General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar – episode 125 #Hezballah#Iran#Israel#meeting Trump-Putin#negotiations#Russia#security radar#Syria#Ukraine#USA#War in Ukraine
Full transcript of a popular podcast on global and domestic security issues. The podcast was originally released in Slovak language on Aug 8, 2025.
Trump’s ultimatum has expired. The end of the war, however, is nowhere in sight, but everyone is already looking forward to a possible meeting between Putin and Trump. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is considering occupying the entire territory of the Gaza Strip.
Welcome to listening to the 125th edition of General Pavel Macko’s security radar.
Moderator: Paľo, welcome.
Pavel Macko: Good day.
Fog of War
Moderator: We’ve already discussed possible Trump negotiations, negotiations in Moscow on our website and in the video I recorded with you, Paľo. Let’s go straight to the situation on the battlefields.
Strategic Bombing in Ukraine
Paľo Macko: I’ll start by saying that strategic bombing continues from both sides. Incidentally, this was also one of the rumors that the Russians might want to offer a suspension of these strategic attacks. But that would be unilaterally advantageous for the Russians, despite them increasing the production of drones and missiles.
Ukrainians, by counter-attacking deep into Russian territory and destroying their factories and bases, are weakening the Russians‘ capacity that could be thrown onto the battlefield itself.
Record Russian Drone Attacks
Russians are breaking records again. I have statistics here for the last month:
▪️In June, Russians launched approximately 5,400 Shahed drones at Ukraine
▪️Last month it was already 6,443 drones
▪️That averages over 200 drones per day
The attacks are massive. We’ve seen multiple records broken in July, and attacks in the last week that were very massive. They are based on Shahed technology.
Ukrainians destroyed one storage facility, but according to Ukrainian intelligence, Russians are now capable of producing around 170 drones per day. Compared to May, they’ve increased it by another 70; at that time, they were producing about 100. The formal goal is 300 drones per day by the end of the year, but realistically it’s about 190-200 drones.
What does this mean? Russians are able to accumulate these drones. When we saw 700 drones in one day, these attacks could be even stronger. They also use rocket attacks, and this could lead to such a volume that we might experience up to 2,000 drones in a day.
Ukrainian Attacks on Russian Positions
Ukrainians are also trying to attack. This week there were again attacks by Ukrainians on Russian positions. I’ll look at the list; there were many targets hit:
▪️Oil refinery in Novokuibyshevsk in the Samara region
▪️Storage and launch site for Shahid drones in the Primorsko-Akhtiarsk region
▪️Elektropribor plant
What’s important is that there’s quite successful coordination of Ukrainian forces – the SBU security service, HUR military intelligence, and unmanned systems forces can coordinate and comprehensively plan such operations.
Situation on the Battlefields
Kursk and Sumy Regions
Fighting continues in the Kursk and Sumy regions. In the Kursk region, Russians tried to renew their offensive, but it was extinguished.
Looking at the Sumy region, more complex reports emerged about how Ukrainian commandos got into the rear of Russian units and eliminated several companies. A small diversionary group managed to cause casualties of around 330 dead and several hundred wounded. They had it prepared. When they made contact, Ukrainians were able to support the attack with drones and other means, and the losses on the Russian side were large.
Russians still hold a smaller buffer zone in the Sumy region. I’d pause here. They say it’s a buffer zone, but in reality, it looks different. Sumy is a city of 250,000. It’s a big city and relatively close to the borders. Here the Russians could try to take the city or make a gray zone out of it, because then they would keep Ukrainians in check and have another area. And if not capture it, then destroy it.
We see that Russians are now pushing in negotiations for recognition of control over the Kherson region. But Ukrainians drove them out of Kherson. Zaporizhzhia region – Russians don’t control Zaporizhzhia as a large city of a million people, nor do they currently have a chance to control it.
It cannot be ruled out that Russians might try to make a larger offensive in this direction and then pressure Ukrainians: „Okay, we’ll leave Sumy alone, but you have to give us Zaporizhzhia…“ That’s a rogue tactic.
Kharkiv Region and Kupiansk
Fighting is taking place in the Kharkiv region. So far, Russians have failed to consolidate the two protrusions – Lyptsi and Vovchansk, which form Russian force protrusions in Ukrainian territory.
The situation is most complicated near Pokrovsk, where they’re advancing from both the southwest and northwest. Pokrovsk is not surrounded, but the main supply route between Pokrovsk and Dnipro is gradually coming into the firing range of Russian forces.
Moderator: You mentioned Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. I don’t know if you want to add anything to that.
Paľo Macko: No, I would perhaps return to Kupiansk, because this is the second hot spot. Russians declared that they’ve moved further, but it appears that in villages west of the Oskil River, where they have a bridgehead, Russians don’t have complete control. It’s more like the operation of diversionary reconnaissance groups that show some presence there, do something. Optically it looks like they already have it under control, but Kupiansk is holding.
All these cities are in a difficult situation – whether Toretsk, Kupiansk, or Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk – but all have been holding for more than a year, some for more than two years. Russians are advancing, but there’s no sign of any great force that could break it quickly. But they will try to do so.
Middle East
Moderator: Alright, let’s go to the Middle East. Yesterday, overnight from Thursday to Friday, Israel’s war cabinet met and decided, simply put, to occupy the Gaza Strip.
Paľo Macko: Well, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip until 2005, or had full security control there, then handed it over to the Palestinian authorities. Hamas took power in Gaza in 2005, and since then the entire coastal strip, which we call the Gaza Strip, has been isolated. Israel built a protective fence there, and on October 7, 2023, we saw how that ended. Terrorists from Hamas and Islamic Jihad came out through the protective barrier around the Gaza Strip.
I wouldn’t talk about occupation, but there is pressure that they want to get the entire Gaza Strip under security control. This has, of course, sparked controversy in Israel, but I’ll focus more on what the plan would mean.
It should be a 4-5 month ground operation that would begin with the occupation and control of the entire Gaza Strip. One thing is to break military resistance and get in, but another is to maintain control. In this case, it would mean establishing security forces at least temporarily throughout Gaza, with the need to fight among the population. At the same time, after the fighting ends, they would have to maintain control, patrol the streets, and maintain order. It’s a risky operation, but it should be for about 4-5 months.
Moderator: Okay, wait, I’ll interrupt you. Do they have any other option? If they can’t agree with Hamas, and Hamas doesn’t want to agree, they don’t have many options.
Paľo Macko: It carries risk because there’s quite a lot of resistance even in Israeli security forces. They look at it in terms of what risks it carries.
The goals are:
▪️Remove Hamas – clear, legitimate
▪️Ensure the release of hostages – a completely great goal, because it’s been going on for almost two years. Hostages are in a miserable state, and Hamas uses this for blackmail, trying to divide Israeli society. Those who have relatives as hostages have been protesting from the beginning, which is natural. They’re demanding major concessions to Hamas, just to get their people home. To this, another part of the population says: „Fine, but that puts everyone else at risk.“
▪️Ensuring that Gaza does not pose a threat to Israel
All these goals are quite legitimate, but it means fighting in densely populated parts of the city. Therefore, not all foreign partners support it. There are security risks and the possibility of higher casualties on the side of Israeli forces and the population. And that’s what they objected to in the security forces – whether it’s worth it to them.
There are two philosophies:
1) Take control of the territory and clean it up
2) Isolate it and let it do what it wants inside
These are the plans and possible consequences of those plans.
Current Situation in Gaza and Surrounding Areas
Moderator: What major battles and events have occurred in Gaza, Israel, and Syria in the past week?
Paľo Macko: Fighting still continues. There were some airstrikes, strikes. There were allegedly also collateral casualties, Palestinian civilians killed. The profile of the fighting is difficult. Hamas knows it needs to hide among the population, provokes some action, then a strike follows. And usually, the strike unfortunately also carries casualties of innocent civilians who happen to be there at that moment.
We’ve already talked about the security cabinet meeting, but unfortunately the hostage crisis continues. We’ve seen footage of miserable hostages, and they’re still not liberated.
On the West Bank, Operation Iron Wall continues, which has been ongoing since January 2024. Again, it’s an effort to keep the security situation under control.
Moderator: I want to ask, is it true that the Lebanese government called on Hezbollah to hand over weapons?
Paľo Macko: Yes, this is true. This has been being addressed for several days and weeks. Now the pressure is escalating. The Lebanese government sees:
1) That Hezbollah is weakened
2) That it no longer has support in Syria and Iran is far away and also has its problems
3) That it constantly provokes pressure from Israel – whenever Hezbollah does something, a counter-strike follows
Lebanon wants Hezbollah to abide by the agreement with Israel, where it promised to leave the buffer zone, that there would be no weapon and no fighter there. This is an agreement from the previous conflict in 2006, which was violated, and now the new ceasefire is supposed to renew this agreement. So it’s completely logical that the Lebanese government is putting pressure on Hezbollah.
Moderator: And what’s new in Syria?
Paľo Macko: In Syria, the ceasefire is fortunately holding. It continues even after those intense momentary clashes where there were quite large casualties. Tension is still there. There are more than 192 thousand civilians who have been displaced – these are so-called internally displaced persons. They had to move and are temporarily bivouacking somewhere in other parts. It will be a problem to get them back.
There were large casualties – more than 500 dead on the side of fighters, but also more than 400 Syrian soldiers. And one more piece of information – Israeli Druze don’t perceive borders as a barrier. They simply migrate back and forth because they try to help their communities.
Strategic Background
Moderator: Paľo, today we’ll skip the history of World War II, but this week we commemorated another anniversary – 80 years since the dropping of atomic bombs. What do you have prepared in the background today?
Paľo Macko: I have several topics here; it was really a rich week. Everything we’ve seen, including those Moscow negotiations. But I would go to other things that are more in the background.
Interview with Kyrylo Budanov
First, I would mention an interesting interview with the head of Ukrainian intelligence defense service, Kyrylo Budanov. He had a philosophical moment, a reflection, where he discussed how Ukraine should continue its resistance against Russians and that national unity needs to be maintained.
It needs to be put in context that these were his subjective expressions, but he was quite on point in saying that if the country internally starts to fall apart or fragment into various interest groups, there will also be an erosion of independence and risks. If those in power break away too much from the chain, there’s a risk they’ll break away from the people. And that was in Ukraine – after the Orange Revolution, Tymoshenko ultimately failed, then we saw Poroshenko’s government, which was also kind of „neither here nor there.“
Into this come these negotiations, where there might be some ceasefire, but not everyone will be satisfied with it. As long as you’re under pressure, you stick together like a flock. But when that pressure eases, differences can surface.
Moderator: I’ve heard that Ukrainians got access to data from a Russian submarine that’s part of the nuclear triad. Is that true?
Paľo Macko: Yes, that’s right. It’s a shock. For Russians, it’s a serious matter. Ukrainian intelligence gained access to classified specifications. We’re talking about a Russian nuclear submarine, not some older one, but one of those modern Borei-class that carries 16 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each with multiple warheads.
It’s a means of retaliation. Countries keep these submarines precisely because they’re always in an unknown location and are a guarantee that even if they were attacked with nuclear weapons, they wouldn’t be disarmed, because they can counter-strike from submarines.
It’s a fiasco if Ukrainian intelligence service got access to:
▪️Security measures on the submarine
▪️Procedures and protocols
▪️Even the crew list
This doesn’t speak well of the protection of Russian strategic capabilities. Of course, this could cause escalation. Maybe it wasn’t even good that they published it, that they know it. We don’t know what all they know, but the fact that they published it is already on the edge, when even Russians have in their doctrine an attack on their nuclear facility as one of the triggers. But they’re not affecting or attacking the submarine so far.
The problem is that Russians already had a mishap a few years ago when they lost control of the so-called nuclear briefcase. It was when they had their Russian „Air Force One“ parked at the Moscow airport, and some thief broke into it. They claim it was a thief, but someone got in there and had access to electronic systems and everything related to it. So for a nuclear superpower, this is quite irresponsible.
Joint Weapons Purchase for Ukraine
Moderator: What about the joint weapons purchase for Ukraine that was talked about so much?
Paľo Macko: A lot was talked about it, but the process in dozens of Ramstein formats was always chaotic. Only now is it starting to come together, coordination is taking place.
At this moment, the European Public Procurement Agreement for Ukraine has been created. The Czech Republic, Denmark, and the Netherlands have launched a joint program worth $1 billion for the delivery of American weapons to Ukraine. This is already about planning, coordinating with a clear time horizon and a clear order. It should be for air defense systems and artillery.
The impact is that it’s moving from donations to structured procurement, when there’s not much left to donate. Thus, it can be put into some consolidation, and arms factories can better plan their capacities.
The important thing is to maintain strategic unity. If we know we need to help Ukraine, not primarily for them, but also for ourselves, then it needs to be done – and it needs to be done sensibly, in a consolidated manner, and not chaotically, where there’s a different idea every week.
Call from Israeli Security Leaders
Moderator: In Israel, there’s an interesting call from the security elite, who are calling for a stop to the fighting in Gaza. What’s that about?
Paľo Macko: In August, about 600 former Israeli security leaders, including former heads of Mossad, Shin Bet (their counterintelligence), and the General Staff, signed a call for an immediate end to the war in Gaza.
They claim that the main military objectives have already been met, Hamas has lost key capabilities, it doesn’t represent a great real force. There are its remnants, but it’s more a political matter from their perspective than a military one. Therefore, they say they wouldn’t need to engage further.
We don’t have to agree with them, but it’s a signal from people who stood at the head of the General Staff and these components, have insight into these things, and are weighing on the scales: what they can achieve and what it will cost them. And on the other side of the scales is: what all it can cause and what risks it carries. They’re trying to balance those risks.
This call resonated in the media as well. Of course, it’s just a call from a „council of elders“ that has no formal position. Netanyahu is the one who, in the end, whether we like him or not, is the prime minister who bears the immediate responsibility, is responsible for the functioning of the state, the security of citizens, and security forces. He has the mandate to decide as he sees fit.
It’s an indication that Israeli society is still free; it’s not like Russia. In Russia, not only Putin decides, but also the „top.“ War hawks may not only be in the Kremlin but also in the Duma and other components, where they still dream of a great victory and the destruction of the entire West. And that’s dangerous. That’s why we listen to those programs on Russian state television, where they want to bomb us with nuclear weapons, kill us, destroy our cities, and rename Paris to Vladimir and the like. This is dangerous – the fascization of Russian society continues.
View of the World – 360°
Moderator: So what does your radar show?
Paľo Macko: The ceasefire between Cambodia and Thailand is holding so far. We saw the delimitation commission working for the first time on Monday. This week I would like to return to Iran.
Moderator: And what’s there? Is the ceasefire working, not working? Or is there currently some silence around Iran?
Paľo Macko: The ceasefire is working, but I was doing a comprehensive monitoring of crisis areas in the world, and I must say that over the past week, apart from the Russian-Ukrainian war and the conflict in the Middle East, Iran resonated the most. But a little differently than we might expect.
Iranian Covert Operations
Iran came to the forefront in connection with the increase in Iranian covert operations, especially assassinations and kidnappings targeting individuals in Europe and throughout North America. It’s a big problem; even a coordinated report came out where 11 intelligence services drew attention to this.
When we consider that we saw a 12-day war between Israel and Iran, which ended with US intervention, subsequently a ceasefire was concluded at US pressure, but they were threatening even then. Many took it as if the regime is already weak, that it will collapse any moment, but it has, like in Romania, when securitate fought even when it was clear that the regime had fallen, an extensive network and is doing hybrid activities.
It’s not just Russians, it’s not just North Koreans, but Iran is extremely active, has its diasporas all over the world. I’ve already mentioned the warning issued by the USA, UK, France, and 11 other countries.
Iranian agents have narrowly focused on:
▪️Dissidents
▪️Journalists
▪️Their former officials living in Western countries
They’re after them, trying to attack them, and using classic methods of hybrid threats:
▪️Surveillance
▪️Cyber intrusions
▪️Kidnapping attempts
Many of which were thwarted or foiled at the last minute by counterintelligence in these countries.
The global impact is that it has diplomatic consequences. They summoned Iranian ambassadors and said: „Wait, these are already hostile activities, what are you allowing yourselves on our territory?“ They had to increase protection for multiple individuals, and joint investigations of Iranian networks are being conducted.
It’s like with Russians here – they’re spread through various agents, secondary collaborators, poor fellows who work in alternative media and for 500 euros will sell their own country and endanger the lives of their fellow citizens. Unfortunately, this is also happening from Iran.
Moderator: Let’s go to those activities. Can you name some?
Paľo Macko: I would divide them into blocks:
1) Expanded activity of foreign intelligence service – Iranian operatives were tracking journalists and officials
2) Espionage techniques and cyber attacks – Iranians were always good at hacking. Not only did they become victims of their centrifuges being hacked, but they themselves are very good.
3) Hezbollah – looks like half-dead, but there’s still space. People were partially disarmed, but Iran can still eventually use it to destabilize Lebanon.
If I were to follow up on the previous question – Lebanon realizes that people do desperate acts, and this Hezbollah, which has lost significance, may lose interest in being a major political force in Lebanon. They participate in power, have deputies there, but when they lost their influence, they can degenerate into destabilization – they’ll start causing harm.
Of course, there’s also nuclear tension, because we still don’t know how much nuclear material remained and where. And if Iran has embarked on such diversionary, espionage, cyber, and terrorist activities, it can use that material for purposes other than we originally thought.
Quote for the End
Moderator: Let’s go to my favorite section, and that’s the quote.
Paľo Macko: The times are hectic. We’ve been discussing the biggest military security crises. But at the beginning of July, exactly a month and two days ago, the Dalai Lama, who is a symbol of resistance against Chinese rule in Tibet, a moral authority and spiritual leader of Lamaist faith, turned 90. Amazing age.
For someone who has lived almost his entire life in exile, he has had a disproportionately large positive influence in the world, including through his spiritual message. So in honor of his 90 years (and we wish him, of course, the longest and most fruitful life), I would like to offer a thought from him:
„Live a good and honest life. When you get older and look back, you will be able to rejoice a second time.“ – Dalai Lama
