a „protective dome“ over the USA. It is to have a satellite layer for tracking hypersonic targets, space interceptors are also planned. The goal is to neutralize Chinese and Russian hypersonic weapons. The space hypersonic and ballistic sensor layer is to have satellites capable of tracking hypersonic missiles in real time. The goal is to gain information and decision superiority in the first seconds of an attack.

Navy modernization is to be ensured by the Golden Fleet project. The USA is building a fleet for the Pacific, which will include new classes of destroyers, modernized nuclear submarines, unmanned surface and underwater platforms, satellite and network systems for „distributed naval operations.“ The goal is to maintain dominance in the Pacific against the rapidly growing Chinese fleet. The new generation of aviation is to consist of new 6th generation stealth fighters F-47 „Dream Fighter“ and NGAD (Next Generation Air Dominance). The F-47 has AI-assisted control and the ability to lead swarms of combat drones. Extreme emphasis is placed on electronic warfare. NGAD is to be a „system of systems,“ i.e., a piloted machine plus autonomous wingman drones, which are essentially unmanned combat fighters. The goal of aviation modernization is to maintain air dominance after 2030.

The ground forces await the largest reorganization in a generation. The USA is implementing a fundamental reform that changes structure, equipment and the way of fighting. Old programs will be eliminated or limited. New priorities are long-range fires, autonomy and drones, AI in combat control, network command, anti-drone defense. TIC brigades (TIC = Transformation in Contact) are to be developed. This is a completely new type of brigade having hundreds of drones, autonomous vehicles, AI tools, satellite communication, new organizational structures. The goal is a brigade that fights like a swarm – quickly, distributed, autonomously.

China

Will concentrate on the core of Asia, the global South and economic ties. China will try to gain and maintain a dominant position in East Asia both economically and technologically. In the South China Sea area, it wants to achieve gradual control. It wants to dominate the Global South, i.e., Africa, Latin America and the Middle East economically, not militarily.

China’s main areas of competition will be in the Indo-Pacific with the USA, Japan and India. In Central Asia with Russia economically and with Turkey politically. However, China probably will not win India – it will always be autonomous, or Europe – it is too distant, too connected with the West. It will try to gain Russia as a vassal. Russia will be dependent, but not completely obedient.

The People’s Liberation Army is to be „world-class“ by 2049 – i.e., an army that can operate globally and defend Chinese interests anywhere, not just at its own borders. China’s strategic goals in the military are to ensure the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049. The army is a key tool to guarantee sovereignty, territorial integrity (especially Taiwan) and protection of Chinese interests at home and abroad. By 2027, it should achieve the ability to force Taiwan to submit and deter the USA from intervention. By 2035, a fundamental completion of modernization is expected – joint integrated forces capable of conducting „informatized and intelligent“ warfare. By 2049, it should be a full world-class force at the level of the USA in key domains such as navy, missiles, space, cybernetics and nuclear weapons. China’s ambition is a transition from local wars on the periphery to global power projection, i.e., to protection of sea lanes, investments, diaspora and corridors.

Russia

Russia’s strategic ambitions are to maintain the status of a great power and nuclear pole against the USA, to have the ability to militarily dictate to the near abroad and be a factor in Europe, the Arctic and the Middle East. The political goal is to have armed forces capable of supporting revisionist politics, i.e., changing borders, maintaining sphere of influence, blackmailing the West with nuclear and conventional forces. The operational goal is to be able to quickly deploy well-prepared forces in the neighborhood (Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus), intervene in crises outside the region (Syria, Africa). The long-term goal is to have an „at least sufficiently modern“ army – not necessarily as a technological leader, but capable of actually fighting and maintaining pressure on NATO and neighbors.

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine fully revealed Russia’s persistent weaknesses. However, despite problems in Ukraine, Russia is adapting and rapidly modernizing. The country is in a regime of economic mobilization of war production and the political leadership does not give up the ambition to militarily restore its sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe.

Europe

Europe’s security pillar is still NATO and the USA, not the EU. The discussion about „strategic autonomy“ returned after February 24, 2022, but the reality is that without the USA, Ukraine and the eastern wing can only survive with great difficulty today. Putin brutally reminded us that military force is back as the main language of politics, and thus paradoxically launched not only NATO, but also new debates about the European Defense Union. Trump and volatility from the USA, especially Trump’s statements that he „will not protect delinquent NATO members,“ were a shock and at the same time a catalyst. The EU today openly talks about Europe having to learn to „take care of itself,“ which can serve at least as insurance. The EU is therefore an economic giant, a regulatory superpower, but a military semi-finished product. This can be a deadly combination in multipolar competition.

Europe today stands in the middle of a great power storm as a rich but militarily immature actor. If it doesn’t want to be just a space that Washington, Moscow and Beijing decide about, it must do what it has avoided for 30 years: build its own defense capacity, unite the arms industry and protect its democracies as critical infrastructure.

What Awaits Us?

If today’s dynamics continue, the world will not be divided into territories, but into ecosystems. The USA will maintain oceans and technologies, China Asia and the global South, India autonomy, Russia only its region and Europe will have to decide whether it will be a pole or periphery. The division of the world in the 21st century is a competition for influence and power, not just for maps.

The world is heading toward harsh competition between three military poles – the USA, China and a nuclear-armed but weakened Russia. The decisive factor will be whether we manage to maintain competition in the regime of managed rivalry, or whether we break down into a fragmented, conflict environment in which small states will only be pawns in the game of great powers.

The post Are We Returning to the Law of the Stronger? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Note: This is a transcript of the original broadcast at .týžden in Slovak language

Moderator: Welcome to listening, and I can hardly believe it, to the 150th edition of the Security Radar of my friend General Pavel Macko. Welcome, Pavel.

Pavel Macko: Thank you very much, pleasant listening.

FOG OF WAR

Putin’s „Ceasefire“ on Ukrainian Infrastructure

Moderator: How did Putin’s ceasefire on attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure turn out?

Pavel Macko: It turned out like all the ceasefires that Putin declared – simply big talk. He actually used the time when he didn’t attack for those few days – he didn’t even keep to those 7 days. He used the fact that he accumulated missiles and drones and made an even more intensive attack, which was even harder for the Ukrainians to stop.

This means that his effect was far higher than if he had attacked every day. And that’s actually the result of Putin’s „ceasefire“.

But it’s essential that none of us normal people, who know this, expected Putin to make any fundamental turn. But the falseness, even complete monstrosity of these peace activists was confirmed, who are actually making a defense of such aggression and claim they are trying to achieve peace. In reality, they are trying to achieve Russian victory.

Overall Picture of the Week

When I look at this overall, the overall picture of the week on several levels is as follows:

▪️First: Russia is intensifying pressure on multiple front sections, but any advances are not large

▪️Ukraine is achieving local counter-attacks, especially near Kupiansk and Kostiantynivka

▪️This winter campaign is extraordinarily exhausting – after several years, actually for the first time during these 4 years of war, when it’s truly the toughest winter

▪️The impacts are enormous and meanwhile the Russians have also gained some additional resources

▪️Ukrainian air defense after 4 years is exhausted

▪️Russian losses are however record-breaking – in January they again lost 30 thousand soldiers

▪️On the other hand, they are massively replenishing equipment and continuing that long-term war economy

Diplomatically: Russia is again stalling for time, not retreating from its demands and actually negotiating only to prevent greater pressure, greater sanctions and a tougher stance from those countries and Ukraine that want to achieve that ceasefire and ensure that this war finally ends.

Situation on the Front Lines

Moderator: So let’s go to the front line and I suggest we go to Kharkiv and Kupiansk.

Pavel Macko: Good. When we look at Kharkiv and Kupiansk, there were partial counter-attacks by Ukrainian forces. Near Kupiansk, they managed to regain some positions again.

When we look, I have notes here that Russia has been pushing for a long time from the north and east. They also had such a bridgehead on the other side of the Oskil river and the Ukrainians managed to push back in these areas.

Other Front Sectors

Lyman, Siversk, Sloviansk: There we know that fighting is already taking place in Siversk. Russian units continued attacks toward Novoselivka, Vykhivka, Serednie, Drobysheve and Dybrova, but there was no fundamental advance there.

Near Kostiantynivka, Druzhivka: Ukraine conversely achieved significant successes.

Near Yablunivka: The Russians advanced slightly east of the city.

Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad: There the Russians were slightly successful. Reconnaissance-sabotage units penetrated directly into Myrnohrad and increased pressure along one of the main transport routes. Ukraine however repelled dozens of attacks around Rodynske.

Zaporizhzhia Oblast: The biggest battles around Hulyaipole have been continuing for a long time. West of Dobropillia. But it’s extreme there – the Russians attack 32 times daily on just this one small front section.

In Kherson: There the classic shelling continues. The Russians still claim in those negotiations that they want Kherson back, but de facto they want to completely destroy it just like the destroyed Vovchansk and all those cities on the contact line.

Middle East – Gaza and Israel

Moderator: Let’s go to the Middle East. Are there any changes in Gaza and Israel?

Pavel Macko: That overall picture is… The ceasefire formally continues, we were supposed to move to the second phase. But it’s actually eroding:

▪️Israeli activities continue

▪️Hamas reacts similarly or provokes clashes

▪️International mechanisms are not yet functioning

▪️Humanitarian crisis (the situation is difficult)

Indeed, now the crossing at Rafah has also been opened, but it’s insufficient, the UN components are not functioning there either.

Problems with Humanitarian Organizations

Israel called on Doctors Without Borders to leave the Gaza Strip because they again suspect them of collaborating with Palestinians – not the citizens they should serve, but collaborating with Hamas.

Moderator: I read such a report in the Israeli press – there was their own reporter who showed one Palestinian doctor who during the war appeared as a doctor, showed victims, everything. And in the end it turned out he was a Hamas officer. Good, let’s continue.

Pavel Macko: Exactly, there are also honest ones there, but by providing legitimacy or legend for that cover, it naturally irritates the other side.

Administrative Arrangement of Gaza

When we look further, the administrative arrangement of Gaza is unclear. The United States – we talked about Al-Shat here, who is supposed to be there, that former Palestinian Authority minister, could be the administrator, temporary head of that administration, some bureaucratic government. However, it’s not yet in the situation where it would really function.

Reconstruction is at a dead end, because as long as there’s no stable and secure environment, the donors don’t have confidence, don’t give money there and there are no mechanisms that would implement it.

Security Situation

As I indicated, there was a series of clashes and attacks. Hamas and its security components conducted operations against groups they designate as Israeli-supported gangs.

In other words, other Palestinians, who don’t identify with Hamas, who maybe have a different view on how things should function in Gaza, are already also targets, so Hamas is already attacking its own.

The Israelis consolidated somehow, adjusted that yellow line. Of course, this immediately caused Arab outcry that they want to reduce even more or reduce Gaza’s territory.

Creation of New Administration

Moderator: How is the creation of new administration in Gaza progressing? Because without that we won’t move forward.

Pavel Macko: Definitely. This is what I already indicated in that overview. The border crossing at Rafah opened. There’s a limited number of patients who can cross from one side to the other.

The US is pushing for that multi-phase plan– meaning a full transition to phase 2, including an international security mission and gradual reconstruction.

But since there’s no agreement on disarming Hamas, they haven’t moved anywhere, therefore territorial administration hasn’t moved either, because one is subordinated to or conditional on the other.

Therefore those players like the United Arab Emirates prepared a project of some Emirati complex in southern Gaza, where they want to actually house thousands of displaced Palestinians.

But the project is politically controversial, because again Palestinians reject relocation to zones controlled by Israel, because that’s in the part that’s behind that yellow line on the other side.

So nothing has been achieved there yet and these new institutions can’t establish themselves.

Fundamental Problem

Moderator: When I look at this as a layperson – because I am a layperson – it seems to me that without Hamas being dispersed, things won’t move forward there.

Pavel Macko: We’ve been saying this since the beginning, since October 7, 2023. Why don’t they disperse it? Because we’ve seen that it causes large collateral losses. Therefore everyone turned against Israel.

On the other hand, we see that President Trump already asked for a Nobel Peace Prize for this, but he didn’t get it. Good anyway, because that would be unfair. And now we see that even he can’t push this through.

This means that this conflict will continue as we’ve been saying for a long time. It can be stabilized only when there’s willingness from the Arab side, first directly from the ranks of Palestinians, whom Hamas has been indoctrinating for a quarter century, because it completely controlled there.

And precisely these clashes – this is exactly about the fact that as soon as there’s a slightly different opinion, people from Hamas immediately liquidate them there, murder and shoot their own.

Second: Arabs never gave up – and I mean Hamas and these radical components – they never gave up the goal of complete liquidation of Israel.

And as long as they don’t give this up and as long as international security forces don’t come there, who will run into the same thing Israel runs into – that they will have to do the so-called dirty work, that they will also have to militarily strike those unfortunates who won’t want to cooperate in that ceasefire – this will continue.

Situation in Syria

Moderator: What’s happening around Syria? We said that the biggest tension…

Pavel Macko: First, there are conflicts of interest between Lebanon and Syria, because there’s a part of those fled officers hiding in Lebanon.

There’s Hezbollah, which is no longer a political favorite in Syria after the replacement of Bashar al-Assad, because they fought against this al-Shar. So that’s one part.

It calmed down there, but recent weeks saw strong conflict between the new governmental power and SDF forces including Kurdish units.

Ceasefire and Integration

From January 20 a de facto ceasefire has been in place there. It looks like the situation is stabilizing.

Kurds are really in the weakest position in the last 10 years. They had to leave the western bank of the Euphrates river, had to move to the eastern side, but ended the fighting. They also ended in other areas.

What was originally promised when Bashar al-Assad fell is happening – that integration will occur. Only that integration is not now that the entire SDF would integrate at once, it’s integrating by individual regions, by individual cities and communities.

What is negative on one hand for those Kurds, because therefore they don’t create some compact whole.

From the governmental power’s perspective it’s advantageous in that no parallel command is created – because we see this in Bosnia and Herzegovina, how it looks: there’s that federation, but actually Republika Srpska does whatever it wants anyway.

This political-administrative arrangement of Syria still awaits its solution and the military one is such that the government is trying to integrate those armed components into a unified army.

Lebanon

In Lebanon the situation is still tense and there are some pockets of resistance, Israel had to react again.

And mainly it shows also there that similarly as in Syria, the political situation is very unstable. They had an interim government basically since that explosion – if listeners remember, since that huge explosion in the port in Beirut – there was such a provisional governmental regime.

And this continues. The only thing that changed is that Hezbollah’s role and position is weaker.

STRATEGIC BACKGROUND

Three-Party Negotiations on Ukraine

Moderator: Main attention focused on three-party negotiations on Ukraine. So can you somehow briefly evaluate them? But it seems to me that nothing is moving anywhere.

Pavel Macko: Basically you’re right. We’re already done with this conclusion. But I’ll still explain it a bit.

We had two rounds. The first round was January 23 and 24. We already partially discussed it. Then came the second round.

First Round of Negotiations

I’ll first recap that first round, because it’s important for understanding where we’ve moved.

In that first round there was actually direct contact between Ukrainians and Russians through – with the presence of the US as mediator after almost 4 years.

And it was the first round. No one had great expectations that peace would suddenly emerge there. It was at such a higher working level.

Ukrainian delegation:

▪️Rustam Umerov

▪️former defense minister, today head of security council

▪️Kirill Budanov

▪️former head of HUR and now head of presidential office

▪️Chief of General Staff

Here I need to explain – Syrsky is the main commander of Ukrainian forces. That means he is the commander. And what we have as chief of staff, they have as chief of general staff. And that general was also there.

Russian side had Dmitriev there – economic-political negotiator and had the head of Russian GRU there.

Results of First Round

That means, that format– first, what happened was that a framework and format for negotiations was established. Professional working groups were established in which details will be discussed.

Main topics were addressed:

▪️Territorial issues

▪️they didn’t agree on anything, there’s a key dispute

▪️Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

▪️also a problem

▪️Security guarantees for Ukraine

These are actually two such dealbreakers or showstoppers, as it’s said in English. These are the brakes, obstacles so far insurmountable. That means security guarantees and territory.

Because Russia still claims that Ukraine should give up territory that Russians haven’t been able to somehow encompass even after 4 years of war.

Atmosphere of Negotiations

Moderator: What’s the dynamic of those negotiations, what’s the atmosphere? That’s also important there.

Pavel Macko: Both sides claimed it was productive and substantive, meaning they had content. When I already hear the word „productive“…

Ukraine said that yes, these were substantial negotiations, that concrete steps and practical solutions were addressed, which set aside those two most important issues I mentioned.

The US also designated them as productive and appreciated what I also appreciated, that those technical military teams negotiated together, because the ceasefire also needs to be agreed upon military-technically, so that the first shot from one drunk soldier doesn’t restart the war. Because that can also happen.

Russians proved that they don’t have willingness for peace, but meanwhile intensively attacked and said that military operations will continue until Kyiv accepts their demands.

In other words, Russians probably both for domestic audience and for their audience in the third world, are playing such a game – this is called hardball in English, such a tough game.

Basically they want, even if they’ll have to concede from those demands of theirs, they want to sell it as their clear victory. Of course, everyone sees that’s not true.

And if Russians don’t catch the right moment that they won’t gain more, the exact opposite can happen, that they can also collapse. Ukraine can of course also collapse – it’s closer to it than Russia, but it’s a very complex situation.

Summary of First Round

So it was something new after 4 years. They didn’t insult each other after these negotiations, so it’s already important that the negotiation was substantive. I would summarize it that way.

Key conclusions:

▪️Created a framework but didn’t bring results

▪️Territories and security guarantees (this is simply the stumbling block)

▪️Russia uses parallel attacks as a pressure tool

▪️Therefore reducing trust from Ukraine and its supporters that those negotiations are sincere

▪️USA, to not lose face, is trying to keep these negotiations alive

It’s noteworthy that the State Department, foreign ministry, is not represented there, meaning those who are there are not classic diplomats.

Second Round of Negotiations

Moderator: How do you evaluate that second round?

Pavel Macko: That second round progressed, because quite logically, from what I explained in that first round, it was more about procedural issues, formats, who with whom, when, in which groups.

Now it was more about real negotiations, within individual groups they negotiated in more detail.

From what we have – of course, detailed record of these negotiations is not publicly available – so:

▪️That long-term dispute continues

▪️Security guarantees are still without concrete progress

▪️USA acts as mediator

▪️both sides remain relatively firm

Russian Provocations

Russians escalated energy attacks, and this even during the announced ceasefire, which of course Kyiv designated as violation of agreement. It was visible when they bombed a classic conventional power plant and then also a heating plant near Kyiv.

Russians thought that by this they would scare the rest, that if you don’t yield to us and won’t negotiate with us, or accept conditions, we’ll attack. They don’t want to negotiate, they just want Ukrainians to accept conditions – so somehow we’ll continue and you’ll be even worse off.

Of course, they’re abusing this time when there are extreme frosts there.

Positive Progress

But they moved forward in what Zelensky also expected and wanted. They moved forward in the expected prisoner exchange– 314 or 324, I’m not sure now what that number was. The first 150 were already exchanged.

It’s good that also on that Russian side, besides those nationalists, extremists and such clowns like Medvedev, who shouted that all those prisoners of war should be killed – for example from Mariupol, those who were now almost 4 years in captivity – so they returned from that captivity.

Because war also has its rules, we have Geneva Conventions for that and this is something that Russians should also observe.

Further Development

The rest is that they’ll continue, they’ll probably meet next in the United States.

But that Russian strong pressure rather causes greater support for Ukraine from its supporters.

NATO Reactions

Moderator: I noticed that when the NATO Secretary General was in Ukraine a few days ago, he got to taste how a massive Russian attack tastes. Can this somehow change NATO’s approach?

Pavel Macko:It’s already changing, because if I listened carefully to Rutte’s statements, for example his predecessor talked about Ukraine’s integration into NATO and so on, but that language was diplomatic.

Now Rutte had relatively harsh language toward these Russians, said unambiguously that this is proof that Moscow doesn’t want peace. And it’s not some pretext.

Russians thought that hard attacks would help– and otherwise they miscalculated strategically in this, just as they miscalculated on February 24, 2022, because they quickly jumped away from that negotiation. They were persuaded by Macron, by Joe Biden. Scholz called Putin several times, Macron called even a few hours before that invasion. Putin saying that invasion wouldn’t happen, but he wanted to play that tough game, attacked, knocked out his front teeth and still can’t get out of it.

And now it’s the same, that Rutte gave very sharp statements. I put it in a table because we prepared that scenario together.

He said – this is a quote: „This peace will be lasting not because papers are signed, but because it will be backed by hard power.“

Change in NATO Position

This means, if Russians now refused that no foreign soldiers would be there, no support for Ukraine, because Russia wanted a weakened Ukraine that would be a puppet in Russia’s hands, this is changing.

And when they decide in the future to take control of Ukraine, they can do it politically through their extensive agent network and install a new Yanukovych there, or they can do it again militarily, that they would complete what they haven’t managed so far.

After they gather strength – like now with those recent attacks – let’s imagine that we give Russians a year or two pause to re-arm, re-equip and then strike Ukraine again.

This is now changing, NATO’s position as a whole is also changing, where it says it will continue this support and interprets this Russian attack as an attempt at terror and pressure. And therefore arguments for those robust security guarantees are strengthened.

End of New START Treaty

Moderator: The last treaty on control of strategic nuclear weapons, New START, ended. So explain what that agreement was and why it ended?

Pavel Macko: I would probably also like us to make this today’s main topic, to get a broader perspective for our listeners.

What the New START Treaty Was

So first that New START– this was the last functioning agreement, signed by Barack Obama and the Russian president, which actually limited strategic nuclear weapons.

But I’ll say what the development was here.

Historical Development of Nuclear Agreements

During the Cold War, in the late 60s, these powers got into a situation where they achieved huge numbers of nuclear weapons, because that paranoia and mutual suspicion, where we found ourselves in arms races, ended in:

▪️Russians eventually had more than 40,000 nuclear warheads (today they have 5,400)

▪️United States at that peak had more than 32,000 nuclear warheads

A large part of this was also tactical. We had large-caliber artillery shells and such short-range missiles there.

This means that even for regular battlefield combat it was calculated that these nuclear weapons would be used in clashes between these states, while hydrogen bombs were rather mounted on those long-range means, whether intercontinental missiles.

First Negotiations

Those negotiations ran already 1968-1969, but somehow they didn’t manage to conclude. Of course, Nixon’s pressure and move also with China eventually convinced the Soviets.

I’ll just enumerate them. There was a whole series of agreements:

SALT– this was that first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1969-1979.

Very quickly then came SALT 1, where strategic carriers were also limited, meaning the number of missiles and those other means.

A second treaty SALT 2 was also negotiated in 1979, but it wasn’t ratified. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan then and they didn’t ratify it, but both sides more or less adhered to it.

ABM and INF Treaties

In 1972 the ABM treaty was also concluded – this was limitation of anti-missile defense, where the number was set at maximum 200, later adjusted to 100 anti-missile systems.

The problem is that when one side starts building too strong anti-missile defense, it forces the other to increase the number of those offensive means.

I forgot one important one – this was the INF treaty – it was called about banning medium and short-range missiles between Gorbachev and Reagan in 1987.

This was absolutely crucial for Europe. In Europe we were in the range of 3 to 8 minutes response time, meaning the risk of accidental nuclear conflict was enormous.

By completely eliminating these missiles, that space was cleared, and therefore only space for those intercontinental missiles was left. There’s at least half an hour for reaction there.

This means that even in case of some stupid escalation, the red phone could still be used, and those missiles could be sent to self-destruct and stop a potential attack. This couldn’t be done with these medium-range missiles.

START Treaties

Then after the end of the Cold War came the START agreement in 1991. From huge numbers, those numbers were reduced even more significantly and we actually got to today’s numbers.

There was START II, which also banned those multiple warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles, on those heavy ones. Because you can cheat there. You say you’ll have only 100 intercontinental missiles, but put ten of these warheads in each.

Russians have Avangard prepared this way. In the final flight stage it’s as if you again had ten missiles. Suddenly you have thousands instead of hundreds. So this treaty was important because of that.

New START

Then this agreement, when it ended, actually that new START was negotiated, where limits on warheads and carriers were set. And it was extended a few years ago for 5 years, but this extension expired, a new agreement wasn’t concluded.

New START parameters:

▪️1,500 deployed strategic warheads

▪️meaning those they can have in operational regime

▪️700 deployed carriers

▪️800 total carriers

▪️this includes strategic bombers

Control Mechanisms

So there were mainly detailed inspection mechanisms. Both sides announced where they have those forces, where the US has problems with those Russian mobile ones, but they always had to notify major movements.

And both sides could visit those places. Of course they didn’t go into the guts of these systems, but they could verify whether those measures are being observed, whether they secretly haven’t built additional forces, whether they secretly don’t have some additional missiles there. All this has now ended.

Why the Treaty Ended

When I say it formally, Russia suspended participation in 2023 and subsequently the United States also reacted, but formally the treaty was valid, no one violated it.

This happened mainly because when the war in Ukraine started, Russians supposedly for technical reasons started blocking these verifications, these on-site inspections.

The reason– on one hand I understand them, it was paranoid, because they were at war with Ukraine and feared that during those inspections Americans would learn something they could then pass to Ukrainians.

On the other hand Americans said– there’s no point going into such an agreement that can’t be verified, as we also said before with the Budapest Memorandum and so on…

So this was absolutely crucial. They considered the US as a hostile side. This was part of that Russian rhetoric, that Putin constantly says, because when he’s not succeeding, he says that first he wanted to denazify and demilitarize everything. And when he’s not succeeding, he says he’s actually fighting the entire West. And this is that propaganda that goes around.

Chinese Factor

Another thing was that there were also those negotiations and considerations that China announced a large nuclear program, even to triple the number of its warheads by the decade, it already has 600 warheads now.

China has such an ambition that by 2035 to have parity with the United States in some components and in its region or catch up with Russia and the United States.

And after 2040 China wants to already be an equal partner also in strategic nuclear weapons to the United States.

Chinese Triad

This means that China started building the so-called triad. The triad is that you have:

1 ) Those ground intercontinental ballistic missiles

2) You have them then on submarines

▪️these are well protected because they’re hard to detect, meaning it’s a second strike weapon or last judgment, that when everything fails, even if that country was destroyed, it has the ability either semi-automatically or even automatically to respond to that strike and destroy the other side

3) And there are then aviation means – strategic aviation.

Russians invested more in those aviation means in those cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, which they now use only with conventional warheads directly on Ukraine.

Why New START Finally Fell?

I said that it fell actually because:

▪️United States wanted a broader agreement

▪️Russia wanted a different agreement, because it conditioned it, wanted to balance and offset other things on it

▪️China didn’t want any agreement yet, said it’s not yet that player that should be regulated

Russian and Chinese Armament

Moderator: I notice that Russia demonstrated new weapons and of course we’ve seen it also with the Chinese. And those Russian conventional ones aren’t very trustworthy. But should we fear those Russian nuclear weapons? And what about the USA? Are they falling behind or not?

Pavel Macko: Several aspects. It’s true that Russia modernized and quite massively. I wouldn’t underestimate their nuclear arsenal.

Russian Nuclear Forces

First, insiders know that there are really elite troops there. These aren’t those bums called ground troops that they showed at the beginning of the war. It’s more professional there.

But we’ve seen accidents there too, but that was mostly during tests. This means we can’t say in what technical state those missiles that are in operational service are.

But we know that Russians demonstrated in 2018 a series of those displays – Avangard, Zircon, which can also have nuclear warheads.

Hypersonic Systems

Sub-warhead is a small missile inside that big missile. There are several of them. These are so-called hypersonic gliders, which can still maneuver.

They have their own engine, can change flight path and fly at that hypersonic speed, which by the way all ballistic missiles fly.

But the difference is that the glider can still maneuver and fundamentally change direction and can go hundreds of kilometers elsewhere than where the original missile would fall.

Russian Modernization

So Russians modernized. They have:

▪️New Yars and Sarmat missiles

▪️New submarine-launched ballistic missiles (which are launched Bulava)

▪️New submarines of Borei class

▪️New cruise missiles Kh-102 (Kh-101, which they used, this is some derivative)

▪️They have those Avangardes, Poseidon, Burevestnik

Principally Russians modernized, because the Soviet Union left them old junk. And they were aware that conventionally – and then they also introduced professional army – conventionally Russia didn’t have a chance not only against NATO, but also potentially against other rivals. And therefore invested asymmetrically in nuclear arsenal.

Chinese Expansion

What about China? China is expanding. But of course from that low base. China was that below-average student, below-average player, even lower than United Kingdom and France.

France has 290 and United Kingdom some roughly 250-245 of these warheads.

China started building its potential. Just as it builds its conventional army – visible that it has 5th generation fighters, stealth fighters already better than Russians, that it invests in other means.

It started investing in this too, but started from that low number:

▪️Had in 2010: 200 warheads

▪️Today has: 600

▪️Heading toward at least a thousand by the end of this decade

Chinese Triad

But it’s also building a triad. As it starts expanding in that Pacific and sees that the United States has dominance there, it’s building nuclear triad. That means new nuclear submarines and also hypersonic systems.

We’ve seen several of them now on parade and this is precisely because of that rivalry in Indo-Pacific and also fear of American anti-missile defense, which is strengthening. Now we’ve heard about Golden Dome.

American Nuclear Forces

Moderator: And are the USA falling behind or not?

This is interesting, because a lot in professional journals and so on was criticism when Russians introduced these hypersonic systems, then Chinese also conventional and potentially also nuclear systems, which are for example designed to destroy those aircraft carrier battle groups.

When you have a hypersonic missile, the opponent can’t stop it anymore, you put a nuclear payload there, so you can actually erase that American advantage – aircraft carriers, Americans are rulers of the seas with them. What the British Empire used to be.

They have 9 battle carrier groups– those are aircraft carrier battle groups, several fleets, they have large Pacific, Atlantic fleet.

Criticism of American Lag

When China developed this, many evil tongues say that the US fell asleep, don’t have hypersonic systems, didn’t pay much attention to it. But I’ll mention several aspects.

It’s really true that Minuteman III are missiles from the 70s, but technologically they were much more advanced than those Russian missiles that were in forces. But the US didn’t modernize them.

They have only one warhead, can’t even add others, while Russians meanwhile made an upgrade where they don’t have multiple warheads mounted, but can and know how to do it relatively quickly.

So in this segment the US seemed to lag behind.

New American Programs

Currently running is a program for Sentinel upgrade or replacement of Minuteman III. Otherwise Sentinel is also that invisible reconnaissance drone RQ-171, but these should be Sentinel missiles, which should be ready by 2030. That’s still 5 years, but it’s an extremely expensive project, so the question is whether it will be successful or not.

But the US has strategic aviation, where unlike Russian aircraft they have absolutely top-notch stealth bombers. B-2 were already excellent and now B-21 Raider are absolute world top.

China and Russia don’t have even a chance yet to catch up to them in this in the next decade.

American Strength in Submarines

Main US strength lies and there they modernized, or had highly advanced technologies – and those are missiles launched from submarines.

In this they are absolute top. Still their Trident 2 D5LE missiles are unmatched, so they don’t even need to modernize them.

Golden Dome

Currently, I won’t discuss this today, we’ll discuss it another time. Golden Dome is not only protection from space against missile attacks – those are just sensors, but Golden Dome is supposed to also ensure maintaining connection, that all those submarines and fleets in stealth mode, even after nuclear explosions, should function and should be able to communicate with each other.

Should We Fear Nuclear Arms Race?

Moderator: So tell me this one thing – should we fear that nuclear arms race or not?

Pavel Macko:There are several scenarios. It started when there were 30-40 thousand warheads on both sides. We’re far from that happening, it would cost enormous expenses and I believe it won’t go to this limit.

The truth is that absence of all agreements can cause distrust on both sides and we see that even Trump indicated they might resume nuclear tests. These by the way are also agreed to be banned, but that comprehensive ban treaty wasn’t ratified.

This means it’s not legally binding. Only so far it was quietly observed.

Possible Scenarios

So there are several scenarios:

1) Quiet voluntary continuity and waiting for a suitable time when they sit down for negotiations. This would probably capture what Trump said.

When Trump said that when New START expires, it expires, that we’re simply not under such pressure that we must accept any pressure from Russia and we want to have China in it too. So that’s the first scenario.

2) New arms race– that’s the worst, that new arms race comes, meaning Trump will invest money and launch it.

3) Trilateral negotiations– that all three nuclear players and basically also militarily biggest powers USA, Russia and China sit down and try to agree.

4) Fragmentation, regionalization of that nuclear deterrence – meaning Europe including France, United Kingdom and others. That it fragments and we already have 9 nuclear countries and more can be added.

5) Crisis escalation– absolutely worst scenario, unlikely but very dangerous, is crisis escalation, that simply at some moment these conventional conflicts get out of control and one side will demonstrate use of nuclear forces.

I think that currently we are in scenario A– meaning quiet voluntary continuity and attempt at negotiation.

Slovakia in Security Context

Moderator: And where do we find ourselves in this, Slovakia?

Pavel Macko: I’m looking for a decent word. We are disoriented, trampled in the ground. We buried ourselves there like moles, only we didn’t choose good terrain, because we buried ourselves in some swamp and it’s leaking into our mole hole from all sides.

Slovakia is being left out of all these security discussions. As I indicated those scenarios, we actually don’t know where security will move and how it will transform.

Problems of Fico’s Government

Into this comes hysteria of this Smer government, which does knee-jerk politics in four world directions and breaks its allied relations to the core.

We saw Epstein, that actually our top representatives get caught in traps… Even if it’s not confirmed that our prime minister met with Bannon or not, by the way Fico was at that same CPAC forum last year, where Bannon was hailing and after him Robert Fico… not right after him, but later Robert Fico spoke, while even such a leader of extremists from French National Front left after this hailing. Even for him it was too much. Our prime minister stayed there. And that’s a problem.

Lies About MiG-29

The last cherry on top is that the prime minister shouted at the previous government that they are traitors, that they disarmed Slovakia. Now the prosecutor, who was pro-Smer, and I dare say this, let them be angry at me or not, if needed, I would give dozens of arguments…

Moderator: Pro-Smer is not a good expression, she just helped Smer.

Pavel Macko: Yes, to be correct.

Even she found that the law regarding donation of MiGs and S-300 was not violated and prosecutor Remeta explained it in detail, how it really was. Fico lied yesterday at the press conference when he again said that S-300 was modernized.

And yet I know he has many generals, even loyal to him, who could have advised him and said it’s nonsense. But apparently he doesn’t ask anyone, because Fico doesn’t ask anyone about anything today.

From Fico’s foreign trips we have no outputs and conclusions. Not even the confidential ones. Simply there are no records from those negotiations, which is complete nonsense. This never was in Slovakia.

Tunneling of Slovak Army

Actually I’ll now remind you of one thing. And that’s something I probably also announce that I’ll likely file a criminal complaint, because if this government went to prosecute the previous one for that donation, then the prosecutor now confirmed what that government claimed, what I claim, that here enormous damage was arising during MiG maintenance.

When through the company of Fico’s friend Výboh subscription contract was made, where Russians committed that for that money they will maintain the number… I know that number, but I can’t say it because Minister Gajdoš refused to give it to me officially on my request, so I could publish it, how many of those 12 fighters we originally had should be permanently combat-ready, but it was roughly two thirds.

And we sometimes achieved only one tenth. And the prosecutor also said that at the end we had one fighter that was combat-capable and flight-capable, but we paid money for that full contract.

This means that not the previous government, but Fico’s governments tunneled Slovak armed forces and endangered the security of the Slovak Republic.

360°

Iran and Negotiations with USA

Moderator: Let’s look at developments around Iran. Will a new agreement be negotiated and the situation calmed, or will America have to strike there?

Pavel Macko: The question is whether America dares to strike there, because that’s actually why it didn’t strike during those protests.

They could actually provide an argument to that extreme Iranian government that it would unleash a kind of side conflict, that it would actually start some conflict in the Persian Gulf and therefore escalate the situation.

This would of course allow that government to make extreme measures at home, to suppress any opposition and could endanger American interests in that space, also American forces that are there.

American Military Preparation

Therefore Americans moved those aircraft carriers there, they have mighty force there now that could really strike.

I don’t think and Americans never indicate that they would want some ground invasion or landing, as we saw also in Venezuela, but they can very drastically strike those key targets in Iran.

But they also don’t want to do it, because it can be just a spark for a bigger conflict. Therefore there’s that offer for negotiation.

Today they should meet also with help of intermediary countries that try to give some negotiation format.

So that tension is very high, but it must be said that these negotiations today (February 6, 2026) are a real attempt at de-escalation.

Content of Negotiations

But chances for some fundamental breakthrough are small, we already have a long podcast, so I’ll just briefly say what those negotiations should be about.

First that dynamic or tension is illustrated by the fact that United States called on its citizens to immediately leave Iran.

Khamenei again said that if the US attacks, that conflict will change into regional war. That’s what I indicated.

Demands of Sides

When I return to those negotiations:

USA demands:

▪️Complete removal of enriched uranium stocks – Iran is willing to negotiate about this

▪️They want to also limit the ballistic program

▪️meaning those carriers

▪️And end support for regional militias like Hezbollah, Houthis and so on

Iran still insists that it’s prepared to negotiate only about that nuclear program, but ballistic missiles and those revolutionary guards and those various clones of revolutionary guards they bred throughout that region – those proxy groups – it doesn’t want to discuss this.

Qatar, Turkey and Egypt try to somehow act as intermediaries, but we’ll see.

Development Assessment

Simply, it will be first contact, that risk is high.

My assessment is that the US will balance between what I said, that risk of large escalation, but at some moment at least some limited strike may come.

I can even imagine they would strike directly at Khamenei.

Final Quote About Negotiation

Moderator: You spoke here today twice, or several times about negotiations and I know you prepared such a negotiation quote. So tell us and say who created that quote.

Pavel Macko: So: „If you approach negotiation with the assumption that the other person thinks the same way as you, you’re wrong. It’s not about empathy, but about projection.“

And it was said by Chris Voss– he’s a popular author of several books, former chief FBI negotiator.

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#EU #NATO #reflexive control #Russia #Russian Nuclear Threats #Russian War of Aggression #Ukraine

In the civilized world, it’s the opposite, we should help the victim of a rapist. Today’s Russia does not belong to the civilized world and should be treated as a depraved rapist.

Putin’s Russia has 1/7 of the world and all the resources to be a successful and attractive country without war crimes, pressure and nuclear terrorism. But it is led by the biggest thugs and mass murderers since Adolf Hitler. They have pillaged their own country and cover up their inability to improve it with military aggression against their neighbors.

They show us a miraculous nuclear torpedo, a miraculous cruise missile, presenting their country as an Empire of miracles. But the conquest of the small town of Pokrovsk has already taken them almost two years. Now they cry that it’s all the fault of the defending Ukraine and those who, in my opinion, still provide insufficient material help to Ukraine.

Russia’s criminal war in Ukraine has been illegitimate from the very beginning, is in deep contradiction with the UN Charter, and has been condemned twice by the UN General Assembly. Russia should have long had its membership in the UN Security Council suspended and been given a clear ultimatum to end the military aggression. Instead, the hypocritical world watches the continuing Russian madness on the threshold of the extermination of humanity.

There is no Ukrainian crisis, just the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. Russia started the war in Ukraine and Russia is prolonging it despite the fact that it evidently cannot win it. Moscow’s criminals are the greatest threat to the human race in history and have decided to play Russian roulette with the world. Yet they know well that an unjust war cannot be won. Hitler did not win it in the USSR, and neither will Putin win it in Ukraine.

To end the war, it is enough for the war criminals around Putin to stop sending Russian soldiers and recruited desperate people from all over the world to their deaths, to issue an order to end the war. Within 24 hours, there will be peace!

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#ceasefire #drone #Fico #Israel #Peace negotiations #Putin #Russia #Syria #Trump #Ukraine #USA #War in Ukraine #Zelensky

Welcome to the 128th edition of General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar.

Moderator: Welcome, Palo.

Pavel Macko: Thank you very much, I greet the listeners and wish you a pleasant extended weekend and holiday.

Moderator: And I’d like to ask one more thing – today in Banská Bystrica we commemorate the Slovak National Uprising, and I haven’t read that Robert Fico would be there, so I’m curious if he will come at all.

Pavel Macko: Well, I’m curious about that too, but I’ll be honest, I don’t even want him to go there, because a person who shows neo-Nazi gestures to support one of his prosecuted friends probably doesn’t deserve to stand on the podium.

Fog of War

Moderator: So, General, what is the development on the two main battlefields? Let’s start with Ukraine.

Pavel Macko: I’ll go straight to the point. We always start with strategic bombing, and we had the opportunity to see it yesterday. The Russians attacked furiously again, it was one of the largest attacks.

We already have 21 dead and four dozen wounded. In total, yesterday they launched:

▪️598 Shaheds and various decoys (they release decoys to blind the air defense system)

▪️31 missiles, including two Kinzhals

▪️12-13 Iskander-M or KN-23 missiles (those are Hwasong missiles from North Korea)

▪️The rest were Kalibr missiles from vessels and Kh-101 missiles from aircraft, which the Russians regularly use

This time, the primary target was Kyiv, where they hit 17 different objects in multiple districts of the city, directly in the center. We have 48 wounded here in Poznan. That was the information in the morning when I prepared the materials.

Of course, among other things, the British Council in Kyiv was also hit (that’s their representation, similar to the Polish Institute in our country) and the location of the European delegation, which, by the way, is led by Slovak citizen Katarína Mathernová, the EU Ambassador.

This means that the Russians, with precision weapons that have an accuracy of up to 5 meters, hit the representative mission of the European Union. Any coincidence is ruled out there. It was intentional to have something explode near the EU diplomatic mission. The effect was perhaps greater than the Russians originally wanted to scare those people, but that’s the principle.

It is an absolute negation of any Russian interest in peace. They systematically continued these strategic attacks. Previously on western Ukraine – we even had an attack in Mukachevo, which is a district town very close to our borders, where they attacked an American factory.

There are only three conclusions to this:

1) The Russians will escalate these attacks; they have absolutely no interest in any negotiations

2) They will increasingly focus on infrastructure

3) And this is an important conclusion – I haven’t caught the Russians declaring that the mentioned factory produced anything for the defense industry. It’s ordinary consumer electronics. It cannot be ruled out that it might also do something for the army, but the Russians would be very happy to boast about it to justify the attack on this target.

But they actually attacked this factory directly. This is proof that the presence of American companies somewhere in Ukraine is not a security guarantee. And at the same time, that Russians attack anything that can harm Ukrainians. And they don’t care at all whether it’s a military target or not. Because if that factory wasn’t involved in anything and is located on the opposite end of Ukraine, it in no way contributed to Ukrainian military potential, nor did it threaten Russian aggressive forces that have no business being in Ukraine.

Moderator: Okay, and what about the Ukrainians?

Pavel Macko: The Ukrainians, of course, are trying to respond as well, escalating their campaign. We’ve seen that they’re now really focusing on the energy industry, Russian oil refineries, but also on important railway junctions.

So the Ukrainians, in return, managed to strike near Moscow, where they actually complicated the fuel supply of Moscow itself. Most recently, they also struck 170 km north of Moscow on an important railway junction, but those were diversionary-sabotage actions. That means they blew up trains with fuel, taking that station and junction out of operation for some time.

They attacked similarly in other areas as well. For example, what we saw – at the beginning of the week they attacked one refinery, then in the middle of the week in Novoshakhtinsk, a refinery in the Rostov region, which set the area on fire. Later it was the Siziran refinery in the Samara region, and the Volgograd refinery already cyclically.

They also attacked the Druzhba oil pipeline. This, of course, was met with great displeasure from the Slovak and Hungarian governments. It should be said here that the Hungarian and Slovak Republics have seriously jeopardized their own energy security, because they are aware that a 3.5-year war has been going on in that area, that this is a legitimate target, but even accidentally it can happen that there will be damage… After all, planes don’t fly over Ukraine precisely because there is a war.

And everyone must count on the same thing, that any critical infrastructure, whether intentionally or accidentally, can become the subject of an attack, or be damaged as a result of combat activities. This happens regularly. And we are shouting about Ukrainians that they are terrorists who are defending themselves, but an explosion next to the building of the European Union diplomatic mission, where our Slovak citizens are, that’s okay?

Not to mention that this is a clear attack on the European Union, the Russians are clearly demonstrating that they will continue to dare. And this confirms what I have been saying for a long time, that if we give the Russians an opportunity, if one presents itself, they will also attack the North Atlantic Alliance and then try to de-escalate very quickly by threatening to use nuclear weapons. This is a proven Russian doctrine, it does not change, it is officially exercised, trained, written, and is also implemented by Russian state bodies and Russian political leadership.

Moderator: And I’d like to ask one more thing. Well, why don’t the Ukrainians do the same? Why don’t they start bombing Moscow?

Pavel Macko: Higher moral standard, and the second thing is, the Russians do it – first, they are supported by rogue states, criminals such as the North Korean regime or Iran, and quietly by China, which is a communist regime, although in China communism as a social system no longer rules, but communists rule there and worse, because they actually use hard profit capitalism with perverse exploitation of child labor, but at the same time, it’s simply a gang of communist party leaders who actually have totalitarian power in the country.

And those regimes of Putin and Xi Jinping are very close to each other. Russia can afford, in quotation marks, to do what it wants because it has a huge nuclear arsenal, which Ukraine gave up according to the Budapest Memorandum, and Ukraine is dependent on the help of all the rest of us. And with politicians like Fico, Orbán, but of course others who are critical now, like Polish President Nawrocky, well, Ukrainians cannot afford to do the same in that war as would be demanded, like the Russians. They simply have to maintain that higher standard.

Moderator: Well, you also mentioned some Hungarian, but that’s not a Hungarian Hungarian.

Pavel Macko: Yes, he has the nickname „Magyar“, otherwise he is a Ukrainian of Hungarian nationality, Major Robert Brovdi, he has been known for a long time. He has always been very active since the beginning of the war, he is a Ukrainian patriot. This proves that it does not depend on ethnicity, but that identification with one’s state and the willingness to defend it against an external threat is primary.

And now, it’s a complete bizarreness, because the collaborationist, anti-Hungarian, and anti-European government in Budapest has even put this ethnic Hungarian fighting for Ukraine’s freedom against external aggression on a list saying that he must not enter the Schengen area for three years. To this, the Poles, again Radek Sikorski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, immediately responded that they are inviting him to visit Poland and that they will ensure his safety on Polish territory, which is also in the Schengen area.

And here I’ll just remind you, it’s good that you asked about that, that Hungary is the gateway and hole for Russian agents and various murderers and arsonists who come to the European Union, because Hungary has simplified the visa regime for Russian citizens at a time when a major war is being waged here.

This means that Hungary’s rhetoric is unpleasant, it is explicitly anti-Ukrainian. Hungary also has territorial claims on Ukraine, so there is a sense of predatory interest there. I’m just shocked and fascinated by where is Slovakia’s national-state interest, because in this case with Druzhba we are talking about the government of the Slovak Republic instead of ensuring energy security, because it knows that it can happen there by accident, stubbornly promotes the interests of a private Hungarian oligarchic company, which actually controls Slovnaft. We so generously privatized it under Mečiar and then our tunnel makers quickly passed it on to a Hungarian company. And actually, one private Hungarian company is now blackmailing two states and the entire European Union because it has political cover. This is a total betrayal of national and national-security interests by Robert Fico and his government.

Continuation of Fighting in Ukraine

Moderator: Let’s go to the battlefields. How are the fights continuing? Is that Russian penetration into the Dnipropetrovsk region serious?

Pavel Macko: Of course, it’s always something worthy of attention, because the Russians are indicating that they could continue beyond those four formally annexed areas, and by doing so, they are literally exposing themselves, I would say, because they reveal those primary goals, that they would really want at least all of Left-bank Ukraine.

I’ll explain for the listeners – Left-bank, when going in the direction of the river flow, everything that is to the left or east of the Dnipro River, so from Kyiv to the east (but the Russians would probably like to get Kyiv too), all the way to the estuary is everything that the Russians would like as a minimum goal. Lavrov confirmed that he wants all of Ukraine.

But when I look at it, so far that penetration is small tactically. On the contrary, the Russians also face the risk that if they get too far, the same thing could happen to them as at Dobropillia, that Ukrainian forces will close the loop around them and they will be surrounded. But the Russians are demonstrating their determination by this.

But there is a broader context here, which I wanted to get to even with those military operations. At that tactical level, the Russians are now systematically bombing bridges across the Dnipro. This means that they are really preparing conditions for the future to disrupt the supply of Ukrainian forces. If they happen to achieve a breakthrough, whether in the Donbas or somewhere else, so that they can advance as quickly as possible to the Dnipro River and to those large population centers of Zaporizhzhia and the city of Dnipro.

This is not imminent yet. When I make a roundup:

▪️In the north, intense fighting, but no change in situation or positions, I mean, whether in Kursk, Sumy, or Kharkiv regions

▪️When we look at Kupiansk, they attacked Sinkivka again. I’ll explain this because until now we’ve been talking about them being beyond the Oskil River in the north, near Kupiansk, where they created such a bridgehead. They are not succeeding in continuing further, so they are again increasing pressure on the opposite bank of the river, just on the northern outskirts of that town of Kupiansk, where Sinkivka is right in the way. So they attacked there now, but those attacks were repelled

▪️When we look at those other directions, Lyman, Toretsk, there are intense battles, attacks were repelled

▪️The situation around Pokrovsk is serious, but it is stabilized. The Ukrainians eliminated that Dobropillia penetration, but that is actually east of Dobropillia. The Ukrainians eliminated this and the situation is more or less static.

Only the Russian pressure is escalating in terms of aerial bombs and other materials. Otherwise, there is no significant breakthrough from either side. We also saw yesterday intensive bombing by Ukraine, whether by drones, even by gliding bombs, of Russian positions along the southern front, in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.

If this continued longer, we would start monitoring it intensively, because it could also indicate that Ukrainians might try to change the situation in this area, but so far it rather looks like it’s preventive.

Moderator: And it’s in the Kharkiv region, not in the Kherson region?

Pavel Macko: I said Kharkiv, I apologize. It’s in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, because I was talking about the south. And it’s exactly there that they attacked their bases, their warehouses, even trains with fuels. And it seems to me that at this moment I would assess it as prevention. Simply put, they are trying to reduce the Russians‘ capacity and strength so that they don’t happen to think about another attack or another offensive in the south.

Middle East

Moderator: The Middle East. Why hasn’t a ceasefire agreement been reached so far? How is the situation developing there?

Pavel Macko: The situation there is of course complicated, there are a lot of emotions around it, as well as many contradictory reactions from politicians on the international scene and the media. Of course, those media, when it’s Al Jazeera, is strongly pro-Palestinian, always looking at it from their angle, then there are international media that try to be objective, then there are Israeli media, which even when they are opposed to Netanyahu, portray the situation a bit differently. So it’s difficult to navigate sometimes.

Currently this week, what happened in the last few days – Hamas formally said that it publicly accepts the Qatari-Egyptian proposal for a 60-day ceasefire, where they would actually also release roughly half of those hostages.

Meanwhile, however, Israel has already approved the plan that we discussed here – a five-phase plan. Now the first phase is running, and that is a plan to conquer the Gaza Strip, to completely control Gaza City and Jabalia, which should complete Israeli control over this area, and then in further phases, the Israelis intend to clean it up, but at the same time later hand over control to some authority other than Hamas.

Why was no agreement reached? Israel first demonstrated that it is capable and ready to carry out that operation. The most intensive phase is to begin no later than October 7th. The preparatory phase is already running, which means that evacuation has occurred, people are being resettled, and at the same time Israel is tightening the noose, which means there is intensive bombing of Hamas positions.

In this area, they have not yet entered with the main force into that space, but they are creating such a closure around that city. To one side, they are letting refugees into camps that are being prepared in the more southern area, and at the same time, they are trying to increase pressure on Hamas.

Quite logically, an agreement was not reached because Israel, in a situation when Netanyahu got approval for this plan, and they also completed that detailed military operational plan last week, wants to increase pressure, because this is just another delaying step from Hamas. Israel wants to resolve it now.

Meanwhile, pressure is increasing to address the humanitarian situation that exists there. The losses are also escalating, and we have also seen large demonstrations in Israel. Because family members are impatient. This is understandable, but there is also the other side of the coin, which says that Hamas has not offered to return your relatives. He offered that part of them, mostly the dead and some of the living, will be returned. And that means, what will happen after those 60 days? The conflict will continue again.

It’s a difficult situation. When we look at the international scene as well, there is strong criticism, largely justified, of the way those operations are conducted by Israel. On the other hand, there is strong support from the United States.

Moderator: And the Czech Republic.

Pavel Macko: I know that, but militarily it’s not that significant.

Moderator: What’s happening in Syria, Lebanon, or in the Red Sea?

Pavel Macko: In Lebanon, the effort to disarm Hezbollah continues. At the same time, we know that next year the mandate of those UNIFIL units will end. And Lebanon, quite logically, in an effort to avoid a larger conflict with Israel, is trying to disarm Hezbollah instead.

Now is the opportune time, because conditions are not favorable for Hezbollah in Syria either. Iran is – I don’t want to say weakened, but certainly its influence is not what it was before, and it has other concerns. It needs to recover from the blow that was dealt to it several weeks ago.

When we look at Syria, the consequences of that conflict in Suwayda are still being addressed. That’s in the southern province, where there were attacks on Druze and fighting between Druze and Bedouins, in which government troops got involved. Israel responded to this. This week we saw strikes from Israel that were on the positions of some Syrian units near Damascus. Behind this is the fact that Israel had some of its reconnaissance-observation and eavesdropping devices, which these troops also attacked. So Israel was cleaning it up there.

The Syrian army – it is not a compact unit. There were various armed factions there, which tried to integrate Kurds in the north. In the south, they integrated various tribes. Today’s president was previously a leader from that main group, which overthrew the government of Damascus with finality. He is trying to integrate it, but we are talking about more than two dozen different groups there. Israel still suspects some of them of being too closely connected with Hezbollah and is trying to eliminate this threat.

I’ll also mention, since the Houthis attacked Israel again, and that was around August 22nd, that’s last time, if we were recording the radar, they sent rockets to Israel, cluster rockets with cluster munitions. And to this, of course, Israeli planes struck back at locations in Sanaa and in other areas at warehouses with fuels and weapons. This means that Israel is responding to this and trying to maintain the safety of navigation in the Red Sea, but mainly to respond to these Houthi attacks.

Strategic Backstage

Moderator: Today I read such an article that the German Chancellor declared that there will be no meeting between Zelensky and Putin. So, the German Chancellor is apparently well informed and knows well what is happening. Palo, what is the state of those preparations for negotiations between Zelensky and Putin?

Pavel Macko: What I’ve been indicating before is being fulfilled, even when we were with Martin Svarovsky at your place in that video, that it will eventually be decided elsewhere. The Russians are looking for pretexts to prevent Putin and Zelensky from meeting. We now saw that attack on Kyiv.

Lavrov has again confirmed that the conditions are not there for it. Putin is willing to meet with Zelensky even when he has in his hands an agreement with which he will definitely agree. At the moment, Putin feels that such an agreement should be the unconditional surrender of Ukraine. Of course, Ukraine not only doesn’t feel up to that, but it can’t do that either.

The latest news also includes those security guarantees about which the Russians spoke so „positively“ and vaguely in Alaska. I have pointed out in several other interviews that we are amateurs even at the highest diplomatic level, that we don’t want to read those nuances. When the Russians say something, what is the nuance there, one needs to weigh not just every word, but every comma, period, and accent mark, because it can completely change the meaning.

The Russians actually just needed to gain time. They are trying to play a big strategic game with the United States and with President Trump, where Putin is gaining the upper hand, because Trump does not have the strength and determination to use the tools he has. He still thinks that for some big deal he will get the Nobel Peace Prize. Of course, he won’t get anything, and the conflict continues.

Trump has now approached India more strongly and increased those secondary tariffs to 50%. That’s a kind of selective approach, because he doesn’t have this resolved with China, but on the other hand, it’s at least an indication that in a situation when the Nobel Peace Prize is not in sight, and he looks like a loser in these negotiations, he has to do something and does what is logical. And there is also talk about some sale of longer-range missiles.

Let’s wait, because we’ll find out when those missiles are already flying. There is, of course, such controversy that meanwhile they were restricting the use of longer-range weapons on Russian territory, but there is also some disharmony between the Ministry of Defense and Trump himself, because that has already happened once with the export of those weapons that had already been approved by the previous government to Ukraine.

When I return to the core of the question – the Russians do not want to negotiate, and most recently they said that under no circumstances do they want security guarantees that would consist of having some troops from NATO member countries. They will not accept that.

This means that the fight will continue to the total exhaustion of one side or the other, and we have to think carefully about what we will do. I mean we collectively, the West including Slovakia, although I give the Slovak government zero chance of helping anything. On the contrary, it is capable of carrying out sabotage against Ukrainians, but at least it has been doing political diversion for a long time.

But it can be expected that it will have to come to increased supplies for Ukraine. Ukraine must withstand this. I don’t quite understand the Russian strategy, because for example this attack on Kyiv was senseless, because they had a far greater number of militarily more significant targets they could attack, and simply they are trying to continue conducting that psychological warfare.

But by doing so, they are actually undermining their efforts. Really that Russian warning finger, that caution, we can also hit your European mission, even that is not safe. That is completely before any efforts for a ceasefire, which paradoxically can unite the EU except for exceptions of these two countries.

Moderator: I heard that Erdogan is preparing some steel dome in Turkey. Is it some kind of equivalent to that Israeli Iron Dome? Or what is it actually about?

Pavel Macko: At the very least, by that naming, because they called it Steel Dome, they are trying to imitate something. Iron Dome is iron as such, and Steel is this hardened iron, which is steel. They deliberately chose that name – Golden Dome was also invented by President Trump.

Turkey previously bought S-400 from the Russians, that didn’t meet with much response. Most recently, it has turned out that the Triumf system is not such a triumph as many would imagine.

Turkey, which by the way, and I wrote about it, and I’ll give advertisement to the continuation of that saga about drones, so in the magazine .týždeň in the latest issue I wrote that Turkey is one of the strong players in the field of military drones and is trying to build something like air sovereignty. After seeing that it is occasionally the subject of some sanctions, because we know that they were excluded from the F-35 program, temporarily also from F-16. They regained that with the nod to the entry of Finland and Sweden, that they will be able to maintain F-16 in an operational state.

This week they presented a system, which is actually something similar, but Iron Dome. That Israeli system is a short-range system and is also for such high intensity of those artillery shells and for lower targets and for rockets, but not for that long distance. This Turkish system is from Turkish manufacturers, they also use their own rockets there. Its plus is that it’s quite an interesting solution according to what is publicly available. It is also designed against drones.

This means that it already reacts, the development is such that this integrated complex system of medium and short range responds to drones and can similarly up to those 30, maximum 50 kilometers act also against rockets. This means that it is also an anti-missile shield.

They should also protect the area around the Dardanelles, Bosphorus, where it is absolutely key infrastructure. It’s such a combination. They have ground stations, they have mobile launchers, 47 launchers. It’s in the first package they put together. But there is also a combination of radars, sensors, both on land and at sea. This means also from naval platforms. And some firing means are also from naval platforms. So I will definitely follow it.

Moderator: But the Turks must not find out that you’re watching it.

Pavel Macko: But no. They know that it is being watched by more significant people than me. And therefore they kept the details relatively secret, because parameters of such a system are commonly given. The Turks kept them secret. This means we don’t really know what the reach, range is there.

Slovak National Uprising and Its Legacy

Moderator: We have already mentioned the 81st anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising in the introduction. At this very time, when we are recording the podcast, the speaker of parliament and the president should already be speaking in Banská Bystrica. We still don’t know if Prime Minister Fico is there as well. So we’ll see when we finish recording this podcast. What would you like to say about the Slovak National Uprising?

Pavel Macko: It seems almost absurd to me that this gang of semi-fascists goes to honor the Slovak National Uprising. They stole the Slovak National Uprising from the Slovak nation. It was appropriated by extremists whose rhetoric is purely neo-Nazi, or then extreme.

A prime minister who, in support of some Bombic or Danny Kollár, shows a White Power gesture, or some right-wing extremist gestures, which are very close to fascism. That’s just something that’s terrible. When you take everything they do, who they ally with, that they’re also thinking about integration with Republika, that they already count on them as a future possible partner, given that Andrej Danko is not able to deliver some MPs, even last time he brought such nobodies there to parliament, and he remained the only one from the Slovak National Party, so it’s bad.

But I’ll put it in context. What do I want to convey? First, I want to greet all the still living veterans of the Slovak National Uprising who fought. When I was still serving, at one of the previous anniversaries I had the honor to present medals to 793 of them on behalf of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces as a deputy chief of the general staff. Unfortunately, it is natural with that age, most of them are no longer alive, there remain just a few. Some of them are active, some less so, but respect and honor belong to all of them.

The message of the Slovak National Uprising is, in my opinion, underappreciated and also profaned by what we just talked about, but also by attacks of such as the Kotleba people, who not so long ago were hanging a black flag on the county office in Banská Bystrica on the anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising.

It should be said, because there will now be many historians talking, and there will be many outputs on this uprising, that that’s why we also left out World War II today. But I’m not going to analyze the uprising itself in detail either. But I want to say, it was an uprising of the Slovak nation, it wasn’t just a handful of rebels. It was that healthy part of the nation, which stood up primarily against domestic fascists, against the domestic regime, which collaborated with Nazi Germany.

And of course the uprising was prepared for a long time. It was then finally accelerated, in the end there was a betrayal, so it had to take place earlier than planned, there was no synchronization of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps, the Soviet army, that they should pass through Dukla and start liberating the territory as quickly as possible together with those two East Slovak divisions, which were actually supposed to let those troops through.

What was essential was that it was primarily an uprising against one’s own domestic Ludak regime, where that healthy part of the Slovak nation rejected this totalitarian regime, which murdered its citizens and even paid for it to Nazi Germany in Reich marks for each killed Jew or Roma. That is something incredible.

The message is also in the fact that they fought. Despite knowing that they were going against overwhelming odds, they fought. They also fought against the Nazis, but it wasn’t a pure uprising just against the Nazis, it was an uprising against a regime that was then supported by the Nazis and who then, when they saw that the regime might collapse, also decided on a massive occupation of Slovakia. But the cause and effect were clear there – the primary cause was dissatisfaction with this regime, which was a pro-Nazi regime.

These heroes, whom I still salute, and the government of moderation and others, proved that one should not say that one must not fight against overwhelming odds. Because we’re now hearing from our government representatives that the occupier will leave one day. No, they stood up and started fighting, because they knew that it was important to stand up to evil, and that when that evil uses weapons, you have to stand up to it with a weapon in your hand.

Today, these government representatives, in a forum other than that podium in Banská Bystrica, would probably say that they were some charlatans who fought instead of capitulating and unnecessarily prolonged losses and war. It’s the opposite. Simply put, there are moments when one needs to resist, and fortunately, the Slovak nation had this moment in that uprising, and it is one of the strongest historical moments. Our nation stood up against evil and did not look at whether they had a chance to win or not. It simply stood up because it was the right thing to do, and therefore I think we should value the message of this uprising.

The current situation is bad and is coming to a head, so we need to say again what all the bad things were that the insurgents rebelled against. What all happened after the suppression of the uprising, that Slovak citizens also participated in it, or mainly in some cases, and what rhetoric they used to discredit these insurgents. What rhetoric some politicians use today to discredit democracy in Slovakia or to discredit Ukraine’s effort to survive under the pressure of external aggression.

360°

Moderator: What’s on your radar?

Pavel Macko: I would mention two things. First, Taiwan and again Africa. Unfortunately.

Moderator: And why Taiwan again?

Pavel Macko: Chinese military exercises are currently taking place around Taiwan. It’s called „Joint Sword“ or „Common Sword“ in that strait. These are Chinese military maneuvers. They were launched last week on August 26th. They continued for several days and practiced a blockade of Taiwan. Precise strikes on key targets.

In short, they wanted to demonstrate that when they decide militarily, they are able to block maritime routes in that strait – the Taiwan Strait. That is the area between Taiwan and mainland China. They also had their own aircraft carrier there. They involved fighter planes and the coast guard there.

One should also mention the political context here. Beijing again labeled the Taiwanese president as a parasite and declared that as soon as he will push for complete independence of Taiwan, that means war.

It is strategically important for us. We’ve already discussed it here in that Taiwan is one of the key manufacturers, a completely dominant manufacturer of semiconductors. Today we can’t move without semiconductors. In one such better upper-middle class car, e.g., in a German one, there are 37-40 thousand different electronic components, while Taiwan produces:

▪️100% of advanced chips for artificial intelligence

▪️More than 90% of advanced chips overall

▪️60% of all semiconductors.

Moderator: Okay, and what about Africa?

Pavel Macko: Well, in Africa, Sudan. We haven’t talked about it for a long time. And that conflict really isn’t subsiding, but is escalating. On one hand, there is a complex situation in Darfur. The Sudanese army and those RSF forces or Rapid Support Forces, or rapid reaction forces, rapid support, are fighting there. Those are those rebellious generals who have their own agenda.

And actually, the siege of the capital in Darfur has been going on for a long time. The fighting continues intensively, recently those government troops have seemingly partially gained the upper hand. On the other hand, we see that in the eastern part there are other rebel groups, which the Sudanese government accuses of being fed and supported by Eritrean forces and politicians.

The situation is deteriorating. If we last talked about 5.6 million internally displaced refugees, today we are talking about 10.8 million people. With that, 25 million people have problems with nutrition and food, who are in immediate danger of famine breaking out.

Of course, the international community is not able to somehow organize, suppress this. That conflict is too strong, we don’t have the capacity and probably not the will to go into such a conflict, because it has already been experienced in Somalia, when in the early 90s those fights were taking place between individual factions. The Americans, when they came to help, in the end it ended with the retreat after the fall of that Black Hawk, because those conflicts are very complicated.

Always, when an external player comes there, and it doesn’t matter what kind of international unit, so always the problem is then that in the end somehow the domestic hostile factions group against external forces. So I mention that conflict because RSF tried to declare as if a competing government. The UN Security Council rejected it against that government, because actually there is still a threat of the disintegration of Sudan.

In a situation when we see that that whole sub-Saharan belt, we talked about it last time, is already in disarray, so this is a further deterioration of the situation. A conflict that has been going on since April 2023 has also exceeded more than two and a quarter years.

Moderator: Unfortunately, the Russians are also meddling in their own way in this conflict. Why? Is it so?

Pavel Macko: Unfortunately, in that we see that the Russians are daring, and that they are that source of instability in the world. And there isn’t even any ideology behind it anymore, just ordinary, God-forsaken stealing and plundering of resources.

Moderator: We’re at the quote, so we’re at the end. Sorry, Palo, let me intervene.

Radovan Macko (publishing director): I would like to announce to our listeners that we are planning to come to them. I’ll interrupt you again. This, who is speaking, is Macko, but not the general. It’s Rado Macko and he’s the publishing director.

I am now announcing an important message to you. Dear listeners, we are coming to you this time on September 12th. We will be broadcasting our security radar with General Pavel Macko at Cinematic in Piešťany at 5:30 PM. We cordially invite you and look forward to seeing you.

Pavel Macko: I am also looking forward to it and will be on the road directly. I will be returning from France, where I have some lectures, but I will be even more motivated to get to the domestic audience.

Quote

Moderator: So, a quote. We mentioned the Slovak National Uprising. Today is a holiday, the anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising. I suggested that it wasn’t just a small group of people. That it wasn’t even just a communist uprising, as it was then profaned during socialism, that the communists appropriated that uprising.

Pavel Macko: So I’ll allow myself such a quote from Kornel Filo, a member of the Slovak National Council for the Democratic Party from 1946:

I must emphasize that this was truly and in all consequences a nationwide uprising, a spontaneous explosion of the entire Slovak nation against Nazi neo-paganism, oppression and enslavement. That part of the nation, which our ill-wishers today so gladly label as reactionary, participated in this national uprising. On the fronts of the Slovak National Uprising, ladies and gentlemen, up to 60,000 Slovak Catholics fought.

See also:

General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar 127 – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar 126 – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar – episode 125 – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

The post General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar 128 appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#coalition of willing #Fico #France #Putin #Russia #security guarantees #Slovakia #Ukraine #USA #War in Ukraine #Zelensky

Leaders of Nordic and Baltic states are discussing possibilities to increase pressure on Moscow at today’s summit in Denmark. Later in the afternoon, they will move to Paris for bilateral negotiations, from where they will connect with other allied leaders tomorrow, together with French President Emmanuel Macron.

The aim of the meeting is:

▪️Clarify what security guarantees the „coalition of the willing“ can provide to Ukraine after the war

▪️Ensure that Russian aggression does not repeat

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte will also join online. „We expect that tomorrow or soon after, it will be clearer what we can provide together. We also want to involve the American side more and clarify how they want to participate in the implementation of security guarantees,“ officials said.

Current Situation in Ukraine

The Ukrainian Air Force reports that it repelled attacks by more than five hundred Russian drones and twenty-four missiles during the night. Residents of Druzhkivka in the Donetsk region faced artillery fire. In total, Russian night strikes injured at least 12 people and caused fires in many places.

Unmanned aircraft also targeted Kyiv, where the British Defense Minister arrived this morning.

„The main targets were civilian infrastructure, especially energy facilities, transport hubs, and even garages and apartments, which the Russians have become accustomed to attacking. Dozens of residential buildings in various regions of our country were damaged during the night.„

Interview with Pavel Macko

Moderator: From tomorrow’s meeting of the coalition of the willing with the participation of Volodymyr Zelensky, can we expect that it will bring clarity to the form of security guarantees for Ukraine? That after this meeting, the guarantees will be more concrete than before?

Pavel Macko: It is definitely a diplomatic effort by President Zelensky and Western leaders. The essential point is that they will discuss what guarantees Ukraine can receive, as it is quite clear that most of these leaders have come to terms with the fact that during the Donald Trump era, Ukraine will not become a NATO member country.

However, what is essential is something completely different, and that is whether we will even reach the point where these security guarantees could be activated. That is, whether we will reach some peaceful settlement or stopping or freezing of the conflict, and some at least temporary peace agreements with Russia. Such a peace agreement would then presuppose ensuring the security and maintenance of the achieved ceasefire or peace, which would be the so-called security guarantees.

Significance of Ongoing Negotiations

In any case, the discussion is important because it addresses what forces, capabilities, and mechanisms should be put in place for such a security guarantee to be provided at all. Of course, all of this will then be the subject of negotiations with Russia, because otherwise the only chance for the implementation of security guarantees would occur if Russian troops were pushed out of Ukraine, which is unrealistic at this moment.

This means that regardless of what they agree on, it will also depend on Russia whether it will agree to it. Especially when Russia is clearly not preparing for peace or a ceasefire, which complicates the preparation of those guarantees – it is not clear what the target state is for which the guarantees are intended.

„It is absolutely fundamental. Simply put, without knowing whether these guarantees will be acceptable to the other side, you are preparing for the unknown.“

During these talks, they are certainly also discussing how to even reach a state where it will be possible to implement these security guarantees. In other words, how to force Russia to enter negotiations on ending this war:

▪️By strengthening economic sanctions

▪️By strengthening Ukrainian capacities

▪️By strengthening Ukrainian capabilities

In short, for Russia to recognize that it no longer has the ability and capacity to gain anything further. After all, the Russians are regrouping and trying to do something because in the last three-quarters of a year, they have not actually achieved any significant success in this war and are constantly prolonging it.

Parameters of Security Guarantees

The parameters of these security guarantees without cooperation with Russia are very broad. Simply put, they must also consider such war plans as what would happen in case these security guarantees were not respected. If, for example, some troops were deployed, what would then be the mechanisms for their activation and possible involvement in suppressing any disruption of the agreed peace process?

Moderator: Let’s move on to what is being considered in more concrete terms. The participation of the United States will be essential. In this context, it is being said that it would consist of American air support for European soldiers deployed in Ukraine, the sharing of intelligence information, and the sharing of command and control systems. Would this form of American participation be sufficient to make the guarantees ultimately functional and deter Russia sufficiently from further attacks?

Pavel Macko: It would be, assuming there would be more than just support during ceasefire monitoring and security status. If the United States provided:

▪️Intelligence support

▪️Strategic air bridge for ongoing support and rotation of these troops (the EU has significant deficits in this area)

It is essential that the United States be prepared to activate massive air support in the event that these peace agreements are actually violated and there is potential contact with Western countries and their armies.

Strategic Significance of American Support

The logic is clear – it is on the European continent, primarily a question of European security, and quite logically, the United States demands that European countries participate in it to the maximum extent possible.

On the other hand, the United States is a key and strategic ally of European countries in NATO and cannot leave them in the lurch. This means that we should pay attention to the words of Mark Rutte, who says that in the classified parts of the talks, the United States must declare unequivocal determination and readiness for maximum possible support in case of escalation, that is, if a ceasefire is violated.

The United States has at its disposal:

▪️Strong air forces directly in Europe and the surrounding area

▪️The ability to project power – to move additional capacities in a short time using aircraft carriers

▪️Naval forces and submarines from which they can launch Tomahawk cruise missiles or similar means

Now it’s about getting this into those agreements and making it visible to Russia as well. Any possible violation in the future could mean massive escalation and a hard hit, including intervention by the United States. This must be clearly communicated to avoid misunderstanding or miscalculation on the Russian side.

Buffer Zone Between Front Lines

Moderator: Is it a realistic idea to create a buffer zone between the Ukrainian and Russian front lines? I’m asking because it would most likely mean the withdrawal of one side or the other from territories that it currently controls.

Pavel Macko: Nothing is impossible, but of course it is a very complicated step. In this situation, it would mean that Ukraine would have to abandon its fortified positions, which are currently holding despite great Russian pressure.

The Russians would also withdraw, but if they maintained an offensive formation, a perhaps 40-kilometer buffer strip – no man’s land – would be created. But if there were no obstacles in it, whether passive, in the form of barriers or minefields, then in case the Russians decided to violate this ceasefire in the future, they would be able to very quickly overcome this buffer zone and continue further.

Strategic Disadvantages of the Buffer Zone

If Ukraine did not build strong new defensive positions at the edge of this buffer zone, and if the peacekeeping forces provided by the guarantors were not able to occupy, monitor, or stop the advance of Russian troops in this zone, it would clearly give an advantage to Russian forces.

Russians simply do not need fortified defensive positions for an offensive, while Ukrainians would need them for possible defense against renewed aggression, or they would need another force that could stop that aggression – and immediately.

Reaction to the Slovak Prime Minister’s Stance

Moderator: I’m interested in one more thing. What do you think Ukrainian President Zelensky will answer when, at a joint meeting, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico protests against Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries, as he promised in China before Vladimir Putin?

Pavel Macko: I think this matter is completely clear. Robert Fico in this case is playing with false cards. If he wants energy security for Slovakia, he should have diversified sources in the first place.

President Zelensky will probably tell him that:

1) Russia has attacked Ukraine

2) Ukraine is defending itself

3) The entire area is a war zone

Therefore, it is logical that even the only source that Robert Fico relies on may be subject to attacks. Ukraine does this in the interest of protecting the lives of its own citizens and as part of self-defense.

Counterproductive Stance of Slovakia

Robert Fico can at most at this moment threaten Ukraine that he will be disloyal and that he will somehow try to block the reverse flow that also supplies Ukraine – whether it’s gas, oil, or the interconnection of energy networks. But that would also be counterproductive, because a detour can be made through other countries. It only puts Slovakia in the position of not a non-cooperating partner, but a neighbor who is stabbing a dagger in the back of an attacked country.

In short, Zelensky will certainly express understanding for Robert Fico’s concerns regarding our energy security, but we have long known that a military conflict is ongoing, that there is a war, and that such infrastructure can also accidentally become the target of an explosion or accident. So I don’t think Fico will achieve anything more.

Moderator: Pavel Macko, thank you.

Pavel Macko: Thank you for the invitation. Have a nice day.

The post Negotiations on Security Guarantees for Ukraine appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

The possible warming of relations and ending of the war from the Trump-Putin summit in cold Alaska quickly cooled down. Allies are discussing security guarantees, which however will not be according to NATO’s Article 5. Hamas would now agree to a temporary ceasefire, but Israel already has a military operation plan.

#France #Macko #Peace negotiations #Putin #Russia #security guarantees #security radar #Trump #UK #Ukraine #USA #War in Ukraine #Zelensky

Transcript of a popular podcast prepader together with the weekly .týždeň.

Moderator: Welcome to listening to the 127th edition of General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar. Welcome, General.

General Macko: Thank you very much, pleasant listening.

Fog of War: Developments in Ukraine

Moderator: What is the development on the two main battlefields? Let’s start with Ukraine.

General Macko: I’ll start traditionally, let’s go to the strategic bombing. Despite intensive negotiations taking place at all possible levels and diplomatic messages, the clearest message of how the Russians mean it was precisely by sending missiles and drones to Ukraine. This makes it clear to everyone what they are after – to drag out time.

The most massive attack was on the night of August 20, where they hit Lviv, Mukachevo, Lutsk, attacking mainly western Ukraine. In Mukachevo, just a few kilometers from the Slovak and Hungarian borders, they attacked an American factory. This is also an answer to those who say that when the United States will mine minerals there, it will be a sufficient security guarantee. This resonated sometime after February, but it’s not like that.

They also attacked the Pavlohrad Mechanical Plant. The Russians still declare that they destroyed stocks of Sapsan missiles. I don’t know that, Ukraine of course doesn’t confirm it anywhere.

Similar to how Ukrainians recently showed the Flamingo missile… In this case, it’s better to stick to the principle „don’t shout hop until you’ve jumped“. Why? It’s clear that Zelensky needs to say such things to boost the morale of his own population and soldiers. But here it’s better to maintain operational security. Russian intelligence services have indications, but they never have precise information, we shouldn’t give it to them.

It’s not good to hint at what I have and what I can do with it. If the Ukrainians wanted to create a real psychological shock, they should have fired that Flamingo at a proper Russian base. It is said that they have already done so, but probably not yet.

The point is that the first moment of surprise is key. Flamingo is a large missile with a large radar signature. It’s a subsonic missile that flies like a cruise missile. This means it will be detectable by Russian systems. The Ukrainians should have done exactly what the Russians do – release a large swarm of drones, confuse Russian systems, and in between send them one proper hit.

We’ll see if the Ukrainians will use those Sapsan or Grim-2 ballistic missiles. Russian claims about their destruction are probably a hoax, just like claims that they destroyed twice as many HIMARS as were ever delivered to Ukraine. And despite that, HIMARS are still firing.

Ukrainian Counterattacks

When we look at the Ukrainian side, of course Ukraine also tried to return these attacks and was relatively successful. They had a massive drone attack from the night of August 19 to 20. The Russians claimed they didn’t cause damage, but independent sources report infrastructure damage in several places.

The Volgograd oil refinery and the railway station in Voronezh were attacked again. Something exploded in the Ivanovo region. Ukrainian intelligence claims that Konstantin Nagayko, the Russian commander responsible for the attack on Kharkiv, was injured in an explosion. It was probably an action by Ukrainian intelligence services.

Summary of the Situation

To summarize, my comment would be that the Russians are dragging out peace negotiations (they claim they no longer want a ceasefire, only peace) and currently, from a strategic bombing perspective, they are concentrating on Ukraine’s industrial base. They are trying to undermine it to the maximum extent possible and intersperse it with attacks on the civilian population. Of course, as winter approaches, they will again concentrate on energy infrastructure to take away their breath.

Developments on the Battlefields

Moderator: How are the Ukrainians doing? Did they manage to stop the breakthrough at Dobropillya?

General Macko: It looks like yes. That initial hit was very successful. This means that Ukrainian forces brought in reinforcements, divided the Russian formation into several parts, but couldn’t completely finish it off. The Russians are of course reinforcing it, but the Ukrainians…

We don’t have a visual aid, of course, we’re in the radio version, but imagine something like an oval with an arm coming out of it – like when you inflate a glove and a thumb sticks out. That was the protrusion at Dobropillya. The Ukrainians blocked it, divided it into several parts, but now they are trying to further attack the base from which that protrusion came, to release the „steam“ from this area.

The Ukrainians are relatively successful at this. It is true that the Russians have the 8th Combined Arms Army there, they have the 51st Combined Arms Army, they attacked there with elements of at least three brigades. Of course, the forces are thin on both sides. If we’re talking about a brigade, it’s certainly not 3,500-7,000 soldiers, because Ukrainians had even larger brigades than the Russians. But the Russians are pushing reinforcements there because they know exactly that if they lose momentum there, they won’t be able to threaten the rest of Donbas.

So now it has stabilized a bit, but it’s basically a success for the Ukrainians – they contained it, pushed back. They also had a small success around Pokrovsk, where for the first time they cleared the interior of Pokrovsk from sabotage reconnaissance groups and slightly its surroundings as well.

On the other hand, the Russians slightly advanced in the vicinity of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk. Not that they would control those cities, but they got a bit further beyond them. They slightly advanced by one settlement in the Dnipropetrovsk region, but from the Russians‘ perspective, this is probably propaganda, suggesting that they could attack in that direction as well.

The last thing I would like to mention – there are signals emerging that the Russians could shift pressure, since they’re not succeeding directly in Donbas, more to the Zaporizhzhia region, to the southern front.

Addition to Dobropillya

General Macko: I have just one note about that. I caught quite a good analysis from the Czech profile Perun. They are guys who have been working with drones for a longer time. They talked about why the breakthrough at Dobropillya happened – the Ukrainians thinned out the defensive lines there. We discussed this a few episodes back, we said that instead of a continuous line, they created „strongholds“ or support points with drone operators.

But of course, the other side also reacts. The Russians have a unit and system called Rubikon, which we also discussed. They use Rubikon in such a way that they don’t attack directly just the first line, but mainly the supply routes, convoys, and destroy the troops‘ supplies. This proved successful for them in the Kursk region, and that’s why the Ukrainians eventually withdrew. They had good terrain there, but it also had a disadvantage – it was channelized, they had only a few valleys and roads through which supplies could be delivered.

Now it’s interesting that NATO has also started building a drone wall or drone barrier in the Baltics. The wall alone is not enough. It needs to be said that you always need a combination of means. In the end, war is always about will, and there must also be a soldier with will.

Moderator: When you mention drones, everyone imagines only those that fly, but now I notice that Ukrainians use many ground drones. Is that real?

General Macko: It is real. I’ll also do a bit of advertising for the weekly, because I started writing a series about drones. This issue contains the history of drones, which might surprise many – drones go back to the First World War. So it’s nothing new.

I recommend getting the latest issue of the weekly. But to return to the question – yes, Ukrainians are significantly progressing with ground drones. They were successful with naval ones, they cleared the Black Sea Fleet from Crimea, and now they are more significantly deploying ground drones.

My conclusion from this is that it’s important. The battlefield is becoming more technological, nobody can stop that, but in the end, every war is a battle of wills. Where there is will, those defend themselves. When we don’t have will, no technology will help us.

Middle East

Moderator: Let’s move to the Middle East. How is the situation developing there? Hamas allegedly already agrees with a 60-day ceasefire. I’ll allow myself an assessment – it’s certainly the result of Israeli pressure that they agree.

General Macko: Definitely, because Israel announced that it’s no longer going to negotiate. They approved the decision to go and occupy the rest of Gaza. We discussed those goals and stages in detail last time. Last week, Israel started planning a detailed military plan. They had a strategic plan, which we discussed, and the detailed military plan, which I hinted at last time, Israel has now announced that they have completed it.

The Americans pressed Hamas or the Palestinians to engage in negotiations. Hamas announced that it is ready to negotiate. Because they said they are ready for another 60-day ceasefire.

Netanyahu, of course, said: „You know what, we’ve already decided and we’re going to strike you, we have a military plan.“ Netanyahu has now suspended those operations, but again, it’s more of a negotiating strategy, a communication strategy, because militarily he already has things prepared. After all, we all know that those measures were set up so that only preparatory military activities are to take place now. The main task is only from October 7, because they said they would start at the earliest on October 7, and they would also symbolically start the sharp combat phase on the anniversary of Hamas‘ attack from October 7, 2023.

So now these are the so-called „shaping operations“ or „forming operations“, where they are building conditions… On August 8, they already issued an evacuation order for people to leave Jabalia and Gaza City. Now logistical infrastructure is being built in the south. So regardless of what Netanyahu said, the main combat operations would not have started anyway. But he created space and pressure on Hamas by that: „You know what, this is the last chance, we’ll suspend it, and this is the last chance for you to come to an agreement. We won’t go and kill all of you, but you won’t be in power anymore, you must leave the Gaza Strip, there will be some other authority instead of you, and you must demilitarize.“

And they don’t want that. They don’t want it because again the trick with the two-month ceasefire is: „Okay, so out of those 50 hostages, we might return 30 dead ones and 10 live ones, and we’ll keep those 10 again and we’ll drag out time again.“

Despite all the criticism of Israel at this moment, it’s good that Israel is pretending to be more restrained and wants to wait and see what Hamas actually agrees to. And if it doesn’t meet its parameters, it will pressure them: „Okay, I’ll pull out not from the drawer, but from those topographic pouches, the battle plans, and we’ll go and finish it.“ Or we’ll agree in such a way that we won’t have to negotiate on another ceasefire, that this will already be a permanent ceasefire.

We’ll see how it develops, but in the meantime, during that week, exactly what happened was that they completed that military plan. Operational and tactical planning has some time sequence. I’ve been dealing with this for years, also at allied levels. Those large contours of the plan were clear, different alternatives, so-called „branch plans“ – branching of plans, what will be if… – to calculate all possible reactions. And Israel has now completed this.

Meanwhile, some security operations continued. There was bombing again in southern Lebanon. Here I just remind that Lebanon is disarming Hezbollah. The Lebanese government has issued clear instructions to disarm Hezbollah.

Netanyahu appears a bit controversial, with his tough talk and speaking about Greater Israel. That’s fine to some extent, but what disturbs me, and maybe it’s counterproductive, is the further expansion of settlements in the West Bank, because it will provoke further reactions that divert attention from the core of the problem, which is now in Gaza.

Moderator: I would like to ask about those settlements, because to laypeople like me, it sounds like: „Well, they’ll build a few houses there, so what? What could bother anyone about that?“ What is the principle issue with building those settlements?

General Macko: The principle is that the West Bank, according to the original UN resolutions when the state of Israel was created, was assigned to the Arabs. After the Arabs expelled… we were saying here that Israel, when it was established, had about 750,000 inhabitants. And the Arabs in that first Arab-Israeli war, when Czechoslovakia was still supplying weapons and aircraft to Israel for it to survive at all, in response to their being unsuccessful in that war and not destroying the state of Israel, expelled 850,000 Jews from their countries where Jews had lived for centuries. That’s more than the population of Israel itself.

So the Israelis placed them on their territory, but it was dense there and there isn’t water everywhere. In the desert, it’s not easy. So these Israelis, for at least 20 years, or Jews, were in refugee camps. Many established settlements, they said: „Okay, when you expelled them from your countries and we no longer have space in what was allocated to us,“ so they established settlements and settled those Jews also in territories originally assigned to Arabs and built some settlements there.

Now it’s controversial because if some two-state solution is to be made in the future, then Israeli settlers, when there is suitable land, want to go there and they go into the risk that they will be in that hot cauldron with a population that doesn’t want them there, and they still build settlements there.

It’s exactly like when the Russians bring their own people everywhere… That’s why it’s controversial, because it disrupts the compactness of the territory, and the Arabs fear that in the future, when there is some arrangement, Israel will also claim that part of the territory because it already has settlements there.

Strategic Backstage: Trump-Putin Negotiations

Moderator: Since the last radar, the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska took place, followed by Zelensky’s negotiations with Western leaders in Washington. It even looked like a trilateral Putin-Trump-Zelensky meeting could take place this week. But I didn’t believe it at all. But it’s starting to get complicated again. How do you personally evaluate that development? You certainly see it through slightly different eyes than we laypeople.

General Macko: What we more or less agreed on with Martin Swarovsky, when we were last at your place in a joint video before the negotiations, is being fulfilled – that we don’t have great expectations from these negotiations.

Why? Because I also have to look at the symptoms that accompany it. If you give an ultimatum to someone like Putin, and then you yourself send your emissaries, that was Witkoff, who went to Moscow two days before the ultimatum expired, and that meeting in Alaska was arranged, which is fine…

I also supported it, because the United States, unlike our Minister of Foreign Affairs or Prime Minister, have that displacement and are the player that can contribute to ending the conflict. They have all the tools for which the Russians would have to think whether they want to go into confrontation with the United States, or they realize that they cannot win that war anyway, so it’s better to end it.

The problem is that when you send negotiators and then the ultimatum expires and despite that, the Russians don’t agree to a ceasefire, you’re sending a signal that you don’t have the will to continue and bring things to an end. It could have been done like this: „Okay, we’ll negotiate in Alaska, but a ceasefire must occur by August 8, and when it doesn’t… then we won’t negotiate.“ Or: „We’ll negotiate, but when a ceasefire doesn’t happen, I’ll impose sanctions in the meantime, and when we agree in the negotiations, I can suspend or cancel them, but since I’ve given an ultimatum once, I must keep it.“

Otherwise, we teach the opponent that we are not so determined, we are not so decided, and therefore they will drag out time with us. And that’s exactly what happened.

I laconically noted on social network X that the problem today is that the Russians have nothing, but they have a lot of vodka and will. And we have almost everything, but we don’t have that will. And therefore, in the end, not our economic strength, not the military strength of the collective West, not Ukrainian determination, but Russian will to continue in that war will prevail, and the Russians will drag out time.

So very briefly: In Alaska, there were indications that the negotiations could lead to a result, but neither side said the complete details. The good news was that Trump, after Merz and company intensively negotiated with him before, and Zelensky too, doesn’t dare to accept something right away, but he didn’t want to appear as the bad one who would a priori accept Russian demands. That’s why he adjourned it and said that we’re almost close to an agreement, but… this is a quote: „Until everything is agreed, nothing is agreed.“ That’s what President Trump said at that press conference, where he gave the first word to Putin.

Then he said he would consult with allies. He consulted with allies, the allies even with Zelensky traveled to the White House. Those negotiations were constructive, but with two major strategic conclusions:

1) The first was that the US will not provide troops for potential security guarantees. What is leaking, although no one will confirm it to you, is that more or less internally, the United States is reconciled with the fact that Ukraine will have to cede territory – but not just any territory for any territory, but Donbas, that it will have to cede. And that is the „Fortress Donbass“ or „Donbass fortress“, which has been fought over not for 3.5 years, but for 11 years.

I’ll remind you that when that Russian war started, the Russians occupied, with those so-called rebels, who were actually members of the Russian intelligence service, or Wagner Group members, or „soldiers on vacation“ (Russian soldiers on vacation), also Sloviansk. Ukrainian forces conquered it and pushed them out, and that’s when they built that strong defense in Donbas. And that was also Lysychansk, that was also Severodonetsk, which later fell. Then Bakhmut also fell, but they still have that rampart, fortification, and those economically important cities.

So the Ukrainians cannot surrender this, because firstly, the Russians were not able to conquer it militarily. Maybe they will gain it in 10 years, but until then, if the West did exactly what it should, Russia would collapse and economically would have to accept other conditions.

So it was said that the United States does not support Ukraine in NATO. Well, strategically, they probably agreed with Putin: „We won’t provoke you, you need guarantees.“ Putin himself said in Alaska that Ukraine also needs guarantees. So it was agreed that they would agree. And that’s always such… I say that what happens behind the scenes is important.

Western allies, since they knew that the United States would not go into direct confrontation, that they don’t have too much will to push for sanctions, and that at the same time Trump is impatient and wants to have it over with as quickly as possible, so they said they would give security guarantees. And those were then negotiated during the week.

So if it won’t be Article 5, we all knew that Ukraine cannot be admitted to NATO now during the war, but until the last moment, not only Jens Stoltenberg, but also the new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, assured that it’s only a matter of time before Ukraine will be in NATO. And now we’re deviating and saying that we’ll give it other security guarantees.

I don’t want to say I don’t believe them, but it’s important for Putin to believe it. Because if something is to deter you, you must be convinced that the other side will do it. I’ll translate it for laypeople: If we say that we’ll give security guarantees such that peace will be agreed and we’ll put troops there to supervise the implementation of the agreement and the Russians will also know about it, then the Russians would have to agree with it, because otherwise they won’t sign the peace or it will be a pretext for them to continue the war.

Theoretically, we wouldn’t have to ask the Russians. But it would have to be credible, because all those security guarantees lie in the fact that it doesn’t matter whether you put 5,000 or 500,000 soldiers there. In the end, it must be that if after the conclusion of peace, Russia attacks Ukraine again, those who provide security guarantees go to war with Russia. I don’t mean by that that they go to destroy Moscow, but at minimum they will go into a sharp war with it to kick it out of Ukraine. And until Putin has the feeling that this is absolutely guaranteed, he won’t believe it.

2) The second thing is the United States, and here I will be positive towards the United States. The United States said they won’t put troops on the ground. It’s quite logical, because it’s really the case that we, Europe, have the primary interest in security in Ukraine. And therefore quite logically, J.D. Vance, with whom I don’t have to agree on everything, says: „So put your own troops then.“

But the United States must have a firm commitment, even if they won’t have a commitment in Article 5 to Ukraine, they must have a firm commitment to their allies. And they also said that they will support us from the air. And that air support can be logistical. They have a huge transport fleet, so they can quickly bring in supplies and reinforcements for allied troops.

It can also be combat. They have combat aircraft, we’ve seen that they can, with those aircraft carriers and aircraft they have in Europe today, and with tankers they can bring in, get to that area very quickly. They can maintain what they maintained over Iran – continuity of combat operations. Not that we fly for 3 minutes, fire a missile, and have to land. They can keep aircraft in the air, they can create continuous pressure, they have means like long-range missiles and the like. So theoretically, they could do it.

And now we see Russia’s reaction – at this moment, Russia is starting to speculate. They say that China should also be in those security guarantees. Logically, it seems fine. On the other hand, we in Europe can probably say that we don’t need it. The Russians are creating an axis with China and North Korea. And besides North Korean soldiers, we don’t need Chinese soldiers in Europe either. Let China guard its space in Asia nicely and not stick its horns into Taiwan, the Philippines, and beyond, where it’s pushing. Certainly not into Europe. Because that wouldn’t be a true guarantee.

And the Russians want such a guarantee… I can imagine, for example, Turkish troops as separation troops. Because the Turks have relatively good relations with both sides. We’ll see how it develops. But I’m starting to suspect that the meeting, as you suggested, won’t happen. Already now, the Russians are saying that they first need to negotiate things at the working level. Trump has actually already said that the Russians and Ukrainians should go to negotiations themselves.

And here I’ll give a final anecdote. President Trump boasted. First, he said that he had already closed or ended 5 wars. Then 7. Now he said 7. I’ll leave it for another podcast, but I want to say that, for example, between Serbia and Kosovo, there was no imminent war threat. That was virtual from Trump.

Where credit can be given to him is certainly in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, because those parties also negotiated with the White House. And they also humiliated Putin because they went to close it in Washington with the assistance of the United States. And the United States is also involved there in the corridor between Karabakh and Armenia.

When we look at India and Pakistan, Pakistan nominated Trump for the Nobel Prize and India says you had no hand in it at all, you weren’t involved. And finally in Cambodia and Thailand, yes, China and the United States assisted with that, pushed, but the mediator was ASEAN. The Prime Minister of one of the ASEAN countries was the main sponsor who secured that agreement. But of course, these two big ones, the USA and China, gave that political-strategic signal that they are behind that agreement, they are pushing for it, and so it happened.

Weapons Deliveries for Ukraine

Moderator: How will it be with weapons deliveries for Ukraine?

General Macko: These weapons deliveries continue, various formats are being negotiated. What was said holds true, that the United States will sell those weapons to NATO and NATO will pass them on to Ukraine. Financial mechanisms are being sought for how to finance it. I think this will continue.

Several initiatives have been announced, because here we need to have a clear scenario: As long as Russia keeps dragging out the war, Ukraine needs that support and help. We’ve seen that Trump is even using his so-called „presidential drawdown authority“. This means that without Congressional approval, he can reduce part of the army’s supplies. Here we’ve returned to the regime that was roughly under President Biden.

But for domestic politics, President Trump now has an excuse, because he’ll say: „I did everything for there to be peace, but the Russians won’t listen, so I have to help the Ukrainians.“

Moderator: Yesterday he even said that Biden forced the Ukrainians only to defend themselves, that war cannot be won by defending and that the Ukrainians should attack. Did I explain it correctly?

General Macko: Bingo! That’s exactly what I said back in April of last year, when I said that everyone says Trump is unpredictable. We knew that. I said, prepare for a roller coaster.

But what was essential was that I said that Trump, if he gets angry, can go into it radically. And those are the remarks about whether Zelensky is willing to attack Moscow and so on. Because it’s like this: Even if Ukraine doesn’t want to defeat Russia on Russian territory, in defense you can avoid losing. But you can never win. No war was ever won by defense.

Anniversary of August 21, 1968

Moderator: Yesterday we commemorated that sad anniversary of August 21, when the Russians invaded us. You, from what I know, were also at some memorial events. But I would first ask you if you could comment on such a simple fact that Prime Minister Fico didn’t say a word about it.

General Macko: I think it’s completely clear. In ’68, the world was divided into two camps. And our ancestors had no choice. And despite that, they had collaborators here who legitimized the entry of Soviet troops.

As Juraj Mesík wrote yesterday in a commentary for one newspaper – let’s tell the truth, that people didn’t write about Soviets anywhere when those Russians came here. They wrote „Russians go home!“ And by Russians, they meant that empire. Now we’re not talking about nationalities that they drove into it from their country and those partner states.

But when they came here, we still had collaborators who sanctified it. But back then our ancestors couldn’t help themselves against that enormous superiority that rushed in here during the night. But today we can choose. And today we have collaborators here who are again speculating to go this same path, and it’s outrageous that the Prime Minister did not comment on this.

But something else is also outrageous. Foreign Minister Blanár did comment. And purely technically, if I didn’t know what he said before and who he is, what he said was correct.

Even the President expressed himself. I allowed myself to needle him and troll him yesterday, because the President said that we must be in the European Union and NATO to not experience something like this, for it not to be repeated. So I’ll remind everyone, and I’ll be bad and biased, that the President began his presidential campaign by taking a photo with the Russian Federation’s Ambassador Bratchikov. And that testifies to his sincere interests in Russia, where he still hasn’t understood that Russia is an aggressor, that Russia has been conducting this imperial policy for the last 300 years, and that we should be on guard against Russia, and not collaborate with them or collect points from misguided citizens who would even today welcome these occupation troops on our territory.

Moderator: And where did you spend yesterday?

General Macko: I spent it in Trnava. It’s true that Patrik Lenghart, a university teacher, an activist, convinced me to also join a civic association, an activity called „Wednesday,“ where we are trying to limit the influence of foreign powers, in this case Russia, here, because the Russians are trying to create again an atmosphere in Slovakia like the one that preceded the invasion in ’68.

So I was with Michal Kocáb in Trnava, there were also artists who supported it. It was a more than two-hour event, we were reminiscing about the symbolism of these events, but also those threats and what is happening in Ukraine, what is the connection between what is happening in Ukraine, the year ’68, and what can happen to us if we’re not careful.

This same thing was expected from our government. It didn’t have to explicitly attack Russia, but it should have given a clear signal to citizens: „This is happening in Ukraine and that’s why we’re going to support Ukraine and our common interests within Europe.“

And do you know what the Prime Minister did? It’s not that he didn’t express himself. The Prime Minister also made the headlines of Indian newspapers. I follow those English-language and Indian ones, where he made headlines. And for what does our Prime Minister make world headlines? He didn’t get there with any reform, he didn’t get there with anything extraordinary that would be in Slovakia. Slovakia got to the headlines of world media the most during his governments when they killed Kuciak, when he attacked Macron and called everyone in the West warmongers. And now again, because he said that Slovakia will block all European support activities towards Ukraine.

History of the Second World War

Moderator: Let’s go to history, the cycle from the Second World War. Last time we discussed the Balkans, if I remember correctly. What was happening to the east of us?

General Macko: This worked out for us and factually it’s not a plan, I can tell the listeners. Because the original plan was that we would get to the Slovak National Uprising, but that can’t be realized, that war was longer, more complex.

We’re missing from that picture, when we take from the year ’40 to ’41, the Soviet Union and what was happening in its surroundings. And a lot was happening there. Outwardly, the Russians or Soviets pretended to be a neutral power, but in reality, they were very active.

I’ll remind that we discussed the Winter War, and it ended in March 1940 with some peace agreement. The Winter War with Finland. The Russians understood that they wanted to have that Karelia to secure the defense of Leningrad then, but they knew that they couldn’t turn Finns into Russians, so they left the rest alone, because they got a beating right in that first phase anyway. In the second phase of the Winter War, they were a bit more successful.

But what continued? The Soviets continued to cooperate very intensively with Nazi Germany. They were allies. When we look at spring-summer 1940, they expanded and occupied – they did an Anschluss – the Baltic states: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia under the pretext of protecting their western border. They called it „securing the western border“. And as if they were protecting these nations. So in June they occupied them. And in July they immediately annexed them. They created Soviet republics in these three countries and annexed them.

In June 1940, the Soviet Union also forced the cession of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia from Romania. That’s today’s Moldova. In the fall, the Soviets under Stalin tried to conduct diplomacy. They plotted even more with the Nazis.

I remind that the Soviet Union on September 17, 1939, attacked Poland, 17 days later than Slovakia and Nazi Germany. And they divided Poland between them. So Stalin, based on those Molotov-Ribbentrop pacts, tried to get closer to Hitler and Nazi Germany. They wanted to divide Europe and the world.

So Molotov in November 1940 visited Berlin, where he negotiated about the possible entry of the Soviet Union into the pact of three powers, which was Germany, Italy, and Japan. In short, the Soviet Union still in November 1940, for its dirty imperial interests, after it stole the Baltics, after it stole Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, wanted to become part of the fascist axis of Germany, Italy, and Japan. I’m just reminding all those Russophiles.

On June 22, 1941, a breach was made to that, when the Germans attacked the Soviet Union. That’s why the Soviets say, because you have to translate those words, „treacherous attack“, because even under communist propaganda, you’re older, Jeno, you remember it, that they always said „treacherous attack on the Soviet Union“. That was in those Czech documentary films. Treacherous in that they were the closest allies of Nazi Germany and it betrayed them when it already saw that they weren’t sufficiently prepared, and implemented Operation Barbarossa.

Moderator: What military operations did the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, so this word I’ve already removed from my vocabulary, undertake in this period, besides that Winter War?

General Macko: Let’s say directly Bolshevik Russia – the Bolshevik Communist Party was then called the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). Literally.

Well, that occupation of the Baltics, that was a lightning military operation without a declaration of war, where they actually sent units, occupied strategic points, and forced governments to resign. Now, that’s why I’m reminding of this, this is exactly like through carbon paper, this is what the Russians do systematically. They did it in ’68 here, they landed at Ruzyně, stole, took our political leadership to Moscow, and subsequently established their regime here, installed their people here, with whom they then ruled.

They even forced on us a treaty, which our Prosecutor General Maroš Žilinka, an associate of this Petrushev, where he goes to the Hermitage and walked with him a few years ago, talked about, and that’s such a shame. He said that it was an excellent treaty, that it was far better than the defense cooperation agreement with the United States.

And this is Slovakia, and this is what we don’t realize – those threats, that the Russians are coming, and it doesn’t matter whether it was Tsarist Russia, whether it’s Bolshevik Russia, whether it’s now post-imperial Russia. The Russians have always done this – they occupied key squares on the chessboard, replaced the pieces, took control, when they couldn’t control, they destroyed everything with bombs, missiles, tanks.

Moderator: How did the neighbors react to everything that those Russians got up to?

General Macko: Well of course, and that’s another explanation of why history sometimes happens as it happens. Because besides this, they also conducted covert operations and repressions in those occupied territories.

Just as here after 1945, even before the communists took power here, they exported people illegally to gulags, they did this in these countries too. The NKVD, which was the predecessor of the KGB, the Soviet secret police, carried out extensive purges, deportations, arrests in newly occupied territories, to destroy potential resistance and ensure Sovietization. This is what would await Ukrainians if Ukraine fell, this is what would await all of us if they fell.

So the reaction of those countries was quite clear. Poland was dismantled. There was only domestic underground resistance there, but it was dismantled. Finland, since it lost territory in that war, after the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union, quite understandably joined the German side, because they hoped to at least recapture lost Karelia.

Romania also had to cede that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in 1940, so later it joined the German invasion against the Soviet Union. Hungary was watching very carefully, because when they occupied that Bessarabia and Bukovina, the Russians came closer to the borders of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, which was then in Czechoslovakia, but the more southern part was Hungarian-speaking, and the Soviets pushed in there. So Hungary also joined the war against the Soviet Union alongside Germany.

I mentioned Poland, and the Slovak state – we had relatively normal relations with the Soviet Union and under the influence of those events, we also joined and sent the Rapid Brigade on June 22, 1941.

In other words, with its disgusting imperialist policy, Russia pushed those countries, which could have been either neutral or perhaps even allies with them, into Hitler’s fold, because in the end, those countries had no other choice if they wanted to survive. They had to join where they thought they would be better off.

360°: Africa

Moderator: What’s on your radar, Pali?

General Macko: I have several things there, but it’s Africa again. That’s a beautiful area. The main thing that caught my interest from those agency reports is that the Nigerian army reported on a significant operation in the Lake Chad basin, where they eliminated the highest leader of Boko Haram.

This drew attention also because of the importance of that region, because we’re talking about Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. The operation is considered quite a big blow to the jihadist group, which has been plaguing that region with violence for more than 10 years. These are just hard-core jihadists.

Besides that, there was an interesting incident that a bomb exploded near a military air base in Colombia, as if violence was returning there. There was a fight there also with Maoists who were hiding in the mountains. Tension in Syria, intra-Syrian tension, was renewed in connection with the 12th anniversary of the deadly chemical attack near Damascus. These are such unresolved problems.

But what stood out to me the most was that Boko Haram.

Moderator: And what actually is Boko Haram?

General Macko: Boko Haram was founded in Nigeria, in the northeast, by some Muhammad Yusuf in 2002. By the way, it’s similar to how Hamas was formed. There was also a Yusuf there who founded Hamas.

It started as a religious movement that opposed Western-style education. Actually that „Boko Haram“, „haram“ means forbidden, and that „Boko Haram“ was like „we don’t want this Western education“. Just as the Taliban started in Madrasas somewhere in Pakistan, and also tried to return to Islamic conservatism, Sharia law.

But of course, subsequently it began to radicalize there. Yusuf was killed outside of court during skirmishes, they had a new leader, and he was no longer concerned with education or culture, but with a hard jihadist uprising. First they focused on Nigeria, then they went to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger and exploited the permeability of borders and those various ethnic ties. And they started to stick their necks out.

I remember that they kidnapped schoolgirls, raped them, but that’s less known now. In 2015, they then pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. The Islamic State was supposed to be a worldwide caliphate, Islamic, that would control the whole world. And they declared themselves as the West African province of the Islamic State.

And just a statistic: That uprising caused 350,000 deaths, 3.2 million displaced people in that area, in the Lake Chad basin. Of course, agriculture, trade, access to health services were significantly disrupted.

So a multinational joint operational group was then formed there, composed of units from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, who tried to fight against them. Then we had units in Mali, even international ones, and a European mission, which also tried to help locals in Mali against these Islamists.

But in Mali, what then happened was that a military junta seized power and kicked out these units as well.

Moderator: And what do the Americans, French, and Russians do with these juntas, with those local ones, in this area?

General Macko: And this is interesting, because we discussed within the Security Radar that a belt of those West African juntas was created. ECOWAS was 15 countries that were in that sub-Saharan area and West Africa, which cooperated as an economic association like the European Union or something similar. And they broke away, because there is a junta in Mali, in Burkina Faso, and also in Niger. We discussed this recently.

And now what happened? The United States, along with the French, had a base in Niger, from where, in cooperation with those local governments, they helped fight against these Islamists, jihadists. After the junta took power in Niger, they kicked them out, so the United States and France withdrew their troops and left that area.

Moderator: And imagine who is there…? Can I guess? Russians.

General Macko: Exactly. The Russians wormed their way in there, the Wagner Group came there first, and now the Russians have done it in such a way that they created the Africa Corps. By the way, the Africa Corps is a Nazi legacy from the past, Erwin Rommel commanded it. So the Russians have now built, following the model of those Nazis, the Africa Corps. These are basically successors to the Wagner Group, but the Russians now openly admit that they are supported, financed, and sponsored by the Russian Ministry of Defense.

These are trying to do several things there. First, to keep those juntas in power, to help them against the Islamists, because they disrupt order there, and mainly to mine diamonds and other minerals. To earn money.

Russia is strategically focused on this – they are trying to monopolize. This is also in Ukraine. There are large gas deposits around Crimea and in some parts of Ukraine. When the Russians take it, Europe will still be dependent only on Russian gas or from the rest of the world.

This is something that happened – after the collapse of the colonial empire, the Western world seemed to be less interested in Africa, abandoned it. 65% of natural resources today are controlled by China, and Russia is trying to grab the rest as quickly as possible.

Moderator: And what about the French?

General Macko: The French, unfortunately, are gradually leaving from there. They are losing influence there, even though they were former French colonies.

And the Russians, exactly as always. Let’s take it. In Europe, the Russians say that they still celebrate victory over fascism, even though they brought the second totalitarianism. And a moment ago we said that they were close allies – the Soviets and the Nazis. So although the Russians say, they maintain that tradition that they fight against fascism, at the same time they are the biggest sponsor and supporter of these extreme right-wing movements throughout Europe.

And in Africa, they do the same – they say that they help countries against former colonialists and the like. And gradually, in silence, they build their Russian colonies there. I just remind that in reality, Russia, where its territory is today, never built colonies and went straight to annexation. As Putin said, where the foot of a Russian soldier steps, it is ours. „This is ours.“

And this is a message probably also in connection with the anniversary of August 21, 1968, and the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Russian troops have already entered here twice. And that’s why Putin still thinks he has a claim to this whole Central and Eastern Europe. And it would be ideal for him if there were puppet governments here, like in Belarus. Because Lavrov also said this week that it’s not just about some territories in Ukraine. That they want to have such a political regime in Ukraine that they need and want.

And this is actually a warning and the main message of this week. Beware, these are permanent Russian imperial interests, here and in Africa. They will have cutthroats, killers there just to keep those countries under their influence.

Quote at the End

Moderator: What could perhaps be a quote for this difficult week?

General Macko: I’ve been saying for a long time that Russian imperial policy has not changed from Tsarist Russia through Bolshevik Russia to the present day. It’s just called differently. And that Putin dreamed of re-establishing Greater Russia. He’s a man from the KGB, raised on one teat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other from the KGB, and that stayed with him.

And that these people, supporters of Russia, like our red revolutionary Blaha and similar ones, actually still preach some Red Revolution, which, regardless of the victims, is supposedly the best for society.

So I’ll remind what none other than Sir Winston Churchill said about this regime: „Everyone sees how communism decomposes the soul of a nation, makes it miserable in peace and vile in war.“

Read also:

https://pavelmacko.sk/2025/08/14/general-pavel-mackos-security-radar-episode-125/

Analysis of the Situation on the Ukrainian Front with General Pavel Macko – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

The post General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar 127 appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#360 #Alaska Summit #Fog of War #Macko #peace talks #Putin #Russia #stategic bombing #strategic backgroung #Trump #USA #War in Ukraine #Zelensky

Full transcript of the popular podcast in weekly .týždeň . Originally released Aug 15, 2025 (in Slovak).

Welcome to listening to the 126th edition of General Pavel Macko’s security radar, whom I welcome here.

Pavel Macko: Thank you, have a nice day.

Fog of War

Moderator: Trump and Putin’s meeting will begin literally in a few hours. We’ll return to the preparation and expectations in the background. On the battlefield, or even in the rear, nothing indicates that the war should end. So, Pali, what’s the development?

Pavel Macko: Exactly. We see that both sides are trying to achieve the maximum until the last moment. That means, no slackening of troop activity, that they are preparing to take some advantageous defensive positions, but intense fighting is taking place.

Moderator: I’ll start with strategic bombing. I just read that Ukrainians attacked some cargo ship with weapons.

Pavel Macko: I just caught this from you, that it’s an Iranian cargo ship in a port in the Caspian Sea, where they were transporting Shahed drones. This is a sign that both sides are going all out until the last moment. When we look at Russian strategic attacks, it has quieted down a bit in terms of cities. Nevertheless, the Russians attacked Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro on the 8th. On 10.08, they attacked in the Dnipropetrovsk region and claim to have destroyed 4 Patriot launchers and a radar, which should probably affect air defense. On the 14th, they attacked in Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk.

Russian intelligence says they focused on Sapsan or Grim-2 missile systems. They claim to have eliminated Ukraine’s capability in the area of these deep strikes.

I’ll comment on this a bit. The destruction of Patriots wouldn’t be something exceptional; we’ve seen it before. 4 launchers, that’s about half of a fire battery. It’s a serious loss because they’re looking for every single launcher. Here’s just my note, because even before, when they destroyed some part of a Patriot near Kyiv more than a year ago, it turned out that it had been sitting in one place for too long.

This is a mobile device. It is, of course, used for strategic defense in the case of Ukraine, but it needs to be moved. That means moving and implementing measures that the Iranians experienced – that we must have these devices protected. Not only against those large missiles that shoot it down but also against drones and other devices that its radar doesn’t normally see. That means, multi-layered defense must be done.

We’ll see if this is confirmed or not. Of course, it would be unpleasant, but again, this is a big war where neither side can remain without losses.

As for the destruction of Sapsan, I’m not sure if they really managed to liquidate these factories. Whether they tried to do it, whether it wasn’t just about the launchers somewhere in Sumy, but that there are those military armories in Dnipropetrovsk.

Here, I would say that sometimes silence is golden. I understand that President Zelensky needs to boost morale and that he talks about „we have already tested those rockets, we are ready,“ but when he presents it too publicly, he draws a lot of attention, because the other side will evaluate it as a real threat and will do everything to destroy it. It would be more sensible to produce a few hundred and then announce it and the next day make a flurry. But whether they really destroyed it or not, we will see by whether the Ukrainians will use them.

Moderator: Well, and what about the Ukrainians then, how are they doing?

Pavel Macko: The Ukrainians were also extremely active. You already mentioned that last event now, which I haven’t studied in depth yet, but when we look, they attacked virtually every day:

▪️August 9 in the Volgograd region – a refinery in Volgograd, by the way, the smoke can still be seen even now

▪️August 10 in the Belgorod region – ammunition depot

▪️August 11 in the Bryansk region – a railway junction used for military logistics (by the way, this was also part of that Kursk operation, that there was a possibility to eliminate several of those directions)

▪️August 12 in the Krasnodar Territory – they attack there often, but now they attacked fuel storage tanks, and not with air drones, but with naval drones

That means, they actually sailed across the entire Black Sea and hit with naval drones, which are in the Sea of Azov and hit coastal storage tanks. So it wasn’t quite the eastern Black Sea coast, but it was in the Sea of Azov. That means, they had to get to it or pass by Kerch unobserved under the Kerch Bridge.

Moderator: So that definitely caught my interest. I’m just waiting for when that Kerch Bridge will come up.

Pavel Macko: I think that at the moment it’s not such a priority that they would invest too much in it. The Russians are guarding it, and it wouldn’t give any operational advantage to the Ukrainians at the moment.

Moderator: And what about Pokrovsk? Is it really such a serious breakthrough as they say?

Pavel Macko: Well, now let’s look at those battlefields. The situation on that Donetsk front is, of course, tense. It’s like a tightly stretched string, where you just wait for it to snap.

I’ve been saying for a long time that the Russians are increasing that pressure, they have numerical superiority, they’re trying different tactics. And they managed a breakthrough with smaller units, they seeped through inconspicuously. And actually, under normal circumstances, if I looked at a 10-kilometer shift – well, that’s not like from Lužná to Bratislava. And I’ll say that in such a big war, it’s nothing.

Of course, but given that despite that enormous effort, enormous losses, we see those Russian advances – step by step, house by house, trench by trench, and it took them a year and a half – they actually made about a 10-kilometer advance over the course of this week.

Towards Dobropilia. I’ll just explain it, we don’t have a map, so it’s like:

▪️They’re fighting at Kupiansk. The fighting still persists there, nothing fundamental is changing. They’re trying to capture Kupiansk through that bridgehead, across the Oskil River.

▪️They’re fighting at Chasiv Yar, where they’ve already gotten behind that area, behind Chasiv Yar, but the Ukrainians are still holding in the northwestern part of Chasiv Yar.

▪️Kostiantynivka is free, but they’re kind of bypassing it.

▪️Battles similar to those in Chasiv Yar are also in Toretsk.

And to that, there’s also the area that is Pokrovsk. At Pokrovsk, they got from the south to Dachne, that’s southwest, that they bypassed Pokrovsk. But to Dobropilia, when they got further, there’s actually that road that goes from Pokrovsk and then goes north between Dobropilia and Kramatorsk. It’s such an important road that the Russians are trying to reach, because that would significantly affect logistics.

Despite the fact that terrain vehicles and the like are also used – the Russians at the beginning of the invasion, and the Ukrainians now need paved communications for large logistics. So it’s serious, mainly because they caught the Ukrainians being careless. Despite knowing that there’s huge pressure there, they allowed the Russians to make such a wedge with which they penetrated 10 kilometers. In this case, it’s quite a lot.

Because it allows, if it were to fall, for example, that Kostiantynivka, it would allow the Russians to open a gate for a larger attack or for the siege of Pokrovsk. But it’s not something that would mean that everything will collapse now and they’ll start advancing tens of kilometers. But the Russians will increase that pressure there.

We’re still talking about them looking for a place to push. Of course, the Russians don’t control 30% of the Donetsk region. And even if they didn’t encompass it, they want to have the most advantageous position, so that if by chance in the future, even after some ceasefire, the fighting is renewed, they would get as far as possible.

Moderator: We might talk about this tomorrow morning together, after the Trump-Putin meeting. You’ll be wiser, I probably won’t be, but you will be. Alright, let’s go to the criticism of Syrskyi.

Criticism of Syrskyi

Pavel Macko: Well, and this is related to precisely these battles. When we were talking here about him replacing Zaluzhnyi, we said, well, it’s a legitimate thing for President Zelensky, but by doing so, he’s also putting his hands more into those operations.

Syrskyi is exactly the person who has that long screwdriver and actually tries to manage, even micromanage, every unit. And here I would say that the criticism is partly justified, partly not.

Simply, no one changes. Zelensky took Syrskyi because he was the less rebellious one and asked less than Zaluzhnyi. On the other hand, it was known about Syrskyi that he’s that Soviet soldier. That he’s simply that unyielding one, that he commands. When he defended Bakhmut, he held Soledar for a long time, I criticized it, because they sacrificed three brigades in Soledar.

So the criticism is partly justified, but of course, you have to fight with what you have. You won’t have better ones. Here’s a different trend. When I was doing that study with those German colleagues from that first phase of the war, Ukraine still had those experienced soldiers from Donbas. And they really used mission command, or command through objective, they were independent.

But many of them also fell, many of them were rotated. And actually what happened is that we’ve now reached the stage that they had to mobilize and they’re using those officers who have those old Soviet habits. And really it’s as the Wall Street Journal wrote, that „a big Soviet army is destroying a small one.“

But that’s the worst thing the Ukrainians could have done. I’ve been criticizing it for at least a year and a half, that they must not adapt to Russian tactics, because Russian tactics are based on massive artillery strikes, aviation, and quantity.

It’s not true, as Tomáš Forró was writing now, that the Ukrainians are also lacking personnel, which is true, but that therefore they have no chance of winning and will lose sooner or later. That’s not true, because in history, rarely has pure quantity alone won. But of course, it’s a complex situation, the Ukrainians have to deal with it.

Middle East

Moderator: So, the Middle East. What’s new there? How is it developing?

Pavel Macko: The situation is influenced by the Israeli cabinet’s decision to occupy and clear Gaza. Currently, it’s such that preparatory work is underway. The General Staff is still planning the parameters of that operation. As we said in the introduction, a massive heat wave has hit not only Slovakia but also Israel. There, of course, it means something completely different.

At the moment, the order has already been issued for the evacuation of those people from the Gaza Strip. But the conditions or camp in the southern part of the Gaza Strip are not yet prepared.

Intense military operations were taking place. Israel again bombed several Hamas positions. There were also higher casualties. Thus, the humanitarian crisis is deepening. Although in one day, the Israelis released more, but significantly more trucks are prepared than they can let through continuously into that area.

What definitely caught the attention of all media were the protests and the killing of journalists. Up to six of them. Of course, Israel immediately said that the journalist, one from Al Jazeera, is or was… I saw photographs where he was photographed with those terrorists. That he was the head of a Hamas cell. That means, at that moment, he became a legitimate target, because that’s exactly the controversy, like when an unnamed „woodpecker“ in Slovakia infiltrated the media as a member of SIS [Slovak Intelligence Service].
Well, Peter Tóth.

Moderator: I was thinking, who is the woodpecker. Peter Tóth.

Pavel Macko: Well, that’s exactly where the boundaries end in a democratic society. Here we’re talking about when someone cooperates with terrorists, they can’t hide behind a microphone.

Of course, controversy was also caused by the statement of Bezalel Smotrich, a minister from those radicals, who again is considering expanding settlements in the West Bank. That’s not really the best time and the best topic to be opening now.

Moderator: Last time, last week, you mentioned that Israel wants to evacuate as many Palestinians as possible from Gaza City down south, by October 7 at the latest. And yesterday I read that they are also negotiating with some African country.

Pavel Macko: Well, and that’s interesting, because Sudan was divided, there’s also South Sudan, and actually Israel is also negotiating with South Sudan about potentially relocating parts of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to South Sudan.

Moderator: Permanently?

Pavel Macko: As soon as they come there temporarily and stay there for more than a year, it will be permanent, because these conditions are worsening in the Gaza Strip.

The city if it will be… because there was a conflict between Israeli forces, the Chief of General Staff says let’s besiege, they’re going to combine siege tactics directly through entry into the city or so-called „clearing operations.“ That’s why the evacuation orders were issued.

The problem is that conditions in the southern part of the Gaza Strip, in that open space where some tent city for 600,000 and more people is supposed to arise, don’t exist yet. I can’t imagine it, it’s also humanitarianly complex.

But on the other hand, these people will be pushed out of that area because of those operations, because otherwise there are huge losses threatened on both sides. And there’s also another risk, exactly the opposite, that Hamas, on the contrary, will try to forcibly keep those people in the Gaza Strip and in Gaza City. They will persuade some to stay, and some will be held there by force.

Moderator: I was completely shocked by the air supply and the fact that one of those packages hit a young Palestinian and killed him. How is it with that supply?

Pavel Macko: Overall, there have already been 23 such incidents. What’s the context? Gaza would need about 600 trucks daily to have such a smooth flow. There are several thousand trucks that are de facto already on the way, and now there are several problems.

The Israelis don’t recognize some unknown NGOs that help, because they don’t consider them partners. Part is stuck on some security checks and suspiciousness, so Israel wants to control each cargo, which delays it, but technically they could probably do it by putting more personnel there, making several control checkpoints, and getting a larger number of trucks into circulation.

To this comes an airlift, in which countries participate. Canada is extremely active, but also Spain and other European countries, which actually drop this aid. But that pallet has about one ton, that’s really the most crisis aid. There I would rather understand if some medical aid, medicines, and such things were dropped to get them as quickly as possible.

Israel allowed it because it trusts those partners that they won’t be dropping weapons and explosives there. But of course, those people are desperate. We’ve experienced this in Africa, we experience it in various conflict zones, that those people desperately lunge for that aid until the last moment. But that pallet is not a parachute with a person, it falls relatively quickly, which means, unfortunately, that accident happened, and there are several problems.

Strategic Background

Moderator: Strategic background. So in a few hours, what will happen?

Pavel Macko: Well, a meeting between Donald Trump and President Putin.

Moderator: And what do you expect from it? Are you optimistic?

Pavel Macko: Well, I have mixed feelings, to be honest. But Trump in his recent statements sounded quite reasonable, he was sending indirect signals to Putin, in my opinion.

But the risk is that he wants to meet one-on-one. This last happened, I think, in Helsinki in 2018, and nobody was enthusiastic about it, because he actually came with such very accommodating steps in favor of Putin.

Moderator: So one former colleague wrote that she wanted to faint to interrupt that negotiation.

Pavel Macko: Yes, I read that somewhere too. Well, what’s the risk? It needs to be said that Trump is not a professional diplomat and he’s up against a KGB agent, who has actually led the state all his life, has these Machiavellian methods under his skin, commands the world map, commands all these nooks and crannies.

It turned out that even with Kim Jong-un, that Trump is… I don’t want to disparage, he’s a president elected by 77 million Americans, so I’d prefer not to comment on him, but simply, he’s a person who is naive in this. Simply, he doesn’t have it studied, that’s the difference compared to Biden, because Biden was a long-time diplomat, a long-time politician. Trump was a real estate agent.

Well, and the problem is that he sometimes nods to something in good faith. It’s not that he’s bad, or too accommodating to Putin, but he simply nods in good faith to something that he thinks is fine, and then finds out that it’s completely different or off, because he sometimes has such childish…

Moderator: Maybe he doesn’t even realize.

Pavel Macko: Well, take for example, he was signing after being elected and after inauguration, he was signing some decrees and some orders, even with Spain, and he asked if it’s a country in BRICS. So Spain, that’s one of the bigger partners in NATO. A schoolboy here would probably know that, but again I say, this is the risk that simply the charm of personality, and we don’t know yet, of course, I wouldn’t go into these conspiracies, what all they have prepared for Trump.

From his statements, I saw a sincere effort that he won’t give it so easily to Putin. But Putin will try to use this situation, because he delayed everything, fulfilled nothing, and still demanded a meeting. Trump said he would mainly listen to him. Let’s hope it will be so.

But actually, it will all be about Putin wanting to open several questions and give that lollipop on which he wants to lure him, because we know that Trump, even in the election campaign, said that he would like to reduce armaments, that he would like simply… Because the INF treaty on those short and medium-range missiles. This strategic agreement fell. The last START is falling. And thereby there’s no replacement for those disarmament treaties from the times of the deep Cold War, and there’s a threat that a new round of the arms race will really be unleashed. Well, and the Russians are offering him that they could negotiate about this.

Moderator: Exactly. And that’s why the signaling needs to be seen in this context as well, because this is called diplomatic signaling. There will be the Zapad [West] exercise, and among other things, the Russians are communicating that in mid-September, they will practice with the Belarusians the use of tactical nuclear weapons, the use of „oreshniki“ [nut-crackers].

Pavel Macko: All this is supposed to make a bait and atmosphere. This is reflexive control. That’s exactly what influences the actions of the other side.

So let’s wait for the results. It’s a few hours. I’m curious myself, because it can go awry in all directions, but one thing is certain. We also discussed this with Martin Svárovský, that in the end, it won’t work without Ukraine. Ukraine has been at war for too long, has been defending itself for too long, and is too big to just accept a new Munich Dictate with the blink of an eye.

Moderator: In connection with tomorrow’s meeting, Chancellor Merz initiated a whole series of meetings of European leaders. How do you evaluate those activities?

Pavel Macko: I think it was necessary. I actually spoke on this topic, I think, on Czech Television last week, that this is exactly what they should be doing, that diplomacy should now be taking place behind the scenes.

Of course, there was something for the cameras, some of it was signals towards Putin, some towards Trump, so that it was also said publicly where some „red lines“ are in quotation marks, so that Trump would also be in the situation that he has to perceive it and can’t then subsequently say that he didn’t know about it.

But I would just pick out two aspects from it. First, what is actually like a prerequisite, on which the partners agreed. Because the atmosphere was good, everyone evaluated it positively. We know that behind the scenes it was probably ugly, as they say in English, so it’s less nice, but there was no discord in advance.

That means, what they at least agreed on was that the format of the negotiations should be such that any final agreement must be with the participation of Ukraine, perhaps other partners as well. Trump also promised that if they agree now, they could quickly proceed next week to trilateral negotiations, and perhaps there would be other partners there as well.

The second thing is that a ceasefire is an absolutely basic condition, that there must be some security guarantees, and the United States indicated that they could be engaged in this, we don’t know yet how, well, and that Russia will not have a veto, even though Trump said that he won’t let Ukraine into NATO anyway.

Moderator: Alright, and what if Putin doesn’t back down?

Pavel Macko: Well, if he doesn’t back down, then we’re in a situation where Trump has lost his pants and image, because in that case, he will look like a very weak negotiator, because he gave an ultimatum, which he even shortened. The ultimatum expired, but he didn’t actually implement anything. Meanwhile, of course, to avoid this stress, he sent Witkoff to persuade Putin. I think it’s on a good path, but I don’t trust Putin too much.

So I caught such a statement, from Trump’s first administration was Marshall Billingslea. He’s such an expert, a plenipotentiary precisely for sanctions, and he’s actually saying what would need to be done. Complete blocking, that simply those sanctions must come. And that would mean complete blocking against all financial institutions, completely cutting off the Russians from the SWIFT system, but also sanctioning secondarily all foreign banks that would try to produce some secondary, some parallel settlement system that the Russians could use.

Furthermore, immediately impose sanctions on several Chinese banks that have, for example, financed exports to Russia and to the aviation and defense sector. Because that machinery for the aviation defense sector went there.

Another thing is to announce sectoral sanctions on all Russian energy transactions, including secondary sanctions, that means, for the time being, there could also be those 25% sanctions that were announced, or tariffs on India, on China. This could be done immediately, and then that law could also come, which is actually in the American Congress. That’s Senator Graham and also Blumenthal. They have 84 co-submitters, so there’s strong pressure there.

And one important thing is that they could also add and expand sanctions on the Russian grey fleet. The United Kingdom did something, the European Union did. In total, there are more than 500 ships that are leased in Russia in all sorts of ways. They would be able to block them in some way.

Of course, if these measures were done, they would be able to throttle Putin by 600 million dollars a day and at the same time, those interests from these frozen parts or from those frozen assets that are there could be given to buy American weapons for Ukraine for the time being. So this would certainly help.

But these are things that we’ve known for, let’s say, three years. And with those sanctions, progress is so terribly slow that the Russians always manage to avoid parts of those sanctions in some way.

VAT on Arms Production

Moderator: Alright, let’s go to Slovakia. Some government politicians, and even the Slovakia movement, have an idea that they want to increase VAT on arms production and maximize the tax and license fees on arms companies, because they allegedly make extreme profits. That seems fine at first glance, you’re making money on weapons. What do you think about it?

Pavel Macko: Well, it has several problems. I would say it bluntly, that it’s dangerous stupid populism and in the end, it would harm Slovakia. Also our defense capability and it would prolong the modernization of the army. And it could drive those manufacturers out of Slovakia.

I’ll try to break it down a bit in two minutes.

First, increasing VAT doesn’t make sense. Those weapons and ammunition are sold primarily abroad, and VAT is applied at the final consumption in our territory. That means, when we increase VAT, on one hand, we’ve increased the defense budget, and right away we take it, because actually, the state pays that VAT to itself. That means, you just recycle your money, which would mean a significant increase in the cost of modernizing our army, which is probably not the best thing we could do in this situation.

As for those licenses and tax increases, well, we have some tax laws, as generally from the point of view of the rule of law. Making up special taxes, that’s like when they invented a special pension for Prime Minister FICO and wanted a special pension for the Attorney General, but not every one, but precisely that Žilinka. This is simply nonsense. This simply isn’t done, because it’s legally non-standard. There should be clear rules.

But quite essential is that good arms factories have always been a lucrative business. But this would actually make the sale of these weapons and ammunition to Ukraine even more expensive. That means, I’m surprised at the Slovakia movement, that apart from that lack of knowledge of economic principles, that we’re actually increasing VAT at home for our own army and making our modernization more expensive, that we’re going to penalize even the Ukrainians, because we’ve caught on to some statement by Robert Fico that „not even a bullet to Ukraine.“ Now we criticize him that he exports more there, that’s okay that we criticize him, but we don’t criticize him for the fact that those arms factories, those weapons are exported there. We criticize him for the hypocrisy that Robert Fico is actually presenting with this.

But now imagine, it’s supposed to be up to 5% of defense expenditure. And so, do we want to buy everything from abroad? Or will we sink our arms factories, or create an environment for them. I would, on the contrary, reduce income taxes precisely to motivate increased production and development of the sector and reduce taxes, or for example, give some state support.

Let’s take, in Vlkanová we have a Slovak arms factory, which grew on a green meadow, which built a quad – a combat vehicle, but the main thing is what’s on it. It’s actually one of the main tools for example for fighting against drones, which are becoming dominant on that battlefield, and they can export it, and we’re actually going to burden them with taxes now and punish them for success.

Simply, this is exactly wrong, when we look at the economy having just 0.2% growth now, one of the smallest in the entire European Union and in the eurozone. That curve of growth decline is horrible when we look at the last year and a half, and that’s not even fully reflecting all those consolidation measures, which are literally suffocating the economy. Let’s not rake and poke into what works.

World War II – Balkans

Moderator: So let’s go to the continuation of the cycle about World War II. Last time we analyzed the Battle of Britain here, and today we’re moving to the Balkans. What was happening there?

Pavel Macko: So briefly, there was the battle for the Balkans, for Greece. Albania was annexed by Italy already in 1939, but Mussolini was looking at Greece. Now he was frustrated by how the Germans were advancing everywhere with blitzkrieg. So he decided without coordination with the Germans to attack Greece. And it didn’t end well. It ended well for the Greeks, but only temporarily, unfortunately.

When we talk, these are battles in the Balkans, which eventually includes the occupation of Yugoslavia and ended with the battle for Crete. So I’ll briefly just first say those events:

On October 28, 1940, Italy attacked Greece from Albania with about 70,000 soldiers. It started with the Italians giving an ultimatum to the Greeks to allow them to advance at sea and to essentially surrender, submit, and subordinate themselves to Italian interests. But the war didn’t develop according to Italian expectations. The Greeks, first of all, stood their ground and said they wouldn’t back down and started fighting.

And subsequently, they even pushed those Italians back into Albania in early November. In December to January, in winter, Greek units advanced deep into southern Albania, to key cities, key mountain passes.

And in February, Britain got involved in it. I remind you that at that time, Cyprus was part of the British Empire. The British had interests in the eastern Mediterranean, and of course, Italian expansion into the Aegean Sea would have threatened their interests. So the British began helping the Greeks with the help of the Royal Air Force and their commando soldiers.

And the Italians got a thrashing. Then the Germans launched Operation Marita in April 1941, and on April 27, the Germans finally conquered Athens. Greece came under Axis occupation. And finally, on June 1, 1941, the resistance on Crete also ended.

Moderator: Well, you already mentioned at the beginning that the main cause of the Italian-Greek war was Mussolini’s imperial megalomania. And what was going on in Yugoslavia?

Pavel Macko: Well, I would still go back a bit to that Mussolini and maybe to those parameters, that when we look, Italy deployed 6 divisions and later increased it to 29 divisions and 400,000 soldiers. But they were poorly equipped, had very low morale, simply it wasn’t going well for them.

Greece started with 4 divisions and 50,000 soldiers, expanded it to 13, but they had strong defensive tactics, high morale, it was in the mountains. The United Kingdom then got involved, and finally Germany attacked in April with 24 divisions, led by Field Marshal List.

When I return to those causes, Mussolini imagined a new Roman Empire. He wanted to achieve all this in the Mediterranean, he wanted to expand Italy’s influence to Greece, to Yugoslavia, to the Balkans. And it was also such frustration, he was jealous of the Germans, that in that Axis, where he was together with Germany and Japan, he played second fiddle.

With Greece, there was of course long-term tension. By the way, October 28 is a very significant, memorial day in Greece. It’s called „Oxi“ day. Oxi was „no,“ because the Italians gave an ultimatum to the Greeks, and the Greek prime minister said that they shouldn’t submit, that simply they would defend themselves. Literally, that was the statement, „so there will be war then.“

And actually, when I now return to Yugoslavia, that’s an interesting development. Because Yugoslavia at the beginning was forced by the Axis countries to sign an agreement with these Axis countries and was like an ally, but that lasted only a few days. In March 1941, it reluctantly signed that tripartite pact under pressure from Germany and Italy.

Two days later, on March 27, there was a coup d’état in Yugoslavia led by pro-British officers. Yugoslavia became a monarchy, they installed King Peter II as the ruling monarch. This angered Hitler, because he counted on using Yugoslavia for his goals. Suddenly it was unreliable for him and a threat to his Balkan strategy.

The Italians also disappointed him, so he decided to solve things himself and directly. On April 6, 1941, Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria launched a coordinated invasion of Yugoslavia. It fell in 11 days, Belgrade was heavily bombed. They divided that Yugoslavia. Germany occupied Central Serbia, Italy annexed parts of Slovenia, Kosovo, and Dalmatia. Hungary and Bulgaria also took a part, the Hungarians the north. And the Independent State of Croatia was established in that territory.

But a resistance movement emerged in Yugoslavia, and the country became a focal point of partisan warfare. This then had an impact on the entire course of World War II and further courses of battles in the Balkans, but even on the Cold War.

If we look at it, that resistance had two parts. One were the Chetniks. That was led by General Draža Mihailović. Later, however, those Western allies opposed him, because they suspected him of helping the Nazis in the fight against partisans. And the partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito, they fought in the mountains. They then received great support from the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the USA, and eventually gradually liberated that Yugoslavia.

The significance was that the March coup (1941) in Yugoslavia diverted German troops. They had to delay the operation for the invasion of Greece. Thereby, however, the Barbarossa plan was also delayed. The Germans didn’t manage to get to Moscow after the invasion of the Soviet Union before winter, and actually, it all broke for them. So that was probably the most important thing. And of course, Mussolini’s collapse.

360°

Moderator: 360° Pali, what’s on your radar?

Pavel Macko: Well, again, the situation in Congo, in western Africa, and in the Sahel region is becoming more complicated. The UN is paying increased attention to this. And the problem is that the Security Council holds such regular briefings. So they did such a briefing. It actually got like to the top. It also lit up red on my radar, because the Security Council was discussing it.

There’s a quite difficult humanitarian situation there. There are large such inter-tribal attacks. Well, and actually this something, if you remember that conflict between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda, that was a very bloody conflict, so this is actually still about the same thing. That this area is such a hot cauldron, where it boils and at the moment it’s bubbling and boiling over again.

Moderator: Alright, and what kind of conflict is it? Where does it have its roots?

Pavel Macko: Well, that conflict, it’s a long-term conflict. It goes actually back to the colonial era, because there are several groups there, actually large numbers of inhabitants were relocated there.

And when I look, there was always some war there. Actually, this current situation is that in the Kivu area, there’s such an M23 movement – rebels, who have actually been fighting for a long time for some self-determination. There’s a big escalation of violence, they’re dragging Rwanda, Uganda into it.

But when I take it that those roots go really back to the fact that actually during Belgian colonial rule, large numbers of those Hutus and Tutsis were forcibly relocated from Rwanda to eastern Congo. And that of course caused long-term ethnic tension. Those ethnicities compete or vie for survival, for their living space, for access to food, to resources.

And there was a whole series of wars there. The Masisi War in 1993, then there was an uprising in 1996, which was led by Tutsis in Kivu and it grew into further regional wars, which drew in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi. There was the so-called Second Congo War. And that is sometimes called the African World War. It was in the years 1998 to 2003.

Europe tried to intervene there, as did the UN. And actually, what happened then was that 9 countries and dozens of armed groups actually fought each other, everyone against everyone. So it’s very complex there, it will continue to be complex, there are those cycles of violence and various militias, and there are of course also geopolitical factors. Simply, there are long-term fights and unrest in the Congo area. It’s actually a country rich in gold, tin. But also other minerals that are mined there, some, for example, important for the electronics industry. There’s 80% of the world’s reserves of coltan, where there are two types of such elements, which are actually used in the electronics industry.

Moderator: You mentioned regional influences. How does it affect neighboring countries?

Pavel Macko: At the moment, it’s such that the whole surroundings are destabilized, and we have just in North Kivu 2.5 million people who have been displaced. And thousands more people are hiding in individual areas. There’s a total collapse of healthcare. Well, and there’s a lack of access to basic food.

This potentially threatens that if it doesn’t manage to be dampened, and the world’s largest UN mission is operating there between them, then we have a huge conflict, which can again change to the fact that more of these countries will actually get involved with each other. And that will also mean huge pressure on already broken countries, like Mali, Niger, and those others. And those refugees will simply move somewhere, presumably only northward.

Moderator: Last week we were talking here about Cambodia and Thailand. Those two countries were also filling world media. It’s somehow quieted down. Is there anything new there?

Pavel Macko: Positive, because so far the ceasefire is being observed. There was also some diplomatic development. Cambodia and Thailand held a meeting of that General Border Committee, or what we would call, that demarcation commission, in Kuala Lumpur on August 7. They agreed in detail on a 13-point ceasefire plan. The movement of troops was frozen. There’s a ban on attacks on civilians. ASEAN observer teams are being deployed there. So it’s a fortunately good development so far.

But even that short conflict has its humanitarian and economic impact. When I look at my notes, 130,000 evacuated in Cambodia, they report injured children. GDP in Cambodia will decrease by 3% this year and as a result of a 20% decline in tourism. And there’s a problem that they have rotating, migrating workers there. That movement will also be restricted. So here you can see that even such a very short conflict can have quite strong consequences.

Final Quote

Moderator: So let’s go to the quote.

Pavel Macko: This week I was thinking that we all have such great expectations. In the end, we’ll probably be disappointed. I would give one from Samuel Huntington, the author of the book about the clash of civilizations, very famous, popular, which came out in the 90s. And he says that „expectations should not be taken for granted, because you never know when you will be disappointed.“

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Deputy Speaker of Parliament Andrej Danko criticizes the president and defense minister for attending only a two-week summer camp instead of mandatory military service, while declaring they won’t fight. He himself proposes reintroducing mandatory service, yet rules out any real military threat to Slovakia. Why then do we need mandatory service? Does he want to use it to raise boys into men?

The war in Ukraine has forced countries to reassess their defense strategies. Is mandatory military service the answer to new security challenges, or is it a relic of the past that brings more risks than benefits? Let’s look at the arguments for and against, and how different countries approach this sensitive topic.

Mandatory Service in the New Security Environment

Many countries shifted to professional armies after the Cold War ended. These were mainly intended to handle international crisis management. Large-scale and prolonged war was considered unlikely. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, swept this assumption aside and brought back the question of preparing for war.

Will mandatory service return as it was during socialism? What worked in the past may not work today. The political regime has changed, society is evolving, and new technologies and threats are emerging. This new reality requires new approaches. The key will be to respond flexibly to changing threats and potential long-term crises. But this requires people – qualified and prepared. Finding a suitable model of defense and security can strengthen a country’s resilience and readiness.

Finland maintained mandatory training for men even after the Cold War ended. As a result, it now has one of Europe’s most prepared armies with more than 900,000 reservists. This model is proving extremely effective in the new security reality. Other countries are considering reintroducing mandatory service.

Hundreds of thousands of reservists may not be enough. What matters is whether they are well-trained and prepared to defend their homeland on the 21st-century battlefield. Mass mobilization in Ukraine revealed many problems with mandatory service. Ukraine mobilized only after the war began, having abolished mandatory service a few years earlier.

Some were lucky and completed proper training or retraining on new equipment abroad. Most had only quick 14-45 day training. This didn’t provide conscripts with sufficient preparation, leading to high casualties and low effectiveness. Short training can’t replace years of professional preparation. Untrained units are more vulnerable and less effective. They’re not suitable for all tasks. But when you’re at war, you don’t have many options.

Although Russians officially claim they didn’t use conscripts in the war against Ukraine, their experience with conscripts isn’t positive either. According to testimonies from many captured Russian conscripts, their morale and commitment were low. Insufficient training and weak motivation contributed to the Russian army’s failures. Mass deployment of poorly prepared conscripts isn’t a recipe for victory.

These experiences show us the risks of mass mobilization. A modern army requires quality and long-term training, not just quick courses. Only professional soldiers receive this. They are expensive, not abundant, and not needed in such numbers during peacetime. In conflict, professionals will still handle the most complex tasks. But they’ll need support and reinforcement from reservists. Reservists will also have many tasks away from the main battlefield, such as protecting critical infrastructure and territorial defense.

Professional vs. Conscript Army

Many countries waver between professional and conscript armies. Both models have their strengths and weaknesses. A professional army offers a high level of training and specialization, but at the cost of higher expenses and lower numbers.

Professionals are better prepared for modern combat. Specialization allows more efficient deployment of resources. Professional soldiers know each other long-term; cohesion and morale in professional units are higher. On the other hand, a conscript army provides a larger number of soldiers and a broader social base. While a professional army may be partially isolated and forgotten by society, a conscript army involves almost every family and thus unites the nation.

The Swiss model of mandatory service for men is considered successful. Almost 50% of the male population undergoes 18-21 weeks of training. This gives Switzerland prepared reserves with more than 100,000 soldiers that can be quickly activated. The traditional quality vs. quantity dilemma shows here in full force.

The ideal solution appears to be a hybrid model – a professional core supplemented by well-trained reserves, including smaller but rapidly available active reserves. Active reserves should be something like part-time professional soldiers.

A professional army will always be fully utilized. When integrated into a collective defense system, it will have three main tasks: to respond and fight immediately, to ensure the reception and integration of allies, and to mobilize and train reserves. To train new conscripts and provide advanced training for reservists, you need quality instructors. These are only found in a professional army.

Overview of European Models

In Europe, we find a diverse range of approaches to mandatory service. Countries like Finland, Sweden, Norway, Greece, and Austria still actively use mandatory service. The Nordic models appear most successful. Service length ranges from 6 to 19 months. While Finns have 6-12 months of training, Swedes have 11 months. In the Norwegian model, training lasts 12-19 months.

Finland’s total defense system involves almost all men in service. They receive quality military training and become part of prepared reserves. This approach has high public support and is perceived as an essential part of national security. Sweden promotes a selective model, where only a portion of the population is drafted annually. Selected citizens complete 11-month training and form the basis for mobilization.

The success of these models lies in their flexibility and adaptation to modern conditions. It’s not so much about classic mandatory service, but about a targeted system of building reserves.

Traditionally, mandatory service was the domain of men. In the 21st century, however, more countries are inclining toward a more universal model. The argument is not only gender equality but also the practical advantages of involving the entire population. Women make up 50% of the population; their potential cannot be ignored. Modern combat requires diverse skills, not just physical strength. The inclusion of women has a positive impact on unit dynamics.

Norway and Sweden have already introduced mandatory service for both genders. The Norwegian experience shows that universal service is not only possible but beneficial. Since 2015, women have been required to complete service under the same conditions as men, without exemptions. After initial concerns, the system has proven successful, with women now making up 25-30% of conscripts.

Civilian Alternative and National Service

Not everyone is made for the army, even if they’re willing to serve their country. Others, for various personal reasons, don’t want to serve with weapons. To ensure a fair approach and equality of citizens, many countries offer the option of civilian service.

Civilian service respects individual freedom of conscience. It allows meaningful contribution to defense in non-military ways. This strengthens the connection between the army and the rest of society. It builds cohesion in good times and bad.

An interesting concept is national service combining military and civilian elements. The French model of universal national service is an example of such an approach. Young people can either undergo military training or engage in civilian missions in education, environment, or solidarity. This combines personal development with community benefit. So far, it’s an experiment that may soon become the norm.

Civilian alternatives to mandatory service extend its social reach. They allow everyone to find their role in defending and developing the country. But what about public support for mandatory service and these models?

Public Support

The success of any mandatory service model depends on public support. While in Slovakia we have the lowest willingness to fight for our country and the highest susceptibility to conspiracies, attitudes in other European countries are more confident. Out of cowardice, we hallucinate about self-declared neutrality and protection from the Russian behemoth. Our neighbors and partners are looking for ways to strengthen their country and its resilience against threats.

Surveys show significant differences between countries and generations. While support is high in Finland and Norway, elsewhere it’s lower. In Nordic countries, 70-80% of the population supports mandatory service. In the rest of Europe, support ranges from 30% to 60%. Younger generations are less inclined toward mandatory service. Partly because it affects them, and the current era offers opportunities and freedoms they’re reluctant to give up. But without resilience and defense of the country, they could quickly lose them completely.

A key factor is the perception of threats and willingness to defend the country. A Ukrainian survey from 2022 showed that up to 80% of residents were willing to defend their homeland. This is in sharp contrast to 25% before the Russian invasion began. A real threat thus dramatically increases support for military duty.

If we want to achieve broad acceptance of mandatory service, we must work with public opinion. We need open discussion about benefits and disadvantages, seeking consensus. Mandatory military service is not a black-and-white issue. It’s certainly not a topic suitable for populist arguments.

It brings many advantages for national security and resilience. It ensures sufficient numbers of trained reserves and broad social participation in defense. It strengthens the country’s readiness to face new threats. It creates a sense of civic responsibility and solidarity, overcomes social differences, and builds cohesion.

On the other hand, it also has its costs and risks. For individuals, it means interrupting studies or careers and personal sacrifices. For society, it represents a significant economic and organizational burden. If poorly designed, it can lead to wasting human potential and reducing combat effectiveness. The psychological impacts of forced service also cannot be underestimated. Not everyone is ready for the challenges of military life and the pressure of combat situations.

Conclusion

New security threats and changed social conditions require reassessment of current models. Experiences from Ukraine and other conflicts show us both challenges and opportunities for a modern army.

The ideal defense model combines a professional core with well-trained reserves. It offers flexible options for involvement for men and women, military and civilian. It relies on high social support and shared values.

The path to such a model is not simple. It requires open and informed discussion, willingness to seek compromises, and courage to change established practices. We must ask not only about the cost of mandatory service but also about the cost of unpreparedness.

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Trump’s ultimatum has expired. The end of the war, however, is nowhere in sight, but everyone is already looking forward to a possible meeting between Putin and Trump. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is considering occupying the entire territory of the Gaza Strip.

Welcome to listening to the 125th edition of General Pavel Macko’s security radar.

Moderator: Paľo, welcome.

Pavel Macko: Good day.

Fog of War

Moderator: We’ve already discussed possible Trump negotiations, negotiations in Moscow on our website and in the video I recorded with you, Paľo. Let’s go straight to the situation on the battlefields.

Strategic Bombing in Ukraine

Paľo Macko: I’ll start by saying that strategic bombing continues from both sides. Incidentally, this was also one of the rumors that the Russians might want to offer a suspension of these strategic attacks. But that would be unilaterally advantageous for the Russians, despite them increasing the production of drones and missiles.

Ukrainians, by counter-attacking deep into Russian territory and destroying their factories and bases, are weakening the Russians‘ capacity that could be thrown onto the battlefield itself.

Record Russian Drone Attacks

Russians are breaking records again. I have statistics here for the last month:

▪️In June, Russians launched approximately 5,400 Shahed drones at Ukraine

▪️Last month it was already 6,443 drones

▪️That averages over 200 drones per day

The attacks are massive. We’ve seen multiple records broken in July, and attacks in the last week that were very massive. They are based on Shahed technology.

Ukrainians destroyed one storage facility, but according to Ukrainian intelligence, Russians are now capable of producing around 170 drones per day. Compared to May, they’ve increased it by another 70; at that time, they were producing about 100. The formal goal is 300 drones per day by the end of the year, but realistically it’s about 190-200 drones.

What does this mean? Russians are able to accumulate these drones. When we saw 700 drones in one day, these attacks could be even stronger. They also use rocket attacks, and this could lead to such a volume that we might experience up to 2,000 drones in a day.

Ukrainian Attacks on Russian Positions

Ukrainians are also trying to attack. This week there were again attacks by Ukrainians on Russian positions. I’ll look at the list; there were many targets hit:

▪️Oil refinery in Novokuibyshevsk in the Samara region

▪️Storage and launch site for Shahid drones in the Primorsko-Akhtiarsk region

▪️Elektropribor plant

What’s important is that there’s quite successful coordination of Ukrainian forces – the SBU security service, HUR military intelligence, and unmanned systems forces can coordinate and comprehensively plan such operations.

Situation on the Battlefields

Kursk and Sumy Regions

Fighting continues in the Kursk and Sumy regions. In the Kursk region, Russians tried to renew their offensive, but it was extinguished.

Looking at the Sumy region, more complex reports emerged about how Ukrainian commandos got into the rear of Russian units and eliminated several companies. A small diversionary group managed to cause casualties of around 330 dead and several hundred wounded. They had it prepared. When they made contact, Ukrainians were able to support the attack with drones and other means, and the losses on the Russian side were large.

Russians still hold a smaller buffer zone in the Sumy region. I’d pause here. They say it’s a buffer zone, but in reality, it looks different. Sumy is a city of 250,000. It’s a big city and relatively close to the borders. Here the Russians could try to take the city or make a gray zone out of it, because then they would keep Ukrainians in check and have another area. And if not capture it, then destroy it.

We see that Russians are now pushing in negotiations for recognition of control over the Kherson region. But Ukrainians drove them out of Kherson. Zaporizhzhia region – Russians don’t control Zaporizhzhia as a large city of a million people, nor do they currently have a chance to control it.

It cannot be ruled out that Russians might try to make a larger offensive in this direction and then pressure Ukrainians: „Okay, we’ll leave Sumy alone, but you have to give us Zaporizhzhia…“ That’s a rogue tactic.

Kharkiv Region and Kupiansk

Fighting is taking place in the Kharkiv region. So far, Russians have failed to consolidate the two protrusions – Lyptsi and Vovchansk, which form Russian force protrusions in Ukrainian territory.

The situation is most complicated near Pokrovsk, where they’re advancing from both the southwest and northwest. Pokrovsk is not surrounded, but the main supply route between Pokrovsk and Dnipro is gradually coming into the firing range of Russian forces.

Moderator: You mentioned Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. I don’t know if you want to add anything to that.

Paľo Macko: No, I would perhaps return to Kupiansk, because this is the second hot spot. Russians declared that they’ve moved further, but it appears that in villages west of the Oskil River, where they have a bridgehead, Russians don’t have complete control. It’s more like the operation of diversionary reconnaissance groups that show some presence there, do something. Optically it looks like they already have it under control, but Kupiansk is holding.

All these cities are in a difficult situation – whether Toretsk, Kupiansk, or Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk – but all have been holding for more than a year, some for more than two years. Russians are advancing, but there’s no sign of any great force that could break it quickly. But they will try to do so.

Middle East

Moderator: Alright, let’s go to the Middle East. Yesterday, overnight from Thursday to Friday, Israel’s war cabinet met and decided, simply put, to occupy the Gaza Strip.

Paľo Macko: Well, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip until 2005, or had full security control there, then handed it over to the Palestinian authorities. Hamas took power in Gaza in 2005, and since then the entire coastal strip, which we call the Gaza Strip, has been isolated. Israel built a protective fence there, and on October 7, 2023, we saw how that ended. Terrorists from Hamas and Islamic Jihad came out through the protective barrier around the Gaza Strip.

I wouldn’t talk about occupation, but there is pressure that they want to get the entire Gaza Strip under security control. This has, of course, sparked controversy in Israel, but I’ll focus more on what the plan would mean.

It should be a 4-5 month ground operation that would begin with the occupation and control of the entire Gaza Strip. One thing is to break military resistance and get in, but another is to maintain control. In this case, it would mean establishing security forces at least temporarily throughout Gaza, with the need to fight among the population. At the same time, after the fighting ends, they would have to maintain control, patrol the streets, and maintain order. It’s a risky operation, but it should be for about 4-5 months.

Moderator: Okay, wait, I’ll interrupt you. Do they have any other option? If they can’t agree with Hamas, and Hamas doesn’t want to agree, they don’t have many options.

Paľo Macko: It carries risk because there’s quite a lot of resistance even in Israeli security forces. They look at it in terms of what risks it carries.

The goals are:

▪️Remove Hamas – clear, legitimate

▪️Ensure the release of hostages – a completely great goal, because it’s been going on for almost two years. Hostages are in a miserable state, and Hamas uses this for blackmail, trying to divide Israeli society. Those who have relatives as hostages have been protesting from the beginning, which is natural. They’re demanding major concessions to Hamas, just to get their people home. To this, another part of the population says: „Fine, but that puts everyone else at risk.“

▪️Ensuring that Gaza does not pose a threat to Israel

All these goals are quite legitimate, but it means fighting in densely populated parts of the city. Therefore, not all foreign partners support it. There are security risks and the possibility of higher casualties on the side of Israeli forces and the population. And that’s what they objected to in the security forces – whether it’s worth it to them.

There are two philosophies:

1) Take control of the territory and clean it up

2) Isolate it and let it do what it wants inside

These are the plans and possible consequences of those plans.

Current Situation in Gaza and Surrounding Areas

Moderator: What major battles and events have occurred in Gaza, Israel, and Syria in the past week?

Paľo Macko: Fighting still continues. There were some airstrikes, strikes. There were allegedly also collateral casualties, Palestinian civilians killed. The profile of the fighting is difficult. Hamas knows it needs to hide among the population, provokes some action, then a strike follows. And usually, the strike unfortunately also carries casualties of innocent civilians who happen to be there at that moment.

We’ve already talked about the security cabinet meeting, but unfortunately the hostage crisis continues. We’ve seen footage of miserable hostages, and they’re still not liberated.

On the West Bank, Operation Iron Wall continues, which has been ongoing since January 2024. Again, it’s an effort to keep the security situation under control.

Moderator: I want to ask, is it true that the Lebanese government called on Hezbollah to hand over weapons?

Paľo Macko: Yes, this is true. This has been being addressed for several days and weeks. Now the pressure is escalating. The Lebanese government sees:

1) That Hezbollah is weakened

2) That it no longer has support in Syria and Iran is far away and also has its problems

3) That it constantly provokes pressure from Israel – whenever Hezbollah does something, a counter-strike follows

Lebanon wants Hezbollah to abide by the agreement with Israel, where it promised to leave the buffer zone, that there would be no weapon and no fighter there. This is an agreement from the previous conflict in 2006, which was violated, and now the new ceasefire is supposed to renew this agreement. So it’s completely logical that the Lebanese government is putting pressure on Hezbollah.

Moderator: And what’s new in Syria?

Paľo Macko: In Syria, the ceasefire is fortunately holding. It continues even after those intense momentary clashes where there were quite large casualties. Tension is still there. There are more than 192 thousand civilians who have been displaced – these are so-called internally displaced persons. They had to move and are temporarily bivouacking somewhere in other parts. It will be a problem to get them back.

There were large casualties – more than 500 dead on the side of fighters, but also more than 400 Syrian soldiers. And one more piece of information – Israeli Druze don’t perceive borders as a barrier. They simply migrate back and forth because they try to help their communities.

Strategic Background

Moderator: Paľo, today we’ll skip the history of World War II, but this week we commemorated another anniversary – 80 years since the dropping of atomic bombs. What do you have prepared in the background today?

Paľo Macko: I have several topics here; it was really a rich week. Everything we’ve seen, including those Moscow negotiations. But I would go to other things that are more in the background.

Interview with Kyrylo Budanov

First, I would mention an interesting interview with the head of Ukrainian intelligence defense service, Kyrylo Budanov. He had a philosophical moment, a reflection, where he discussed how Ukraine should continue its resistance against Russians and that national unity needs to be maintained.

It needs to be put in context that these were his subjective expressions, but he was quite on point in saying that if the country internally starts to fall apart or fragment into various interest groups, there will also be an erosion of independence and risks. If those in power break away too much from the chain, there’s a risk they’ll break away from the people. And that was in Ukraine – after the Orange Revolution, Tymoshenko ultimately failed, then we saw Poroshenko’s government, which was also kind of „neither here nor there.“

Into this come these negotiations, where there might be some ceasefire, but not everyone will be satisfied with it. As long as you’re under pressure, you stick together like a flock. But when that pressure eases, differences can surface.

Moderator: I’ve heard that Ukrainians got access to data from a Russian submarine that’s part of the nuclear triad. Is that true?

Paľo Macko: Yes, that’s right. It’s a shock. For Russians, it’s a serious matter. Ukrainian intelligence gained access to classified specifications. We’re talking about a Russian nuclear submarine, not some older one, but one of those modern Borei-class that carries 16 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each with multiple warheads.

It’s a means of retaliation. Countries keep these submarines precisely because they’re always in an unknown location and are a guarantee that even if they were attacked with nuclear weapons, they wouldn’t be disarmed, because they can counter-strike from submarines.

It’s a fiasco if Ukrainian intelligence service got access to:

▪️Security measures on the submarine

▪️Procedures and protocols

▪️Even the crew list

This doesn’t speak well of the protection of Russian strategic capabilities. Of course, this could cause escalation. Maybe it wasn’t even good that they published it, that they know it. We don’t know what all they know, but the fact that they published it is already on the edge, when even Russians have in their doctrine an attack on their nuclear facility as one of the triggers. But they’re not affecting or attacking the submarine so far.

The problem is that Russians already had a mishap a few years ago when they lost control of the so-called nuclear briefcase. It was when they had their Russian „Air Force One“ parked at the Moscow airport, and some thief broke into it. They claim it was a thief, but someone got in there and had access to electronic systems and everything related to it. So for a nuclear superpower, this is quite irresponsible.

Joint Weapons Purchase for Ukraine

Moderator: What about the joint weapons purchase for Ukraine that was talked about so much?

Paľo Macko: A lot was talked about it, but the process in dozens of Ramstein formats was always chaotic. Only now is it starting to come together, coordination is taking place.

At this moment, the European Public Procurement Agreement for Ukraine has been created. The Czech Republic, Denmark, and the Netherlands have launched a joint program worth $1 billion for the delivery of American weapons to Ukraine. This is already about planning, coordinating with a clear time horizon and a clear order. It should be for air defense systems and artillery.

The impact is that it’s moving from donations to structured procurement, when there’s not much left to donate. Thus, it can be put into some consolidation, and arms factories can better plan their capacities.

The important thing is to maintain strategic unity. If we know we need to help Ukraine, not primarily for them, but also for ourselves, then it needs to be done – and it needs to be done sensibly, in a consolidated manner, and not chaotically, where there’s a different idea every week.

Call from Israeli Security Leaders

Moderator: In Israel, there’s an interesting call from the security elite, who are calling for a stop to the fighting in Gaza. What’s that about?

Paľo Macko: In August, about 600 former Israeli security leaders, including former heads of Mossad, Shin Bet (their counterintelligence), and the General Staff, signed a call for an immediate end to the war in Gaza.

They claim that the main military objectives have already been met, Hamas has lost key capabilities, it doesn’t represent a great real force. There are its remnants, but it’s more a political matter from their perspective than a military one. Therefore, they say they wouldn’t need to engage further.

We don’t have to agree with them, but it’s a signal from people who stood at the head of the General Staff and these components, have insight into these things, and are weighing on the scales: what they can achieve and what it will cost them. And on the other side of the scales is: what all it can cause and what risks it carries. They’re trying to balance those risks.

This call resonated in the media as well. Of course, it’s just a call from a „council of elders“ that has no formal position. Netanyahu is the one who, in the end, whether we like him or not, is the prime minister who bears the immediate responsibility, is responsible for the functioning of the state, the security of citizens, and security forces. He has the mandate to decide as he sees fit.

It’s an indication that Israeli society is still free; it’s not like Russia. In Russia, not only Putin decides, but also the „top.“ War hawks may not only be in the Kremlin but also in the Duma and other components, where they still dream of a great victory and the destruction of the entire West. And that’s dangerous. That’s why we listen to those programs on Russian state television, where they want to bomb us with nuclear weapons, kill us, destroy our cities, and rename Paris to Vladimir and the like. This is dangerous – the fascization of Russian society continues.

View of the World – 360°

Moderator: So what does your radar show?

Paľo Macko: The ceasefire between Cambodia and Thailand is holding so far. We saw the delimitation commission working for the first time on Monday. This week I would like to return to Iran.

Moderator: And what’s there? Is the ceasefire working, not working? Or is there currently some silence around Iran?

Paľo Macko: The ceasefire is working, but I was doing a comprehensive monitoring of crisis areas in the world, and I must say that over the past week, apart from the Russian-Ukrainian war and the conflict in the Middle East, Iran resonated the most. But a little differently than we might expect.

Iranian Covert Operations

Iran came to the forefront in connection with the increase in Iranian covert operations, especially assassinations and kidnappings targeting individuals in Europe and throughout North America. It’s a big problem; even a coordinated report came out where 11 intelligence services drew attention to this.

When we consider that we saw a 12-day war between Israel and Iran, which ended with US intervention, subsequently a ceasefire was concluded at US pressure, but they were threatening even then. Many took it as if the regime is already weak, that it will collapse any moment, but it has, like in Romania, when securitate fought even when it was clear that the regime had fallen, an extensive network and is doing hybrid activities.

It’s not just Russians, it’s not just North Koreans, but Iran is extremely active, has its diasporas all over the world. I’ve already mentioned the warning issued by the USA, UK, France, and 11 other countries.

Iranian agents have narrowly focused on:

▪️Dissidents

▪️Journalists

▪️Their former officials living in Western countries

They’re after them, trying to attack them, and using classic methods of hybrid threats:

▪️Surveillance

▪️Cyber intrusions

▪️Kidnapping attempts

Many of which were thwarted or foiled at the last minute by counterintelligence in these countries.

The global impact is that it has diplomatic consequences. They summoned Iranian ambassadors and said: „Wait, these are already hostile activities, what are you allowing yourselves on our territory?“ They had to increase protection for multiple individuals, and joint investigations of Iranian networks are being conducted.

It’s like with Russians here – they’re spread through various agents, secondary collaborators, poor fellows who work in alternative media and for 500 euros will sell their own country and endanger the lives of their fellow citizens. Unfortunately, this is also happening from Iran.

Moderator: Let’s go to those activities. Can you name some?

Paľo Macko: I would divide them into blocks:

1) Expanded activity of foreign intelligence service – Iranian operatives were tracking journalists and officials

2) Espionage techniques and cyber attacks – Iranians were always good at hacking. Not only did they become victims of their centrifuges being hacked, but they themselves are very good.

3) Hezbollah – looks like half-dead, but there’s still space. People were partially disarmed, but Iran can still eventually use it to destabilize Lebanon.

If I were to follow up on the previous question – Lebanon realizes that people do desperate acts, and this Hezbollah, which has lost significance, may lose interest in being a major political force in Lebanon. They participate in power, have deputies there, but when they lost their influence, they can degenerate into destabilization – they’ll start causing harm.

Of course, there’s also nuclear tension, because we still don’t know how much nuclear material remained and where. And if Iran has embarked on such diversionary, espionage, cyber, and terrorist activities, it can use that material for purposes other than we originally thought.

Quote for the End

Moderator: Let’s go to my favorite section, and that’s the quote.

Paľo Macko: The times are hectic. We’ve been discussing the biggest military security crises. But at the beginning of July, exactly a month and two days ago, the Dalai Lama, who is a symbol of resistance against Chinese rule in Tibet, a moral authority and spiritual leader of Lamaist faith, turned 90. Amazing age.

For someone who has lived almost his entire life in exile, he has had a disproportionately large positive influence in the world, including through his spiritual message. So in honor of his 90 years (and we wish him, of course, the longest and most fruitful life), I would like to offer a thought from him:

„Live a good and honest life. When you get older and look back, you will be able to rejoice a second time.“ – Dalai Lama

The post General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar – episode 125 appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#aerial attacks #air defence #Chasiv Yar #drone #Pokrovsk #Russia #Russian aggression #Shahed #Ukraine #War in Ukraine

Latest attacks on both sides

Flames engulfed dozens of shops. According to local authorities, there were no casualties in the attacks. In the Kherson region, Russian shelling of the village of Antonivka caused the death of one man.

Ukraine also attacked. According to local reports, an unmanned aerial vehicle that hit a railway station in the Volgograd region in southwestern Russia damaged power lines. A fire broke out at the site.

The most significant damage in Odesa occurred at an electronics shopping center, where stores with electronics and household appliances caught fire. Rescuers, together with volunteers, also extinguished a fire in an abandoned building near the railway tracks.

Ceasefire negotiations and the threat of sanctions

US envoy Steve Whitkoff could negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine in Moscow on Wednesday or Thursday. President Donald Trump announced this and again warned that Russia would face severe sanctions if it did not agree to stop the fighting by Friday when the specified ten-day deadline expires.

Trump said he plans to impose up to 100% import duties on countries that buy Russian oil. Such a measure could particularly affect Brazil, China, and India.

„We will impose sanctions, but it looks like they are quite good at circumventing them. You know, they are cunning people, so we’ll see what happens.“ – Donald Trump

„It is unacceptable for India to continue financing this war by purchasing oil from Russia. It may be shocking for people to learn that India is essentially at the same level as China in purchasing Russian oil. It presents itself as one of our closest allies, but it doesn’t buy our products.“ – Steve Miller

Interview with General Pavel Macko

Moderator: We will continue discussing the current development of the war in Ukraine in the ČT 24 studio in the following minutes. Pavel Macko, Lieutenant General (Retired), former commander of the NATO Joint Forces Training Center, is already with us. Good afternoon.

Pavel Macko: Good day.

Moderator: Ukraine today confirmed a drone attack on an airport in Crimea, where it reportedly destroyed one fighter jet and damaged four other aircraft. How significant is this strike from a military perspective, especially regarding Russia’s ability to maintain air superiority in the region?

Pavel Macko: We have seen several such Ukrainian attacks over the last two to three days. Regarding Crimea and the attack on the Saky base, where a Su-30MS fighter was destroyed, another such fighter was damaged, and three Su-24 fighter-bombers were damaged, this was carried out by the Ukrainian SBU service, Team Alpha. This means that it was likely done using shorter-range drones, but directly from Crimean territory or its immediate vicinity.

But meanwhile, we have also seen massive attacks deep into Russian territory. The attack on the Volgograd region was already mentioned in the report, but we also saw attacks in the Krasnodar region on the Sochi base or Sochi airport, where there is also an oil terminal of the Russian company Rosneft. That was burning too. We saw Ukrainian strikes on multiple industrial facilities.

This means that Ukraine is gradually improving its ability to penetrate Russian air defense and simultaneously destroy not only military objects but also the military-industrial complex – factories that supply either electronic components or radio-electronic warfare systems for Russian weapon systems.

The Russians are responding by trying to fortify facilities being built in Milerovo, Gvardeysk, and also in Crimea, where the Russians are trying to build improved shelters for air equipment, even after the successful „Spider web“ operation that the Ukrainians carried out in early July.

Moderator: Ukraine has also admitted responsibility for hitting a fuel depot in Sochi. Is this more of a signal for the Russian leadership, or potentially the Russian public, or does it change something about the current balance of forces?

Pavel Macko: It’s not just a signal. Simply put, Ukraine is gradually trying to equalize in the capability of long-range attacks. The Russians attack with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and especially Shahed drones. Ukrainians have a wider spectrum of these long-range drones, they are developing other drones as well, and we will see increasingly frequent attacks on these bases.

The Russians are improving aircraft positions, fortifying all facilities, trying to strengthen air defense, but similar to how Ukraine has problems intercepting Russian drones, this applies to the opposite side as well. Through this, Ukraine is clearly demonstrating that Russia is not invulnerable.

Basically, for Ukraine, this is the only effectively possible way to defend against increasing Russian aggression – to act asymmetrically, disrupt the Russian rear, meaning logistical and air bases, and thus not allow the Russians to escalate the transfer of forces and offensive means to the Ukrainian battlefield.

Moderator: How challenging is it to hit such targets without direct air support, only with the mentioned drones, and what does this possibly tell us about the current capabilities of the Ukrainian army?

Pavel Macko: The Ukrainians have demonstrated not only on land but also at sea that they can equip these resources with relatively good navigation and communication tools. Thus, they can control them remotely, or they operate in a semi-autonomous mode. In any case, they need to guide them to the target area.

This means that the Ukrainians have this communication relatively resistant, the Russians cannot completely jam it and cannot destroy all these targets. As a result, Ukrainians penetrate deeper and deeper into these areas, and that’s why the Russians are resorting to mechanical fortification of objects.

Of course, it’s a never-ending story, because Ukrainians will escalate these attacks. Ukrainians are definitely advancing technologically. It’s a kind of duel – we see that in the drone area, the basic cycle is 3 to 6 months. This means that what works well today may not work in 3 months because the other side has a counter-tool.

For example, the Ukrainians recently put into operation Interceptor 2.0. It’s their own product, but there are also components from Western countries. It’s a drone designed to hunt Russian drones, and this will likely continue on both sides.

Drone warfare and production capacities

Pavel Macko: First of all, Ukraine is significantly ramping up drone production and is also receiving increased aid. Most recently, Britain announced that it would deliver around 100,000 drones, and these are mostly combat drones for contact combat.

Ukraine specializes primarily in long-range drones, but it is also developing ballistic missiles, which it has already tested, and now they are waiting for serial production to start. Similarly, Ukraine is trying to produce cruise missiles.

Moderator: And what do we actually know, or conversely, don’t know at all, about Russian reserves and Russian production capacities? Because during July, according to Ukrainian authorities, Russia attacked with 6,300 long-range drones and sent 198 missiles and rockets, which in the case of drones is the most per month, and there were more missiles only in June. So how long can Russia still maintain this?

Pavel Macko: It’s a battle for survival on both sides and a race against time. Both sides are escalating production. The Russians are capable of producing about 120 missiles of various types per month.

In their latest use, the Russians also deployed missiles such as the Kh-22, which is an anti-ship missile originally designed to destroy aircraft carriers or as a nuclear weapon carrier. It is very inaccurate, by the way – it has an inaccuracy of up to 600 meters, which is why it is extremely dangerous to use it in built-up areas and very difficult to intercept.

The Russians are producing around 100 to 150 Shahed drones daily, and their planned capacity is that they would like to achieve a capacity of up to 300 drones per day by the end of the year. This would mean a significant increase in the use of these drones from the 5,000 in June, and 6,000 plus in July.

Simply put, after depleting their resources in artillery, where primarily the artillery systems themselves are failing, the Russians are shifting a large part of the focus to drone technology. This is both in contact combat on the front line and in deep attacks.

In short, Shahed drones and their Geran derivatives, which have been modernized, will be the main combat tool of the Russians in the coming months. And the same is happening on the Ukrainian side, but there it’s for the opposite reason – the Ukrainians never had very numerous artillery, and therefore were forced to resort to the dronization of the entire fight.

Strategically important points on the front

Moderator: On the front, the greatest attention is now focused on the locations of Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar. What exactly are the Russians trying to do? Why is this section of the front important?

Pavel Macko: When I consider Pokrovsk, it’s an important logistical hub, which would allow the Russians, if they controlled it, to proceed then from the salient northward and in a kind of arc maneuver try to open up the space of the so far unoccupied Donbas. Of course, in connection with further attacks, or they also have the alternative to continue further into the Dnipropetrovsk region.

Simply put, it’s an important supply route for Ukrainian forces from the direction of Dnipro. Dnipro is a large industrial center, a supply center, and has further connections to central Ukraine.

If we look at Chasiv Yar, it’s a kind of elevated terrain and is actually a direct gateway to the basin where Sloviansk and Kramatorsk are located. Of course, there are other villages there as well.

In the case of Chasiv Yar, the Russians have it almost under control after 16 months, but the Ukrainians are still holding on in the western part. As far as Pokrovsk is concerned, they haven’t directly attacked it, although some reconnaissance and sabotage groups have penetrated there. The Russians are concentrating more on a bypassing maneuver, where they are trying to bypass Pokrovsk from the southwest and from the north and gradually isolate it, interrupt supply routes directly to Pokrovsk, and subsequently either exhaust it or try to take control of it.

In short, both of these cities are important. One is in the western part, the as yet unoccupied part of the Donetsk region, the other is more in the west-central part, that’s Pokrovsk. And it allows the Russians, if they were to acquire them, to contemplate a further attack towards the as yet unoccupied part of the Donetsk region.

Nuclear rhetoric and deployment of American submarines

Moderator: One last thing. The deployment of American nuclear submarines closer to Russia. Is this, in your opinion, an adequate reaction from Donald Trump to the words of Dmitry Medvedev, and does it potentially have any escalation potential? Because spokesman Peskov has already called for caution, saying that everyone should be very, very careful with nuclear rhetoric.

Pavel Macko: It’s good that Dmitry Peskov is saying this, because Russia has been constantly intimidating, literally blackmailing with nuclear weapons for three and a half years. President, ex-president Medvedev is not just anyone, because he is after all a deputy of the Security Council and doesn’t say anything into the wind without it being approved from the Kremlin. Or if he were speaking arbitrarily, they would silence him very quickly.

This means that Russia has long been conducting this so-called reflexive control, where it is constantly hinting, suggesting that it is prepared to use nuclear weapons. We hear this from Russian state television every week, that Europe should look forward to an attack, President Putin himself has repeatedly threatened a nuclear „solution.“

And then, of course, came just a verbal reaction from President Trump, which from a military perspective doesn’t have any real significance, because part of these submarines with nuclear missiles is permanently in combat service and is permanently hidden in such areas where the adversary doesn’t know about them.

It’s part of the nuclear triad, and it’s precisely these submarines that are meant to guarantee that in the case of even a first strike from the other side, the one who has these submarines retains the capability of a retaliatory strike. From this perspective, it should be seen only as signaling from President Trump.

Some may have criticized it as an unfortunate word. He used it on an unofficial platform, on his social media. But it was a clear message to the Russians that today’s „language“ from the Russians cannot go on indefinitely. And he implied by this that the United States, like Russia, also has nuclear weapons, and both sides know well that they have the capability of mutual self-destruction. And thus the reproach from Dmitry Peskov should primarily be directed within the Russian ranks.

Moderator: Says Pavel Macko, former commander of the NATO Joint Forces Training Center. Thank you very much for your time. Have a nice day.

Pavel Macko: Thank you for the invitation. Have a nice day.

See also:

How Long Will Russians Continue to Escalate Terror Against Civilians?

Is Russia provoking President Trump?

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#aerial attacks #Chasiv Yar #drone #Kupiansk #Kyiv #missile #Pokrovsk #Russia #Russian war in Ukraine #Sumy #Ukraine

Battles for the strategic city of Chasiv Yar

Ukraine denies reports that it has lost the important city of Chasiv Yar. Russians, on the other hand, claim that they have managed to occupy it after a 16-month bloody battle. According to Ukrainians, however, defenders remain in fortified positions in its western part. They are also under heavy pressure from the aggressors in another strategic city, Pokrovsk. Russian bombs were also killing in the inland areas.

The battle for the city of 12,000 began with the landing of Russian paratroopers last April. The vast majority of residents were replaced by Ukrainian soldiers, who fortified themselves in cellars and the ruins of buildings. However, the encounter turned into a cruel war of attrition, which turned the industrial settlement into ruins.

For 484 days already, the Russians have been showering Ukrainian positions with grenades, rockets, and suicide drones. Kyiv denies Moscow’s boastful reports that its forces have broken through on the extensive front and occupied the city. According to sources from Czech television, defenders are still holding out in its western part.

Another key city, Pokrovsk, is also falling. Fighting for it has been going on since last July. Here too, Ukrainians lack infantry. Massive Russian attacks with the help of drones often cover the often suicidal advance of small units. Where they manage to break through, the aggressors immediately deploy reinforcements and enlarge the breakthrough. The defenders then have no choice but to retreat.

Attacks on Ukrainian inland

Russians also attacked in the Ukrainian inland. Kyiv was hit in two waves:

▪️First, swarms of Russian drones circled over the city

▪️Then the Russian army fired missiles

In one of Kyiv’s districts, an Iskander missile destroyed part of a residential building.

Interview with Pavel Macko, former commander of the NATO Joint Forces Training Center

Moderator: Good evening to you.

Pavel Macko: Good evening.

Moderator: So if we first stop at those Russian air strikes on Ukrainian territory, they have been much more massive lately. What tactics do the Russians use in them and how does the Ukrainian air defense manage to respond?

Pavel Macko: Well, they are already combining those attacks, whether with missiles or drones. But they are already flying in with those drones from all directions. In this way, they are trying to saturate basically the entire air defense system. Meanwhile, they have also improved the design of those drones. And it’s harder for Ukrainians. They still had a 95% success rate last year. Now it’s about 79%. And against missiles, of course, they are gradually running out of those ground-to-air resources, and the effectiveness reaches about 50%. So this is actually the main way Russians are trying to break through that defense – to saturate it with the maximum number from all directions.

Moderator: When I turn it around, how successful is Ukraine in its air strikes on Russia, and can it match Russia in the production of unmanned machines, or missiles?

Pavel Macko: Ukraine is catching up in the production of these unmanned machines, and of course we are talking about different categories. Russians primarily threaten Ukraine with those Shahed clones, which they are now producing themselves. And Ukraine has made very significant progress, has greater reaches into the depths of Russian territory. Those strikes are increasingly effective and really inflict severe blows to that Russian infrastructure, but also to the Russian military-industrial complex. For example, strong Russian air defenses cannot prevent all these strikes. And additionally, Ukraine is also working on ballistic missiles and they almost have a range of up to 700 kilometers and is also working on its own cruise missiles derived from the Neptune missile.

Moderator: If we look at the front, we’ve already mentioned it, Ukraine today denied the Russian claim that the Russians captured the city of Chasiv Yar. What information do we have about what’s happening on the ground, and how important is this city?

Pavel Macko: This city is tactically significant. I know that it’s used in the media as a strategic target, but it’s a tactically significant place. Its possession or control could fundamentally influence the course of fighting in that immediate vicinity. Namely, it would increase pressure on Konstantinovka, and if that fell too, the Russians would open up space for a stronger attack into that northwestern part of the Donetsk region around Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

It’s also an elevated city, where it’s advantageous tactical terrain for defense, because from it you can also control that surrounding area if the Russians tried to bypass Chasiv Yar. And it’s also advantageous for supporting a possible penetration into the depth of that territory. So it’s important to monitor it.

Ukrainians still hold positions there according to the latest information, but if they lost that city, the Russians would gain such a local tactical advantage. But basically they have to finish, and if they wanted success in that entire Donbas, they probably have to complete the operation in the area of Toretsk and Pokrovsk as well. Or then bet a lot of forces on one breakthrough. But that’s also risky in that they could get to advanced positions and then be subsequently under Ukrainian fire.

Moderator: You mentioned Pokrovsk, which lies about 60 kilometers south of Chasiv Yar. What is the situation there, how important a section of the front is it? Or, where are the key sections of the front now, where the Russians are pushing the most?

Pavel Macko: Let’s start with Pokrovsk. The Russians are trying to bypass Pokrovsk from the southwest, they are actually already beyond Pokrovsk, heading west and also on the northern side. They are using a similar tactic as they used at Vuhledar, that they don’t go for a direct attack on the city and don’t conquer it as at Toretsk, Kupiansk, or mainly at Chasiv Yar for 16 months, which is an extremely long time. So they try to bypass it and gradually isolate the city.

The same thing is happening in Toretsk, where Toretsk is still partially under Ukrainian control and Ukrainians are waging the most intense battles, besides these areas. Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, Toretsk. Precisely in the Kupiansk area, where the Russians are again attacking for more than a year and are trying to create a bridgehead and are bypassing that Kupiansk from the north. But they haven’t succeeded so far from the southern side, so they couldn’t surround it. Kupiansk is important because it’s an important hub for supplying Russian troops from that entire area from central or western Russia. At the same time, if the Russians wanted to contemplate any offensive into the Kharkiv region in the future, then they need that Kupiansk under control.

Moderator: Does anything suggest that the Russians might manage a more significant breakthrough in the foreseeable future?

Pavel Macko: Not yet. That Russian offensive is still expected, but it’s running de facto. The Russians are testing the strength of the Ukrainian defense in various places and are trying to break through it. But they haven’t created something that I would call operational reserves. That means at some depth distance from the combat line, that they would have some reserves that they could immediately deploy into that breakthrough, as the Ukrainians did in the case of that breakthrough almost three years ago, when they were attacking precisely in the Kharkiv region.

That means that the Russians will try to break through the defense somewhere. And then they will do the regrouping afterwards by taking from some part of the front and will transfer forces to that breakthrough point as quickly as possible. But that’s mostly by rail and it doesn’t mean that we could expect some massive breakthrough from day to day. Simply put, they will try for such tactical successes. But we see that conquering a city of 12,000 for 16 months is probably not something that could be called modern maneuver warfare.

Moderator: What price are the Russians paying for advancing on the front?

Pavel Macko: That price is enormous. For Chasiv Yar itself, it’s said that those losses could be approaching 10 thousand. Last year, for those 4 thousand square kilometers, the Russians paid with enormous losses. Those are wounded and fallen, not just fallen – 427 thousand soldiers. These losses at this pace are very high.

Ukrainians, although they have a smaller number of personnel, but still using drones and other measures, they manage to quite intensively destroy these Russian attacks. It means that the Russians continue at the cost of those massive waves, when they actually oversaturate that ground defense of Ukrainians, but those Russian losses are disproportionately high. They are high, but apparently it’s not some factor that would influence Russian decision-making.

Moderator: We’re talking about Russian pressure, but do Ukrainians have more initiative in some parts of the front?

Pavel Macko: It’s kind of alternating. Of course, overall, the Russians have the tactical initiative and at this moment also the operational initiative, which means they open those combat encounters. They decide where the attack is mostly happening. But Ukrainians repeatedly in that northern part near Pokrovsk, or in the western part near Chasiv Yar, they repeatedly pushed back even in the last few days.

Back to those Ukrainian units. We saw in the Sumy region that the Russians tried, after the Ukrainians withdrew from the Kursk region, they tried to push towards Sumy through the Sumy region. There, the Ukrainians pushed them back. The same thing happens continuously then at those other main points, whether at Toretsk, or also around Chasiv Yar. The city itself is of course now a gray zone, where they are actually fighting for control of the rest of that western part of the city.

Moderator: Says the former commander of the NATO Joint Forces Training Center Pavel Macko. Thank you very much for the interview. I wish you a nice day.

Pavel Macko: Thank you for the invitation. Have a nice evening.

Note: The original video in Czech and LSovak language you can see here:
https://youtu.be/QsOahqIJa6M?si=prFZA2B8HYRclOBD

The post How Long Will Russians Continue to Escalate Terror Against Civilians? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#Czechoslovakia #mobilization #modern mobilization #USA #WWI

You can listen this article in a form of podcast:
https://www.podbean.com/ew/pb-smb8q-1922dd1 or here Mobilisation! – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

Coalition politicians mobilized people against COVID measures and corruption investigations. It brought them to power. Have we experienced a real mobilization? Most people would think that we were lucky and haven’t experienced any mobilization firsthand. But if you were ten or more years old in 2000, you did experience a mobilization. A different kind than military.

With the arrival of the millennium, there was a worldwide mobilization of forces and a major software and computer systems cleanup to handle the transition to four-digit year display in computer systems (the so-called Y2K mobilization).

Computers stored only the last two digits of the year in dates. If you had 98, the system added 19 and the year in the date was 1998. But how would systems interpret 00? Mostly as 1900. The world had a problem. Although Slovakia wasn’t as digitized as the West, there could still have been problems in banking, public services, and similar areas.

Unlike military mobilization, this one was led by civilian IT experts, companies, and officials. Governments and international organizations only coordinated it. Thanks to joint efforts, the transition to the new millennium was problem-free. The mobilization also resulted in increased computer production and renovation of old equipment.

What is mobilization?

Y2K mobilization is considered a model of proactive risk management. It turned out that mobilization doesn’t require tanks or soldiers – it can be about information, coordination, and foresight. When we talk about mobilization at the state level, we typically mean concentrated efforts to avert a major, potentially existential threat, or to minimize its impacts.

Mobilization – whether military, civil, digital, or disaster-related – is always about preparing the right people, resources, and systems for action. Every mobilization must have a clear purpose. It’s a response to a threat, crisis, or opportunity. Mobilization of healthcare, security, and logistics capacities during the COVID pandemic was also an opportunity to activate the scientific research base. Mobilization can be:

▪️military

▪️ civil

▪️technical

▪️political

Speed and coordination

Mobilization isn’t about standard procedures; we demand rapid deployment of people and resources. Mobilization shows us how strong and effective the state is. Not the number of police officers or hand-holding citizens in everyday life. During a crisis, it’s not about what comes to someone’s mind. Centralized command with synchronized action across sectors is needed.

Communication with the public is a key condition for success, especially for non-military threats. People must receive transparent information about why mobilization is taking place. They need to be reassured to reduce panic and ensure their cooperation.

Without prepared resources, all effort is futile. Infrastructure, logistics, supplies, personnel must be available from the start. Emergency plans and backup options allow them to respond flexibly. The legitimacy of extraordinary measures and the authority of those who order them are also important. Mobilization requires legal support and a public mandate. It often involves executive decision-making or emergency powers.

Without the participation of citizens, experts, and organizations that play key roles, it would be just an intellectual exercise. Participation can be voluntary, or people can be officially drafted or professionally assigned. Efficiency and discipline require a detailed plan, synchronization of activities, clear tasks, and rapid execution. Even civil mobilizations are similar to war preparedness. All activities must be monitored and managed.

Monitoring and adaptability are also important for successful mobilization. This gives leaders feedback to adjust strategy on the go. This cannot be achieved without transparent reporting of results, failures, and successes.

This is exactly what we expected from government commissioner Kotlár. Instead of a serious analysis of processes and state crisis management during the pandemic, we got metaphysical nonsense from an orthopedist with a child’s microscope. This is almost a guarantee that this government would totally fail in a similar mobilization.

From Clausewitz to drones

The modern concept of mobilization took shape only in the 19th century. Clausewitz, in his timeless theory of war, came up with the famous statement that „war is the continuation of politics by other means“ and is always subordinate to political goals. In his understanding, war is a dynamic interplay of:

▪️ violence and passion (ordinary people)

▪️ chance and probability (the army)

▪️ rational calculation (the government)

Using this „remarkable trinity,“ he explains war as a social and political phenomenon, not just a military one.

Clausewitz came up with the concept of „absolute war.“ This might suggest that he is also the author of mobilization. Clausewitz never used this term. However, his theory of war is the philosophical foundation for mobilization. He emphasized that war requires complete social engagement, which mobilization later defined. The term „mobilization“ appeared only in the 1850s and was first used to designate Prussian military preparations. It reflects the idea that war is shaped by political will, national emotions, and strategic calculation.

Mobilization is Clausewitz’s theory in action. It’s about transforming political intent into military power through social effort. Let’s look at how mobilization evolved during the First and Second World Wars, up to today’s hybrid forms, including cyber and cognitive mobilization.

The First World War brought the birth of systematic mobilization

From June 28, 1914 (the assassination in Sarajevo) to August 6 (the first major battle), only 39 days passed. The world went from peace to global war in just over a month. This rapid escalation is often called the „July Crisis“ and is a textbook example of how diplomacy, alliances, and miscalculations can escalate into disaster. Mobilization was declared in Austria-Hungary on July 25, 1914. Less than two weeks later, fighting had already begun.

For the first time, entire national economies were redirected to war. Governments created central planning boards to allocate raw materials, labor, and transportation. Experiences from the war led to the systematization of mobilization preparations. Nations learned that mobilization had been reactive and chaotic. The war revealed the need for planning and coordination between ministries and agencies.

The Second World War brought the peak of total war mobilization

The international situation deteriorated gradually as the Nazis consolidated their power in Germany. By 1938, the world was at a breaking point. Mobilization plans were elaborated in detail, institutions were prepared, and the population was motivated. Czechoslovakia was one of the first to experience mobilization for real. The government carried out two mobilizations in 1938.

The first was a partial mobilization on May 20 during the so-called May crisis, when reports of German troop concentrations near the borders appeared. About 180,000 reservists were called up, expanding the army to about 380,000 men. The State Defense Guard (SOS) was also activated, which began to occupy border areas. After the situation calmed down, mobilization was canceled on June 13.

After Hitler presented an ultimatum to cede part of the territory, Jan Syrový’s government declared general mobilization on September 23 at 22:00. 1,250,000 men were called up. The mobilization proceeded quickly and successfully. Within 24 hours, 60% of reservists reported. The army used a 1936 plan to quickly mobilize:

▪️350 tanks

▪️5,000 artillery pieces

▪️950 military aircraft

▪️217,000 horses

▪️26,000 vehicles

▪️5,000 motorcycles

Soldiers were to bring food for two days, cutlery, cleaning supplies, and a backpack.

The speed and efficiency of mobilization was unprecedented, even by today’s standards. After the declaration of general mobilization, society united. People were ready to defend the republic, although they knew they were facing overwhelming odds. Spontaneous gatherings were held in cities, and banners proclaimed: „We won’t give up an inch of the republic!“ or „Czechoslovakia will defend itself!“. Radio served as a bonding agent. Residents sat by their radios, waiting for orders and news. People waited for a clear decision, and while many cried, others rejoiced that a decision had finally been made.

American mobilization as a key to victory

After the US was drawn into the war, mobilization also took place across the ocean. The Americans further refined the concept of mobilization. It wasn’t just about immediate action as in Czechoslovakia, but about long-term mobilization of all national resources. This was also one of the important factors for the final victory over fascism and Japanese imperialism. The USA long-term mobilized resources for its European allies as well.

There was a fundamental revision of the economy. The USA transformed into a planned war economy:

▪️Civilian factories were rebuilt to produce tanks, aircraft, and ammunition

▪️The federal government financed most industrial investments

▪️It often owned facilities and leased them to private companies

▪️There was a significant managed expansion of the workforce

▪️Massive work shifts were introduced

▪️Women and minorities entered the workforce in record numbers

▪️Agencies such as the War Manpower Commission coordinated its allocation

The war showed that government-led industrial transformation is possible and effective.

Mobilization during the Cold War

During the Cold War, mobilization was perceived as part of deterrence. The main goal was to secure and demonstrate strategic readiness. Mobilization planning shifted from implementation to preparedness. Countries introduced:

▪️Long-term storage of critical materials (e.g., rubber, rare earths)

▪️Maintaining emergency production capacity for defense supply chains

How useful would these be today, when we can’t restart production even after more than three years since the Russian invasion of Ukraine!

Technological mobilization was also taking place. Emphasis was placed on research and development and innovation (e.g., DARPA). Technologies became an element of deterrence. Mobilization expanded to education, infrastructure, and scientific policy. Mobilization planning was embedded in national security strategy.

Current challenges require fragmented mobilization

The COVID-19 pandemic revealed gaps in supply chain resilience and coordination between the public and private sectors. Climate change is an epochal matter and requires long-term civil mobilization with a shift toward sustainability, decarbonization, and adaptive infrastructure.

The war in Ukraine and hybrid threats bring new dimensions to the view of mobilization. Ukraine’s defense shows how civil society, technology startups, and decentralized logistics can mobilize under fire. Western countries face challenges in mobilizing national will. This raises the need to revise mobilization theory.

From trenches to algorithms: mobilization change

Experiences from Ukraine, our inability to keep pace with a weaker Russia in military production, and future challenges force us to comprehensively reassess our approach to mobilization. While we have almost forgotten about mobilization, today we must simultaneously address several conceptual problems. We need to answer basic questions:

▪️„What to mobilize and why?“

▪️„Mobilization or modernization?“

Researchers call for a revival of the mobilization economy. Not just for war, but also for existential threats. Mobilization now includes information warfare, cyber resilience, and economic deterrence.

At the NATO summit, allies agreed to significantly increase defense spending. The real increase in hard military spending to 3.5% of GDP and total spending to 5% of GDP is not just an effort to please President Trump. The numbers come from military planners‘ data on the minimum military capabilities that are supposed to guarantee our deterrence and ability to defend ourselves.

Maintaining national will

In a long conflict, victory is rarely achieved by firepower alone. It requires mobilization of national will. It’s about combining:

▪️military readiness

▪️civil resilience

▪️social cohesion

The concept of total defense transcends traditional battlefield boundaries and integrates every layer of society into the defense architecture. We must be able to conduct combat operations and protect the entire territory simultaneously. Modern war is decentralized. Territorial defense blurs the boundaries between soldier and citizen and promotes a culture in which defense is a shared responsibility.

Infrastructure protection and civil defense

A separate chapter is infrastructure protection and civil defense. Energy networks, transportation hubs, and communication networks are increasingly vulnerable in hybrid warfare. We need to plan for resilience. Countries invest in:

▪️redundant systems

▪️cyber resilience

▪️rapid repairs

All this to withstand long-term disruption of their function.

Slovak specifics and weaknesses

Slovakia might have problems maintaining the determination to invest in defense and defend the homeland. Deep divisions persist in society regarding:

▪️the war in Ukraine

▪️Russian influence

▪️internal governance

We lack volunteer networks or a culture of civic resistance. Energy dependence on Russia and inadequately funded infrastructure could lead to collapse under constant pressure. Cyber attacks, disinformation, and energy sabotage could disrupt cohesion without a single shot fired. We would have difficulty replicating the Ukrainian model of total defense without fundamental reforms in civic engagement, infrastructure, and political unity.

Mobilization or modernization?

As Europe increases defense spending in response to renewed geopolitical threats, a critical question arises: Are we mobilizing for past wars or preparing for future conflicts? Many current spending plans still favor older platforms and traditional procurement cycles.

The sharp increase in spending also brings strategic risks:

▪️Investing in outdated systems risks irrelevance on battlefields saturated with drones and cyber capabilities

▪️One-time spending spikes can undermine research and development, dual-use technologies, and startup ecosystems

Paradigm shift

To avoid mobilizing for the wrong war, defense spending must prioritize:

▪️modular, scalable systems over older platforms

▪️investments in artificial intelligence, quantum, cyber, and space capabilities

▪️support for civil-military integration including territorial defense and infrastructure resilience

NATO or EU mobilization will be joint, but sustainability must also be local. We need to promote joint procurement, interoperability, and industrial sovereignty. This is homework for policymakers and politicians.

Mobilization is no longer just about tanks and soldiers. It’s about systems, societies, and strategic purpose. In today’s threat environment, the question is not just how we mobilize, but why and for what we mobilize. For deterrence, the concept of mobilization must have signaling capability to the adversary and demonstrate our credible determination.

Deterrence is not just about having power. It’s about showing that you can use it effectively and sustainably. For resilience, ensuring continuity and recovery of state operations is critical. The most important mobilization assets are:

▪️civil society

▪️volunteer networks

▪️territorial defense

▪️psychological preparedness

▪️critical infrastructure

▪️state management capacity

▪️private sector

Conclusion: Mobilization as a strategic act

Mobilization is not just a budget line in public finances. It is a strategic act of national existential purpose. To be effective, it must be:

▪️aligned with modern threat paradigms

▪️integrating deterrence and resilience

▪️engaging the whole society, not just the army

Despite our constitutional officials putting on uniforms and training with weapons in hand, immediate military mobilization is not imminent. We have a few years to reconsider our concepts, change laws, build capacities, and especially trust.

The next mobilization that we won’t avoid will be political mobilization to maintain the democratic constitutional system and our continued membership in the EU and NATO. But if we fail in this, we can forget about the rest. Our fate will be determined by others who won’t take our national interests and goals into account.

The post Mobilization! appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#Attack on Kyiv #Kyiv #Putin #Russain war of agression #Russia #Trump #Trump’s ultimate #USA #War in Ukraine

We are discussing the military and political consequences of the current situation in Ukraine with General Pavel Macko.

Interview with General Pavel Macko

Host: Welcome to JOJ24 broadcast. Good evening. General, why did the Russians decide to launch such a massive attack at this particular time?

General Macko: The Russians are now cyclically conducting at least one major attack on Kyiv every week. This is happening in the middle of the summer fighting season, while there’s also some ultimatum running which they are downplaying, and despite this, they want to damage Ukrainian infrastructure to the maximum extent possible. They want to hit as many targets as possible and use such massive combined attacks for this purpose.

Today’s attack wasn’t exceptional in this regard, since it’s cyclical as I said – these records are being broken all the time. What could be emphasized, however, is that for the first time, the attack began with a massive drone assault from all directions on Kyiv. This was meant to saturate the air defense system, followed by the launching of cruise missiles Iskander-K.

These are similar to Iskander ballistic missiles, except these fly at a low altitude above the ground. They are very precise missiles with a standard accuracy of less than 5 meters. And since we see what they hit, it’s clear that this was a completely deliberate Russian strike on a civilian area, because apart from the apartment building that was destroyed, there were only other civilian objects all around. So any error or accident is ruled out. Simply put, they did it deliberately.

Russian military doctrine and destruction of civilian infrastructure

The reason is that while the Russians don’t formally have in their doctrines that they can violate the Geneva Conventions and attack civilian targets, they do have in their military doctrine the destruction of civilian infrastructure – whether transportation or energy. They use it as a tool to undermine will, as part of psychological warfare and also as a tool of political pressure.

The fact that it doesn’t work is another matter, but simply in that portfolio of options they have available, the Russians have used this too. This is also the case with the „Oreshnik“ on Dnipro, where it has a large dispersion – on the contrary, it cannot hit precisely – and is also meant to cause as much damage, chaos, and panic as possible in the middle of the city.

They are trying to indicate that they will continue the attacks, that they will escalate, and that Ukrainians should not rely on sanctions or secondary sanctions or international pressure. The only chance – this is Russia’s message – is for Ukrainians to surrender, comply with Russian terms, and maybe then the Russians will change their approach.

Host: In recent months, Russia has also been escalating attacks on Ukrainian cities and towns far behind the front line. Is this a Russian tactic and what is it aimed at?

General Macko: This is what I’ve already indicated. They’ve been doing this since the beginning of the conflict, but of course as Ukrainian air defense gradually weakens and as the Russians gradually find tactical approaches to make attacks more effective, they are precisely aiming to create panic and chaos throughout the country and, of course, weaken infrastructure.

Attempt to weaken the Ukrainian economy and defense industry

This is also an important aspect. Ukraine is increasingly producing defense equipment on its own. For this, of course, it needs energy, it needs factories. The military ones are mostly underground and are well protected from the Soviet era – Ukraine was like an armory of the Soviet Union. But of course there are supply chains, there are also regular factories.

As a result, the Russians are trying to disrupt this Ukrainian economy as much as possible, to „cut its veins“ so that the economy cannot generate as many defensive resources. This makes Ukraine less dependent on external supplies and less dependent on political decisions and cycles within those external supplies, as we have seen that supplies were repeatedly interrupted.

So this is also a key objective of Russia – if they attack somewhere in central or western Ukraine, they attack precisely with the aim of disrupting the functioning of the Ukrainian economy and especially the military-industrial complex to the maximum extent possible.

Host: Could Trump’s shortened ultimatum also have been a catalyst for the Russian attack? The Russians firmly rejected it. What do you think will be the reaction of the American administration?

Trump, sanctions and the US response

General Macko: I’ll start with a reflection on whether it was a reaction. The Russians have been systematically escalating these attacks, so it’s hard to say. It would be speculation if I said that now they are actually sending signals to Trump as well. They have been doing this systematically since the beginning of the year and have been doing it since Trump took power.

After rejecting a possible ceasefire and ceasefire offers in April, the Russians began to escalate the pressure. Thus, they are trying to do something about the conflict. They probably also have their own economic problems.

When it comes to President Trump’s ultimatum, he has to some extent fallen into the trap of his own statements. This means he will have to do something. He has now threatened secondary sanctions – that means sanctions on all countries that will buy from the Russians certain products that will be subject to sanctions, as the United States itself does not buy many of them.

Here’s the problem where, at least with China, it could end up that Trump will not be able to enforce this and China will continue to buy oil from Russia as well as gas. And if the Americans came with those sanctions, the chapter of tariff and trade war would open again.

Trump has also indicated a very tough stance toward India, where it at least appears that he could really impose secondary tariffs and that those negotiations could be very tough. India, despite having built better relations with the United States in recent years, trades very intensively not only in arms products but also in oil products with Russia. This, of course, undermines Donald Trump’s effort to force Russia to end the fighting and sit at the peace table.

Planned American support for Ukraine

But there is also another aspect – Donald Trump is apparently preparing the ground for a more radical announcement of further deliveries of weapons systems to Ukraine, including offensive weapons systems. There is currently a bill in Congress in the Senate that should allow a regular model of financing and supplying Ukrainian forces with American weapons through NATO allies, where at least $8 billion a year should go to this type of support.

Host: As you mentioned yourself, Ukraine is facing a summer offensive, during which Russian forces are making advances in areas that have been relatively spared since the beginning of the war. Moscow has announced that its troops have captured the city of Chasiv Yar, which was an important stronghold of the Ukrainian army in the east of the country. What might this mean for Ukraine’s negotiating positions and for the further development of the conflict?

The significance of the capture of Chasiv Yar and the situation at the front

General Macko: It doesn’t fundamentally change the situation yet, because the fighting for Chasiv Yar has been going on for 16 months, so the city is totally destroyed. We’re talking about a town the size of Holíč or Šamorín – a 12,000-person city that the Russians have been conquering for 16 months. The actual fighting for Chasiv Yar has been going on since the fall of Bakhmut in May 2023, which means more than two years, because the first phase was to get to the Donbas water canal, which was a kind of natural barrier on the border of Chasiv Yar. When the Russians overcame it, they spent another 16 months conquering the city.

The situation is similar in Kupiansk, where for more than a year the Russians have been trying to capture the city. It’s the same with Pokrovsk, in Toretsk – they are in the city, but the fighting for the city has also been going on for over a year.

This means that even if the Russians captured these cities, even if the capture of Chasiv Yar was confirmed, it would tactically give them an advantageous position. There is higher terrain there that provides a good view of the surrounding area. They could further attack Konstantinovka, and if they gained that too, they would open a gateway for a larger grouping of troops, which we don’t see anywhere yet. They would have to move it from somewhere, and then they could start attacking in the direction of Kramatorsk and Slavyansk.

Limits of Russian advance and negotiating positions

But even if they were successful in this, Russia’s negotiating position is that they still demand that Ukraine cede parts that have not been occupied so far, which they either never occupied at all, such as Slavyansk, Kramatorsk or Zaporizhzhia, or which they occupied temporarily, such as Kherson, from where they were pushed out.

This means that the negotiating position will not change in any fundamental way. The Russians would need a bigger breakthrough to occupy the rest of Donbas, but so far it doesn’t look like they have the capacity for that – unless the Ukrainians make some huge mistake. We don’t see any operational reserves, any larger grouping of troops that would be somewhere close to the front line and waiting to be deployed where the front line is broken through.

This means that even if the Russians break through the front line, they will more or less prioritize and take troops from some other parts of the front section and quickly strengthen the breakthrough area. But of course, this takes some time and also gives the Ukrainians time to regroup their forces.

Russian tactics and slow progress

The Russians are simply taking advantage of the fact that they have numerical superiority and that Ukrainians have a problem with personnel, which they compensate for with greater use of drones. The Russians are throwing all forces into battles, but progress is relatively slow. For larger cities, they are creating conditions for their encirclement and then gradual capture, but so far there is no sign of any dramatic speed in terms of advancing tens of kilometers a day.

Host: That was General Pavel Macko. Thank you for the interview and your time. Goodbye.

General Macko: Thank you for the invitation, have a pleasant evening.

Host: I will add to the viewers that you can also watch the entire interview on our website joj24.sk in the Studio JOJ24 section.

Videorecording of the interview you can see here:

https://youtu.be/r8Tzk3clOzg?si=lwRL_7fzxM-6AErE

See also:

Ukrainians and Russians are Learning. What About Us?

Ukrainian War for Existence – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

Analysis: Is a lasting and just peace within reach? – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

Trump sends nuclear submarines near Russia after Putin aide’s ‘dead hand‘ threat

The post Is Russia provoking President Trump? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Ruský útok na ukrajinské výcvikové stredisko si vyžiadal obete.
Ruské rakety zabili troch vojakov a ďalších osemnásť zranili pri útoku na ukrajinské výcvikové stredisko, uviedol Kyjev. Moskva tvrdí, že zasiahla areál v Černihivskej oblasti na severe napadnutej krajiny. Predchádzajúci deň Ukrajinci informovali o tridsiatich obetiach ruského ostreľovania rôznych miest brániaceho sa štátu.

#armádne zbory #drony #Putin #reorganizácia ukrajinskej armády #Rusko #Trump #Trumpove ultimátum #Ukrajina

Rozhovor s generálporučíkom Pavlom Mackom

Moderátor: Podrobnejšie s ďalším hosťom štúdia ČLT24, Pavlom Mackom, generálporučíkom vo výslužbe, bývalým veliteľom výcvikového centra spojeneckých síl NATO, ktorý je s nami v spojení. Dobré dopoludnie.

Pavel Macko: Dobrý deň.

Moderátor: Americký prezident Trump skrátil ultimátum, počas ktorého má Rusko uzavrieť prímerie s Ukrajinou, a to na desať dní. Ako sa americké ultimáta odrážajú do situácie na bojisku, do postupu Ruska voči Ukrajine?

Pavel Macko: Rusko jasne deklarovalo pri tom prvom oznámení ultimáta na 50 dní, aj teraz, že ono mieni pokračovať naďalej vo vojne a stupňuje svoj tlak. Jednak zvyšuje útoky do vnútrozemia Ukrajiny – to sú presne tie civilné straty, o ktorých ste pred chvíľkou hovorili. Ale zároveň stupňuje tlak aj na bojisku.

Je uprostred letnej bojovej sezóny. Zostáva mu niekoľko týždňov, maximálne dva mesiace optimálnych bojových podmienok. Potom bude také prechodné obdobie. Takže to nemá priamy vplyv. Rusi jednoducho ignorujú toto ultimátum a snažia sa získať maximálne možné zisky. A už teraz robia Ukrajincom maximálne škody počas toho behu ultimáta.

Moderátor: Pokiaľ ultimáta nefungujú, čo by mohlo Vladimíra Putina primäť k tomu, aby si sadol za rokovací stôl?

Pavel Macko: Tak úplne zásadné by bolo, keby to ultimátum vypršalo – ono ešte nevypršalo, takže nevieme posúdiť, či funguje alebo nie. Takže by došlo k nejakej akcii. A tá akcia by bola, že by Spojené štáty naozaj pristúpili k výraznejším ekonomickým sankciám, ale samozrejme v tomto prípade aj sekundárnym.

K tomu sa prípadne môžeme vrátiť, lebo je to komplikované – znamenalo by to narušenie vzťahov s Indiou, s Čínou, kde medzitým bežia rokovania o iných tarifných urovnaniach medzi Spojenými štátmi a týmito krajinami. Ale je to jedna možnosť.

A druhá možnosť je, že Spojené štáty zrejme majú pripravený nejaký plán. A v prípade vypršania ultimáta naozaj príde zvýšenie dodávok zbraňových systémov pre Ukrajinu a zvýšenie podpory celkovej pre Ukrajinu tak, aby nebola s jednou rukou zviazaná za chrbtom pri vedení tohto konfliktu.

Inými slovami, prezident Trump sa snažil prezentovať od samého začiatku, už počas kampane, ako mierotvorec, ktorý zabezpečí mier. Teraz si zbiera dostatok argumentov na to, aby mohol komfortne vycúvať z tohto postoja, a to, čo všetci považujú za neúspech jeho diplomacie a stratégie, aby mohol predať tak, že to je vlastne vina na strane Ruska. A tým pádom sa mohol vrátiť k tej politike jasnej jednoznačnej podpory Ukrajiny, samozrejme za iných ekonomických podmienok, ako tomu bolo za Bidenovej administratívy.

Situácia na bojisku

Moderátor: Dostávame sa k tomu, ako sa darí jednej či druhej strane na bojisku. Ten ruský postup je aktuálne aký? Pred niekoľkými týždňami sa zdalo, že pomerne akceleroval. Platí to stále?

Pavel Macko: Nemyslím si. Rusi samozrejme mierne postupujú, ale skúsim to dať do perspektívy. Najkritickejšia situácia je v oblasti Pokrovska, kde Rusi, či už smerom juhozápadne od Pokrovska, akoby obchádzajú ten Pokrovsk. Mali v predchádzajúcich dňoch aj čiastočné úspechy na tom severnom smere. Potom ich zase Ukrajinci na chvíľu zatlačili, ale pravda je tá, že prieskumno-diverzné oddiely alebo malé prieskumno-diverzné jednotky ruských vojsk prenikli priamo do Pokrovska. No ale o ten Pokrovsk sa bojuje už rok, aj keď sa tá situácia zhoršuje.

Ale dám to ešte do väčšej perspektívy, lebo sa veľa bojuje aj pri Limane, v tom smere na Siversk, Torecka vlastne ešte bližšie pri Kupiansku. Keď si pozrieme Kupiansk, tak Rusi sa snažia dostať Kupiansk naspäť do svojich rúk od novembra 2023. Zintenzívnili v lete tú ofenzívu proti Kupiansku. Na jeseň minulý rok bola evakuácia, vlastne máme koniec júla 2025.

A Rusi síce rozširovali to predmestie, tá situácia v Kupiansku je zložitejšia, lebo sa dostali na druhú stranu rieky a postupujú akoby od severu a snažia sa podobne ako v tých ostatných prípadoch obísť Kupiansk zo všetkých smerov a tak ho dostať. No ale nedobíjajú ho.

Keď sa pozrieme na Toreck, bojuje sa viac ako rok, od mája minulého roku. Keď sa pozrieme na Časivjar, tak to je od pádu Bachmutu, to už je viac ako dva roky. To znamená, je to relatívne. Samozrejme, že Rusi za cenu nesmiernych strát získavajú postupne také predmestia a posúvajú sa mierne, ale ten postup nenaznačuje niečo, že by dochádzalo k nejakému dramatickému zvratu.

Ten prišiel napríklad minulý rok tým vpádom Ukrajincov do Kurskej oblasti. To znamená, aj teraz je to tak, že jedna aj druhá strana sa snaží udržať svoje pozície. Rusi mierne postupujú, ale môže sa stať, že pokiaľ by koncentrovali všetky sily do svojho útoku, buď budú úspešní a prekročia vlastne… ale môže sa stať opačne, že napríklad prepadnú, a vtedy by sa vyskytla príležitosť pre ukrajinský rýchly protiútok.

Moderátor: V tomto smere, teda v tom smere, kto by do budúcna mohol mať iniciatívu – predstavuje niečo zásadného to znovudobytie malej obce v Sumskej oblasti Ukrajinou? Alebo je to proste epizóda sama osebe, ktorá nenaznačuje nič smerom do budúcna?

Pavel Macko: Ja to vidím skôr ako epizódu, ale ona má svoj význam, pretože Rusi sa v tomto momente snažili otvoriť akoby ďalší úsek frontu, a tým pádom vedia, že Ukrajinci majú pomerne málo síl proti Rusom a že vlastne by roztiahli akoby tú ukrajinskú zostavu. A tým pádom by ju viac napli, ako keď naťahujete pružinu, a vlastne snažili by sa ju niekde pretrhnúť.

Tým, že toto Ukrajinci viac-menej vyriešili alebo vyriešili, naznačili, že nie sú tak slabí v tejto oblasti. Tak to odobralo Rusom túto možnosť a uvidí sa, či Rusi sa budú snažiť znovu ďalej tam pokúšať preraziť, alebo skonsolidovať tú líniu pri Charkove. Lebo na sever od Charkova majú tiež také dve oblasti a minimálne Rusi by sa snažili ich spojiť dokopy, aby to skonsolidovali, vytvorili si konsolidované predmostie alebo také nárazníkovú zónu. A z nej by potom mohli sa pokúsiť opäť na odlákanie pozornosti alebo na prekvapenie Ukrajincov pokúsiť zaútočiť v smere na Charkov.

Samozrejme, dobyť Charkov je úplne… Cieľ v tomto okamihu z ríše snov. Neprerusom nevedia dobyť ani ten Časiv jar.

Reorganizácia ukrajinskej armády

Moderátor: Ukrajina sa tiež snaží znižovať svoje straty. Ako zásadná v tomto smere je reorganizácia ukrajinskej armády, budovanie nových zborov, zložených z niekoľkých brigád a ďalších formácií? Ako kľúčové to je?

Pavel Macko: Je tu viacero aspektov:

▪️Sú tu technologické aspekty

▪️Sú tu organizačné aspekty

▪️Sú tu aj doktrinálno-taktické aspekty

Organizácia na brigádny systém a zborový systém znamená, že tieto brigády sú koncentrované pod jednotné velenie jedného armádneho zboru, čo umožňuje tie špecializované podporné prvky, ako palebnú podporu, delostrelectvo brigádu alebo dronové jednotky koncentrovať. Tým pádom ich aj flexibilnejšie realokovať, presmerovávať na jednotlivé smery tam, kde je treba.

Lebo pokiaľ to máte v inej štruktúre a máte to viacero rozdelené medzi taktické manévrové jednotky, tak je to fajn, majú to okamžite k dispozícii, ale nemôžete to potom presmerovať niekam inam, trvá to proste dlhšie.

Druhá vec je, že výrazne sa posilňuje úloha dronov na jednej aj na druhej strane. Napriek tomu, že už boli dominantné, sú stále dominantnejšie, a hľadá sa efektívna organizačná štruktúra aj pre tieto dronové jednotky. Skrátka, tie sa stávajú hlavnou palebnou alebo bojovou silou. Takže to je tento aspekt.

No a samozrejme, Ukrajina sa snaží nájsť aj optimálny pomer medzi tým, ako skoncentrovať tie kapacity vzhľadom na meniacu sa taktiku – že útočí sa v menších jednotkách, ale zároveň potrebujete kryť väčší priestor na tie možné náhle prieniky. No a výsledkom je vlastne táto reorganizácia.

Ja som presvedčený, že je to krok správnym smerom, ale samozrejme ten diabol je v detaile – ako sa im podarí to reálne realizovať a či si to osvoja aj tí velitelia.

Moderátor: Pavel Macko, veľmi vám ďakujem. Pekný deň.

The post Prelomia Rusi ukrajinskú obranu alebo ustúpia ultimátu? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

But fighting without vision and strategy is not enough. It’s important to know why we fight and what we fight for.

#EU #NATO #Putin #Russia #Trump #Ukraine #USA #War in Ukraine #Zelensky

Pavel Macko reporting for Týždeň magazine. Full transcript of the podcast https://youtu.be/GmSQTqTEAQA?si=QePWcXi8HiZLAVVC

Eve of War

In Europe, at the beginning of 2022, we sensed that something terrible was brewing, but most of us didn’t want to admit it. Neither citizens nor politicians. We were still enjoying the euphoria of three-quarters of a century of peace and over three decades of general freedom.

The public and politicians not only in the Baltic states but throughout Europe anxiously watched Russian maneuvers around Ukraine’s borders. They also perceived the continuing diversionary actions of Russian intelligence services and „vacationing“ soldiers in eastern Ukraine. These were accompanied by artificial hysteria about an impending Ukrainian attack on two separatist republics.

Russia had more than 100,000 armed soldiers on the borders, bringing in blood supplies, field hospitals, and additional troops. Meanwhile, pro-Russian collaborators there were already talking about a Ukrainian invasion in autumn 2021 and organizing forced evacuation of the population. Ukrainians showed not even a hint of any troop regrouping. President Zelensky even downplayed warnings from Western intelligence services.

After Russian ultimatums in December 2021, when they demanded Ukraine’s disarmament and its reintegration into the „Russian world,“ as well as the annulment of NATO expansion after 1997, the tension was palpable. But few could imagine a major war. It made sense to no one except Putin.

Slovak Anomaly

Slovakia was already an anomaly on a global scale at that time. Politicians of today’s ruling coalition organized protests and, under the pretext of peace, openly supported Russian aggression and demands. They even accused the West, especially the USA, of trying to provoke aggression against Russia. They organized a hunt against our MPs for supporting the defense agreement with the USA and threatened, together with today’s department head, a general strike. All in support of Russian interests, not Slovak ones.

Whether they did so out of complete confusion or were coordinated from the Russian embassy may one day be discovered by historians and investigators. Today, these are under the thumb of Maroš Žilinka, who as late as February 8, 2022, threatened parliamentarians with „the judgment of history“ for not wanting to hear his desperate fight against the agreement with the USA. Just before that, he praised the benefits of Soviet occupation.

Fight for Independence and Freedom

In July, we commemorate the anniversary of the American Revolution – the war for independence that culminated in the declaration of independence of American colonies. Since then, July 4 has been Independence Day in the USA. The French Revolution began with an attack on the Bastille and was a war for freedom. The French commemorate July 14 as Bastille Day.

Ukrainians today are fighting a combined war – for the bare existence of their own nation and their own free state. How this war turns out will determine our future history. In Slovakia’s case, probably also the existence of our state in its current form and borders.

Let’s analyze in two parts what happened, what is still happening, and what it means for Europe and Slovakia. What we have believed in so far is gradually disappearing, fears are being fulfilled.

Historical Parallels and Putin’s Strategy

To many people, President Putin’s approach just before the invasion of Ukraine resembled Hitler’s strategy during the Munich Dictate. Historical parallels are always somewhat flawed, but there might be something to it.

Russia had been conducting hybrid operations for a long time to prepare the international audience for a new reality. After the West’s strategic blunder of ending operations in Afghanistan and the massive disruption of normal life during COVID, Russia gained the impression that the West was tired. They thought it was self-absorbed and people were frightened of losing comfort.

Political leaders were at odds and trying to solve one cascading crisis after another, as well as strategic adaptation to rapid climate change. For Russia, like all autocratic regimes, this was a secondary matter. The primary concern is maintaining and strengthening power.

Ukraine and the entire West were strategically disturbed, unable to concentrate on the existential threat. The Russians evaluated this as an opportunity to capitalize on long-term disruptive activities in the world, into which they had invested billions of dollars for years.

Putin’s Ultimatum

But Putin’s ultimatum failed. Not so much because the West felt strong and united. Rather, they underestimated Putin and his determination.

The nearly 200,000 troops around Ukraine in late January 2022 looked threatening but not convincing enough that Russia could really engage in a major war. So the US rejected Putin’s ultimatum.

He maneuvered himself into a situation where he didn’t have many options left:

◾️Either admit he was bluffing and his costly show of force didn’t work

◾️Or attempt a lightning action, this time with the risk of high losses compared to the occupation of Crimea without a shot

But if he quickly achieved strategic goals, he would be able to politically sell it to his domestic and international audience. The West and the rest of the world would, according to Putin’s reasoning, come to terms with the new reality.

Beginning of the Invasion

The order to start the invasion came. In the early morning hours, around 5 AM on February 24, 2022, a large-scale invasion of Ukraine began.

Similar to Hitler, who attacked Poland early in the morning at 4:45 AM on September 1, 1939, Putin counted on a Blitzkrieg – a rapid advance into Ukraine’s interior and its rapid collapse.

Like the Nazis in Poland, the Russians quickly attacked Ukraine from three strategic directions:

◾️From the north toward Kyiv

◾️From the east toward Kharkiv and Donbas

◾️ In the south to Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and further along the Mykolaiv-Odesa axis

The entire maneuver was supported from the first minutes by strategic bombing of key defensive points and critical infrastructure. The cherry on top was to be a strategic airborne operation in Hostomel and the rapid occupation of Kyiv’s center and key political-administrative facilities.

Stalled Blitzkrieg

An exemplary lightning chess game, which the Russians had doctrinally and practically rehearsed and tested multiple times in the post-World War II period. It always went smoothly. Now the Russians suddenly got stuck.

Although the media still talks about a „three-day war,“ according to available information, the Russians had planned the entire operation for 10 days. In 10 days, they wanted to control not only Kyiv but the entire Ukraine, break its armed resistance, install a puppet government, suppress resistance hotspots, and stabilize the situation. This is what empires have been doing for centuries in rebellious provinces or with disobedient small neighbors. They know that any long conflict is exhausting and a strategic risk.

All of this failed for the Russians. The world was shocked not only that the Russians engaged in a war we haven’t seen since 1945 – that is, a war where a strong opponent attacks a relatively large neighbor with all means, who effectively defends itself.

Strategic Shocks for Russia

The Russians experienced several strategic shocks and couldn’t withdraw from the conflict in time. Regardless of the current state on the battlefield after more than three years, they strategically lost at the beginning. But they can still gain operational and tactical victory at an enormous cost.

First Strategic Shock

The biggest strategic shock for the Russians was that Ukrainians began to spontaneously defend themselves – ordinary citizens with Molotov cocktails. What was an advantage for the Russians – an attack on a more than 2,200-kilometer-long front, which was to ensure the overloading of Ukrainian defense and rapid collapse – turned into a Russian nightmare.

Their own troops became overloaded, their logistics failed, they couldn’t generate what everyone expected from a military superpower: massive dynamic combined arms maneuvers of large military formations with full support from the air, artillery, and mobility.

Second Strategic Shock

The second strategic shock for the Russians was the rejection of the invasion by Russian-speaking Ukrainians. The entire „liberating“ myth about the invasion fell.

Third Strategic Shock

The third strategic shock for the Russians was the vigorous and unified approach of the EU and NATO, which managed to respond within 24 hours with a clear political message. This then gradually transformed into breaking the barrier of fear of Russia and gradual aid to bleeding Ukraine.

Long Exhausting War

Instead of a lightning conquest of Ukraine, the Russians ended up in a long exhausting war. Ukrainians are fighting for bare survival.

Meanwhile, this war, with more than a million human casualties on the Russian side alone, has turned into a war of survival for the Russians as well. First and foremost, it’s about the survival of Putin’s regime and Putin personally. In the long term, it’s also about the survival of Russia as a strong and respected empire.

Russia is being exhausted, internal tension is growing, and on its borders, it has not only increasingly sovereign former colonies but also a numerically superior and economically stronger China.

Despite the failure of the lightning war, the Russians managed to destroy hope for a peaceful life in Europe. The Russians totally destroyed the post-war model of peaceful coexistence of countries and the OSCE security mechanism. There is a deep furrow not only between Russia and Ukraine but also between Russia and the West. Unfortunately, this is also within our societies. It is a consequence of the long-term hybrid war that the Russians are waging against us.

Life in a Different World

On February 24, 2022, in my very first media commentary on the beginning war, I expressed the opinion that regardless of whether the Russian invasion ends the next day or lasts for years, from 2/24/2022, we live in a different world, and our children will probably never experience the era of relaxation like all of us after November 1989. War is returning as a common political-historical phenomenon into our lives.

That’s why it’s important to analyze what happened, what is happening, and where it might lead. The Russian war in Ukraine has and will have a transformative effect on warfare and socio-political conditions for the next generations.

From Blitzkrieg to Gradual Dying Out

The war still continues. But it already is and will be a source of numerous studies and analyses. It will shape an entire generation of politicians, soldiers, and experts. I myself had the opportunity to participate in one of the first extensive studies. Our international three-member team attempted to generalize the lessons from the first ten months of the war. We provocatively named the report „How to Defeat Russia.“

Another two years have passed since then, and dozens of similar analyses have appeared. The situation on the battlefield has also changed and continues to evolve.

Distorted Intelligence Information

The Russian invasion was based on distorted intelligence information and poor strategic assessment. Putin was hungry for war, and no one had the courage to tell him that Russia, despite the relative weakness of Ukraine, was not prepared for a major war.

The Russians calculated that the population would quickly reconcile with the fall of Zelensky and Russian power. The Russians had practiced combat operations for several months, but they were not prepared for real combat.

Logistics Failure

The structure of Russian logistics was not adapted to conducting intensive combat operations for a longer period on foreign territory. The Russians had their so-called operational logistics outsourced to a state civilian company at that time.

At the tactical level, Russian troops carried with them only two calculation days of supplies at the battalion and at the brigade or regiment level. This was far from enough for the tens to hundreds of kilometers of advances in the first days. NATO has up to seven days of supplies at the same level.

Ukrainian tactics and weather also played their part. The Russian war machine got stuck. The rapid conquest of Ukraine turned into long-term battles in multiple dimensions.

Moreover, despite strategic bombing, the Russians failed to suppress Ukrainian air defense and gain air superiority. This has marked the entire course of the war so far.

Three Phases of the War

If we take into account the key factors and the prevailing character of activities, we can talk about three phases of the war.

First Phase (2022)

The first phase of the war took place in 2022. Briefly, it can be said that the Russians suffered a Ukrainian defensive shock, and Ukraine’s counteroffensive repelled the Russian advance at Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson.

Ukrainians even rapidly liberated a large part of the occupied territories, pushing the Russians into heavy defense. They had to resort to partial mobilization to prevent the collapse of front lines in southern Ukraine.

Western aid increased sharply, allowing precise strikes and recapturing territory. But Ukrainians partly became victims of their own success, and by the end of 2022, aid slowed down.

Second Phase (2023)

The second phase took place in 2023. Ukraine maintained tactical initiative almost the entire year but failed to turn it into operationally significant success. A stalemate ensued.

Russia strategically adapted, abandoned ideas of a quick victory, and dug in in eastern and southern Ukraine. Surovikin’s multi-layered line was too tough a nut to crack for Ukraine’s limited offensive formation.

Ukraine’s summer offensive stalled amid fortified lines saturated with a new generation of Russian drones. Ukraine shifted toward attrition warfare. What normally serves to shape the operational environment became the main content of combat activities aimed at logistics, command centers, and the enemy’s rear infrastructure.

It was confirmed that recapturing one’s own occupied territory, if the aggressor shifts to strategic defense, is extremely difficult.

Third Phase (2024 – Present)

The third phase of the war has been ongoing from the beginning of 2024 until now. It could be called hybrid escalation and technological transformation.

Although the Russians have operational initiative all the time, they cannot perform a fundamental rapid operation that would move the battlefield. Attempts at modern combined arms maneuvers of large formations have failed; instead, tactics have shifted toward constant small tactical attacks.

The battlefield is fully transparent, nothing can be hidden, soldiers often have only 10 minutes for combat maneuver and taking a new position. Moreover, it is saturated with all-seeing and all-destroying drones.

Ukraine has expanded drone and missile attacks deep into Russian territory, for example, in the case of Kursk. Russia has intensified aerial bombing and pressure on the Donetsk and Kharkiv fronts. The battlefield is becoming increasingly fragmented, decentralized, and technologically driven.

Main Factors for Ukraine’s Survival

When the invasion began, many experts believed we were seeing an atypical war, a clash of two post-Soviet armies irrelevant to Western armies.

The truth is that in the first months of the war, Ukrainians had the tactical and doctrinal upper hand. Especially that part of the Ukrainian army that had experience with operations in Donbas and had undergone Westernization. Commanders were independent, able to make decisions flexibly according to the situation, and mastered the principles of so-called mission command, where you only assign a goal to the unit, not a rigid procedure.

Russians were the exact opposite at the beginning – rigid, unable to make independent decisions, always looking at their superior and his detailed instructions. This has changed in the meantime. Russians are learning too.

Despite this, Ukrainians have so far managed to resist regardless of Russian numerical superiority and Russian superiority in strategic weapons.

Hybrid Model of the Ukrainian Army

The Ukrainian army has evolved from post-Soviet forces into a hybrid model that combines NATO-style mission command, asymmetric tactics, and targeting with AI support.

Russia, despite failures, has also adapted its Soviet-era doctrine and strengthened it with multi-layered defense, electronic warfare, mass artillery, and finally strong air support at the line of contact.

The course of the war so far shows that if Ukraine wants to survive, it must prioritize the strategic neutralization of the stronger Russia over a decisive victory on the battlefield. Ukraine’s victory may not come in the form of a signed treaty or complete restoration of territory. Instead, it may depend on the strategic neutralization of Russia and its aggression, making Russian aggression futile, even if the war persists.

Five Key Factors for Survival and Success

From this perspective, these 5 key factors for survival and success can be identified:

1) Disabling and Denying Russian Operations

◾️Ukraine must continue to paralyze Russian offensive capacity through drone warfare, remote mining, and attacks into the strategic operational depth of the adversary

◾️Functional defeats of enemy capabilities, such as disabling a bomber base or oil infrastructure, can shift the war from attrition to operational insignificance of that Russian capability

2) Sovereignty of the Defense Industry

◾️Ukraine started in a very difficult situation. It could rely only on limited supplies from the Soviet era, a weakened defense industry, and foreign aid

◾️Today, it can produce up to 52% of its needs itself, and this share is rising despite Russian bombing

◾️Domestic production of drones, artillery, and air defense systems is essential

◾️European partners are financing Ukrainian weapons production to reduce dependence

3) Civil-Military Integration

◾️In war, not only the armed forces but the entire country is involved. Not only because rockets and drones fall everywhere, but mainly because Ukraine correctly introduced the concept of total defense and resilience

◾️Territorial defense forces, volunteer battalions, and civilian mobilization form the backbone of Ukraine’s resilience

◾️Protection of critical infrastructure and maintaining societal continuity are as important as success on the battlefield

◾️For example, the ability to quickly repair damaged railways and the inability of Russians to hit moving targets deep in Ukrainian territory were the main reasons why the Russians failed to stop growing foreign aid

4) Strategic Deterrence

◾️Ukraine’s victory plan has partly fallen by the wayside, especially after the advent of the Trump administration in the US

◾️But it correctly proposes a package of non-nuclear deterrence including capabilities for long-distance strikes and joint defense operations with future partners

◾️Deterrence must be credible, sustainable, and anchored in Ukraine’s post-war security architecture

5) International Support and Political Unity

◾️Continued Western assistance – financial, military, and diplomatic – is essential

◾️Ukraine’s survival depends on maintaining global attention and fighting war fatigue, especially amid changing US politics

This applies not only within Ukraine but also in Slovakia and the West. In Ukraine, our security and free existence are being fought for. If Russia succeeds, the chance that we will find ourselves under Russian control again or live in constant fear of what the Russians will do will dramatically increase. Such a state would not only have political and psychological impacts but would mainly significantly cut into our resources. It would be the end of our security and relative prosperity.

Peace is Still Not in Sight and Democracy in Crisis

„It was supposed to be resolved within 24 hours.“ It’s hard to estimate whether Donald Trump’s pre-election statements were just conscious populist lies or the self-indulgent naivety of a politician whom the Russians bailed out of problems several times as a businessman.

No one expected President Trump to actually end the war in one day, but the US administration’s approach so far has been a huge disappointment and hasn’t brought the end of the war closer. It’s nowhere in sight.

Ukrainians so far cannot push the Russians out, and they cannot defeat Ukraine. But they can cause increasing suffering to civilians. This is due to the increasingly exhausted Ukrainian air defense, periodic blocking of American aid, and the inability of Americans and the West to produce more means to combat Russian missiles, drones, and heavy bombs.

Bad American Strategy

The Americans chose a very bad strategy. Despite knowing for decades that only a tough stance works against the Russians and their expansionism, they tried to buy the Russians at the cost of unilateral pressure on Ukraine.

If it had worked, Ukrainians might not have liked it, but at least it could be said that the end justifies the means. But the exact opposite happened. Putin stopped taking the Americans and their president seriously. Behind polite diplomatic phrases is mockery and even greater arrogance and brutality from the Russians. They rejected all of Ukraine’s offers for a ceasefire and negotiation and indicate that they only accept complete capitulation of Ukraine and humiliated forgiveness from the West.

Instead of stopping the war, long-time allies quarreled because of it. Europe is putting together a coalition of the willing in case it’s no longer possible to count on the Americans. But without American capabilities, Europeans will still be players in a supporting role for a long time if it comes to direct confrontation with Russia.

NATO in Crisis

Meanwhile, the Americans are giving them (Russians) too much space. It’s not just about American pragmatism and focusing more on China as the main competitor, but also about the inability, even after more than three years, to increase production of critical systems and missiles for air defense.

The recent NATO summit thus threatened a major dispute or even catastrophe. Some European politicians like Fico and Orbán were even prematurely celebrating Russian victory and new orders in Europe.

President Trump eventually had his way. NATO countries committed to increasing defense spending up to 5% of GDP. The crisis was temporarily averted. But the commitment to increase defense spending has no clear timeline and also includes a lot of room for creative accounting. So real strengthening of defense may not come quickly enough.

Moreover, Russia’s 5th column in NATO, led by Fico, has already made it known that they won’t give an extra cent for their defense. On the contrary, even from the current 2% of GDP for defense, they will significantly cut for explicitly civilian projects and openly talk about leaving NATO.

This was founded not only for defense against the aggressive Soviet Union and today’s Russia, but was also built on common values. How long this alliance will last in times of business politics and permanent trade and tariff war between the US and the rest of the allies is unclear.

Ukraine Must Help Itself

Ukraine, fighting for its survival, will primarily have to help itself. Just as it spontaneously did from the first day and hope that then others will help it too.

Battle to the End?

Under the given circumstances, it’s important for Ukrainians and for all of us not to lose attention and not to get tired. If a solution to the conflict doesn’t come on the diplomatic field, Ukraine must endure it militarily as well.

The current situation is extremely complex. The Russians cannot significantly advance on land, but they attack all the more from the air. The intensity of Russian attacks on civilian targets and critical infrastructure is constantly rising.

Ukrainians have eliminated part of the strategic bombers, and then they have many long-range missiles from flat flight paths, but the Russians can compensate with ballistic missiles and especially long-range drones. They modernized originally Iranian drones and today can produce hundreds of them daily. In June alone, Russians launched more than 5,400 drones at Ukraine.

At the same time, the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defense is gradually declining. In 2022, they could eliminate 95% of drones and 74% of missiles. Today it’s only 79% and 50%.

Situation at the Front

The Russians still have tactical and operational initiative and are pushing practically across the entire front. Fortunately, they have so far failed to capture any major city except Vuhledar. The second year, there is fighting for Kupiansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk. The Russians have also approached Kostiantynivka and penetrated the edge of the Dnipropetrovsk region.

The question arises whether Ukrainians still have a chance to endure. According to my estimate and the estimate of colleague experts, they still have a chance, and mainly they have no other option.

Transformation of Warfare

Ukrainians, aware of this, are not resting on their laurels. Both sides are coming up with innovations. The character of combat has fundamentally changed. It’s not just a solution out of necessity. It’s rather a fundamental transformation of warfare.

What otherwise takes years has been shortened to months. The innovation cycle, for example, in the field of drones, lasts only 3 months. Today’s tactical advantage may be marginal or completely irrelevant by the end of the year.

Although the Russians have an apparent advantage in the amount of personnel, they are not without problems either. They cannot just deploy conscripts in operations on Ukrainian territory. Training new contracted or called-up soldiers is complicated on both sides, and neither side has enough instructors.

Ukraine is more vulnerable in that training takes place in a war zone, but it can compensate for this with training from its allies and supporters.

Ukrainian Capabilities

Ukraine still has approximately 1 million men and women in arms, who are tired from long-term deployment but also have greater motivation.

Ukraine can produce more and more weapons systems by itself. For example, they can produce up to 250 self-propelled howitzers annually, which is more than all of NATO combined. Despite the massive use of drones, heavy equipment and artillery are still needed. Only the way they are used is changing.

Ukraine is gradually increasing the capacity of its air force with donated F-16 fighters and French Mirage 2000-5F fighters. The fact that they have already lost three of them is not a catastrophe but proof that they are using them more frequently and riskily.

Technological Edge

Despite significant Russian numerical, economic, raw material, and technological superiority, Ukrainians manage to keep pace with them and achieve technological excellence.

Ukraine is today a global leader in the production and use of drones. They have achieved absolute excellence with the help of Western companies in the field of artificial intelligence utilization.

An innovative way of processing data in the cloud and digitalizing the use of relatively outdated technology has brought a dramatic change in the field of target determination, targeting, and their destruction. Even with a smaller number of weapons systems of varying quality, they can achieve extremely effective fire destruction.

Strategic Asymmetry

The greatest advantage of Ukrainians lies in their strategic approach to changing doctrine. Aware of Russian numerical superiority and the unavailability of some strategic weapons and means with operational reach, Ukrainians focused on strategic asymmetry in their military operations.

They focus on mobility, deep precise strikes, and increasingly use guerrilla warfare and special forces operations deep in Russian territory. They have made the protection of air and sea routes and the long-term building of their own capabilities and capacities a strategic priority.

Despite long-term political fatigue from the war and the unpredictability of Americans, they can still rely on their allies. Support from countries of the Ramstein format continues to function, and partners help finance Ukrainian armament programs or technology transfer.

Self-Preservation Instinct and Will of the Nation

The instinct of self-preservation can mobilize and stimulate heroic performances. This applies equally to nations as to individuals.

Ukrainians are fighting an existential struggle. Every single Russian drone strike, every single rocket in the city center brings destruction. But instead of the depression and defeatism expected by the Russians, these motivate Ukrainians and mobilize the civilian population.

If before the invasion Putin dared to claim that Ukrainians don’t even exist and everyone has always belonged to the „Russian world,“ today he has a consolidated and confident nation before him.

The will of a nation to fight has been one of the main sources of strength of nations and the key to success in all long and great wars so far.

All these are factors that don’t make Ukrainians doomed to defeat by any means. The Russians experienced three strategic surprises right at the beginning. If Putin today relies on lasting longer in this war, he may experience a fourth and final strategic surprise.

Ukrainians can still withstand Russian aggression, but meanwhile, it may happen that we won’t withstand it, here in Slovakia.

Lessons from the War for Us in the West

Regardless of how Russian aggression and Ukraine’s fight for survival eventually end, we must learn from this war. It revealed the fragility of European security assumptions, the urgency of civil defense, and the need for strategic clarity and mobilization.

Slovakia and Europe as a whole – this conflict is not a distant crisis but a mirror reflecting our own vulnerability and choices.

Hundreds of treatises have already been written about this war today, although not all are fully understood and especially accepted by politicians who decide and citizens whom it concerns. Many assumptions will change, as will their final evaluations. But the main trends are clear today.

This war is already fundamentally changing views on warfare and military-political competition, as well as concepts of state survival. The long-term consequences of the Ukrainian conflict are extensive and deeply transformative – regionally and globally. Together they create a whole series of domino effects.

Main Consequences of the War

Let’s mention at least some:

Geopolitical Realignment

◾️Geopolitical realignment is occurring, and a new cold war dynamic is emerging

◾️The war has cemented the gulf between Russia and Western democracies

◾️NATO and the EU are strengthening ties and expanding military capabilities

◾️Russia is increasingly aligning with China and other non-Western powers, potentially reshaping global alliances and trade routes

◾️Countries that were traditionally non-aligned are reassessing their positions and balancing economic interests with security concerns

Security and Military Changes

◾️European countries are increasing defense budgets and weapons production. This applies not only to the Baltic states and Poland but also to Germany or Sweden

◾️NATO has rapidly expanded as a result of the war. Finland and Sweden’s entry into NATO represents a significant strategic shift in Northern Europe

◾️The conflict has accelerated the use of artificial intelligence, drones, and cyber tools in modern warfare, creating new precedents for future conflicts

Economic and Energy Disruption

◾️Sanctions, disrupted supply chains, and energy shortages have triggered inflation and economic instability worldwide

◾️Europe is rapidly diversifying away from Russian oil and gas, investing in renewable energy sources and alternative suppliers

◾️Even after the conflict ends, many sanctions against Russia will likely persist, changing global trade and investment flows

Human Rights and Social Consequences

◾️Massive casualties, emigration, and declining birth rates are accelerating Russia’s demographic crisis

◾️Widespread human rights violations, including torture and forced deportations, will leave lasting scars and complicate future reconciliation

◾️With millions of displaced Ukrainians, rebuilding communities and infrastructure will likely take decades

Strategic Uncertainty

◾️Frozen conflicts will continue to haunt the world. Even if active fighting ceases, unresolved territorial disputes and political enmity can persist for years

◾️New arms races are coming, and the importance of deterrence is growing. The war has renewed interest in hypersonic weapons, cyber capabilities, and nuclear deterrence strategies

◾️Global governance and cooperation are failing

The war in Ukraine is also bringing a completely new revolution in warfare. Doctrine and tactics are completely changing. The view of the right mix of military capabilities, strategic deterrence, defense, civil defense, and country resilience is fundamentally changing.

Views on the professional army and compulsory service are changing. Concepts of comprehensive mobilization of society await a fundamental revision.

These issues and their impact on Europe and Slovakia will be addressed in the second part of the podcast.

And that’s all for today. I look forward to listening to the second part of the podcast. Thank you for your attention.

The post Ukrainian War for Existence appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#Kyjev #Putin #Rusko #Trump #Ukrajina #USA #Vojna na Ukrajine

Ide o Ukrajinu, nie o Trumpa, Putina či Zelenského

Donaldovi Trumpovi ide len o vlastné ego a „ocenenie“. Milióny trpiacich a obetí vojny ho až tak nezaujímajú. Naopak, jeho postup vyzerá tak, že si asi chce pomocou precedensu s anexiou Krymu nechať zadné vrátka na vlastné vojnové dobrodružstvá a anexie v budúcnosti. To, že Ukrajina nemá také karty ako Rusko, bolo zrejmé od začiatku. Inak by si Rusko nikdy netrúflo na vojenskú agresiu a celoplošnú inváziu. Rusko sa ale prepočítalo. Ani po viac ako troch rokoch totálnej vojny a brutálneho násilia voči civilom nedokáže Ukrajinu poraziť a obsadiť.

Ale to nijako neberie zodpovednosť z pliec USA a Spojeného kráľovstva. Spolu s Ruskom v roku 1994 tlačili na Ukrajinu, aby 5. decembra 1994 podpísala Budapeštianske memorandum. To, že Ukrajina dnes „nemá karty“ a čelí existenčnej hrozbe ako štát aj národ, je v prvom rade zlyhanie tých, ktorí mali garantovať Ukrajine existenciu a bezpečnosť po tom, čo sa pod ich tlakom vzdala možnosti vôbec mať „nejaké karty“.

Vo svete aj doma musia platiť základné pravidlá

Agresor a vrah v podobe Putinovho Ruska sa ohradzuje, že obeť vraždenia je málo kooperatívna a nechce robiť ústupky? TO FAKT? Takže zmierenie sa Ukrajincov s tým, že nik nehodlá vytlačiť Rusko z okupovaných území a Ukrajina a pozostalí obetí mučenia, vraždenia a vojnového násilia majú zabudnúť na stíhanie zodpovedných za vojnové zločiny aj náhradu vojnových škôd stále jastrabom v Moskve a Trumpovi nestačia? Zelenský nie je vlastníkom Ukrajiny a ani keby chcel, nemôže len tak rozdávať územia agresorom. Ukrajina je domokracia a ústava mu to ani nedovoľuje.

To, čo platí v zahraničnej politike je vždy previazané aj s domácou politikou. Ak dovolíme medzinárodným agresorom beztrestne zabíjať a nárokovať si na vojnový lup, tak potom prečo aj doma nezrušíme políciu a justíciu a jednoducho nenecháme vládnuť LYNČ, či právo silnejšieho? Prečo máme stíhať zlodejov a vrahov, ak chceme zohľadňovať ich „nároky“ voči obetiach ich zločinov? Prečo máme stíhať teroristov, ak chceme legitimizovať ich skutky, hľadať pre ne ospravedlnenie a nútiť obete terorimu, aby akceptovali „nároky“ teroristov?

Vraždenie a násilie sa nielen morálne, ale aj právne odsudzuje všade na svete bez ohľadu kultúru, vieru a politický systém s výnimkou fašizmu, komunizmu a diktátorských režimov. Ide o základné ľudské hodnoty, ktoré nás majú odlišovať od ríše zvierat či strojov. Ak ľudstvo abdikuje na základné ľudské hodnoty a princípy, či vo vnútri spoločnosti alebo na medzinárodnom poli, aký zmysel by mala existencia ľudskej civilizácie? Veď to nemôže byť len medzistav pred vyvraždením na základe práva silnejšieho.

The post Dá sa vôbec dosiahnuť mier bez jasného postoja k agresii? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#Eurofighter Typhoon #Musk #Nemecko #Španielsko #Spojené kráľovstvo #Tesla #Trump #Turecko #USA

Tesla padá voľným pádom

Robiť biznis a politiku súčasne, najmä keď verejne napádate svojich partnerov, či sa spájate s extrémistami, sa môže vypomstiť aj najbohatším ľuďom ako Elon Musk. Ten nielenže kontroverzným spôsobom a bez serióznej analýzy opravuje americký štát a spôsobuje masívne prepúšťanie a fatálne omyly. Následne po ňom súdy či iní členovia administratívy opravujú škody, ktoré napácha. Jeho spoločnosť Tesla vyrástla aj vďaka umelého ošiaľu z elektrických vozidiel, ktoré si kupovali fajnšmekri a hlavne progresívna a liberálnejšia časť populácie, citlivo vnímajúca pokračujúce globálne klimatické zmeny.

Lenže súčasná vláda USA, v ktorej má výrazný vplyv práve majiteľ Tesly, nielenže spochybňuje klimatickú krízu. Vo veľkom ruší ekologické opatrenia, odstupuje od Kjótskeho protolu, podporuje masívnu ťažbu a spotrebu fosílnych palív. Hlavným heslom sa stalo „Drill, Baby, Drill!“, voľne preložené „Ťaž koľko sa len dá!“. Ak do toho prídu Elonove arogantné vyjadrenia, neonacistické pózy, miešanie sa do vnútornej politiky a volieb iných štátov a priama podpora ultrapravicových síl, vyvoláva to pochopiteľne negatívnu spätnú reakciu.

Začína sa bojkot výrobkov Tesly v Amerike, Kanade, škandinávskych krajinách, Nemecku, ale aj vo vzdialenej Austrálii. Prepad predajov za posledné dva mesiace je ohromujúci. V niektorých krajinách poklesol predaj vozidiel Tesla aj o viac ako 70 %, v Nemecku to bolo 46 %. Poškodenie reputácie v takomto rozsahu bude dlhodobé. Naviac, Tesla už nemá exkluzivitu, na trhu je množstvo lacnejších a lepších elektromobilov.

Spoločnosť Tesla bola extrémne nadhodnotená na burze. Napríklad skutočná automobilka General Motors, mnohonásobne väčšia ako Tesla, má kapitalizáciu 48 mld. USD (14.3.), zatiaľ čo nepomerne menšia Tesla aj po prepade 30 % za posledný mesiac má trhovú kapitalizáciu (hodnotu na burze) 804 mld. USD (14.3.). Teraz táto bublina praská ako svojho času digitálna bublina dot.com. Tesla padá voľným pádom a hlavnou príčinou je strata dôvery vo firmu vlastnenú a riadenú Elonom Muskom. Celkovo od svcjho vrcholu zo 17. decembra 2024 Tesla za posledné tri mesiace padla už o 48 %.

Strata dôvery v USA môže znamenať stratu zákazníkov a novú konkurenciu

Po posledných opatreniach americkej vlády voči Ukrajine a v dôsledku neustále sa meniacej rétoriky vo vzťahu ku svojim spojencom, sa niečo podobné môže stať aj s dôverou spojencov a americkým exportom zbraní. Ten je prísne regulovaný ministerstvom zahraničných vecí a Kongresom USA, ale je to aj mimoriadny zdroj príjmov amerických zbrojoviek.

Tie síce už dávno nie sú chrbticou americkej ekonomiky a tvoria len jej veľmi malú časť. Ale profitabilita a dobrá kondícia amerických zbrojoviek sa priamo odzrkadľuje v americkej národnej bezpečnosti aj v schopnosti rozumne financovať rozvoj zbrojárenských technológií a udržať si technologickú špičku. To všetko v čoraz nebezpečnejšom svete, v ktorom čoraz väčšiu úlohu hrá Čína. Tá už aj v oblasti zbrojných technologií už dávno nie je len najvýkonnejšou kopírkou už známych riešení na svete.

Spojené štáty po predstavení v Oválnej pracovni pri návšteve prezidenta Zelenského zastavili materiálnu vojenskú pomoc pre Ukrajinu. To ale mnohí z nás čakali, obávali sa toho aj Ukrajinci. Na druhej strane, Trumpova administratíva zatiaľ žiadnu pomoc pre Ukrajinu ani nemala v pláne. Došlo k zastaveniu dobiehajúcej pomoci z predchádzajúceho balíčka celkovej pomoci vo výške 60 mld. USD. Ten bol schválený po dlhých obštrukciách Republikánov minulý rok v apríli. Veľká časť z toho bola vojenská pomoc, pričom zostávalo dodať zbrane a muníciu za cca 3 a pol miliardy. Ak by Biden neváhal, tak táto pomoc by bola už dávno vyskladnená a dodaná na Ukrajinu.

No skutočný šok nastal po tom, čo USA nielen obmedzili, či dokonca zastavili výmenu spravodajských informácií a prístup k satelitným snímkam, ale zablokovali aj efektívne používanie už viacerých dodaných zbraní. Nejde len o zablokovanie prístupu k presnejšej vojenskej GPS navigácii. Veľa zariadení má v sebe kryptozariadenia na utajovanú komunikáciu a riadenie operácií.

Na spojenie sa používajú v 27 krajinách NATO rádiostanice Harris, spojenie medzi stíhačkami vo vzduchu, prostriedkami včasnej výstrahy, PVO a pozemnými riadicimi centrami ide cez dátový protokol Link-16. Tieto systémy sú bez tzv. kľúčového hospodárstva nepoužiteľné, alebo nedokážu meniť šifrovanie a stávajú sa zraniteľnými.

Podobne je tomu so stíhačkami a ich systémami rádioelektronického boja, kde sa frekvencie a charakteristiky prostriedkov protivníka často menia. K tomu sa musí prispôsobovať softvér a charakteristiky aktívnych prvkov. V prípade lietadiel F-35 Lightning II sa špekuľuje, že Američania by v nich mohli mať zabudované aj tzv. kill switche. Teda, že by Američania vedeli diaľkovo v prípade potreby vypnúť kritické systémy. Po tom, čo USA predviedli smerom k Ukrajine, ale aj po čoraz agresívnejšej rétorike, v mnohých hlavných mestách zavládlo zdesenie. Nik si síce nepripúšťa nejaký rýchly rozpad vzťahov s USA, ale 100 % dôveru už asi nemá nik.

Spojené štáty dlhú dobu tlačili na svojich spojencov a to celkom oprávnene, aby výrazne zvýšili v rámci NATO podiel na svojej bezpečnosti. Transakčne orientovaný Donald Trump tlačil na výrazné zvýšenie výdavkov európskych partnerov na zbrojenie a v zápätí hovoril, že spojenci by mali nakupovať americké zbrane a znížiť tak obchodný deficit USA. Niektoré systémy aj dlho ešte budeme musieť nakupovať od Američanov, lebo iné nie sú k dispozícii. Ale zostať silne závislí na čoraz nepredvídateľnejšom a cynickom partnerovi začínajú európski spojenci vnímať ako bezpečnostné riziko.

Poliaci masovo zbroja, v najbližších rokoch ich to bude stáť 400 miliárd eur. Veľkú časť berú od USA, zvyšok z vlastnej výroby alebo z kapacitných dôvodov aj od ostatných partnerov vrátane Južnej Kórei. Ani Američania neboli schopní rýchlo dodať požadované objemy. Predstava, že dávate 5 % HDP na obranu, vynaložíte stovky miliárd na nové Patrioty, THAAD, desiatky stíhačiek F-35 a 470 súprav HIMARS a nemáte istotu, či Vám ich niekto v kritickej situácii nevypne musí byť desivá. Aj keď sa Poliaci spoliehajú na to, že majú kontrakty priamo s výrobcom a nič im nehrozí, vedia, že to nemusí byť tak.

Poliaci zrejme už príliš veľa možností na zmenu nemajú a vzťahy s USA dlhodobo posilňujú. Preto aj nedávna účasť prezidenta Dudu na kontroverznej konferencii konzervatívcov dáva zmysel. Ostatné krajiny majú ešte čas a hlavné obranné nákupy pred sebou. Začínajú váhať a na verejnosti sa ozývajú prvé kuvičie hlasy západných politikov. Prezidentovi Trumpovi sa tak môže podariť dosiahnuť cieľ zvýšenia výdavkov a prebudiť spojencov. Avšak budíček šokom môže podobne ako Muskove výkriky na X a pred kamerami viesť k odklonu od nákupu amerických zbraní.

Nejde len o nemeckých, francúzskych a britských politikov. Nedávno sa nechal počuť portugalský minister obrany, že Portugalsko nenakúpi zamýšľané americké stíhačky F-35. Následne prišla zo strany vlády korekcia, že minister sa unáhlil a že Portugalsko len zvažuje aj iné alternatívy, ale nevylučuje nákup F-35. Podobné fámy sa začínajú šíriť aj o Fínsku. Ale zatiaľ ide skôr o fámy alebo spravodajské hry na rozhádanie spojencov. V každom prípade, pokiaľ sa bude americká administratíva správať ako slon v porceláne, tak síce popichne Európu na vyššie zbrojenie, ale americké zbrojovky až taký osoh z toho mať nebudú.

Turecko potrebuje a chce nové stíhačky

Turecko sa ocitlo v trochu odlišnej situácii. Na nákup najmodernejších amerických zbraní mohlo zabudnúť už po predchádzajúcej roztržke, aj kvôli svojej nekoordinovanej intervencii v Sýrii, či po nákupe ruského systému PVO S-400 Triumf. Turecko bolo zo strany USA vyradené z programu F-35 a dokonca aj z podpory F-16. Erdoganovi sa obštrukciami rozšírenia NATO o Fínsko a Švédsko a blokovaním vstupu Švédska do NATO podarilo odblokovať podporu a dodávky F-16. Ale to bolo maximum, čo mohlo dosiahnuť.

Aj preto malo Turecko už dlhšiu dobu záujem o stíhačky Eurofighter Typhoon, ktoré boli vyvinuté a sú vyrábané európským konzorciom firiem zo Spojeného Kráľovstva, Nemecka, Španielska a Talianska. Aj tento obchod bol dlhšie blokovaný, najmä kvôli jasnému odmietavému postoju Nemecka. Teraz by sa mohla situácia zmeniť. S exportom do krajín mimo konzorcia musia súhlasiť všetci štyria partneri v konzorciu. Spojené kráľovstvo, Taliansko a Španielsko nemajú s predajom stíhačiek Turecku žiadny problém.

Teraz prichádzajú signály, že aj postoj Nemecka by sa mohol zmeniť. Nie je to síce garantované, ale veci sa dali do pohybu a spojené kráľovstvo sa bude veľmi o to snažiť. Nemecko blokovalo predaj okrem iného aj kvôli tureckým protiizraelským postojom a pozíciou ku konfliktu Hamasu s Izraelom.

Turecko má záujem o kúpu 40 ks Eurofighter Typhoon 4. emisie (iterácie) a ich integráciu do tureckých vzdušných síl. Táto verzia je vybavená najmodernejším a špičkovým radarovým systémom AESA CAPTOR-E. Štvrtá generácia (emisia) Eurofighterov by mala byť podľa odhadov prevádzkovateľná minimálne do roku 2060. Dodávateľom pre Turecko by malo byť Spojené kráľovstvo. Podľa najnovších informácií, britské ministerstvo obrany už aj predložilo svojmu tureckému náprotivku podrobný návrh kontraktu. Turci ho teraz detailne posudzujú. Samotní Nemci chcú v najbližšej dobe nakúpiť 38 kusov týchto stíhačiek, čo podčiarkuje dlhodobú strategickú prespektívu a udržateľnosť tohto typu stíhacích strojov.

V súvislosti s rastúcou vojenskou spoluprácou medzi Spojeným kráľovstvom a Tureckom, v decembri minulého roku na leteckej základni Murted pri Ankare pristáli aj dve stíhačky Eurofighter Typhoon britského Kráľovského letectva. Tureckí predtavitelia si tak mohli ohmatať a pozrieť lietadlo priamo na mieste. Spojené kráľovstvo, ktoré už nie je v EÚ, môže zohrať kľúčovú úlohu spojky pri udržaní transatlantického partnerstva. Súčasne je lídrom koalície ochotných nielen pre podporu Ukrajiny, ale aj pre výrazné posilnenie európskej obrany schopnosti.

Turecké letectvo tak nakoniec môže dostať zelenú na posilnenie o namodernejšie európske stíhačky a samotné Turecko na posilnenie svojich väzieb s Európou. Prípadný obchod v tomto prípade prospeje aj európskemu obrannému priemyslu.

//Edit (17.3.2025).

Podľa vyjadrenia The defence news (Canada Reconsiders F-35 Fighter Jet Deal, Explores European Alternatives ) a The Aviationist (Canada Reconsidering $13.2 Billion F-35 Purchase Amid Growing Tensions With The U.S. – The Aviationist), Kanada zvažuje prehodnotenie svojho zámeru na obstaranie stíhačiek F-35 Lightning II a hľadá čiastočnú náhradu v podobe strojov z Európy. Namiesto pôvodných 88 ks F-35 v objeme 13,2 mld USD teraz Kanaďania uvažujú o nákupe maximálne 32 kusov a namiesto zvyšných F-35 zvažuje nákup minimálne 60 ks stíhačiek JAS 39 Gripen verzia E/F od švédskej spoločnosti SAAB. Švédsko v tejto súvislosti ponúklo aj možnosť kompletácie JAS 39 Gripen priamo v Kanade, čo v prípade F-35 Lightning II nie je na základe amerických postupov možné.

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#Červené more #EÚ #EUNAVFOR ASPIDES #Húsiovia #Jemen #Trump #USA

USA a ich spojenci si dlhodobo nevedia rady s Húsiami a ich útokmi na lode v Červenom mori. Skončenie útokov nepriniesla ani európska misia EUNAVFOR ASPIDES. Jedným z problémov je, že reštriktívne pravidlá nasadenia neumožňujú potlačiť aktivity Húsiov, ktorí kontrolujú veľkú časť územia Jemenu a majú rozsiahly vojenský arzenál.

Na Húsiov opakovane udreli USA so Spojeným kráľovstvom, jeden prístav bombardovalo aj izraelské letectvo. Napriek tomu si Húsiovia trúfajú napádať nielen obchodné lode, ale aj americké vojenské lode v Červenom mori, Adenskom zálive aj v úžine Bab-el-Mandab.

Pred niekoľkými týždňami Trump podpísal výnos, ktorým zaradil Húsiov na zoznam zahraničných teroristických skupín. Aj napriek vojenským opatreniam USA a ich spojencov, EÚ a Izraelu, Húsiovia od útoku Hamasu na Izrael už napadli viac ako 100 lodí a plavidiel dronmi, raketami a malými člnmi.

Dnešným dňom prezident Trump ohlásil rozhodnú vojenskú akciu, ktorá podľa neho bude trvať tak dlho, kým neprestanú tieto útoky. Donald Trump zdôraznil, že húsijské útoky spôsobujú miliardové straty a žiadni teroristi nebudú ohrozovať USA a medzinárodný obchod. Prezident Trump nezabudol skritizovať administratívu svojho predchodcu a prisľúbil rozsiahle letecké údery, ktoré môžu trvať aj celé týždne. Súčasne zatiaľ vylúčil akékoľvek pozemné vojenské operácie priamo v Jemene. Húsiovia zatiaľ hlásia 9 mŕtvych v dôsledku dnešných útokov (15.3.2025).

Drsný odkaz poslal Trump aj Iránu, ktorý dlhodobo podporuje aj Húsiov. „Pre Irán: Podpora húsijským teroristom musí okamžite prestať! Nehrozujte americký ľud, jeho prezidenta, ktorý získal jeden z najväčších mandátov v prezidentskej histórii alebo celosvetové dopravné trasy. Ak budete v podpore pokračovať, majte sa na pozore, lebo Amerika Vás zoberie na zodpovednosť a nebudeme pri tom milí.“ napísal Trump na sociálnej sieti.

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#DITA #húfnica vz. 2000 #Konštrukta Defence a.s. #ZŤS a.s. #ZUZANA

Šumy o českej DITE, o tom, že štátny podnik ZŤS im dodáva hlavne, že mu šéfuje dlhoročný smerák s väzbami na najvyššie špičky strany, a že štátna zbrojovka má vraj nevyrovnané záväzky voči partnerovi zaznievajú už dlhšie. Prekryli ich iné a asi aj dôležitejšie veci.

Jeden z našich najlepších praktických delostrelcov a expert na delostrelecké systémy si dovolil zaujímať sa o to, čo sa deje v pozadí a že sa mu nepozdáva niečo na českej húfnici DITE. Česi sú náš najbližší spojenec a partner, na štátnej aj biznisovej úrovni. Ale ak ide o peniaze, láska ide stranou. AČR si napriek ponuke od nás, vybrala francúzske Ceasary. V poriadku. Ale teraz sa zrazu niečo, čo sa zbraňovo viac než podobá na Zuzanu, ide vyrábať v Čechách a dokonca aj s našimi hlavňami.

Vôbec nie som prekvapený, že exminister opäť použil „netuší“ s výsmešným tónom na adresu plukovníka. Ja som sa tiež dozvedel, že som debil, ktorý nevie, čo je to personálny rozkaz ministra, keď som poukázal na evidentnú pravopisnú aj zákonnú chybu. Vtedy, keď minister podpísal svoj prvý rozkaz, ja som mal už podpísaných stovky personálnych rozkazov, len z inej funkcie a s inou hlavičkou, zákonný obsah je rovnaký, jeden a ten istý. ale dostal som odkaz, že sa mám starať do toho, čomu rozumiem a nie do personálnych rozkazov, ktorým vraj nerozumiem. Po jednej replike som to predýchal.

Plukovník sa len ako dobrý gazda pýtal na to, čo sa mu nezdalo. Je to človek, ktorý celý svoj aktívny život zasvetil svojej krajine a službe armáde. Je pripravený kedykoľvek položiť život. Nemusí mať pravdu, ale zaslúži si slušnú odpoveď a nie zosmiešňovanie a verejné ponižovanie od nejakého úradníka, hoc aj ministra obrany.

Transparentnosť a nekompromisnosť asi končia s nástupom do funkcie. Pol roka som si hrýzol do jazyka a dal zátky do uší, aby som nepočúval šumy, len aby som nebol za robíjača demokratického spektra. Lebo takú a ešte horšiu nálepku by som asi dostal pri prvej otázke. Kompetentnosť a lojálnosť sa tu na Slovensku meria len silou kriku a sumou peňazí na reklamu. Tie ja ako čestný „hlupák“ nemám.

Chce to riadne vysvetlenie všetkých šumov, aj personálnych rozhodnutí v štátnom holdingu, nie útoky. Tie nám demokratom nesvedčia.

Celý článok tu:

https://e.dennikn.sk/3508389/ceska-firma-odkopirovala-nasu-hufnicu-zuzana-hovori-velitel-slovenskych-delostrelcov

Súvisiaci článok:
Slovenská štátna zbrojovka pomohla vyrobiť českú húfnicu, ktorá konkuruje dubnickej Zuzane (dennikn.sk)

The post Bohužiaľ, čestný plukovník dostal kopanec! appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#EÚ #GLOBSEC #NATO #Rusko #Smer -SD #Ukrajina #Vojna na Ukrajine 

Blánár ani Smer nie sú odborníci na zahraničnú politiku. Je načase, aby Smer začal riešiť problémy slovenských občanov a nie imperialistické ambície zločincov z Kremľa! Na rozdiel od Smeru, prezidenti SR a ČR svojou návštevou na Ukrajine riešili tie najdôležitejšie problémy občanov SR a ČR – mier, bezpečnosť a stabilitu.

Blanár kritizuje prezidentku a špekuľuje o tom, čo by občania privítali. Občania Slovenska by určite uvítali, keby sa kolaboranti s ruskými vrahmi a nacistami nepretŕčali v televízii. Je nehoráznosť, čo Blanár beztrestne tára o Ukrajine na Markíze. Vojnoví štváči zo Smeru klamú o mieri a vydávajú Ukrajinu a západ za agresora a súčasne presadzujú záujmy nacistického Ruska. Presne ako doma, kde sa Smer vydáva za obeť vraždy J. Kuciaka. Hnus!

Reči o tom, ako sa Rusko nedá poraziť konvečnými zbraňami sú nezmysel. Rusko predsa napadlo Ukrajinu a tá sa bráni. Tá rovnica je presne opačne. Rusko vojensky nedokáže poraziť Ukrajinu a malo by okamžite ukončiť nezmyselnú agresiu. Ak Ukrajincom nepomôžeme, len predlžujeme vojnu. Ak im nedáme zbrane a pomoc, tak sa budeme spolupodieľať na agresii, ktorá má za cieľ likvidáciu ukrajinského národa a štátu.

Blanár de facto jasne povedal, že ak Vás na ulici prepadnú gangstri a budú Vás kopať, tak on by prišiel a ešte Vás dokopal, aby skrátil Vaše utrpenie. Tento politruk melie dookola o predlžovaní vojny. Nech láskavo ide na ruskú ambasádu a žiada okamžité stiahnutie Rusov z Ukrajiny! Vypínam.

The post Prečo volajú do televízií kolaborantov a geopolitických analfabetov? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#bezpečnosť #demagógia #diskreditácia #F-16 #NATO #Rusko #Ukrajina #Vojna na Ukrajine

Mafiánsky štát a jeho strojcovia ako chameleóni zmenili šat a rétoriku, tvária sa ako tribúni ľudu, obhajcovia právneho štátu a mierotvorcovia. A majú tisíce nasledovateľov, ktorí sa orientujú podľa informácií, ktoré sa k nim dostanú. Tých od strojcov mafiánskeho štátu a proruskej scény je viac ako tých objektívnych. Zlo sa snaží prekričať dobro. Taktika je jednoduchá, stačí pustiť do éteru klamstvo a ono sa už samo uchytí, najmä, ak ho nikto nevyvracia.

Ľudia sú uponáhľaní, nemajú čas si overovať fakty. Žijú z titulkov, z krátkych nepravdivých výrokov, z perfektných marketingových ťahov. Takto funguje manipulácia. Vždy sa niečo z klamstva „uchytí“ a stane sa to akceptovanou pravdou. Sú dva spôsoby ako tomu čeliť a reagovať.

Ten prvý je, že tvrdo a trpezlivo vysvetľujete, chodíte do médií, študujete a overujete si fakty a prezentujete otvorene pravdu, aj keď sa to časti davu nepáči. Trpezlivo znášate posmešky, nadávky, vyhrážky a diskreditáciu. Skrátka pre dobro nesiete kožu na trh.

Druhá možnosť je splynúť s davom. Radšej sa nevyjadrujete, ste tíško ako voš pod chrastou. Máte malú eseročku, robíte kšefty aj s obvinenými „kapitánmi“ mafiánskeho štátu, veď Vy za to nemôžete, čo oni robia. Aj keď ste v živote neriadili viac ako troch ľudí, čakáte na svoju šancu a máte ambície trebárs aj na premiéra. Rozhodnú síce občania, ale máte veľkú šancu. Stačia Vám bilboardy, skvelé heslá a dobrá kampaň a urobia z Vás čistého a odhodlaného nositeľa zmeny. Lenže spoločnosť sa aj naďalej bude prepadať do bahna…

Poďme naspäť k demagógii a klamstvám. Stratégovia, akých som popisal ako druhú možnosť, sú tíško a radia nereagovať. Lenže demagógia nezapadne prachom, ale sa šíri oveľa rýchlejšie a ľahšie ako pravda. Aj preto sme šokovaní z predvolebných prieskumov. Ja skúšam za pravdu bojovať. Nielen preto, že to robil už Štefánik, ale preto, že zlu a lži sa nemá ustupovať. Robím to vecne a kľudne, ale niekedy treba aj ostrejšie, ale slušne.

Tu je ukážka, ako chodia diskreditovať na youtube, lebo vedia, že to pozerajú tisíce ľudí:

♨️Robert Molnár ( @robertmolnar7032 ) otvára konverzáciu:

„Macko je taky odbornik ako ja kozmonaut… F16 su nerealne na ukrajine, jedine ak tam pojdu americania do nich. Minimalny bojovy výcvik je 35 mesiacoch..“

✅Odpovedám ( @pavelmacko1723 ):

„Ste chytrý, ale asi hluchý. Povedal som že výcvik je 15 mesiacov na výcvikových strojoch a potom 2 roky na F-16. Takže je to dokonca 39 mesiacov. Tak proti čomu vlastne protestujete? Proti svojmu obrazu v zrkadle? Ja odborník som, ale Vy kozmonautom nebudete ani vo vlhkom sne. „

♨️♨️ Pridáva sa Ľubomír Molnár ( @lubomirmolnar6644 )

„@pavelmacko1723 … Ale pozerám okrem iných aj vaše komentáre. A aj keď nemienim spochybnovať vaše vojenské schopnosti, tak musím konštatovať že ste mnoho krát komentoval dianie na UA ako demagóg. Stačí si pozrieť vaše staršie príspevky.“

✅ Odpovedám:

“ @lubomirmolnar6644 Takže verejná výzva pre Vás pán Molnár: Váš menovec tu má problémy so sluchom a spochybňuje moje vyjadrenie na základe svojho nepodloženého dojmu, lebo v tom videu som presne povedal v akých fázach a ako dlho trvá výcvik. Ale Róbert Molnár si melie svoje a od veci.

Výhodou je, že moje vyjadrenia sa dajú presne prehrať a porovnať s Vašimi klamnými alebo chybnými interpretáciami. Celé mesiace sem ako trollovia chodíte, koordinujete sa v konkrétnych skupinách, ale ANI RAZ ste nepriniesli dôkaz, len republikánske táraniny. Presne tak to tu bude, keď mafia a fašisti vyhrajú voľby. Takže sem dajte moje konkrétne výroky a nie Vaše domnienky a porovnáme si zvukovo-obrazové záznamy, čo rozprávate o mne Vy a čo som skutočne povedal ja.

Na rozdiel od väčšiny analytikov vo svete aj na Slovensku, ja som práve jeden z tých opatrnejších a skeptickejších a nerobil som propagandu, ani som nešíril zbožné želania namiesto faktov, ako to robia notorickí rusofili. A potom môžeme porovnať s vyjadreniami ľudí z Republiky, smerohlasu, či Hlavných správ. A uvidíme, kto tu rok klame a robí demagógiu. Najprv tvrdili, že Rusko nezaútočí, potom sa tešili že za týždeň Ukrajina padne a teraz zúfalo chodia po internete a klamú, kto čo tvrdil. Všetky videá, statusy, články a vyjadrenia sa dajú dohľadať a pekne analyzovať. Takže dajte niečo, alebo prestaňte ohovárať.

♨️♨️ Ľubomír Molnár kontruje:

“ @pavelmacko1723 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lg-D-DDVsuE&t=262s cca 30 minúta. Môžeme sa hrať zo slovíčkami. Ale ak niekto povie že rusi už tento konflikt nemôžu vyhrať ( čo dúfam že nevyhrajú ) neznamená to že prehral, alebo teda prehrá ? A našli by sa ešte podobné výroky, ale nemám čas ani záujem presedieť dva dni pri PC aby som znova počúval všetky vaše príspevky.“

✅ Reagujem:

“ @lubomirmolnar6644 Práve ste sa zosmiešnili. Zahrniem Vašu otázku aj ukážku do budúceho videa, nech aj Vaše okolie vie, ako tárate. Otázka na Vašej úrovni chápania: UŽ RUSI VYHRALI A OBSADILI UKRAJINU? NIE? Tak až to bude pravda, potom príďte! Ale zatiaľ stále platí, čo som povedal ja a Vy ste strelili capa.

Na svojom vyjadrení trvám: „Nie je možné, aby Rusi vyhrali tento konflikt. “ Môžu Ukrajinu vojensky obsadiť, môžu vyvraždiť všetkých Ukrajincov, ale nie je možné si silou natrvalo podrobiť 40 miliónový národ, ktorý sa bráni a nechce s ruským svetom už nič mať.

👉„Pravde veriť, pravdu žiť a pravdu brániť.“ 👈
M.R. Štefánik

The post Macko vs Molnárovci: Vecné argumenty vs demagógia appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#dodávky zbraní #Fahed-110 #Irán #PVO #Rusko #Shahed 136 #Ukrajina #Vojna na Ukrajine

Médiami prebehla pred pár týždňami správa, že Rusi nakupujú zbrane a munície od Iránu a Severnej Kórei. Od Iránu Rusi mali nakúpiť cca 700 samovražedných dronov Šáhid-136. Samovražedné drony sú také bezpilotné lietadlá, ktoré majú priamo  vo svojom trupe zakomponované výbušniny. Ide o jednorazové stroje, ktoré sa navedú na cieľ podobne ako rakety s plochou dráhou letu, len sú podstatne menšie a lacnejšie. Teda nezhadzujú bomby alebo neodpaľujú rakety ako napríklad turecký Bayraktar TB2, ktorý sa preslávil práve na Ukrajine.

To, že Rusi nakupujú práve u Iráncov a Severnej Kórei má dva aspekty.  Po prvé, Rusi sú v čoraz zúfalejšej situácii a ich domáce zásoby zbraní a domáca výroba decimovaná sankciami už nestačia na dlhodobé vedenie vojny na Ukrajine. Po druhé, Rusko sa čoraz viac vyčleňuje z medzinárodného spoločenstva a v záujme presadenia svojich imperiálnych cieľov je ochotné porušiť  akékoľvek medzinárodné záväzky. Niet divu, že neváha nakupovať v medzinárodne izolovaných krajinách. Tie Rusom predajú s radosťou čokoľvek. Jednak by mali problém to predať inde (aj kvôli platným sankciám) a v prípade úspechu Ruska si robia nádej, že s jeho pomocou prelomia medzinárodnú izoláciu bez toho, že by museli zmeniť čo i len zlomok z toho, kvôli čomu sa do nej dostali.

Rusi sa so svojimi zbraňami dostali až na limity svojich možností.  Najmä v oblasti rakiet a dronov už spotrebovali veľkú časť svojich zásob, koniec konfliktu je  nedohľadne a ešte aj na bojisku momentálne prehrávajú. Ukrajinci sa začali pomerne úspešne brániť voči ruským dronom. Tie väčšie vedeli pomerne účinne ničiť aj protivzdušnými prostriedkami krátkeho dosahu, ktorých dostali pomerne dosť od spojencov  a menšie vedeli aj zarušiť a teda odkloniť od cieľov.

Zatiaľ čo dodávky munície zo Severnej Kórei na bojisku nič zásadne nemenia, spolupráca Ruska s Iránom robí oprávnene robí Ukrajincom vrásky na čele. V prípade munície totiž Rusi pokračujú v intenzívnom využívaní delostrelectva, ktoré pôsobí plošne, ale nepresne. Spotrebovávajú na to obrovské množstvo munície, ich preimerná ročná spotreba pri nezmenenej intenzite bojov je desaťnásobkom ročnej produkcie ruského priemyslu. Skôr či neskôr budú mať Rusi viac problémov s hlavňami ako s muníciou, lebo intenzívna paľba vedie k ich opotrebovávaniu. Dodávka Iránskych dronov Šáhid sú však dočasným game changerom. Majú dobrý  taktický dosah a sú pomerne účinné v niektorých scenároch použitia. Pritom sú pomerne malé na včasné zachytenie prostriedkami PVO.

O týchto dronoch sa vie pomerne málo a je zatiaľ ťažké ich zarušiť. Ak ich aj ukrajinské systémy zachytia, používať na ne niekoľko násobne väčšie a drahšie rakety zem – vzduch nie je efektívne. Tieto Ukrajinci potrebujú na väčšie ruské hrozby. Drony Šáhid-136 s bojovou hlavicou s účinnosťou podobnou veľkokalibrovej delostreleckej munície nie sú nič výnimočné. Avšak sú vysoko presné a preto sa dajú účinne použiť na ničenie väčších zbraňových systémov presnými zásahmi. Ich význam vzrástol v súčasnej ruskej kampani proti civilnej, predovšetkým energetickej infraštruktúre. Aj dron s pomerne malou hlavicou dokáže byť na takéto nezodolnené ciele vysoko účinný a vyradiť ich z prevádzky.

Podľa odhadov majú Rusi týchto dronov ešte okolo 300 a hodlajú od Iráncov nakúpiť tisícky. špekuluje sa o tom, že by RUsi nemuseli kupovať hotové drony, ale získali by od Iránu montížnu linku a komponenty. Pokiaľ sa Ukrajincom nepodarí na ne nájsť účinnú protizbraň, mali by Rusi v rukách nástroj, ktorý im síce negarantuje víťazstvo, ale výrazne by pomohol spomaliť ukrajinskú  protiofenzívu a hlavne dlhodobo totálne ničiť ukrajinskú civilnú infraštruktúru. To by neúnosne predlžovalo konflikt a unavovalo nielen Ukrajincov, ale aj ich podporovateľov. Každý systém má svoje slabé miesto a to sa Ukrajinci snažia čo najrýchlejšie odhaliť. V tomto kontexte treba vnímať aj sľúbenú pomoc NATO s dodávkou až 200 systémov na zachytávanie dronov. Ukrajincom v podstate stačí zachytiť, identifikovať a odkloniť dron od pôvodného cieľa alebo ho zničiť jednoduchším a lacnejším prostriedkom. Pre Ukrajincov nie je efektívne použiť výkonné a drahé rakety na dron v hodnote cca 20 tisíc eur.

Irán oficiálne popiera dodávky zbraní Rusku, avšak tie sú vidieť na ukrajinskom bojisku a v ukrajinských mestách. Stovky dodaných a použitých systémov ťažko schovať za výhovorku, že môže ísť o nelegálne posunuté zbrane cez tretiu stranu Rusku. Ukrajinci v tomto čase prichádzajú s podozreniami, že Iránci dodávajú nielen zbrane, ale aj inštruktorov ako ich používať, ktorí sú nasadení priamo v ruských jednotkách na Ukrajine. Ak by sa potvrdilo, že sa to deje so súhlasom iránskej vlády, tak by to aj z medzinárodno-právneho hľadiska robilo z Iránu priameho účastníka vojnového konfliktu na strane agresora.

Týmto ale angažovanie sa Iránu v ruskej agresii ani zďaleka nekončí. Rusi používajú svoje skladové zásoby rakiet protivzdušného systému S-300 podobne ako balistické rakety. Takéto použitie protileteckých rakiet je na pozemné ciele veľmi nepresné, ale to Rusom nevadí pri systematickom ničení veľkých mestských aglomerácií bez rozlíšenia. Na druhej strane už v prvých mesiacoch agresie boli podozrenia, že Rusi, ktorí sa pýšili najlepšími systémami PVO, nakupujú tieto systémy aj od Iráncov (Bavar-373). V týchto dňoch na verejnosť prenikajú informácie, že Rusko hodlá nakupovať aj množstvo iránskych balistických rakiet krátkeho a stredného dosahu.

Konkrétne má ísť o rakety Fateh-110 a Zolfaghar s dostrelom 300 resp. 700 kilometrov. V prípade rakety Fateh-110 ide o derivát sovietskeho systému Luna zo 60-tych rokov minulého storočia, ktorý bol predchodcom systému Točka, ktorý majú ešte Ukrajinci aj Rusi vo výzbroji. Ak sa dodávky potvrdia, tak sa nič zásadné na bojisku nezmení. Svedčí to však o tom, že Rusom skutočne dochádzajú podstatne modernejšie a presnejšie rakety vlastnej produkcie. Na druhej strane sa Irán čoraz viac angažuje na strane Ruska a to asi aj s vidinou tesnejšej politickej spolupráce a budúcich dodávok podstatne sofistikovanejších zbraňových systémov or Rusov, ktorých ale ani oni sami majú momentálne nedostatok.

The post Zapája sa Irán do vojny na Ukrajine? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Podľa všetkého Rusi hľadajú, kam sa podelo jeden a pol milióna zimných uniforiem, ktoré mali byť v mobilizačných skladoch. Znie to ako zlý vtip. Ale, ak je to pravda, je to ukážka zvrhlosti ruského režimu. Aj Ukrajinci majú problémy s výstrojom a niektorí si dokupujú „vychytávky“. Ale na záberoch boja vidíte profesionálnu výbavu a skutočných ukrajinských vojakov, ktorí vyzerajú ako vojaci a bojujú ako vojaci.

V ruských radoch vidíte vandrákov s rôznymi uniformami a často opitých. Už to trdím dlhšie, že nadchádzajúca zima bude krutá pre ukrajinských civilistov, ktorých chce Putin vyhladovať a vymrznúť a ruských vojakov. Ale zima môže byť výhodou pre lepšie vybavených, motivovaných a disciplinovaných ukrajinských vojakov. Tí síce nemajú toľko železného šrotu ako Rusi, ale majú to, čo potrebujú na víťazstvo – odhodľanie a vôľu víťaziť.

Pýtate sa, ako je to možné, že sa niekde stratí také množstvo materiálu? Rusko je najrozľahlejšia krajina sveta. Je to krajina neobmedzených možností, krajina, kde zajtra znamená už včera. To hovorí za všetko!

Ale teraz vážnejšie: Toto je budíček odkrývajúci Rusom aj svetu najväčšiu Potemkinovu dedinu v histórii. Krutá a nebezpečná paródia nacistického štátu s jadrovými zbraňami.

The post Najväčšia Potemkinova dedina s tisíckami skutočných jadrových hlavíc. appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#antivlastenectvo #Donbas #extrémizmus #nacionalizmus #Putin #Rusko #Ukrajina #vlastenectvo #Vojna na Ukrajine #Vojnové zločiny

Najsilnejšími emóciami sú strach, viera všetkých druhov, nacionalizmus, eufória. Emócie spôsobujú vzrušenie a ľudia sú nimi ovládaní natoľko, že strácajú nad sebou kontrolu. Vypínajú racionalitu a kritické uvažovanie, konajú pudovo. Kto vie hrať s emóciami má vyhraté, ľudia ho budú pudovo nasledovať.

Vystrašte niektorých ľudí na smrť (migrantami, liberálmi…) a potom im ponúknite záchranu. Budú Vás zbožňovať, namiesto programu stačí hocičo hovoriť a prelínať to pripomenutím hrozby a Vašej záchrany. Staňte sa kazateľom, ktorí zomkne ohrozenú čriedu na báze náboženstva, príslušnosti k národu a ukážte na nepriateľov. Ovládnete čriedu.

Nacionalizmus a predstierané vlastenectvo sú vynikajúcim nástrojom stimulácie voliča. Stačí pomenovať hrozbu, nájsť nepriateľa a spojencov a hlavne prezentovať seba ako jediného, kto vie kto je kto a ako „na nich“. Ak dokážete osloviť zakomplexovaných či nespokojných s životom, máte jackpot.

Pani Slavěna Vorobelová je náhradníčkou za právoplatne odsúdeného fašistického poslanca. Primitívny nacionalizmus, lži a manipulácie, falošné hrozby a obdiv k Putinovi a jeho režimu pomohli. Zrejme pomohli aj peniaze od plateného ruského špióna, ktorý pracoval pre Rusko proti Slovensku.

Nie je náhoda, že práve falošní slovenskí vlastenci a nacionalisti často používajú najšpinavšie metódy psychologickej vojny, v ktorej sú Rusi experti. Diskreditácia, konšpirácie, manipulácie faktov, falošné obvinenia a neexistujúce ohrozenia sú ich nástrojom. Pani Slavěna pred voľbami bojovala Za rodinu, Za tradície, Za kresťanstvo, Za spravodlivosť. Podobne ako Putinove vojská, ktoré dnes páchajú masové zločiny na Ukrajine, aj ona by si mohla svoje auto a vlastne všetko označiť veľkým „Z“. Bolo by to logické, veď je „Za“ všetko pozitívne.

Pani Slavěna schvaľovala násilné odtrhnutie Donbasu. 22. 2. napísala: „Mierová misia na východnej Ukrajine je prirodzenou reakciou na etnické čistky páchané neonacistickým režimom, podporovaným hlavne z USA“. 23.2. tvrdila, že ruský prezident uznaním separatistických republík otvoril cestu pre vstup vojsk na Donbas, čo označila za mierovú misiu.

Pani Slavěna je morálne spoluzodpovedná za ruské zločiny na Ukrajine. Znásilňovanie ukrajinských žien nie je „Za rodinu“. Vyháňanie miliónov ľudí z ich vlasti nie je „Za tradície“, ale ruským imperiálnym zvykom. Postrieľať ľudí na ulici a nechať ich bez pohrebu obžierať túlavými psami nie je „Za kresťanstvo“. Rovnať so zemou celé sídliská nie je „Za spravodlivosť“.

Čo dodať záverom?

Snáď len to, že politické úspechy je možné dosiahnuť spoluprácou s nepriateľom proti vlastnej krajine a ešte si financovať kampaň za špinavé petroruble. Ale to nie je vlastenecvo. Je to kolaborácia s nepriateľom a hyenizmus voči vlastnému štátu a národu.

Zdroj: Náhradníčkou za Kotlebu je expredsedníčka strany, ktorú sponzoroval Garbár zo špiónskej aféry (dennikn.sk)

The post Falošné vlastenectvo za špinavé petroruble appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

30.12.2021

#Bydén #EÚ #NATO #obrana #obranná spolupráca #povinná služba #Rusko #Švédsko #USA

Švédsko nie je členským štátom NATO, hoci s NATO úzko spolupracuje a intenzívne sa podieľalo aj na misiách NATO v Afganistane. Ako člen EÚ sa Švédsko výrazne angažuje vo vojenských štruktúrach aktivitách Európskej únie vrátane bojových skupín EÚ (EU Battlegroups). V súvislosti so zhoršujúcou sa medzinárodnou situáciou Švédsko v roku 2018 znovu zaviedlo povinnú vojenskú službu s cieľom posilniť obranné kapacity a tvorbu záloh pre prípadnú mobilizáciu. Povinná vojenská služba platí pre mužov aj ženy podobne ako v Nórsku.

Z rozhovoru sa okrem iného dozviete:

V dôsledku meniacej sa situácie v Európe a aktivít Ruska v oblasti Baltického mora, Švédsko výrazne posilňuje svoju obranyschopnosť. Obranné výdavky narastú o 40 %. Zavedenie už spomínanej povinnej vojenskej služby umožnilo rozšíriť švédske ozbrojené sily o 5 plukov pozemného vojska a jedno letecké krídlo. Tým narástli tzv. vojnové tabuľky počtov na 55 tisíc vojakov. Do roku 2025 to má byť 80 tisíc a v roku 2030 okolo 100 tisíc vojakov. Momentálne odvádzajú každý rok 5 500 mužov a žien a tento počet by mal narásť na 8 500 odvedencov za rok.

Švédsko výrazne modernizuje aj svoju techniku, Protivzdušná obrana je posilnená o systémy Patriot, investujú do letectva, ponorkového loďstva, ale aj do kybernetických spôsobilostí. Keďže Švédsko nie je členom NATO, súčasťou zaisťovania obrany je rozširovanie bilaterálnej a regionálnej spolupráce. Tá výrazne narástla s Fínskom a ďalšími krajinami. Narastá aj spolupráca s USA. Rozhovor vznikol pri príležitosti návštevy generála Bydéna u predsedu Zboru náčelníkov štábov vo Washingtone. Švédi sa zúčastnili s Francúzmi a Spojeným kráľovstvom na misii v Mali, švédske sily sú integrované v Spoločných expedičných silách vedených Spojeným kráľovstvom.

Celý rozhovor si môžete prečítať tu:
https://www.defensenews.com/interviews/2021/12/27/swedens-top-general-on-watching-russia-and-responding-to-an-invasion-of-ukraine/

Pozn.: Generála Bydéna som mal možnosť osobne stretnúť a sprevádzať ho pri jeho návšteve výcviku veliteľstva RC North ISAF vo výcvikovom centre JFTC Bydgoszcz, ktorému som velil v rokoch 2011-2013. Švédsko sa aktívne podieľalo na operáciách RC North a v rámci veliteľstva malo pozíciu zástupcu veliteľa.

The post Švédsko razantne posilňuje svoju obranu appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Richard Marcinko bol známy a populárny dôstojník amerického námorníctva. Stál u zrodu špeciálnej jednotky špeciálnych síl Navy SEAL Team SIX, ktorá sa zameriavala na protiteroristické operácie. Jednotka vznikla v roku 1980 po neúspešnom americkom pokuse o oslobodenie 53 rukojemníkov na americkom veľvyslanectve v Teheráne. Aj keď v tej dobe existovali len dva tímy Navy SEAL, Marcinko svoju jednotku pomenoval Team SIX. Bol studená vojna a chcel tak vyslať klamný signál k sovietom o rozsahu síl Navy SEAL.

Marcinko velil tímu 3 roky, od 1980 do 1983. Team SIX sa v roku 2011 preslávil aj úspešnou operáciou na likvidáciu Usámu bin Ládina v komplexe Abbottabád neďaleko pakistanského generálneho štábu. Navy SEAL Team SIX je určený aj na vyhľadávanie a zneškodňovanie jadrových zbraní.

Richard Marcinko bol nielen zdatný veliteľ a držiteľ viacerých vyznamenaní, ale vedel sa aj predať. Verejnosti sa stal známym najmä vďaka svojim dvom najpopulárnejším knihám.

Správu o jeho smrti prinieslo The National Navy UDT SEAL Museum a the New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/27/us/richard-marcinko-dead.html?searchResultPosition=1

The post Česť pamiatke Richarda Marcinka, zakladateľa Navy SEAL Team SIX! appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Misia v Afganistane (ISAF, neskôr Resolute Support) bola najväčšou operáciou NATO v dejinách organizácie. Jej zlyhanie je naša spoločná zodpovednosť. Pre ďalšie fungovanie aliancie je nutné spoločne vyhodnotiť naše pôsobenie.

Slovensko by malo podporiť alebo iniciovať vytvorenie spoločnej komisie NATO. Tá by mala komplexne posúdiť pôsobenie v Afganistane vrátane politických otázok a rozhodovacieho procesu. Podobne by sme mali posúdiť z vojenského a politického hľadiska pôsobenie v Afganistane aj u nás doma.

Tím expertov ešte pod mojím vedením vyhodnotil pôsobenie OS SR v misii ISAF. Potrebujeme komplexné posúdenie pôsobenia v Afganistane aj na celonárodnej úrovni.

Zdroj:

https://www.trtworld.com/americas/us-launches-commission-to-study-afghanistan-fiasco-52676

The post Misiu v Afganistane treba riadne vyhodnotiť! appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Ivanovi Bellovi

Alexandrovi Kollárikovi

Slavomírovi Verčimákovi

a povýšeniu do hodnosti generálporučík

Vladimírovi Šimkovi.

Obzvlášť úprimne ma teší vymenovanie nášho kozmonauta Ivana Bellu do hodnosti brigádneho generála. S Ivanom sa poznáme práve ešte z čias prípravy jeho letu! Páni, v nových hodnostiach želám veľa úspechov a múdrych rozhodnutí!

The post Blahoželám, páni generáli! appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Mal vynikajúcu reputáciu ako vojak aj diplomat. Bol to jeden z váhovej kategórie ako Henry Kissinger a mal aj niečo naviac. No mal aj smolu, že slúžil počas vlády G.W. Busha a svoju reputáciu si čiastočne pokazil tým, že v OSN prezentoval nedostatočne overené dôkazy podstrčené CIA. Tie mali poslúžiť ako pretext pre inváziu do Iraku v roku 2003. Túto chybu veľmi ľutoval až do smrti. Nedal na svoje inštinkty a príliš veril argumentácii spravodajcov a politickému tlaku Busha a Rumsfelda.

Pritom práve Powell bol výrazným zástancom umiernenosti v medzinárodných vzťahoch. Bol známy nielen svojou vojenskou rozhodnosťou a múdrosťou, ale aj postojom, že po vojenských nástrojoch moci treba siahať ako po poslednej možnosti. Colin Powell bol 12. predsedom Zboru náčelníkov štábov, svojho času najmladším a vôbec prvým afro-karibským američanom v najvyššej vojenskej funkcii. Medzi vojakmi a politikmi mal veľký rešpekt. Počas jeho služby ho mnohí navrhovali aj na udelenie výnimočnej piatej generálskej hviezdy (General of the Army, mali ju D. Eisenhower a G.C. Marshall). Nakoniec ju nedostal.

Ako najvyšší americký vojak navštívil aj Slovensko a Vajnorské kasárne. Spomínam si, ako môj bývalý zástupca na ministerstve (UVTM) zvykol žartovať, že si týždeň neumýval ruku po tom, ako mu Colin Powell na nastúpe útvaru podal ruku.

Pamätám si, ako ho v roku 2001 vítal nadšený dav tri tisíc úradníkov amerického ministerstva zahraničia pri nástupe do funkcie. To sa pred ním ani po ňom nestalo žiadnemu ministrovi zahraničia. Bohužiaľ, po fiasku a diskomforte v prvej Bushovej vláde, do tej druhej už nenastúpil. Celkom dobre jeho pozíciu vystihol Bob Woodward v knihe Plan of Attack (Plán útoku).

V roku 1996 zvažoval aj kandidatúru na prezidenta USA. V lete 2001 som bol počas pobytu v malom mestečku Bigfork v Montane pozvaný na nedeľný obed a párty v jednej rodine. Boli to americkí Slováci. Mali u seba na návšteve viacero priateľov z rôznych kútov Ameriky. Ľudia z belošskej strednej vrstvy. Po obede prišla reč aj na politiku. Všetci sa zhodli, že je veľká škoda, že Powell nekandidoval na prezidenta. Všetci by mu dali hlas a boli presvedčení, že by vyhral. Nakoniec pomaly vyšumel z vrcholovej politiky.

Salute, General! Rest in peace!

The post Zomrel generál Colin Powel (1937-2021) appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Začalo sa tým priame oslobodzovanie nášho územia od fašizmu. Celé desaťročia bol tento deň aj sviatkom československej armády. Hodnotenie operácie, jej priebehu a výsledkov, ako aj zlyhania dvoch východoslovenských divízií, ktoré mali otvoriť cestu osloboditeľom ponechávam historikom.

Chcem len vzdať hold 21 tisíc sovietskym a 1800 československým bojovníkom, ktorí za mesiace ťažkých bojov položili svoj život pod Duklou.Česť a sláva patria všetkým tým, čo sa neváhali zapojiť do ozbrojeného zápasu za našu slobodu v Slovenskom národnom povstaní, či na východnej alebo západnej fronte. Niektorých hrdinov poznáme po mene, ale o tisíckach ďalších vedia len ich najbližší príbuzní.

Boli to všetko odvážni ľudia, ktorí neváhali a riskovali aj to najcennejšie čo mali, svoj život a život svojich najbližších. Mohli v kľude čakať doma za pecou alebo pasívne sedieť v zajateckých táboroch na to, ako sa vojna vyvinie. Ale našli odvahu a urobili správne rozhodnutie a to, čo bolo treba pre porážku zla. Mnohí prešli tisícky kilometrov, aby sa dostali tam, kde sa mohli pripraviť na boj a vrátiť sa domov ako osloboditelia. Veľká časť sa konečného víťazstva nedožila.

Nikdy nesmieme zabudnúť na odvahu a obety všetkých čo bojovali za našu slobodu!

Foto: VHÚ Praha

The post Česť a sláva hrdinom Dukly! appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#Beňo #bezpečnosť #NATO #previerky #SIS #Spojené kráľovstvo #Zurian

Pred časom sa pri Kente objavili na autobusovej zastávke utajované dokumenty britského ministerstva obrany. Médiá zaujali predovšetkým utajované informácie týkajúce aktivít v Čiernom mori a Afganistane. Teraz sa ukázalo, že dokumenty stratil babrák, civilný zamestnanec Angus Lapsley, ktorý kandidoval na miesto britského veľvyslanca pri NATO.

Napriek všetkým predpisom o manipulácii s utajovanými skutočnoťami si ich zobral do tašky a manipuloval s nimi tak nedbanlivo, že ich stratil na zastávke. Ku cti mu slúži to, že sa sám prihlásil, ale ono by sa na to zrejme aj tak prišlo. Momentálne mu suspendovali bezpečnostnú previerku a vyšetrovanie pokračuje.

Bohužiaľ, aj takýto incident relativizuje neuveriteľnú historku z nášho domáceho prostredia. Podľa publikovaných informácii sa bývalý riaditeľ NAKA Zurian a bývalý námestník SIS Beňo schádzali v kaviarni či krčme a ako „styční dôstojíci“ si na verejnosti vymieňali utajované informácie. Aspoň tak nejako znie ťažko uveriteľná legenda. Tá bola zrejme vymyslená v snahe vyhnúť sa možnému právnemu postihu za ohrozenie utajovanej a vyhradenej slutočnosti a zbaviť sa podozrenia zo zneužitia právomocí a informácií na varovanie zločincov.

Zdroj foto: The Guardian /facebook/

Použitý zdroj:

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/aug/03/civil-servant-who-lost-mod-files-at-a-bus-stop-was-to-be-uks-ambassador-to-nato

The post Utajované dokumenty stratil kandidát na veľvyslanca pri NATO appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#Afganistan #Čína #NATO #Taliban #terorizmus

Viac o udalosti napríklad tu:
Death toll nears 70 in bombing at Kabul school (msn.com)

Vláda afganskej islamskej republiky z útoku viní Taliban. Ten to zatiaľ popiera. Už viac krát sa stalo, že neskôr priznall účasť na útokoch. Prvá bomba vybuchla pri škole, ďalšie boli namierené na utekajúcich žiakov a zásahové jednotky. Šííti tvoria v prevažne islamskom Afganistane menšinu, väčšina populácie je sunitského vyznania.

Táto udalosť je v ostrom kontraste s vyhláseniami nášho mistra obrany Naďa, predstaviteľmi NATO a USA, že situácia v Afganistane je stabilizovaná a preto medzinárodné vojská odchádzajú. V skutočnosti odchádzajú z iných dôvodov a je to asi správne.

Čína kritizuje, ale nič nerobí pre bezpečnosť

Zaujímavý je postoj Číny, ktorá doteraz nijako neprispievala k bezpečnosti v Afganistane. Ťažila len ekonomické výhody na úkor intervenujúceho Západu. Pritom Afganistan je ich takpovediac zadný dvor. Čínsky veľvyslanec v Kábule v súvislosti s výbuchmi ostro kritizoval USA kvôli sťahovaniu amerických vojsk.

Veľvyslanec Yang napísal: „Čína vyzýva zahraničné jednotky v Afganistane, aby plne zohľadnili bezpečnosť ľudí v krajine a regióne, aby sa sťahovali zodpovedným spôsobom a nespôsobovali ešte väčšiu nestabilitu a utrpenie afgánskeho ľudu.“

Zvláštne. Ak má Čína takú starosť o bezpečnosť Afgancov a celého regiónu, mohla by po 20-tich rokoch vystriedať jednotky vedené NATO. Je to len ironická zhoda okolností, že čínske 107 mm rakety boli jednou z účinných zbraní povstalcov proti medzinárodným jednotkám v dobe, keď Čína skupovala of Afgancov ťažobné práva na nerastné bohatstvo. Možno je čas, aby si ich Číňania chránili sami a pomohli s bezpečnosťou aj afganskej vláde namiesto kritiky odsunu medzinárodných vojsk.

Na výsledky afganskej intervencie mám trocha iný pohľad než naši oficiálni predstavitelia. Aký, to sa dozviete z 35-minútového rozhovoru pre ISD (Institute for Security and Defense).

The post Afganistan: Naznačujú výbuchy v Kábule budúci vývoj? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

S postupujúcou informatizáciou spoločnosti budú spravodajstvo a spravodajská komunita čeliť stále väčším výzvam. Masívna digitalizácia nášho každodenného života prináša nové príležitosti, ale aj nové výzvy. Kybernetický priestor nie je už len nejakým transportným médiom, či prostredím cez ktoré prebieha komunikácia medzi osobami, inštitúciami a štátmi.  Postupne sa stal skutočným priestorom každodenného života jednotlivca a spoločnosti.

V kybernetickom priestore prebieha obrovské množstvo transakcií a udalostí. Mnohé z ich v tomto priestore vznikajú aj zanikajú. Zásadným rozdielom oproti iným sféram ľudského pôsobenia ako zem, vzduch, voda a vesmír je to, že kybernetický priestor je priestorom sám o sebe a súčasne priamo preniká do všetkých ostatných sfér.

Žijeme v zosieťovanom svete. Vedci odhadujú, že až 97 % všetkých informácií je už niekde v kybernetickom priestore. Cez tento priestor prebieha koordinácia  a riadenie ľudských aktivít. Na spoľahlivosti a stabilite kybernetického priestoru sme už dnes životne závislí. V súčasnosti máme k dispozícii takzvaný internet ľudí. Na internet je v ňom pripojených viac ako 5 miliárd osôb, niektorí viacnásobne.

V súvislosti s pokračujúcou robotizáciou a nasadzovaním autonómnych systémov, ako aj zmenou prístupu k takým aktivitám ako je napríklad pozáručný servis spotrebičov, postupne prechádzame do obdobia internetu vecí. V priebehu pár rokov bude okrem ľudí na internet pripojených okolo 200 miliárd ďalších zariadení. Tento exponenciálny rast objemu transakcií a informácií obsiahnutých na internete sa ešte ďalej exponenciálne zvýši s plošným zavedením sietí 5. generácie.

Piaty rozmer: digitálny svet a spravodajstvo

Zatiaľ čo význam ostatných, fyzických sfér života sa nijako nemení, určujúcou sférou sa stáva práve kybernetický priestor. Toto má priamy dopad aj na všetky otázky súvisiace s národnou bezpečnosťou. Zákonite, ak sa väčšina informácií nachádza v kybernetickom priestore, toto sa musí adekvátnym spôsobom premietnuť aj do oblasti spravodajstva.  Kybernetický priestor sa stáva aj kľúčovým priestorom súperenia štátov a mocenských skupín.

Na tento vývoj reagujú viaceré štáty. Reagovalo aj NATO, ktoré na samite vo Varšave v roku 2016 uznalo kybernetický priestor za piatu vojenskú doménu. Stalo sa to aj napriek tomu, že v súvislosti s konfliktom prebiehajúcim v kybernetickom priestore máme neujasnený celý rad medzinárodno-právnych, morálnych a etických otázok. Súperenie v tomto priestore je totiž realitou a jeho účastníkmi nie sú len štátni aktéri. Práve rozvoj internetu a digitalizácia umožnili povýšiť hybridné hrozby na novú úroveň. Do značnej miery sa vyrovnali šance medzi rôznymi aktérmi bez ohľadu na ich fyzickú silu. 

Digitalizácia priniesla celý rad špecifík. Tradičný koncept národnej suverenity alebo možnosť uplatnenia článku 5 Washingtonskej zmluvy nie je možné v plnom rozsahu uplatniť v kybernetickom priestore. Postupne sa vytráca význam alebo vplyv tradičnej hierarchickej štruktúry usporiadania štátu, firiem, ale aj vojenstva. Ako napísal Thomas L. Friedman, svet sa sploštil. [1]

Digitalizácia je fakt vo vývoji spločnosti, ktorý sa nedá zmeniť. Prináša celý rad možností, výziev, ale aj rizík. Od toho, ako ich zvládneme respektíve využijeme, bude závisieť aj úroveň našej obrany a odolnosť voči hrozbám, či účinnosť včasného varovania pred nimi.

Dovoľte mi pozastaviť sa pri troch najväčších výzvach do blízkej budúcnosti a z nich vyplývajúcich požiadavkách na spravodajské zložky

1. Veľké možstvo dát

Dobré spravodajstvo znamená dobrý zber informácií, ich správnu analýzu a interpretáciu a návrh účinných opatrení na rozhodnutie. Najväčšou výzvou súčasnosti nie je ani tak informácie a údaje získať. Najdôležitejšie je nájsť tú podstatnú či kritickú informáciu pre správne rozhodnutie.

Postupným prechodom na internet a rozvojom nových technológií máme dnes k dispozícii obrovské množstva dát. Nejde len o klasické dáta a citlivé informácie ako texty. Podstatne sa zmenili možnosti v získavaní a spracovaní satelitných obrázkov, geografických údajov, obrazovo-zvukových záznamov, biometrických údajov. Výrazne sa rozšírili sociálne siete a množstvo aktivít na nich.

Na jednej strane nám dostupnosť týchto nástrojov, údajov a silná komunikačná sieť poskytujú účinné nástroje na urýchlenie a spresnenie rozhodovacieho cyklu. Platí to rovnako pre biznis, politiku, aj pre vedenie ozbrojeného konfliktu, či bezpečnostných a vojenských operácií.  Na druhej strane sa na týchto údajoch a technológiách stávame čoraz závislejší a zraniteľnejší. Narušenie satelitného navigačného systému alebo vyradenie našich komunikačných sietí môže vyradiť aj značnú časť nášho obranného potenciálu.

Závislosť na informáciách pôsobí našťastie obojstranne. Všetko toto poskytuje aj obrovskú príležitosť pre získavanie informácií pre spravodajskú komunitu. Odhliadnuc od právnych a technických otázok zberu informácií, hlavným problémom však je, že dát máme až príliš veľa. Pohybujeme sa v oblasti tzv. big data, kde sa ich klasický zber, ukladanie a spracovanie nedajú účinne použiť.

Vyšetrovanie pozadia útokov  11. septembra 2001 okrem iného ukázalo, že informácie a indície o možnom útoku boli niekde v systéme. Ale chýbal im kontext a správne vyhodnotenie a preto sa stali zrejmými až po samotných útokoch.

Ak má byť spravodajstvo účinné, bude musieť presunúť svoje ťažisko zo zberu utajovaných informácií k zberu a vyhodnocovaniu neutajovaných informácií. Napríklad z komunikácie vojakov na sociálnych sieťach pred nasadením alebo počas neho sa dá získať podstatne viac informácií, ako si chceme pripustiť.

Spravodajské služby sa budú musieť naučiť s obrovskými súbormi neštruktúrovaných dát. To si bude vyžadovať úplne iné analytické postupy a nástroje ako aj prípravu personálu, než na aké sme boli zvyknutí. Problémom pre menšie krajiny môže byť dostupnosť príslušných technológií pre spracovanie veľkých objemov dát.

2. Umelá inteligencia a kvantové počítače

Rozumné využívanie prvkov umelej inteligencie a zachovanie kľúčovej úlohy človeka v rozhodovacom cykle je najväčšou výzvou pre nasledujúce generácie. Pre spravodajskú komunitu predstavuje najväčšiu príležitosť a hrozbu súčasne.

S rozvojom technológie veľmi rýchlo postupuje rozvoj umelej inteligencie a kvantových počítačov. Bez ohľadu na kontroverznosť a etické otázky súvisiace s umelou inteligenciou, jej rozvoj rýchlo napreduje. Už dnes často krát na sociálnych sieťach komunikujeme s „botom“ – samo učiacim sa programom. Softvéroví asistenti nás sprevádzajú komunikáciou s bankami, ale aj pri vyhľadávaní údajov.

Aj keď toto má ešte ďaleko do umelej inteligencie, predznamenáva to budúci vývoj. Súčasne prebieha intenzívny vývoj na úseku kvantových počítačov. Prvý skutočný kvantový počítač definitívne vyradí všetky súčasné šifrovacie mechanizmy.

Umelá inteligencia v serióznejších oblastiach použitia dosiahla  významný pokrok. Už dnes dokáže napríklad diagnostikovať množstvo chorôb lepšie ako skúsení lekári. Veľký výkonnostný skok je možné očakávať pri spracovaní zvukových a zvukovo-obrazových záznamov. Už dnes dokážu algoritmy sociálnych sietí, bežne dostupné ľuďom, pomerne spoľahlivo rozpoznávať tváre osôb podľa pár referenčných fotografií.

Komplexné expertné systémy s prvkami umelej inteligencie sa stanú výkonným nástrojom nielen spravodajcov, ale napríklad aj kriminalistov. Tieto systémy už existujú dnes a postupne sa zdokonaľujú. Avšak zavádzanie umelej inteligencie má v sebe množstvo rizík a výziev.

Možné aplikácie prvkov umelej inteligencie v oblasti obrany sú podľa najnovšej správy pre americký kongres nasledovné [2]:

✅ spravodajstvo, sledovanie a prieskum

✅ logistika

✅ operácie v kybernetickom priestore

✅ informačné operácie a klamné produkty (“Deep Fake”)

✅ velenie a riadenie

✅ poloautonómne a autonómne vozidlá a prostriedky

✅ smrtiace autonómne zbraňové systémy (LAWS – Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems)

Americká spravodajská komunita pracuje na projektoch umelej inteligencie na základe strategického dokumentu spracovaného bývalým riaditeľom „National Intelligence“ Danom Coatsom  pod názvom „AIM iniciatíva“ (Augmenting Intelligence using Machines Initiative).

Okrem morálno-etických, majú ozbrojené sily a bezpečnostné zložky pred sebou niekoľko výziev v súvislosti s prvkami umelej inteligencie:

🔻 dostupné technológie

🔻 zmena procesov

🔻 adekvátny personál

🔻 inštitucionálna kultúra

1️⃣ Autonómnosť

Tá je výhodou, pokiaľ dokáže odbremeniť ľudí od náročných mechanických a opakujúcich sa činností a sústrediť sa na rozhodovací proces. Problémom je nájsť rovnovážny stav medzi morálnou dilemou a výkonnosťou, teda ako veľa autonómnosti môžeme dovoliť systémom.

2️⃣ Rýchlosť a výdrž

Tieto systémy nepodliehajú únave a môžu výrazne zvýšiť operačné tempo. Ma druhej strane limitujúcim prvkom v operačnom tempe zostáva človek a jeho schopnosť vykonávať rýchle kognitívne rozhodnutia.

3️⃣ Umocňujúci účinok (Scaling)

Ten umožňuje podstatne rozšíriť možnosti a výkonnosť súčasných systémov. Na úrovni krajín môže umožniť zmazať rozdiely vo veľkosti a ekonomickej či vojenskej sile.

4️⃣ Informačná prevaha

Nasadenie autonómných prvkov pre zber a vyhodnocovanie informácií umožňuje exponenciálny rast objemu dát, ale aj vyhodnotených informácií.

5️⃣ Predvídateľnosť výsledkov

Problémom umelej inteligencie je, že k záverom či výsledkom môže dospieť aj neočakávaným spôsobom. Nefunguje ako mechanický systém, kde je presne definovaný priebeh deja. Teda tieto systémy môžu aj fatálnym spôsobom zlyhať aj pri pomerne ľahkej úlohe.

6️⃣ Vysvetliteľnosť procesov

Najvýkonnejšie algoritmy umelej inteligencie nevedia hodnoverne vysvetliť svoj vlastný proces. Otázkou teda zostáva ich spoľahlivosť a hodnovernosť.

7️⃣ Zneužiteľnosť

Všetko, čo poskytuje obrovské  množstvo dát a je autonómne, je súčasne aj napadnuteľné a zneužiteľné protivníkom.

Využívanie prvkov umelej inteligencie a zvyšujúci sa výpočtový výkon sú faktom a budú ich mať k dispozícii nielen štáty, ale aj silní neštátni aktéri.

3. Zmena paradigmy spravodajstva: od podpory k „bojovej“ sile

Hybridný konflikt z veľkej časti môže prebiehať v kybernetickom  a informačnom priestore. Klasická úloha spravodajstva je v pozícii podporného prvku rozhodovacieho procesu alebo podpory exekúcie (combat enabler). Maximálne môže byť prvkom umocňujúcim účinnosť bojových prvkov, letálnych aj neletálnych (force multiplier).

Prechodom do online konfliktu vedenému priamo v kybernetickom priestore  sa postupne stáva priamou „bojovou silou“. Teda mení sa paradigma z klasickej podpory rozhodovacieho procesu a podpory operácií na priame vedenie operácií.

Táto zmena paradigmy zo sebou prináša celý rad výziev a rizík, ako aj požiadavky na zmenu legislatívneho rámca. Najme v stave bezpečnosti tak proti sebe stoja dva záujmy. Tým prvým je zvýšenie účinnosti spravodajstva a skrátenie reakčného času vyžadujúce si priamu aktívnu angažovanosť spravodajských zložiek v obrane alebo protiútoku. Na druhej strane je to potreba ochrany spoločnosti pred zneužitím spravodajských zložiek.

Záverečné odporúčania:

V dôsledku zmien v spoločnosti v súvislosti s digitalizáciu, spravodajské služby budú musieť prejsť zásadnou obsahovou a štrukturálnou reformou. Vhhľadom na stav slovenského bezpečnostného prostredia a spravodajskej komunity týmto sdystémovým zmenám bude musieť predchádzať aj zásadný očistný proces vo vnútri inštitúcií a vymedzenie pôsobnosti medzi jednotlivými zložkami spravodajskej komunity.

1️⃣ Analyzovať úlohy spravodajských zložiek a zmeniť ich poslanie a legislatívne prostredie.

2️⃣ Zásadným spôsobom zmeniť výchovu a prípravu spravodajského personálu a zaisťovanie jeho lojality voči štátu.

3️⃣ Investovať do nových technológií.

4️⃣ Posilniť verejnú a parlamentnú kontrolu spravodajských služieb bez zníženia ich výkonnosti.

Použité zdroje a referencie:

[1] Thomas L. Friedman: The World is Flat, New York, 2005, Farrar, Straus and Giroux

[2] Artificial Intelligence and National Security, Updated November 21, 2019, správa pre kongres USA, dostupná na https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf

[3] https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/cyber-security-and-intelligence-community

[4] https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1582.html

[5] https://www.c4isrnet.com/intel-geoint/2019/08/19/4-big-problems-the-intelligence-community-faces-moving-to-a-new-data-system/

[6] https://www.c4isrnet.com/artificial-intelligence/2019/11/26/heres-how-a-national-intelligence-watchdog-is-improving-ai-oversight/

[7] https://fas.org/irp/dia/vector21/index.html

[8] https://www.afcea.org/content/great-power-competition-defines-defense-intelligence

[9] https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195375886.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195375886-e-0026

[10] https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Article/621113/defense-intelligence-analysis-in-the-age-of-big-data/

[11] https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/02/19/adapting-nato-to-an-unpredictable-and-fast-changing-world/index.html

[12 https://www.dia.mil/News/Articles/Article-View/Article/1601186/big-data-and-the-future-of-war/

[13] https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf

The post Tri kritické požiadavky na účinné spravodajstvo digitálnej éry appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

V týchto dňoch nás zasiahla smutná správa. Vo veku nedožitých 76 rokov zomrel 11.12.2020 pán generál Marián HORSKÝ. Po ťažkej chorobe od nás na večnosť odišiel skvelý vojak a človek.

Generál Horský bol pracovitý, premýšľavý, ale hlavne vždy veselý a optimisticky naladený človek. Nikdy som neslúžil priamo pod ním, ale poznali sme sa roky. Bližšie sme sa zoznámili na spoločnej preventívnej rehabilitácii na Zemplínskej Šírave v roku 2000.

Vtedy tam prišiel z už pomaly končiacej misie pridelenca obrany v Poľsku, kde slúžil spolu s veľvyslankyňou Magdou Vášáryovou. Bolo to v dobe, keď Slovensko bolo vynechané z prvého kola rozširovania NATO, zatiaľ čo zvyšní partneri z V4 dostali pozvánku a stali sa členmi NATO v roku 1999.

Mariánova úloha bola, okrem iného, presvedčiť našich poľských bratov, že aj my tam patríme a potrebujeme podporu našich partnerov. Svoju časť misie pán generál splnil a zanechal veľmi dobrý dojem a nezmazateľnú stopu. Keď som o viac ako dekádu neskôr nastúpil do Poľska ako spojenecký veliteľ NATO JFTC a vrcholný predstaviteľ NATO, ešte stále na generála Horského s uznaním a rešpektom spomínali jeho bývalí kolegovia, generáli, ale aj civilní experti na poľskom ministerstve obrany a ministerstve zahraničných vecí.

Na každom cvičení, ktoré som v rámci pôsobenia na pozemných silách alebo generálnom štábe organizoval, pán generál už ako dôchodca a člen Klubu generálov bol jeden z najaktívnejších diskutujúcich, ktorý išiel do hĺbky a vždy ma vyspovedal o detailoch cvičenia. Aj ako vojenského vyslúžilca ho to zaujímalo, neboli to len zdvorilostné otázky.

Marián bol vôbec prvý generál, ktorý mi poslal sms-ku a hneď mi aj volal, keď mi zadržali syna (ako sme neskôr zistili išlo o zinscenované zadržanie na objednávku) a besné média moju rodinu a mňa osobne trhali na kusy. Neváhal a nepochyboval ani chvíľu. Bol to dlhý telefonický hovor a nikdy naň nezabudnem. Nezabudnem ani na jeho úprimnú podporu, ktorá prišla v čase, keď sa odo mňa mnohí stranili ako od prašivého. Generál Horský bol totiž vždy v prvom rade Človek a otec a chápal, čo si prežívam.

V stredu o 10.00 má poslednú rozlúčku v Dome smútku v Prešove. Bohužiaľ, nedostanem sa tam. Ale mysľou budem s ním. Verím, že bude na nás, ktorí sme tu zostali so spomienkami na neho, dozerať tam zvrchu s láskou a nadhľadom, aký prejavoval celý svoj život.

Odpočinutie večné daj mu Pane! A svetlo večné nech mu svieti, nech odpočíva v pokoji!

The post Česť Tvojej pamiatke, Pán Generál! appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Naša demokracia ani zďaleka nie je perfektná. Ešte veľa cieľov nebolo naplnených a veľa chýb je treba napraviť. Súčasná vláda je v neľahkej situácii v súvislosti s pandémiou, ktorú nikto nečakal. Má sklony ku zmätkom a nadužívaniu moci. No porovnávať dnešnú situáciu so spoločenskými pomermi pred rokom 1989 je bohapustá ignorancia. Alebo je to prejav úplnej neznalosti historických faktov a vtedajších spoločenských pomerov. Jedným z výdobytkov našej nedokonalej demokracie a slobody je aj to, že každý má právo slobodne vyjadriť svoj názor. Dokonca aj komunisti, či fašisti, pokiaľ to robia v súlade s ústavou a zákonmi, ktoré dávajú dostatočný priestor pre každého. Demokracia však nie je anarchia, ale spoločnosť, v ktorej platia základné pravidlá. Štátne inštitúcie musia mať svoju minimálnu autoritu, aby zabezpečili fungovanie spoločnosti a rovné uplatňovanie práv a slobôd všetkých občanov. Ústava a zákony demokratického štátu musia počítať aj s krízovými situáciami, v ktorých je ohrozený život, zdravie, majetok, či sloboda občanov.

Práve krízové situácie vytvárajú priestor pre chaos, aj pre rôznych extrémistov, či prostých kriminálnikov. Všetci títo by chceli zneužiť situáciu vo svoj prospech. Preto musia pre krízy platiť aj špecifické pravidlá, ktoré s týmto počítajú a do istej miery aj obmedzujú základné slobody a práva občanov v nevyhnutnom rozsahu a na nevyhnutnú dobu.

Nebudem sa pridávať k plejáde rôznych autorov výziev. Verím, že rozumní ľudia sa nedajú pomýliť. Všetci môžu vyjadriť svoj názor na spoločenské pomery a na spôsob riešenia súčasnej krízy. Verím však, že ľudia pochopia, že ak sa spájajú a do čela protestov chcú postaviť kryptokomunisti a tí, čo sa pri výkone moci obklopili oligarchami a mafiánskymi skupinami, alebo ich dokonca pomáhali vytvárať, falošní patrioti, nepoctiví privatizéri, ktorí rozkradli štátny majetok a plnokrvní fašisti, tak tejto čudnej skupinke nejde o slobodu a demokraciu.

Naopak, sú to predstavitelia tých skupín, ktoré majú životný záujem na odstránení demokratického ústavného poriadku. Rovnako verím, že vojaci a policajti, tí v zálohe, aj tí, čo aktívne slúžia, sú dostatočne vyspelí a majú zdravý rozum, aby sami posúdili, o čo ide niektorým autorom verejných výziev.

Som presvedčený, že nikto nemá úmysel ani plán použiť ozbrojené sily vo vojenskej úlohe armády pre udržiavanie verejného poriadku. Maximálne môžu byť použité len ako asistenčné sily v prospech polície a pod velením polície, a že aj k tejto možnosti vláda pristúpi len výnimočne.

Neverím úprimnému záujmu o ozbrojené sily v prípade človeka, ktorý celú svoju krátku vojenskú kariéru budoval nie na vojenskej profesionalite, ale hlavne na politickej agende.

Človek môže vo svojom živote dospieť ku zásadnej zmene názoru či postoja. Ale o čom svedčí to, že jeden vojenský funkcionár dokáže byť za 30 rokov ortodoxný komunista, ktorý sa snažil aktívne zachrániť komunistickú stranu aj po 17. novembri 1989? Potom sa ako vojak dostal do politickej funkcie vo FZ ČSFR.

Následne ako aktivista SNS a líder Asociácie slovenských vojakov kádroval tých, ktorí nemali komunistické krytie, či protekciu a museli slúžiť v Čechách. Stal sa zarytým prozápadným reformátorom a likvidátorom armády. Následne bol vojenským expertom KDH a stal sa rusofilom. Potom pôsobil v krajne nacionalistickej strane, ktorá uzavrela volebnú koalíciu s fašistami. O o pár mesiacov neskôr sa uchádzal o funkciu predsedu SNS.

Nič nie je čiernobiele a nikto nie je len dobrý, či zlý. S niektorými názormi a návrhmi tohto pána súhlasím, lebo majú rácio. Ale tých politických veletočov a sebastrednosti je tak veľa, že mu ako politikovi a vojakovi absolútne neverím.

Až si dnes budete pripomínať výročie 17. novembra 1989, alebo budete chcieť vyjadriť svoj kritický názor, verím, že tak urobíte v súlade so zdravým rozumom a zákonmi.

Verím, že nedopustíte, aby sa za Vás skrývali tí, ktorí by ako prví odstránili slobodu a demokraciu. Verte mi, sú medzi nimi aj takí, ktorí pred tromi rokmi boli, pod falošnou zámienkou, pripravení vydávať vojakom stovky ostrých granátov.

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