Ukrainian War for Existence #EU#NATO#Putin#Russia#Trump#Ukraine#USA#War in Ukraine#Zelensky
„Those who think that others will fight for their freedom do not deserve it.“ – Milan Rastislav Štefánik
But fighting without vision and strategy is not enough. It’s important to know why we fight and what we fight for.
#EU #NATO #Putin #Russia #Trump #Ukraine #USA #War in Ukraine #Zelensky
Pavel Macko reporting for Týždeň magazine. Full transcript of the podcast https://youtu.be/GmSQTqTEAQA?si=QePWcXi8HiZLAVVC
Eve of War
In Europe, at the beginning of 2022, we sensed that something terrible was brewing, but most of us didn’t want to admit it. Neither citizens nor politicians. We were still enjoying the euphoria of three-quarters of a century of peace and over three decades of general freedom.
The public and politicians not only in the Baltic states but throughout Europe anxiously watched Russian maneuvers around Ukraine’s borders. They also perceived the continuing diversionary actions of Russian intelligence services and „vacationing“ soldiers in eastern Ukraine. These were accompanied by artificial hysteria about an impending Ukrainian attack on two separatist republics.
Russia had more than 100,000 armed soldiers on the borders, bringing in blood supplies, field hospitals, and additional troops. Meanwhile, pro-Russian collaborators there were already talking about a Ukrainian invasion in autumn 2021 and organizing forced evacuation of the population. Ukrainians showed not even a hint of any troop regrouping. President Zelensky even downplayed warnings from Western intelligence services.
After Russian ultimatums in December 2021, when they demanded Ukraine’s disarmament and its reintegration into the „Russian world,“ as well as the annulment of NATO expansion after 1997, the tension was palpable. But few could imagine a major war. It made sense to no one except Putin.
Slovak Anomaly
Slovakia was already an anomaly on a global scale at that time. Politicians of today’s ruling coalition organized protests and, under the pretext of peace, openly supported Russian aggression and demands. They even accused the West, especially the USA, of trying to provoke aggression against Russia. They organized a hunt against our MPs for supporting the defense agreement with the USA and threatened, together with today’s department head, a general strike. All in support of Russian interests, not Slovak ones.
Whether they did so out of complete confusion or were coordinated from the Russian embassy may one day be discovered by historians and investigators. Today, these are under the thumb of Maroš Žilinka, who as late as February 8, 2022, threatened parliamentarians with „the judgment of history“ for not wanting to hear his desperate fight against the agreement with the USA. Just before that, he praised the benefits of Soviet occupation.
Fight for Independence and Freedom
In July, we commemorate the anniversary of the American Revolution – the war for independence that culminated in the declaration of independence of American colonies. Since then, July 4 has been Independence Day in the USA. The French Revolution began with an attack on the Bastille and was a war for freedom. The French commemorate July 14 as Bastille Day.
Ukrainians today are fighting a combined war – for the bare existence of their own nation and their own free state. How this war turns out will determine our future history. In Slovakia’s case, probably also the existence of our state in its current form and borders.
Let’s analyze in two parts what happened, what is still happening, and what it means for Europe and Slovakia. What we have believed in so far is gradually disappearing, fears are being fulfilled.
Historical Parallels and Putin’s Strategy
To many people, President Putin’s approach just before the invasion of Ukraine resembled Hitler’s strategy during the Munich Dictate. Historical parallels are always somewhat flawed, but there might be something to it.
Russia had been conducting hybrid operations for a long time to prepare the international audience for a new reality. After the West’s strategic blunder of ending operations in Afghanistan and the massive disruption of normal life during COVID, Russia gained the impression that the West was tired. They thought it was self-absorbed and people were frightened of losing comfort.
Political leaders were at odds and trying to solve one cascading crisis after another, as well as strategic adaptation to rapid climate change. For Russia, like all autocratic regimes, this was a secondary matter. The primary concern is maintaining and strengthening power.
Ukraine and the entire West were strategically disturbed, unable to concentrate on the existential threat. The Russians evaluated this as an opportunity to capitalize on long-term disruptive activities in the world, into which they had invested billions of dollars for years.
Putin’s Ultimatum
But Putin’s ultimatum failed. Not so much because the West felt strong and united. Rather, they underestimated Putin and his determination.
The nearly 200,000 troops around Ukraine in late January 2022 looked threatening but not convincing enough that Russia could really engage in a major war. So the US rejected Putin’s ultimatum.
He maneuvered himself into a situation where he didn’t have many options left:
◾️Either admit he was bluffing and his costly show of force didn’t work
◾️Or attempt a lightning action, this time with the risk of high losses compared to the occupation of Crimea without a shot
But if he quickly achieved strategic goals, he would be able to politically sell it to his domestic and international audience. The West and the rest of the world would, according to Putin’s reasoning, come to terms with the new reality.
Beginning of the Invasion
The order to start the invasion came. In the early morning hours, around 5 AM on February 24, 2022, a large-scale invasion of Ukraine began.
Similar to Hitler, who attacked Poland early in the morning at 4:45 AM on September 1, 1939, Putin counted on a Blitzkrieg – a rapid advance into Ukraine’s interior and its rapid collapse.
Like the Nazis in Poland, the Russians quickly attacked Ukraine from three strategic directions:
◾️From the north toward Kyiv
◾️From the east toward Kharkiv and Donbas
◾️ In the south to Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and further along the Mykolaiv-Odesa axis
The entire maneuver was supported from the first minutes by strategic bombing of key defensive points and critical infrastructure. The cherry on top was to be a strategic airborne operation in Hostomel and the rapid occupation of Kyiv’s center and key political-administrative facilities.
Stalled Blitzkrieg
An exemplary lightning chess game, which the Russians had doctrinally and practically rehearsed and tested multiple times in the post-World War II period. It always went smoothly. Now the Russians suddenly got stuck.
Although the media still talks about a „three-day war,“ according to available information, the Russians had planned the entire operation for 10 days. In 10 days, they wanted to control not only Kyiv but the entire Ukraine, break its armed resistance, install a puppet government, suppress resistance hotspots, and stabilize the situation. This is what empires have been doing for centuries in rebellious provinces or with disobedient small neighbors. They know that any long conflict is exhausting and a strategic risk.
All of this failed for the Russians. The world was shocked not only that the Russians engaged in a war we haven’t seen since 1945 – that is, a war where a strong opponent attacks a relatively large neighbor with all means, who effectively defends itself.
Strategic Shocks for Russia
The Russians experienced several strategic shocks and couldn’t withdraw from the conflict in time. Regardless of the current state on the battlefield after more than three years, they strategically lost at the beginning. But they can still gain operational and tactical victory at an enormous cost.
First Strategic Shock
The biggest strategic shock for the Russians was that Ukrainians began to spontaneously defend themselves – ordinary citizens with Molotov cocktails. What was an advantage for the Russians – an attack on a more than 2,200-kilometer-long front, which was to ensure the overloading of Ukrainian defense and rapid collapse – turned into a Russian nightmare.
Their own troops became overloaded, their logistics failed, they couldn’t generate what everyone expected from a military superpower: massive dynamic combined arms maneuvers of large military formations with full support from the air, artillery, and mobility.
Second Strategic Shock
The second strategic shock for the Russians was the rejection of the invasion by Russian-speaking Ukrainians. The entire „liberating“ myth about the invasion fell.
Third Strategic Shock
The third strategic shock for the Russians was the vigorous and unified approach of the EU and NATO, which managed to respond within 24 hours with a clear political message. This then gradually transformed into breaking the barrier of fear of Russia and gradual aid to bleeding Ukraine.
Long Exhausting War
Instead of a lightning conquest of Ukraine, the Russians ended up in a long exhausting war. Ukrainians are fighting for bare survival.
Meanwhile, this war, with more than a million human casualties on the Russian side alone, has turned into a war of survival for the Russians as well. First and foremost, it’s about the survival of Putin’s regime and Putin personally. In the long term, it’s also about the survival of Russia as a strong and respected empire.
Russia is being exhausted, internal tension is growing, and on its borders, it has not only increasingly sovereign former colonies but also a numerically superior and economically stronger China.
Despite the failure of the lightning war, the Russians managed to destroy hope for a peaceful life in Europe. The Russians totally destroyed the post-war model of peaceful coexistence of countries and the OSCE security mechanism. There is a deep furrow not only between Russia and Ukraine but also between Russia and the West. Unfortunately, this is also within our societies. It is a consequence of the long-term hybrid war that the Russians are waging against us.
Life in a Different World
On February 24, 2022, in my very first media commentary on the beginning war, I expressed the opinion that regardless of whether the Russian invasion ends the next day or lasts for years, from 2/24/2022, we live in a different world, and our children will probably never experience the era of relaxation like all of us after November 1989. War is returning as a common political-historical phenomenon into our lives.
That’s why it’s important to analyze what happened, what is happening, and where it might lead. The Russian war in Ukraine has and will have a transformative effect on warfare and socio-political conditions for the next generations.
From Blitzkrieg to Gradual Dying Out
The war still continues. But it already is and will be a source of numerous studies and analyses. It will shape an entire generation of politicians, soldiers, and experts. I myself had the opportunity to participate in one of the first extensive studies. Our international three-member team attempted to generalize the lessons from the first ten months of the war. We provocatively named the report „How to Defeat Russia.“
Another two years have passed since then, and dozens of similar analyses have appeared. The situation on the battlefield has also changed and continues to evolve.
Distorted Intelligence Information
The Russian invasion was based on distorted intelligence information and poor strategic assessment. Putin was hungry for war, and no one had the courage to tell him that Russia, despite the relative weakness of Ukraine, was not prepared for a major war.
The Russians calculated that the population would quickly reconcile with the fall of Zelensky and Russian power. The Russians had practiced combat operations for several months, but they were not prepared for real combat.
Logistics Failure
The structure of Russian logistics was not adapted to conducting intensive combat operations for a longer period on foreign territory. The Russians had their so-called operational logistics outsourced to a state civilian company at that time.
At the tactical level, Russian troops carried with them only two calculation days of supplies at the battalion and at the brigade or regiment level. This was far from enough for the tens to hundreds of kilometers of advances in the first days. NATO has up to seven days of supplies at the same level.
Ukrainian tactics and weather also played their part. The Russian war machine got stuck. The rapid conquest of Ukraine turned into long-term battles in multiple dimensions.
Moreover, despite strategic bombing, the Russians failed to suppress Ukrainian air defense and gain air superiority. This has marked the entire course of the war so far.
Three Phases of the War
If we take into account the key factors and the prevailing character of activities, we can talk about three phases of the war.
First Phase (2022)
The first phase of the war took place in 2022. Briefly, it can be said that the Russians suffered a Ukrainian defensive shock, and Ukraine’s counteroffensive repelled the Russian advance at Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson.
Ukrainians even rapidly liberated a large part of the occupied territories, pushing the Russians into heavy defense. They had to resort to partial mobilization to prevent the collapse of front lines in southern Ukraine.
Western aid increased sharply, allowing precise strikes and recapturing territory. But Ukrainians partly became victims of their own success, and by the end of 2022, aid slowed down.
Second Phase (2023)
The second phase took place in 2023. Ukraine maintained tactical initiative almost the entire year but failed to turn it into operationally significant success. A stalemate ensued.
Russia strategically adapted, abandoned ideas of a quick victory, and dug in in eastern and southern Ukraine. Surovikin’s multi-layered line was too tough a nut to crack for Ukraine’s limited offensive formation.
Ukraine’s summer offensive stalled amid fortified lines saturated with a new generation of Russian drones. Ukraine shifted toward attrition warfare. What normally serves to shape the operational environment became the main content of combat activities aimed at logistics, command centers, and the enemy’s rear infrastructure.
It was confirmed that recapturing one’s own occupied territory, if the aggressor shifts to strategic defense, is extremely difficult.
Third Phase (2024 – Present)
The third phase of the war has been ongoing from the beginning of 2024 until now. It could be called hybrid escalation and technological transformation.
Although the Russians have operational initiative all the time, they cannot perform a fundamental rapid operation that would move the battlefield. Attempts at modern combined arms maneuvers of large formations have failed; instead, tactics have shifted toward constant small tactical attacks.
The battlefield is fully transparent, nothing can be hidden, soldiers often have only 10 minutes for combat maneuver and taking a new position. Moreover, it is saturated with all-seeing and all-destroying drones.
Ukraine has expanded drone and missile attacks deep into Russian territory, for example, in the case of Kursk. Russia has intensified aerial bombing and pressure on the Donetsk and Kharkiv fronts. The battlefield is becoming increasingly fragmented, decentralized, and technologically driven.
Main Factors for Ukraine’s Survival
When the invasion began, many experts believed we were seeing an atypical war, a clash of two post-Soviet armies irrelevant to Western armies.
The truth is that in the first months of the war, Ukrainians had the tactical and doctrinal upper hand. Especially that part of the Ukrainian army that had experience with operations in Donbas and had undergone Westernization. Commanders were independent, able to make decisions flexibly according to the situation, and mastered the principles of so-called mission command, where you only assign a goal to the unit, not a rigid procedure.
Russians were the exact opposite at the beginning – rigid, unable to make independent decisions, always looking at their superior and his detailed instructions. This has changed in the meantime. Russians are learning too.
Despite this, Ukrainians have so far managed to resist regardless of Russian numerical superiority and Russian superiority in strategic weapons.
Hybrid Model of the Ukrainian Army
The Ukrainian army has evolved from post-Soviet forces into a hybrid model that combines NATO-style mission command, asymmetric tactics, and targeting with AI support.
Russia, despite failures, has also adapted its Soviet-era doctrine and strengthened it with multi-layered defense, electronic warfare, mass artillery, and finally strong air support at the line of contact.
The course of the war so far shows that if Ukraine wants to survive, it must prioritize the strategic neutralization of the stronger Russia over a decisive victory on the battlefield. Ukraine’s victory may not come in the form of a signed treaty or complete restoration of territory. Instead, it may depend on the strategic neutralization of Russia and its aggression, making Russian aggression futile, even if the war persists.
Five Key Factors for Survival and Success
From this perspective, these 5 key factors for survival and success can be identified:
1) Disabling and Denying Russian Operations
◾️Ukraine must continue to paralyze Russian offensive capacity through drone warfare, remote mining, and attacks into the strategic operational depth of the adversary
◾️Functional defeats of enemy capabilities, such as disabling a bomber base or oil infrastructure, can shift the war from attrition to operational insignificance of that Russian capability
2) Sovereignty of the Defense Industry
◾️Ukraine started in a very difficult situation. It could rely only on limited supplies from the Soviet era, a weakened defense industry, and foreign aid
◾️Today, it can produce up to 52% of its needs itself, and this share is rising despite Russian bombing
◾️Domestic production of drones, artillery, and air defense systems is essential
◾️European partners are financing Ukrainian weapons production to reduce dependence
3) Civil-Military Integration
◾️In war, not only the armed forces but the entire country is involved. Not only because rockets and drones fall everywhere, but mainly because Ukraine correctly introduced the concept of total defense and resilience
◾️Territorial defense forces, volunteer battalions, and civilian mobilization form the backbone of Ukraine’s resilience
◾️Protection of critical infrastructure and maintaining societal continuity are as important as success on the battlefield
◾️For example, the ability to quickly repair damaged railways and the inability of Russians to hit moving targets deep in Ukrainian territory were the main reasons why the Russians failed to stop growing foreign aid
4) Strategic Deterrence
◾️Ukraine’s victory plan has partly fallen by the wayside, especially after the advent of the Trump administration in the US
◾️But it correctly proposes a package of non-nuclear deterrence including capabilities for long-distance strikes and joint defense operations with future partners
◾️Deterrence must be credible, sustainable, and anchored in Ukraine’s post-war security architecture
5) International Support and Political Unity
◾️Continued Western assistance – financial, military, and diplomatic – is essential
◾️Ukraine’s survival depends on maintaining global attention and fighting war fatigue, especially amid changing US politics
This applies not only within Ukraine but also in Slovakia and the West. In Ukraine, our security and free existence are being fought for. If Russia succeeds, the chance that we will find ourselves under Russian control again or live in constant fear of what the Russians will do will dramatically increase. Such a state would not only have political and psychological impacts but would mainly significantly cut into our resources. It would be the end of our security and relative prosperity.
Peace is Still Not in Sight and Democracy in Crisis
„It was supposed to be resolved within 24 hours.“ It’s hard to estimate whether Donald Trump’s pre-election statements were just conscious populist lies or the self-indulgent naivety of a politician whom the Russians bailed out of problems several times as a businessman.
No one expected President Trump to actually end the war in one day, but the US administration’s approach so far has been a huge disappointment and hasn’t brought the end of the war closer. It’s nowhere in sight.
Ukrainians so far cannot push the Russians out, and they cannot defeat Ukraine. But they can cause increasing suffering to civilians. This is due to the increasingly exhausted Ukrainian air defense, periodic blocking of American aid, and the inability of Americans and the West to produce more means to combat Russian missiles, drones, and heavy bombs.
Bad American Strategy
The Americans chose a very bad strategy. Despite knowing for decades that only a tough stance works against the Russians and their expansionism, they tried to buy the Russians at the cost of unilateral pressure on Ukraine.
If it had worked, Ukrainians might not have liked it, but at least it could be said that the end justifies the means. But the exact opposite happened. Putin stopped taking the Americans and their president seriously. Behind polite diplomatic phrases is mockery and even greater arrogance and brutality from the Russians. They rejected all of Ukraine’s offers for a ceasefire and negotiation and indicate that they only accept complete capitulation of Ukraine and humiliated forgiveness from the West.
Instead of stopping the war, long-time allies quarreled because of it. Europe is putting together a coalition of the willing in case it’s no longer possible to count on the Americans. But without American capabilities, Europeans will still be players in a supporting role for a long time if it comes to direct confrontation with Russia.
NATO in Crisis
Meanwhile, the Americans are giving them (Russians) too much space. It’s not just about American pragmatism and focusing more on China as the main competitor, but also about the inability, even after more than three years, to increase production of critical systems and missiles for air defense.
The recent NATO summit thus threatened a major dispute or even catastrophe. Some European politicians like Fico and Orbán were even prematurely celebrating Russian victory and new orders in Europe.
President Trump eventually had his way. NATO countries committed to increasing defense spending up to 5% of GDP. The crisis was temporarily averted. But the commitment to increase defense spending has no clear timeline and also includes a lot of room for creative accounting. So real strengthening of defense may not come quickly enough.
Moreover, Russia’s 5th column in NATO, led by Fico, has already made it known that they won’t give an extra cent for their defense. On the contrary, even from the current 2% of GDP for defense, they will significantly cut for explicitly civilian projects and openly talk about leaving NATO.
This was founded not only for defense against the aggressive Soviet Union and today’s Russia, but was also built on common values. How long this alliance will last in times of business politics and permanent trade and tariff war between the US and the rest of the allies is unclear.
Ukraine Must Help Itself
Ukraine, fighting for its survival, will primarily have to help itself. Just as it spontaneously did from the first day and hope that then others will help it too.
Battle to the End?
Under the given circumstances, it’s important for Ukrainians and for all of us not to lose attention and not to get tired. If a solution to the conflict doesn’t come on the diplomatic field, Ukraine must endure it militarily as well.
The current situation is extremely complex. The Russians cannot significantly advance on land, but they attack all the more from the air. The intensity of Russian attacks on civilian targets and critical infrastructure is constantly rising.
Ukrainians have eliminated part of the strategic bombers, and then they have many long-range missiles from flat flight paths, but the Russians can compensate with ballistic missiles and especially long-range drones. They modernized originally Iranian drones and today can produce hundreds of them daily. In June alone, Russians launched more than 5,400 drones at Ukraine.
At the same time, the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defense is gradually declining. In 2022, they could eliminate 95% of drones and 74% of missiles. Today it’s only 79% and 50%.
Situation at the Front
The Russians still have tactical and operational initiative and are pushing practically across the entire front. Fortunately, they have so far failed to capture any major city except Vuhledar. The second year, there is fighting for Kupiansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk. The Russians have also approached Kostiantynivka and penetrated the edge of the Dnipropetrovsk region.
The question arises whether Ukrainians still have a chance to endure. According to my estimate and the estimate of colleague experts, they still have a chance, and mainly they have no other option.
Transformation of Warfare
Ukrainians, aware of this, are not resting on their laurels. Both sides are coming up with innovations. The character of combat has fundamentally changed. It’s not just a solution out of necessity. It’s rather a fundamental transformation of warfare.
What otherwise takes years has been shortened to months. The innovation cycle, for example, in the field of drones, lasts only 3 months. Today’s tactical advantage may be marginal or completely irrelevant by the end of the year.
Although the Russians have an apparent advantage in the amount of personnel, they are not without problems either. They cannot just deploy conscripts in operations on Ukrainian territory. Training new contracted or called-up soldiers is complicated on both sides, and neither side has enough instructors.
Ukraine is more vulnerable in that training takes place in a war zone, but it can compensate for this with training from its allies and supporters.
Ukrainian Capabilities
Ukraine still has approximately 1 million men and women in arms, who are tired from long-term deployment but also have greater motivation.
Ukraine can produce more and more weapons systems by itself. For example, they can produce up to 250 self-propelled howitzers annually, which is more than all of NATO combined. Despite the massive use of drones, heavy equipment and artillery are still needed. Only the way they are used is changing.
Ukraine is gradually increasing the capacity of its air force with donated F-16 fighters and French Mirage 2000-5F fighters. The fact that they have already lost three of them is not a catastrophe but proof that they are using them more frequently and riskily.
Technological Edge
Despite significant Russian numerical, economic, raw material, and technological superiority, Ukrainians manage to keep pace with them and achieve technological excellence.
Ukraine is today a global leader in the production and use of drones. They have achieved absolute excellence with the help of Western companies in the field of artificial intelligence utilization.
An innovative way of processing data in the cloud and digitalizing the use of relatively outdated technology has brought a dramatic change in the field of target determination, targeting, and their destruction. Even with a smaller number of weapons systems of varying quality, they can achieve extremely effective fire destruction.
Strategic Asymmetry
The greatest advantage of Ukrainians lies in their strategic approach to changing doctrine. Aware of Russian numerical superiority and the unavailability of some strategic weapons and means with operational reach, Ukrainians focused on strategic asymmetry in their military operations.
They focus on mobility, deep precise strikes, and increasingly use guerrilla warfare and special forces operations deep in Russian territory. They have made the protection of air and sea routes and the long-term building of their own capabilities and capacities a strategic priority.
Despite long-term political fatigue from the war and the unpredictability of Americans, they can still rely on their allies. Support from countries of the Ramstein format continues to function, and partners help finance Ukrainian armament programs or technology transfer.
Self-Preservation Instinct and Will of the Nation
The instinct of self-preservation can mobilize and stimulate heroic performances. This applies equally to nations as to individuals.
Ukrainians are fighting an existential struggle. Every single Russian drone strike, every single rocket in the city center brings destruction. But instead of the depression and defeatism expected by the Russians, these motivate Ukrainians and mobilize the civilian population.
If before the invasion Putin dared to claim that Ukrainians don’t even exist and everyone has always belonged to the „Russian world,“ today he has a consolidated and confident nation before him.
The will of a nation to fight has been one of the main sources of strength of nations and the key to success in all long and great wars so far.
All these are factors that don’t make Ukrainians doomed to defeat by any means. The Russians experienced three strategic surprises right at the beginning. If Putin today relies on lasting longer in this war, he may experience a fourth and final strategic surprise.
Ukrainians can still withstand Russian aggression, but meanwhile, it may happen that we won’t withstand it, here in Slovakia.
Lessons from the War for Us in the West
Regardless of how Russian aggression and Ukraine’s fight for survival eventually end, we must learn from this war. It revealed the fragility of European security assumptions, the urgency of civil defense, and the need for strategic clarity and mobilization.
Slovakia and Europe as a whole – this conflict is not a distant crisis but a mirror reflecting our own vulnerability and choices.
Hundreds of treatises have already been written about this war today, although not all are fully understood and especially accepted by politicians who decide and citizens whom it concerns. Many assumptions will change, as will their final evaluations. But the main trends are clear today.
This war is already fundamentally changing views on warfare and military-political competition, as well as concepts of state survival. The long-term consequences of the Ukrainian conflict are extensive and deeply transformative – regionally and globally. Together they create a whole series of domino effects.
Main Consequences of the War
Let’s mention at least some:
Geopolitical Realignment
◾️Geopolitical realignment is occurring, and a new cold war dynamic is emerging
◾️The war has cemented the gulf between Russia and Western democracies
◾️NATO and the EU are strengthening ties and expanding military capabilities
◾️Russia is increasingly aligning with China and other non-Western powers, potentially reshaping global alliances and trade routes
◾️Countries that were traditionally non-aligned are reassessing their positions and balancing economic interests with security concerns
Security and Military Changes
◾️European countries are increasing defense budgets and weapons production. This applies not only to the Baltic states and Poland but also to Germany or Sweden
◾️NATO has rapidly expanded as a result of the war. Finland and Sweden’s entry into NATO represents a significant strategic shift in Northern Europe
◾️The conflict has accelerated the use of artificial intelligence, drones, and cyber tools in modern warfare, creating new precedents for future conflicts
Economic and Energy Disruption
◾️Sanctions, disrupted supply chains, and energy shortages have triggered inflation and economic instability worldwide
◾️Europe is rapidly diversifying away from Russian oil and gas, investing in renewable energy sources and alternative suppliers
◾️Even after the conflict ends, many sanctions against Russia will likely persist, changing global trade and investment flows
Human Rights and Social Consequences
◾️Massive casualties, emigration, and declining birth rates are accelerating Russia’s demographic crisis
◾️Widespread human rights violations, including torture and forced deportations, will leave lasting scars and complicate future reconciliation
◾️With millions of displaced Ukrainians, rebuilding communities and infrastructure will likely take decades
Strategic Uncertainty
◾️Frozen conflicts will continue to haunt the world. Even if active fighting ceases, unresolved territorial disputes and political enmity can persist for years
◾️New arms races are coming, and the importance of deterrence is growing. The war has renewed interest in hypersonic weapons, cyber capabilities, and nuclear deterrence strategies
◾️Global governance and cooperation are failing
The war in Ukraine is also bringing a completely new revolution in warfare. Doctrine and tactics are completely changing. The view of the right mix of military capabilities, strategic deterrence, defense, civil defense, and country resilience is fundamentally changing.
Views on the professional army and compulsory service are changing. Concepts of comprehensive mobilization of society await a fundamental revision.
These issues and their impact on Europe and Slovakia will be addressed in the second part of the podcast.
And that’s all for today. I look forward to listening to the second part of the podcast. Thank you for your attention.
NASPAŤ