Russians are not succeeding on the battlefield. Ukraine eliminated Russia’s first attempt at a summer offensive before it could properly begin. In the first four months, Ukrainians liberated more territory than Russians conquered – even Russian military bloggers admit this. Ukrainians eventually generously allowed Russians a limited military parade on May 9th. Even the most fortified city in the world, Moscow, cannot completely defend itself against Ukrainian drones. This is fully manifesting in these days. Massive slaughter of Ukrainian civilians and the destruction or damage of up to 50 residential buildings in a single day by Russian drones and ballistic missiles is not working. Ukraine continues to defend itself valiantly.

Suddenly, Russians are talking about peace negotiations, but they still set nonsensical and unrealistic conditions, such as demanding that Ukrainians surrender the entire Donbas. Russians have not conquered Donbas even after 12 years, or rather after more than 4 years of full-scale invasion supported by partial mobilization. Putin is preparing to go to Beijing. Trump no longer supports Putin’s demands regarding Donbas.

And so Russians are practicing nuclear war. Not because they actually intend to wage it – after all, they cannot even stop relatively simple Ukrainian drones and missiles, let alone launch a surprise nuclear attack on someone and protect themselves from a retaliatory strike. Russians do not have such capability. It is only about diverting attention, intimidating the West, providing arguments to false peacekeepers and Russian collaborators. The problem is that malicious tongues say that during not-so-distant Sarmat tests, one of them exploded even during launch. Sooner or later, incompetent and unreliable Russians will create a mess.

It is called reflexive management or reflexive control. They engage you and redirect your conscious and subconscious perception in such a way that it fundamentally influences your decision-making. You then make decisions in a way that suits the architect of the reflexive campaign. It is like a „Beware of vicious dog!“ sign on a fence that subconsciously deters you from even peeking over the fence. Yet during walks around, it is enough to listen whether there is ever actually any dog barking there.

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Note: Shortened transcript of original slovak podcast as from Feb 20. 2026.

Fog of War

Situation in Ukraine

Moderator: What is the overall situation in Ukraine?

General Macko: For the first time in a long time, after 2.5 years, we saw that not only were Russians biting off pieces of Ukrainian territory, but we also saw that Ukraine executed local counterattacks and even regained more than 200 square kilometers of territory.

This is not yet some strategic turnaround, but we see that Ukrainians still have the capability for local counterattacks on land, where they are outnumbered against the Russians.

Strategic campaign continues

Regarding the strategic campaign, it naturally continued. The Russians again generated large packages of massive attacks. They do this cyclically – they did it before the Geneva talks.

🔹Russians rely on quantity

🔹Ukraine demonstrates deep strikes and is capable of hitting very deep into Russian territory

Overall strategic picture: we are in a war of attrition. The talks didn’t move significantly anywhere, despite it being important that they took place.

Zelensky said at the Munich conference that de facto there is no power plant in Ukraine that has not been hit and somehow damaged by Russian forces.

News from the front line

When we look at the front line overall, there are no fundamental changes:

🔹Near Sumy, Russians advanced in one village, but it’s not a breakthrough

🔹No substantial change in Kharkiv region

🔹Relatively quiet around Kupyansk as well

🔹The biggest battles are traditionally in the arc from Lyman through Kostiantynivka, Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk (Donbas)

🔹More pronounced activity in eastern Zaporizhzhia region, where Ukrainians gained the mentioned 200 km²

Deep strikes from both sides

Air warfare continues. Russians had two massive strikes – before the Munich Conference and just before the peace talks in Geneva. They do this cyclically – we saw it before Abu Dhabi, before Alaska.

This is apparently an attempt by Russians as part of large-scale psychological and hybrid warfare against the West, where they try to demonstrate their capabilities.

Key Russian production numbers:

🔹They produce around 130-150 missiles monthly

🔹Thousands of drones monthly

🔹At least 130 drones daily (modernized Gerans)

New Russian capability

Importantly, Russians can now also use Gerans in combination with other reconnaissance drones to hit relatively mobile targets. This was something they couldn’t do at the start of the war – that’s why they bombed railways, because they couldn’t hit trains.

State of war after four years

It’s incredible, but next week it will be 4 years since this war began and the fifth year is starting.

When we look overall, we are absolutely clearly in a state of war of attrition – this is war until total exhaustion.

Personnel problems on both sides

🔹Russians have around 700,000 soldiers in Ukraine

🔹Casualties are high on both sides

🔹Ukraine depends on external sources

Explanation of fallen exchanges: When Russians advance and Ukrainians withdraw, they sometimes don’t have time to take their fallen with them. When Russians move forward, they can collect their fallen, while Ukrainians don’t have this opportunity.

Territorial gains over two years

Over two years, since Russians gained initiative, they gained only 1.5% of Ukrainian territory:

🔹They had 29% in summer 2022

🔹It dropped to 17% in autumn 2022

🔹Over years 2023-2025, they reached nearly 20%

🔹They still control 9% less than at the start of the war

For comparison: In the same time, the Soviet army would have marched through and conquered half of Europe.

Technological innovations

Ukrainians led in technologization:

🔹Focus on drones (aerial, ground, naval)

🔹Have drone forces as independent units

🔹Drone units integrated in combat formations

Russians respond:

🔹Centralized it through the Rubikon system

🔹Modernized electronic warfare

🔹All possible jammers to protect their own forces

Middle East – Gaza and Israel

Moderator: What’s new in Gaza and Israel?

General Macko: Nothing substantial over the past week. Besides Trump’s non-functioning plan, low-intensity, continuous Israeli campaign continues:

🔹Destroying infrastructure

🔹Poor humanitarian situation

🔹Hamas has sporadic activity

No fundamental changes in southern Lebanon or the West Bank.

Important change: The United States announced they want to completely withdraw from Syria in the coming weeks and months. This relates to the new government getting the situation under control.

Strategic Background

Geneva Negotiations

Moderator: How do you evaluate the trilateral talks between the US, Ukraine, and Russia?

General Macko: They fulfilled my expectations – I had no great expectations. Russian communication before the talks already indicated it would be even worse than in Abu Dhabi.

Why did the negotiations fail?

Russians changed the negotiator – they put Medinsky in charge again. He’s a cold, very uncompromising hawk. Statements from February 9th and 10th showed that:

🔹They want major geopolitical concession from the West

🔹They want protectorate over Ukraine

🔹Regardless of territorial agreements, they want to control all of Ukraine

🔹It should be disarmed and without guarantees

Negotiation participants

For the US: Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner (Trump’s personal envoys)

For Ukraine:

🔹Rustam Umerov

🔹Kyryl Budanov

🔹Andriy Hnatov (Chief of General Staff)

🔹David Arachmia

For Russia:

🔹Medinsky

🔹Mikhail Galuzin

🔹Igor Kostyukov (GRU chief – Russian military intelligence service)

Negotiation results

No progress – key issues couldn’t be resolved:

🔹Territorial arrangement

🔹Security guarantees

🔹Ukraine’s future status

First day: 6 hours of negotiations
Second day: Only 2 hours

Zelensky was dissatisfied that sensitive issues weren’t discussed. Ukraine’s position: territorial integrity is non-negotiable.

Trump’s deadlines

Trump set a deadline that has no connection to battlefields, but only to American supplementary congressional elections, where Republicans are doing very poorly.

Zaluzhny’s Presidential Ambitions

Moderator: Zaluzhny indirectly hinted in an interview that he could run for Ukrainian president. How do you see this?

General Macko: It’s an interesting matter. He didn’t formally express it, but the tone of the interview suggested it. He gave an interview to Associated Press.

Controversial claims

Zaluzhny claims that in 2023, just before the Zaporizhzhia offensive, half his forces and ammunition were taken away – a decision by the president and General Syrsky.

Commanders‘ reactions didn’t please Zaluzhny:

🔹They criticize him for bringing this up now

🔹They claim he’s not entirely right

🔹They see the situation differently than he communicates

Historical context of the 2023 offensive

After rapid counteroffensives in autumn 2022, expectations arose for a major Ukrainian counteroffensive. Zaluzhny focused on Zaporizhzhia region, but meanwhile Russians built strong Surovikin line.

Problem: If the direction of attack is expected, it’s no longer the main direction or doesn’t have such a chance to succeed.

The situation in 2023 was different:

🔹The West gave almost no support

🔹Support started coming only in March-April

🔹Troops weren’t trained on Bradley, Leopards

🔹There were information leaks about brigade movements

Criticism of Zaluzhny

Soldiers criticize: He’s trying to retroactively absolve himself of responsibility and shift it to others. Now is wartime – it’s not the most fortunate timing.

Zaluzhny no longer has the popularity he had when he was at home. Instead of talking about what he would do differently, he talks about who’s to blame for what.

Munich Security Conference

Moderator: You write in detail about the Munich Security Conference in our weekly. How do you evaluate it?

General Macko: It was one of the most tense conferences. The greatest expectations were about how the American delegation would react.

Shocking report on the state of the world

The report had an image of an elephant and the headline „Under Destruction“ (instead of the usual „Under Construction“). 120-page report spoke of demolition of international order.

Main demolisher: The United States, which after 1945 de facto built it, protected it all along and guaranteed it.

Conference atmosphere development

Last three years:

🔹2024: Erosion, losing benefits from international arrangement

🔹2025: Already decay

🔹2026: Conscious destruction

Key presentations

Rubio: Had a soaring speech, but then it was totally erased by the visit to Slovakia and especially Hungary, where he showed they don’t care about unity with Europe.

Merz: Said the international order is gone, rejected nuclear armament of Germany.

Macron: Classically – Europe must be self-confident, sovereign and must build its own capabilities.

Chinese paradox

Interesting paradox: The Chinese, who according to Trump benefited from the international system, now act as the biggest protectors of that system.

China tries to benefit as much as possible from the internal contradiction between the West and gain attention not only from third world countries, but also Europe.

Slovak non-participation

The fact that Slovakia wasn’t there is a catastrophe. Either they weren’t there because:

1) We don’t have people capable of such communication (like Blanár)

2) They can only manage departments, not discuss at this level

It’s a great shame for Slovakia – our voice is not heard.

Comparison with Finland

Our president had a program: halusky, Italian cuisine at the Olympic house – that was all. The Finnish president had a 19-point program. Finland is similarly sized, has similar capabilities, but is more advanced.

The difference in presidential output is the difference in country output and citizen success.

Slovak armament

Moderator: In connection with the American Secretary of State’s visit, the Ministry of Defense announced it wants to buy another 4 F-16 fighters and HIMARS rocket launchers. Is this good?

HIMARS – yes

General Macko: I’ll start with HIMARS – as the war in Ukraine shows, there’s a renaissance of artillery, but it’s better to have precise artillery and deeper strikes.

Ours are requesting HIMARS with extended range:

🔹150 kilometers or

🔹PRECISION STRIKE MUNITION up to 500 kilometers (PrSM, original ATACMS)

Missiles are fired from the same system, only the container changes.

We have similar equipment: We had older HIMARS missiles for our rocket launcher, which was combined – it could fire Soviet standard 122mm and NATO MLRS standard from containers.

Advantages:

🔹Rocket launchers we have are on old Tatra 813 chassis

🔹We could manufacture this in cooperation and participate in production for other countries, if put on new chassis

🔹Could cooperate on manufacturing rocket pods or containers

F-16 – not a priority

We have 14 fighters on order (12 combat + 2 training, but really combat two-seaters).

Arguments for additional purchases:

🔹You need 2 minimum in sharp readiness

🔹Another 2 in reserve

🔹Needed for training

🔹Part always in inoperable condition

My opinion: I would be against those fighters. Not because it’s illogical, but it’s not a well-set priority.

After 20 years we’re still behind with one brigade – they’ve wanted a mechanized brigade from us since 2004, so we’d have at least one that can defend us.

Let’s finally complete that brigade and then dream about castles in the air.

Energy security – dispute with Croatians

Moderator: How do you see the dispute with Croatians over the Adria pipeline?

General Macko: I look at it from security perspectives:

Paradox of Slovak approach

On one hand:

🔹We contracted 60 billion euros for defense in 3-4 months (framework agreements)

🔹We consolidate, but arm competitively

On the other hand:

🔹We are totally vulnerable in energy security

🔹We committed to still take Russian oil

What Fico forgot to mention

When attacking Ukraine together with Orbán, he forgot to mention:

🔹Russians bombed Ukraine

🔹Russians bombed a reservoir, thereby also affecting the pipeline

🔹If Ukrainians were repairing, why wouldn’t they solve freezing people in Kyiv first?

Problem of dependence on one source

Instead of source diversification we’re still dependent on one source, where:

🔹Russians use it as a weapon

🔹They use their weapons on the pipeline too

🔹We endanger Slovakia’s stability and security

Croatian position

Croatians speak clearly:

🔹Adria’s capacity is sufficiently large

🔹You can import any oil, but not Russian

🔹EU didn’t give exemption for Russian oil through pipelines

🔹„We won’t burn our fingers“

Real reason for dispute

Fico tries to save the Hungarian model:

🔹They used dumping prices due to Russian embargo

🔹They bought substantially cheaper

🔹But gasoline and diesel are more expensive than in countries with „expensive“ non-Russian oil

🔹Hungarian company takes huge margins

Slovak citizens get nothing from this.

Security risks

Endangered is the entire operation of:

🔹Economy

🔹Health systems

🔹Security systems

🔹Transport systems

The question is appropriate: Should prosecutors look at this? What are the property relationships here?

Security Council

Security council is called regarding ex-minister Tomanová, but not called regarding energy security after 15 years of inability to diversify oil supplies.

360°

American-Iranian negotiations

Moderator: How do you evaluate American-Iranian negotiations in Geneva?

General Macko: Great progress was not achieved. They were open, both sides said so.

Primary problem

Iran says: There’s no force in the world to deprive it completely of nuclear program. It needs uranium enrichment for its own nuclear power plants – otherwise it would be strategically dependent like Slovakia on Russian oil.

USA insists on: They want absolute certainty – 100% guarantee that they won’t have any nuclear program at all.

Escalation instead of agreement

It was clear this would be the stumbling block. That’s why we see escalation:

🔹Poland calling citizens to immediately leave Iran

🔹Trump said he’ll decide „within hours“

🔹He has a secret security meeting

🔹Estimates speak of possible attack over the weekend

Trump’s maximum pressure strategy

Trump needs to make the threat of immediate attack credible:

🔹Recalling citizens

🔹Warnings

🔹Media leaks

🔹Creating psychotic atmosphere

Compared to last week: I don’t think Trump will attack, but the probability of strike has significantly increased.

Cuba

Moderator: It seems the communist regime in Cuba will end. How?

General Macko: So far it looks like similar scenario as in Venezuela. Marco Rubio (his family comes from Cuba) hinted at this during Maduro’s arrest.

American strategy

They’re pushing it to the maximum – applying maximum pressure:

🔹They know Russians won’t be able to help them

🔹They blocked oil deliveries from Venezuela too

🔹Mexico also said they won’t supply oil

Cuba’s state

Cuba was left bare:

🔹Problems since the 90s

🔹Garbage accumulating

🔹Energy outages becoming dramatic

US goal

So they don’t have to invade, they try to achieve that the regime collapses itself. Maximum „tap on the leaning structure“.

Problem: It doesn’t guarantee stable conditions, just a more favorable regime for Americans.

Trump’s Peace Council

Moderator: Is Trump’s peace council an attempt to create a new UN or just entertainment?

General Macko: Everything points to it. He had big ambitions – not just for Gaza, but for the whole world. Eventually he reduced it.

Problems with conception

Reason for reduction:

🔹Invitation was sent to 60 countries

🔹Few of them responded to real membership

🔹Not one paid 1 billion for permanent membership

🔹Russians are still evaluating the possibility

The whole thing is built on „lifetime president Donald Trump“ – one person out of 8 billion people decided to lead such a council.

First session in Washington

At least 40 countries participated (majority observers):

Members: UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Bahrain, Pakistan, Turkey, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Kosovo, Albania, Argentina, Paraguay.

It’s not a balanced organ representing the world.

Gaza program

Financial commitments:

🔹9 countries pledged 7 billion USD for reconstruction

🔹Americans 10 billion (didn’t say from where)

🔹Minimum 70 billion needed

Military mission:

🔹20,000 soldiers + 12,000 police

🔹Soldiers provided by: Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Albania

🔹Commander: Major General Jeffers (former special forces member)

🔹Won’t have UN mandate – only this council’s

Implementation problems

Gaza is unstable, Hamas not disarmed – basic prerequisites for mission functioning are missing.

Western allies are skeptical – they perceive it as an attempt to replace UN and create order dominated by Trump.

Controversial invitations: Netanyahu, Putin (Putin conditioned participation on unfreezing Russian assets).

Closing Quote

„Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man’s character – give him power!“

Abraham Lincoln, US President who died in 1865 by an assassin’s hand.

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Moderator: The war in Ukraine is entering another year. Peace negotiations have not yet brought the desired results. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is convinced that Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin has already started the Third World War. The war has claimed the lives of tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of people. It has caused enormous material damage. According to a joint report by the World Bank, European Union, UN and Ukraine, published on Monday, the costs of post-war reconstruction are estimated at approximately $558 billion over the next decade. However, peace is nowhere in sight.

We will now discuss more with Lieutenant General (Retired) Pavel Macko. Welcome. Thank you for finding the time.

General Macko: Thank you for the invitation.

Moderator: Mr. Macko, at the beginning, we could assess how the front and the war are doing now at the beginning of the fifth year.

Levels of War in Ukraine

General Macko: This war is taking place on four levels.

Tactical Level – Front Line

The most visible one for us is on the front line, it’s about tactical combat. We are in a stage of attrition warfare that is very difficult, with heavy losses and minimal movements on the front line.

When I compare it, at the peak of the Russian invasion in 2022, the Russians controlled 29% of the territory. Then the Ukrainians partially pushed them back, and since then, for at least the past two years, this kind of attrition warfare has been ongoing, where the Russians are slowly trying to crumble, literally breaking Ukrainian defense like stone.

They are helped by gliding bombs, which they have brought to the battlefield or into use in the meantime. But actually, over all that time, over the past two years, they have gained less than 1.5% of Ukrainian territory.

So today, after four years of war, at the beginning of the fifth year of war, the Russians control only less than 20% of the territory. Despite this, they pretend that they could continue prolonging the war, that they could continue.

Operational Level of War

If we look at the operational level of war, the Russians are intensively attacking deep into Ukrainian territory and destroying infrastructure, but just as they failed to destroy Ukrainian air defense at the beginning of the war, it has meanwhile received reinforcement through Western assistance, so it still resists quite effectively. Despite the fact that the strikes are getting bigger.

In four years, however, the Russians have achieved:

🔸The ability to produce more missiles

🔸Produce substantially more drones

🔸Modernized those drones

🔸If the Russians couldn’t hit moving targets deep in territory for three years, they have now achieved this

On the other hand, Ukraine has gained:

🔸The ability to conduct deep strikes into Russian territory with its own forces

🔸We have seen the latest attacks not only with drones, but also with missiles, whether cruise missiles or their own ballistic missiles, which they continue to improve and can manufacture themselves.

Naval Operations

Despite not having a fleet, Ukrainians managed to first push out the Russian fleet, the Black Sea Fleet from Crimea, which became too dangerous and uninhabitable for this fleet.

They pushed them to the eastern coast of the Black Sea to Novorossiysk and surrounding areas. And this through attacks:

🔸Missiles on Crimea

🔸Long-range drones on Crimea

🔸Naval drones

War Transformation

In general, this war has brought fundamental changes. What we see today is a completely different war and different armies than what we saw at the beginning of the Russian invasion in 2022.

The armies have also transformed. Many of the most experienced have already fallen or had to be replaced. And on the other hand, we see that there has been a great transformation of those armies, their organizational structures, there has been technologization of war.

And by the way, this is also what enables Ukraine to survive so far:

🔸Great support from the West – financial, economic, material

🔸Mainly constant asymmetry, modernization

🔸Efforts to balance the numerical superiority in terms of people and equipment on the Russian side

Strategic Level

At the strategic level, we see that the Russians have gained nothing, because Ukraine continues to resist after four years. They wanted to quickly gain Ukraine under their power and gain control over it. That didn’t work out.

And they wanted to discourage other countries from closer relations with the West. The opposite happened. NATO expanded with Sweden and Finland.

Hybrid Activities

On the other hand, and this is the last dimension or level of that war, this war is also taking place in the form of hybrid activities or in this information and psychological space, whether inside Russia, inside Ukraine, or in the surrounding world.

Regarding inside Russia:

🔸Russians suppress any opposition

🔸They try to regulate social media now

Inside Ukraine:

🔸They try through bombing infrastructure and attempts to freeze the population to undermine the will

🔸This has never worked particularly well in history

🔸Despite this, it has devastating effects on the Ukrainian population, but the determination is still strong enough

Towards the West:

🔸Russians try, including through participation in negotiations, which they deliberately prolong, to divide the West and gain support from third world countries

🔸They try to sow seeds of doubt among Ukraine’s Western partners

🔸They conduct long-term information hybrid activities against us

🔸We have seen in recent months and years even sabotage activities directly in the rest of Europe

And we actually see not completely clear unanimity and unity of the West, but support for Ukraine still continues.

War of Endurance

So in summary, we are in a situation where it’s a war about who will last longer.

🔸Currently Ukrainians have nowhere to retreat, they must endure, because they would face the liquidation of statehood and nation

🔸Russians are still fighting on foreign territory and cannot move forward in the war

So they try rather in those other areas, in the psychological, in the hybrid influence to undermine what keeps Ukraine afloat and that is also the external help.

Moderator: I’ll go to the words of General Zaluzhny, who was the army chief. He said these days that basically there is no army that would somehow be able to end this war in the current situation, because the war, as you also indicated, has completely changed from what we were used to.

Not only how the war is conducted, but also the various brakes and counterbalances in stability and security are absolutely different, that the world has changed.

Volodymyr Zelensky also said that Vladimir Putin started the Third World War in the sense that so many countries are actually involved in the conflict, in negotiations, in arms supplies. Do you also perceive it this way, that we are basically already in the Third World War?

Has the Third World War Already Begun?

General Macko: I will answer on two levels.

Regarding Zaluzhny’s Statement

First, regarding Zaluzhny’s statement. Of these current armies that are fighting – Russian and Ukrainian, neither has the strength to make a fundamental change and dramatically reverse the course of the war.

That means it’s an exhausting war that will go on for a long time. We know such wars in history. After all, Russia defeated Napoleon’s stronger and more modern armies by eventually exhausting them – by avoiding direct confrontations and wearing down the French army. It had to retreat there and they finished it during that retreat, so Napoleon actually lost despite expectations, lost in an attrition war.

So an attrition war can be won even by the weaker partner. It’s not at all that mathematics automatically decides in favor of Russia. If it were just about mathematics, all conflicts would be decided in advance. But they weren’t, and we could go far back in history.

How It Could Change

That means it could be changed either by someone else coming and entering the conflict:

Russians tried this:

🔸They drew North Korea directly into military involvement

🔸They rely on military support from Iran and North Korea

🔸But we see that North Korea has now withdrawn, rather only provides material support

Moderator: Iran also has its own problems.

General Macko: Iran has more than enough of its own problems. And there it was also the opposite, that the Russians also didn’t help Iran when it needed it most.

And China is not engaging directly militarily, not providing military aid. On the other hand, many Chinese technologies, machine tools enable Russians to expand military production.

Ukraine’s Problems

When I look at the opposite side, Ukraine has the biggest problem with people. That’s why there’s technologization of war.

It tries to bring innovations, tries to use as much as possible:

🔸Drones

🔸Autonomous systems

🔸Ground drones

🔸Naval drones

So it’s an effort to compensate for that disadvantage in human resources – there are substantially fewer Ukrainians – with other measures.

And it has always been that such a great war brings something like a revolution in warfare and it changes.

Definition of War and Third World War

But if we look at whether there is a Third World War or not, it depends on how we look at the definition of war.

If I look at the definition of war in that classic sense, what for example Clausewitz, such a classic said, that war is the continuation of politics by violent means, but it is politics, then Russia de facto is already conducting this war.

Chronology of Russian aggression:

🔸It has been conducting it in Ukraine at least since 2014

🔸But de facto it has been conducting it since 2008

The moment Russia sensed a chance that the West was not united and moreover consolidated its domestic affairs after two Chechen wars, it did gain control over Chechnya. President Putin decided to take advantage of the fact that in 2008, Georgia and Ukraine were not invited to NATO. Because much is said that in 2008 Ukraine and Georgia were invited – but they were not invited at all. They were only promised indefinite future possible NATO membership. There was no courage to invite them to NATO and they also didn’t have such great domestic will to join.

Consequences of Delayed Integration

And this delay of official invitation and integration caused Ukraine to rather focus on European Union integration, at least they wanted to associate.

This was negotiated by Yanukovych’s regime, which was pro-Russian, but negotiated it. Eventually the Russians intervened and the result was Euromaidan and actually removing Yanukovych from power. The Russians then resorted to open war.

Russian Hybrid Activities

But when we look at what experts have long been saying and what I have also analyzed several times in the past, that Russians conduct activities on our territory, but also elsewhere in the world, that are far beyond spreading friendship and peaceful influence.

Because we have various Polish institutes, French institutes, various competitive Russian-Slovak friendship societies, which aim to spread some culture, promote their own country. These are all welcome and non-violent forms of cooperation and promotion.

But Russia systematically acts and can be said with hostile intent against institutions, against the democratic system that functions in the countries of their opponents.

Russian State Doctrine

Overall, their state doctrine is that they perceive the world as permanent conflict, which is only resolved by different means according to what time it is and where what works best.

So from this perspective we see massive Russian hostile activities. These escalated after the invasion of Ukraine, also in an effort to discourage the rest of the world from cooperating with Ukraine, from supporting Ukraine. This is in accordance with the UN Charter, but the Russians don’t like it.

So we have seen various:

🔸Sabotage actions

🔸Assassination attempts, for example on the head of German Rheinmetall and similar

That means, from this perspective, it can be said that Russians are already carrying out activities that are far beyond peaceful promotion of their interests, but are explicitly of a hostile nature.

Nuclear Rhetoric

And into this comes rhetoric, where Russia has actually used nuclear rhetoric so intensively over the past three years, which we didn’t have during the entire Cold War.

Simply, during the Soviet Union era, this topic was taboo. It was in some strategic calculations. Partners knew about it, but if nuclear weapons were discussed, it was rather in Russian-stimulated peace protests and movements in the western part of the world, then bipolar world, but not in Russia.

Today we see that nuclear intimidation has become a topic of television shows, that it’s actually spread in those evening television programs, but not in some crazy private television, but in Russian state television this nuclear or even nuclear-terrorist propaganda and intimidation is spread.

It’s also spread by Russian state officials, they use this war rhetoric and Putin himself, apparently also in an effort to justify the failure in Ukraine, so increasingly and more speaks about actually conducting war against the entire West.

Which is of course not true, but from this perspective he is already mentally in that conflict with the West and in a figurative sense, even if not literally, it can be said that yes, Zelensky is right when he says that Putin and his regime are already conducting the Third World War with the West – they conduct it systematically and use various tools for it.

Escalation Signals

Which may not be those visible weapons, although we have seen:

🔸Drone intrusions

🔸We have seen testing of our readiness and defense on the eastern border

So it’s a situation that could be said to be already „phase zero“ of a potential military conflict, which – we hope will not happen and doesn’t have to happen.

Moderator: At the security conference in Munich, President Macron got a question from a Ukrainian MP about when NATO member states will send their units to Ukraine. And Macron answered him something like we’re trying not to escalate the situation by having some ally’s foot step on that territory, so we send money, we try to arm Ukraine but we don’t send soldiers.

There is a coalition of the willing or community of the willing, which somehow took over the role after the United States and deals with arms supplies and financing. Is this enough? If we can already say globally that we are somehow drawn into that conflict anyway, is this enough for Ukraine to endure?

Western Support for Ukraine

General Macko: It should be enough, but of course at the cost of high casualties on Ukraine’s side.

Here it must be said that many opportunities were perhaps missed at the beginning of the conflict, that there was too long hesitation by the West.

Even that support, while continuous, has great fluctuations. After all, for example, the Russians advanced most after the Ukrainians pushed them back at the end of 2022 or in the second half of 2022, and then they were preparing a major offensive and Western support stopped or slowed down.

So Russians advanced most at the beginning of 2024 and this at a time when Ukrainians almost ran out of ammunition, because a major aid package was also stopped in the American Congress, we were not able to quickly ramp up military production including ammunition.

Macron’s Position

But the essence is – President Macron from this perspective tried to explain that:

🔸Ukraine was not a NATO member state

🔸The international community first cannot enforce the will of the UN Security Council because Russia as an obstructive element with veto power prevents it

🔸But the General Assembly condemned this aggression repeatedly

🔸He also said that we are clearly helping, because it’s also our duty in terms of the UN Charter – even if it’s not legally enforceable, but it’s our duty

Non-Escalation Strategy

And from this perspective he says that we don’t want to go into direct confrontation with Russians, as long as we don’t see it as inevitable, as long as we see it can be managed otherwise.

This of course may not please Ukrainians. On the other hand, those cautious ones in our societies welcome it, because President Macron and France are still in a state of security, even though they increase measures against threats, because the security situation has worsened. Germany too, all countries, us too.

But we simply don’t want to go directly into that confrontation, because the recipe is:

1) First, help Ukraine to withstand this

2) Second, with economic, diplomatic and other tools pressure Russia – also with that military aid to Ukraine – pressure Russia to abandon continuing this aggression

Problematic Compromises

And Ukraine’s leadership even accepted very favorable conditions for Russians, because Ukraine actually de facto agrees that if the conflict were frozen according to the current line of contact or that front line, it would de facto recognize at least partially those current results and the real state on the battlefield and the results of that war.

Which from the perspective of international law, morality and ethics is absolutely unacceptable, but Ukraine has no interest in continuing the conflict at any cost when they see themselves that they cannot push them out and are looking for a solution that would guarantee that when this happens, Russia won’t use time to recover and continue the war.

Counterbalance to Macron’s Position

And here perhaps it’s also necessary to say the counterbalance to what Macron says. He says that we don’t want to get involved in the current ongoing war, but we are building our defense, to prevent Russia from trying to expand the war to us or elsewhere.

At the same time, we are prepared to guarantee security, if there is an agreed ceasefire and agreed solution – at the same time we are prepared to send even soldiers who would guarantee that the conflict doesn’t break out again, that Russia doesn’t use this situation.

Compromise Between Reality and Caution

That means, it’s such a compromise between that reality and the slow ramp-up of Western aid and the effort not to escalate and on the other hand to prepare so that we are not surprised like when the Russians attacked Ukraine.

But to be prepared, so that we actually deter the Russians in advance with our preparedness from attempting to expand the conflict and expand the great war with the West.

Russian Ambitions

Today Russians actually openly communicate that they want not only to get Ukraine, but they actually want to change relations in Europe, they want to change relations in the world:

🔸They want to have a bigger role in the world

🔸They want to have their sphere of influence

🔸They demand pushing NATO back before 1997

🔸And thereby handing over countries like Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland into – if not subjugation, then into Russia’s sphere of influence

🔸Where Russia will have final authority in deciding what and how these countries will do

And that’s a scenario that nobody wants, so they don’t want to escalate.

Consequences of Ukraine’s Fall

And on the other hand, they are aware that if Ukraine were to fall, that we don’t help it stay afloat, then Russia will be strengthened, will be encouraged by that quasi-success and at the same time will gain the human and economic potential that Ukraine provides to its calculation.

And actually at that moment it will be easiest for Russia – similarly as we saw in history and it’s not just World War II, but also in older history – that such aggressors if they are rewarded for aggression, they consolidate their forces and try to gain even more in an effort to disarm that possible reversal or prevent that reversal, that it should return to the original state.

Moderator: Yes. Many politicians also point out that Russia would definitely not stop at Ukraine. However, you mentioned that we are really preparing and I mean Europe.

And today General Řehka also said this, he is the Chief of General Staff of the Czech Republic. They had a command assembly with the new minister and he mentioned there that the security situation is not simple and that the main danger not only for the Czech Republic, but for Europe is the Russian Federation.

And at the same time he said that many allies inform about this, that they expect the conflict between Europe and Russia between three and six years and that the time for preparation is meanwhile very narrowing.

Is this open communication, that we know you could attack us, a certain way of deterrence by us preparing? This time we won’t let you surprise us?

Deterrence Versus Defense

General Macko: It’s definitely part of that, because there’s a big difference whether you deter, discourage or whether you already have to defend yourself.

Because Ukraine was underestimated by Russia and despite that or precisely because of that Russians, because they thought they could, that nobody would prevent them and that it would be easy, because they misjudged those signals and Ukrainians‘ determination to defend themselves, so they started the war.

And now it’s completely irrelevant whether their big goals failed. The consequences are clear:

🔸We have almost 2 million wounded and fallen

🔸We have many civilian casualties

🔸We have cities in eastern Ukraine completely devastated to the ground

🔸We have destroyed infrastructure inside Ukraine

🔸We now also have damaged infrastructure in Russia

🔸We have huge economic losses that spill over in the form of energy, food and other crises to the rest of the world

🔸And of course, who is closer than Europe, which bears it harder or more

Paradox of Russian Strength

That means, if we want to prevent this, we see how Russia is doing in Ukraine and what Russia is doing. Here is such an apparent paradox – many will object that Russia can’t even properly conquer Pokrovsk, nor the Donbas in four years and why should it be a threat to us.

We still must proceed from the fact that Russia is already in a state of war mobilization:

🔸The economy is redirected to military production

🔸A third of all public expenditures go to war and the defense sector

🔸Russia adopts extraordinary financial measures

🔸Most recently President Putin basically opened back doors for possible forced conscription of reserves, meaning further waves of partial mobilizations

Moderator: So they’re going with that „we are many“ tactic again.

General Macko: Because since they can no longer recruit even for money and it’s apparently not financially sustainable, they’re already starting to openly consider forced conscription to war. Because there’s a difference when you call reserves for different wages than those recruits they get from poor regions of Russia for wages of 5000 euros per month.

Problem of Return to Normal

So when I summarize it all – Russia now has trouble finishing off Ukraine, but if Ukraine were to surrender or there were a ceasefire, Russia also has trouble returning to normal and starting to actually do normal civilian production, stopping those armaments factories.

That means, it’s perhaps advantageous for them, running. If Russia continues at this pace and our pace is slower, these are the assumptions that speak of three to five years, that Russians could dare to go further.

Russian Ambitions and Reality

Now, if Russians openly communicate that their goal is to change relations in Europe, gain greater influence in Europe and change world order, on the other hand it must be said that currently they don’t have the strength and won’t have the strength even in five years to militarily occupy all of Europe.

But they can unleash a conflict on some section, where they provoke NATO to react and will test:

1) First, whether we really keep that Article 5, whether we all stand up decisively

2) Second, that they scare with nuclear weapons – that if you defend yourselves, they’ll take part of Estonia or whatever and if you defend yourselves, they’ll immediately rattle nuclear weapons

3) And they’ll say: „But that will mean a big conflict, let’s negotiate“

4) And there they’ll already have a more advantageous negotiating position. They’ll actually have an advantage, be the one who actually dictates the topic and content of these negotiations

How to Prevent This

The only thing we can do about this – if we don’t want to find ourselves in this situation, if we don’t want to test our resilience, we must clearly and unambiguously communicate:

We must tell the Russians „We are already taking measures, arming ourselves, preparing, we see you, what you’re doing, we understand what you want, but we won’t allow you to do it and we’ll be ready.“

International Communication

And this is communication not only by Karel Řehka, this is communication by Estonian defense minister, who clearly stated that:

„You know what, if you tried to attack at least part of our territory, we’ll strike deep right on the first day we’ll strike back right deep into Russian territory, so you realize you’re opening a big war.“

That means, it’s important and it must be credible, because the whole problem is that as soon as we question our unity and determination in various our discussions, as also at the Munich Conference – we see that there’s actually a West-West dispute, the United States pursues a somewhat different policy.

As soon as we send signals that it might not be so, that Article 5 might not apply, then it can eventually happen that we unite very quickly and react harshly, but the aggressor misjudged it based on our preceding communication and disputes and would resort to aggression. Thereby you’re in such escalation that always threatens to get out of control.

Moderator: While we were talking, we also had a map of the so-called Suwalki Gap. This is a place that should be such an Achilles‘ heel. Why?

Suwalki Gap – Strategic Vulnerability

General Macko: When we look at that map, we actually see that Belarus is part of a union state with Russia:

🔸Today Russians have their nuclear weapons deployed there

🔸They have their bases deployed there

🔸It’s more or less a puppet government that serves in favor of the Russian Federation

🔸After all, Belarusian territory was also used for aggression into Ukraine

Geographic Situation

This, what we see on the map between Kaliningrad Oblast – which is such an enclave, a remnant of what was once East Prussia, which the Russians controlled – and Belarus is the so-called „Suwalki Gap“ according to the town of Suwalki.

It’s roughly a 100 km section and Russians have a so-called A2AD strategy – anti-access area denial. That means, when we look at it, even within the range of rocket artillery – that means that rocket artillery, but also artillery – a large part is under fire control from the territory of Kaliningrad Oblast and Belarus.

Baltic Vulnerability

So when I take countries like Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, they are vulnerable from the perspective that we can only support them by sea. This is of course always risky. The entry of Finland and Sweden has significantly improved the situation, but we can’t really support them much by land.

Many institutions, think tanks have done studies on this. When I commanded the training center, we did scenarios of what it would mean. We modeled it.

Defense Problem

The problem is that if we don’t have permanently such large forces in the Baltics that could defend the Baltics in that clear flat terrain from Russia’s initial assault, we must bring in reinforcements.

And when we want to do this, we must strengthen border defense there to gain time. That’s also what they’re doing:

🔸Making terrain obstacles

🔸Building those defensive ramparts

🔸Trying to make a drone wall

But there’s still that Suwalki Gap, where Russians within such provocation would try – they could try to either directly enter that space and occupy it, or keep it under fire control, so that we couldn’t bring additional reinforcements in favor of these Baltic countries.

And that would be the moment of that blackmail. Moreover, they probably also have nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad.

Analogous Situations

Russians had the same thing in the Black Sea, for example. That’s why Crimea is important for them, because from Crimea they control practically – within missile and aircraft range is the entire Black Sea. They can hit the Bosphorus strait if needed.

And simply this is Russian strategy, which even with smaller forces allows them to control that certain part of the chessboard or map. In this case it’s that Suwalki Gap.

That’s why it’s very important what measures we take and how we could prevent Russians from occupying the Baltics – we must think about it – how we could counter such Russian effort to actually isolate the rest of the Baltics.

Moderator: You mentioned that Russians are already thinking about where to mobilize more soldiers. Mark Rutte in Munich mentioned that about 30,000 soldiers fell there in the last month. The previous month they mentioned basically the same number.

We know that Russia could definitely get some soldiers. It’s a big country. They know, they could handle it. What’s worse are finances.

And now there’s talk about the state fund in Russia, which analysts estimate that from this fund they somehow finance the war and that this fund could last only a year and a half at higher oil prices, maybe 2.5 years.

Do finances have any fundamental impact on when this war will end? And could we perhaps rely on Russia simply running out of money?

Economic Factor in War

General Macko: Since we are in a stage of attrition warfare, it has absolutely fundamental impact, because in attrition warfare there is gradual consumption of personnel and resources for conducting war.

Ukrainians try to replace this with technologization, robots, drones. But you need resources for it.

Standard Scenario

That means, normally it would be that if these countries were in an isolated system, one or the other country would collapse and of course the one with smaller economic, human potential has a greater chance to collapse.

But Ukraine supported by the West has behind it the greater potential. Although the willingness to give maximum support is complicated. We see how difficult it is for even those financial packages to support Ukraine to pass.

Russian Support

On the other hand, Russia receives support from North Korea – we already mentioned that the source has significantly diminished there. China also only gives that support to a certain extent.

American sanctions are a tool despite Americans having such fluctuations in that pressure – sometimes they pressure Ukraine to quickly conclude peace, sometimes the Russians – but still the law was passed in Congress.

We see that:

🔸They confiscate tankers

🔸European countries have also started confiscating tankers of that illegal shadow fleet, which quietly under false flags creates the flow of these Russian products

They try to take away these resources and indeed in history all these attrition, exhaustion conflicts ended on economics, on logistics.

Historical Parallels

After all, World War II was decided on battlefields, but actually both World War I and World War II were decided by economic potential.

Americans at the end of the war both supplied enormous amounts of aid to the Soviets. They deployed the army themselves. But when we look at production, Germans were cut off from oil sources – the main ones. They were gradually cut off from those production capacities and actually on the other hand Americans produced hundreds to thousands of aircraft. That was already such a force that even mathematically Germans couldn’t withstand. It was only a matter of time when they would collapse.

Of course, Germans were broken rather on the battlefield, but here it can be predicted that this time will come.

Uncertainty in Russian Economy

Because the question is that we don’t know the real depth of problems in Russia, just as we didn’t know the actual strength of their army, which looked great on Red Square and in reality turned out not to be that good.

That means also in that economy so far Russians try to keep it under the lid. We know they have high interest rates. They try to make counter-pressure to that. But that cushion is shrinking and those markets are also shrinking.

Compensatory Strategies

They try to compensate somewhere in Africa, but that lucrative West, that’s what sustained them long-term and those reserves in the fund will run out one day.

On the other hand Russians still have great raw material potential. They can still place their production somewhere. So it will also depend on how strong those sanctions will be.

Positive signals

We can see that India, for example, is moving away from oil products from Russia. It is not possible either overnight or technically, but it is gradually happening and it is being replaced by other sources.

That is, there is a quite realistic assumption that despite the size of Russia and despite the numerical superiority, with good measures, it is far from guaranteed that Russia will win this war of attrition. On the contrary, Ukraine has a better chance if the support of the West endures.

Conditions for success

But, of course, this is also conditional on political support and we see that the Russians are intensively trying to influence the political events, to divide us in some way, to undermine that unity, because this is what actually keeps Ukraine alive and makes it a disadvantageous position for the Russians.

Moderator: We believe that the more positive words from this will fall on fertile ground and that Russia will not really win this war. In any case, it will probably take a while and we will certainly not see each other for the last time. Thank you very much for taking the time.

General Macko: Thank you for the invitation. I would very much like to come up with a different topic. Here it is only necessary to say that let’s hope that the Russians will understand that they have nothing more to gain in that war, that some few square kilometers for the next years of fighting will not pay off for them.

Moderator: Thank you very much. My guest was Lieutenant General Pavel Macko, retired. Thank you again for taking the time to follow us for four years.

General Macko: Thank you for the invitation.

The post Four years of Russian war – Assessment appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Ukraine playing all-in? Total nonsense!

If the headline is framed this way, it’s complete nonsense! Ukraine has been going all-in since the first day of aggression, when citizens – despite the hesitation of the army and political leadership of the state – decided spontaneously to defend themselves.

Unlike the Russians, Ukrainians have nowhere to retreat. The dilemma of whether to capitulate now or after further fighting and losses of lives and additional territories is only an apparent dilemma. In reality, it’s all the same.

As long as there is no external mechanism that would prevent Russians from continuing the war or renewing aggression later, they will continue in aggressive expansion.

Immediate capitulation = invitation for further aggression

Immediate capitulation today, without real guarantees in the form of tens of thousands of guarantor soldiers on Ukrainian territory, is just an invitation for further Russian aggression after a brief rest and resource replenishment.

Russia has enormous resources, but also an enormous problem returning to normal life. The easiest thing for the current Russian leadership is to continue aggression, especially if they see it bearing fruit in the form of gains.

Ukraine has a chance if it persists

If Ukraine continues with tenacious defense and maintains external support, it has at least a chance that in a war of attrition, Russians will run out of breath and will to continue the senseless aggression and foolish dream of restoring and expanding the Russian empire sooner.

In this type of conflict, the one who endures longer wins, not the one who is bigger on paper.

Ukrainians are buying time for themselves and us

Ukrainians, through their tenacious resistance, are buying time for themselves and us. Despite two years of tactical initiative, Russians in the last two years have:

🔹Advanced by a few kilometers

🔹Captured less than 2% more territory

🔹Achieved no operational breakthrough

🔹Seized no major city

The facts speak clearly

I remind you of these important data:

🔹In summer 2022: Russians controlled 29% of Ukrainian territory

🔹Today: they still don’t have even 20%

🔹They’ve been fighting for Pokrovsk for almost two years and still don’t have it 100% under control

🔹Russians lost Kupiansk in autumn 2022 and have been trying to recapture it since April 2024! Unsuccessfully.

Russians are the ones really playing all-in

The situation is extremely difficult for Ukrainians and they are running out of strength and will. But if someone here is playing all-in, it’s the Russians.

Why is this so?

Because if Ukrainians don’t surrender now:

🔹They may (but don’t have to) collapse later

🔹The result will be the same for them

🔹They will cease to exist as a free nation

🔹They will be just a Russian protectorate

But if Russia collapses, it can lose a lot – existence in its current form. Inside and especially around Russia, there are enough of those waiting for prey.

The post Who’s Playing All-In Here? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

And we are joined by retired Lieutenant General Pavel Macko. Welcome. Good evening.

Good evening, I wish you.

So let’s discuss both meetings in Geneva together. First, let’s go to those two-day trilateral negotiations on ending the war in Ukraine. Do you expect any fundamental breakthrough from them, which simply hasn’t happened in those previous negotiations so far? Will it happen now in Geneva?

Trilateral negotiations USA-Ukraine-Russia

Quite honestly, I don’t expect any fundamental breakthrough. Nevertheless, those negotiations are important. But it must be said that we had two rounds of negotiations in Abu Dhabi, where they made progress, where it was also good that those negotiations got some format and some structure, where there are actually several working groups for different areas. It’s good that in both delegations there are people who have a military background, whether it was – I don’t mean Kyrylo Budanov there as the former head of that intelligence GUR, but I mean including the chief of staff from Ukraine and the head of GRU from the Russian Federation. There was an economic component and generally a political component in these negotiations. However, what’s essential is that the key issues that prevent any conclusion of agreements are: first, Russia doesn’t accept any security guarantees from the West and any Western influence or Western assistance to Ukraine after a possible conclusion of peace agreements. Second, Russia has large territorial demands, and third, Russia also has demands for changing the political regime in Ukraine and even demands for further fundamental geopolitical concessions from the West, in Europe and generally in relation to Russia. This is further underlined by those current statements of Russian representation, when already on January 14th at a public assembly, regime representatives and Putin indicated that they have more than those territorial demands, than formal recognition of those four illegally annexed regions, but that they would actually be interested in additional regions as well. Subsequently, Lavrov clarified that they would be interested in Kharkiv region, Dnipropetrovsk region, Odesa region and thus also Mykolaiv and Kherson, and this is something that is completely outside the framework. And moreover, Russians are increasing additional demands. The latest statements from February 9th and 10th and from February 14th even go further, where Russia clearly basically signals that it’s interested in such a solution that would mean de facto absolute capitulation of Ukraine. That pattern can perhaps be found in history only in connection with the approach of Nazi Germany, when actually today’s Russian rhetoric speaks about wanting a pro-Russian and friendly Ukraine, de facto some Russian protectorate, where Russians would decide what will be in that truncated remainder of Ukraine. And these are likewise problems and likewise insurmountable contradictions in that vision of future possible arrangements. These, in my opinion, will lead to the fact that although they will negotiate about some minor details and those peripheral matters of peace agreements, it will get stuck precisely on these hard demands. And the change in the very head of the delegation by Medinsky coming again indicates this hawkish position of Russia, which will probably predetermine the results of these negotiations as well.

Russian play

So what does this mean, that Russia is playing for time, that it’s delaying?

Unambiguously, Russia still feels in the position that it still has trump cards in its hands. It’s raising its stakes and actually any concession or attempt at an accommodating step, whether from Ukraine or the United States as a sponsor of these negotiations and simultaneously a supporter of Ukraine, it interprets as disunity and weakness and thereby raises its stakes and systematically attacks Ukraine. It tries to use maximum economic, military and psychological pressure. After all, winter is still peaking in Ukraine and massive energy attacks on energy facilities have an effect. Zelensky confirmed over the weekend during the Munich Security Conference that practically every single power plant in Ukraine is affected in some way and damaged. Russians continue in this and will continue on the front as well. Even though we see there that Ukrainians have some partial tactical successes on the border of Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions, Russians still have the feeling that by this postponement of a possible solution to that conflict they can gain more and that militarily, even if very slowly and at the cost of high casualties they are advancing, so currently Russians will still push to gain as much as possible from a possible agreement. Moreover, rejecting security guarantees gives the possibility to repeat such aggression in the near future and try to bring it to the end. That means, all this is the result of Russian ambitions that perhaps exceed their real possibilities and capabilities, but so far they see that it allows maintaining a certain disunity in support of Ukraine. We see that Europe doesn’t have sufficient capacity – it’s hesitant – and the United States also changes actually those its approaches to supporting Ukraine and to pressure on Russia all the time. Russia senses some chance in this, that by such stretching and partial concessions and then again raising stakes, it can actually stretch time and undermine that unity or that position of Ukraine and its allies and supporters.

End of war in June 2026?

Washington wants to end the war by June according to Volodymyr Zelensky. We’ve heard similar deadlines in various statements, as you’ve already indicated, but without results. Can the American administration succeed this time and also, above all, how? Because Zelensky talked about Americans wanting to exert pressure on both Ukrainian and Russian sides. So what could this be about? What kind of pressure has the White House not yet resorted to?

Here we need to start perhaps from the end, that this deadline is given by the internal politics of the United States, because they have midterm elections or those partial elections to the American Congress. And so far it looks like the support for the Republican Party is quite small and that therefore the Donald Trump administration could lose the majority not only in the Senate, but even in the lower chamber, that means in the House of Representatives. Thereby that possibility of such sovereign rule of the current administration would be significantly limited. Congress could start blocking many steps of President Trump. That means, if he talks about this deadline, it’s not at all some effort to end the conflict at any cost in favor of Ukrainians or Russians. Simply, Donald Trump wants to present some result. As for those possibilities of pressure and tools, well, we’ve already seen the entire spectrum. First, after the American administration took office, he tried it on Ukraine in that famous discussion in the Oval Office, which was even before the actual negotiation and de facto ended the negotiation. Trump pressured Ukraine and said it has no cards, he wanted to achieve a quick result, it didn’t work. Then we saw a series of various concessions, pressures, ultimatums. We saw that in Alaska Trump thought he had achieved some agreement with Russia, but de facto he only gave Putin legitimacy and gave him a podium and red carpet. He abused that. Then came harsh or demands for harsh oil sanctions. Finally, a law is passed in the American Congress. We see that the United States started seizing tankers of that shadow fleet. That means, this is probably the path by which if the United States wanted, they could pressure Russia. But honestly, I think that if such a settlement comes or at least a cessation of fighting by June, it won’t be exclusively the result of American pressure, but rather it will be a combination of several factors, where also that American pressure, but also continuing sanctions and worsening conditions for the Russian economy and for oil export could lead to such a situation that Russia would get to a point where it would already see that it has no possibility to gain more and with a certain degree of frustration would agree to some negotiations. It’s less than 50 percent probability that such a thing will happen. Of course, some sudden break, reversal, something like a collapse on one side or the other can also come, because we really don’t know in depth even that Russia, which still pretends to have the upper hand and wants to gain more, how it really is. Those strongman speeches and this raising of stakes can also be a negotiating tactic that’s supposed to cover up that Russia is not doing as well as it tries to present outwardly.

Iran nuclear program

Let’s go to those second negotiations in Geneva. The second round of indirect nuclear talks between Iran and the USA will also begin. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in this regard announced to Donald Trump that a potential nuclear agreement must include stopping the uranium enrichment process by Iran and also dismantling the entire Iranian nuclear infrastructure. Is this something that Tehran will agree to, in your opinion?

Hard to say, but probably not. We see that the previous nuclear agreement, from which the United States withdrew, had some gaps even in the vision of Donald Trump and his administration. Currently it’s such that Donald Trump is pushing that vision of absolute prohibition of any uranium enrichment. This is something that will be rejected, because Iran will object that it’s prepared to give up the military program, but that it cannot give up that civilian program, which is vitally important for its energy system. Iran faces many problems. It has oil, which is under embargo and practically only China buys it, but on the other hand it has huge problems with water resources, it has large economic problems. We saw a massive wave of unrest that was originally caused rather by economic problems and subsequently came even that political frustration. Iran is currently conducting military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz and indicates that in case of escalation it could put up armed resistance or try to expand or provoke conflict in the wider Persian Gulf region. This would of course complicate global trade in oil products and liquefied gas. So these negotiations will involve complex bargaining. Currently, however, it doesn’t look like the negotiation should reach some quick agreement. It will probably get stuck precisely on the fact that Iran won’t be willing to agree to such ultimatum demands that would completely deprive it of any control over its nuclear program, including that energy nuclear program. The United States will increase that pressure, because Trump also cannot actually accept just some partial agreement. Moreover, in the US Congress in connection with the previous agreement, a law is also passed. And thereby such a nuclear agreement would have to be submitted by Trump to Congress for approval and there are also various opinions and rather opinions on a hard policy toward Iran prevail, regarding control of its nuclear facilities.

Retired Lieutenant General Pavel Macko was speaking. Thank you very much for your time and for your commentary and I wish you a peaceful night if possible.

Thank you for the invitation and likewise a pleasant evening.

The post Two important negotiations in Geneva appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Note: This article is based on english trascription of the original podcast by .tyzden in slovak language. You can listen to it in a form fo podcast here:

Security radar of General Pavel Macko – 151st edition – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

Moderator: Welcome, Pavel.

General Pavel Macko: Thank you very much, warm greetings to the listeners. We also have the Munich Security Conference in the headlines, unfortunately I’m not there this year, but we’ll bring its conclusions on the pages of Týždeň magazine and evaluate it next time.

Fog of War

Moderator (Eugen Korda): As always, what is the security situation in Ukraine?

General Pavel Macko: Very bad. We see the continuation of that tragedy, as we announced – intense fighting is ongoing, intense bombardment. The Russians are trying to keep the Ukrainians in winter and darkness. We see that infrastructure in Kyiv is seriously damaged, but this is happening across the entire country. When I evaluate it overall, the front has hardly moved. The fighting was extremely intense, especially in Donbas. The Russians carried out the largest drone attack last weekend and then we saw yesterday again a large drone and missile attack. They are concentrating on destroying Ukrainian infrastructure. Ukraine also struck energy facilities in Belgorod and Ukrainian command is dealing with air defense problems. Russia is trying to gain and improve its tactical position before the spring season. We see the same from Ukraine’s side.

Moderator: And what’s happening on the front?

General Pavel Macko: When I take it, let’s do a quick overview. In the east, the biggest fighting concerns Bakhmut, Chasiv Yar, Kramatorsk – there the Russians continued pressure west of Bakhmut. Near Chasiv Yar, they are trying to push toward Slovyansk. The most intense fighting was near Klishchiivka, Ivanivske and Kalynivka. When we look at Kharkiv region, the Russians slightly advanced in this Kharkiv region.

Going back to this Donbas, there was also intense fighting on the Avdiivka, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove direction – on this section. There the Russians tried to expand control southwest of Avdiivka. Ukrainian command states that the attacks are massive but ineffective. The reality is that we really haven’t seen any major movement of that line.

If we look further south, there is also intense fighting. We saw such tactical counterattacks by Ukrainians, especially after Starlink went down, so the Russians lost contact. It’s not something significant, it’s more about equalizing positions and showing the reality on the battlefield, because the Russians were using tactics where they infiltrated, settled somewhere and then it looked like they controlled the area. Now this actually allowed them to say that they really no longer control it.

There’s a nice tidbit for listeners – when they lost those Starlink connections, the Russians tried to find Ukrainians who would give them access codes. It’s like with us – these are our satellites, they blackmailed them. But they didn’t know this was tapped, that actually a Ukrainian division created fake accounts and a call and lured about 2,500 Russian accounts, from which they discovered their location and coordinates. And this is probably also visible in that tactical success.

Moderator: Overall picture?

General Pavel Macko: The overall picture, as I already indicated, is not moving in any fundamental way. The situation is stable, but the number of clashes is enormous. Of course, these are smaller units, but the number of clashes is enormous. When I evaluate it overall, the Russians are still slowly advancing. Over the past month they had about 150 to 300 square kilometers of territorial gains, but nothing suggests that one side or the other would have any major fundamental breakthrough.

Moderator: How do you assess Russian missile and drone attacks deep into Ukraine?

General Pavel Macko: It’s an outrage, it continues and here it must be said that whether in the attack of February 7th or now in the latest one – the Russians combine, they learned this over those four years. They combine hypersonic missiles, cruise missiles and drones are added to that, using the fact that they modernized those drones and today they can attack even moving targets. This means, if they have sufficient information from some collaborators on the Ukrainian side or their agents, they can attack moving targets. It’s something Ukraine must deal with. Ukrainian air defense was engaging, destroyed a large number of drones, but still the strikes were strong, cyclically plunging Ukraine into darkness, also damaging Ukrainian production, because obviously for large military production you need a lot of energy.

Moderator: Good, and what about the Ukrainians?

General Pavel Macko: So the Ukrainians also attacked. They attacked Belgorod and Bryansk, there they also attacked those energy facilities. We witnessed an attack with five Flamingos, those are their large missiles. It looks like they’re good. Russia claimed it shot down all five, but despite that we saw secondary explosions in the area. This was attacking a facility of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate, or glavnoe raketno-artilleriyskoe upravlenie (GRAU). These are also large warehouses. It’s in Volgograd region about 350 kilometers, 320 kilometers from the battle line and state border in Russian depth. Overall, Ukrainian strikes are aimed mainly at energy, logistics and ammunition depots. Their goal is to weaken the Russian rear before the spring combat season, similar to what the Russians are trying to do.

Moderator: But I read that Zelensky quite criticized that defense.

General Pavel Macko: Yes, because obviously Ukrainian air defense hasn’t undergone any fundamental changes since 2022. It was successful, but it’s being exhausted. Now I read that Germans will provide 35 Patriot missiles. So for yesterday’s attack they would need about 80. And on top of that they would need to operate against drones. So it’s clear there’s a disproportion. This confirms that, if we look at it in a broader context, the West hesitated for a long time and actually blocked Ukraine and didn’t want to supply them with those longer-range weapons, when that was the only thing that could be done. Not catching every missile, every drone, but destroying those sources from where they come.

But of course, air defense also needs to be improved and there were failures, mainly in those multiple regions. Zelensky criticized this leadership and ordered immediate changes. In some regions, air defense is being rebuilt practically from scratch. We’re talking about those small observer teams, those small strike units up to that large air defense – they had to be restructured, the layers are changing, tactics and command methods are to be changed. And at the same time Zelensky ordered to accelerate drone and weapons supply, supplement personnel and made some personnel changes toward those regional leaders, because this also belongs to territorial defense. And mainly there, where reaction to attacks failed – basically it’s the largest reorganization of Ukrainian air defense since 2022.

However, we won’t analyze this in detail, nor are the information available, because obviously even the Ukrainians won’t reveal everything to open media and won’t give Russians instructions on how to overcome it again.

Moderator: And Zelensky sent a message to the world that for me was almost incredible, that there could be elections and a referendum there.

General Pavel Macko: I take it as part of negotiating tactics. The United States is brutally pressuring Zelensky, they jumped on that Russian propaganda and question Zelensky’s legitimacy. Not all of them, but there are those American hawks, mainly from that MAGA movement. So Zelensky made a clear tactical move, where he said fine, so potentially there could be elections in April, and a referendum on peace agreement and territorial changes, which would create conditions for concluding that peace. And of course the next day came the correction after this caused a wave of displeasure in Ukraine, where he said clearly – provided we reach a ceasefire, because it’s clear that under those bombs and missiles you see day and night, we won’t and cannot hold elections. But we have good will, we’re ready for it. But it’s in the hands of the Ukrainian people to decide, but when you shoot at them and drop bombs, they can’t decide about anything.

Moderator: Gaza and Israel, are there any changes?

General Pavel Macko: Not any major ones. I must say that over the past week tension continued directly in Gaza, it’s still a fragile ceasefire, regularly disrupted by Hamas activities and then retaliatory Israeli strikes and raids. In that past week, no major ground operations were reported, but those air and drone strikes against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) infrastructure continued. This is actually a continuation of those tensions that are there. Simply put, Hamas is still quite strong.

Moderator: Good, what about the rest of Israel? West Bank? By the way, Jews no longer want to call the West Bank the West Bank, but I think Samaria, according to the historical name.

General Pavel Macko: Yes, it’s historical. After all, those who go to church sometimes hear in those biblical texts some references to this territory. But there’s that trend, it’s also subject to criticism. So first, operation Iron Wall continues there, which are actually raids and elimination of those various terrorist cells and groups. But second, there is quite – and this is due to the composition of Netanyahu’s government, where there are also representatives of those more radical streams in Israeli society – and actually expansion of settlements is taking place there. This of course meets with displeasure of that Palestinian population. They are also targets of criticism from outside, even the United States said they should restrain this activity.

Of course, we don’t know now to what extent the real situation is such that it looks like they’re preparing new annexation of the West Bank, because this is what mainly Arab sources suggest, and what is only consolidation of that situation and an attempt to ensure security and at the same time moderate even those most radical voices in Israel.

I also looked at how Israeli media see this. A broader spectrum starting with Haaretz ending with Jerusalem Post and there the summary is that they report on Gaza as precise strikes by Israeli security forces. The topic of hostages still dominates and those echoes on the West Bank. There’s emphasis on Israeli security forces‘ raids and political tension. Internal political crisis is still being communicated and if we look at southern Lebanon, there’s such dry technocratic stating that there’s occasional exchange of fire, but it’s controlled escalation.

Moderator: And how did the creation of technocratic administration in Gaza progress?

General Pavel Macko: Laconically, if I had to say it, I would say that the technocratic government for Gaza exists only on paper, in the field there’s really a vacuum. And now actually – there exists that international plan. We mentioned it here, including that former minister who is supposed to be the head there, he’s ready, but Hamas doesn’t want to disarm. Based on that, Israel then blocks actually this activity and the result is that it’s all on paper. But really nothing fundamental is succeeding. This means we’re still in that position where it’s a good plan, super plan that looks like something worthy of Nobel Prize, but really it can’t be set in motion.

The United States is therefore already pushing a more moderate model, talking about something like demilitarization under supervision, but Israel considers this too soft. Hamas is weakened but not defeated. It still has tunnels, has weapons, has support from part of the population. As we said last time – those who were killed are being replaced by new recruits. And real disarmament is so far only a political declaration, but we don’t see any process heading toward that.

Strategic Background

Moderator: Last week there was a meeting of NATO defense ministers. What did they agree on?

General Pavel Macko: It’s a regular meeting, so-called ministerial. Two weeks ago there was a ministerial of foreign ministers, now defense ministers and next will follow a summit on July 7th and 8th, if I remember correctly, in Ankara. This is such a regular cycle, these ministerials happen at least twice a year and always one is such big, working one, one is more social also with those social activities and team building. In this case it was a working meeting.

At such a ministerial, the agenda for the upcoming summit is also communicated. This means, that level of foreign ministry gives such political guidance, those big political agreements and at such defense ministerial it’s already transformed or translated into the language of numbers, into the language of concrete measures. So at this summit there were several main points.

Monitoring or reporting of progress in fulfilling the two percent GDP for defense commitment was done. Then they talked about building those capabilities, so-called national goals, which are determined within those puzzle pieces or that mosaic that NATO must assemble to be able to defend itself. These are those goals we also have – mechanized brigade and similar. So this was discussed. They talked about strengthening deterrence and defense. They also talked about international projects and some agreements were signed between groups of these members. For example, on joint procurement and technology development, including deep precision strikes, those are mainly long-range missile fires, ballistic protection, protection of underwater infrastructure, so-called Task Force Baltic. And the NATO-Ukraine council also convened. A separate meeting took place with Ukraine’s defense minister.

If we look at it, there was agreement on some issues. Potential disagreement is maybe more in the area of pace of increasing weapons production. Some allies object that we still focus on increasing that GDP percentage, but the increase is not followed by sufficient production, meaning production needs to be accelerated. Rutte openly said that NATO needs more production, faster and in larger quantities. There are also differences in the pace of fulfilling two percent, some countries are already significantly ahead, but for example Germany announced that while it won’t reach those percentages, but actually compared to previous years it’s already going to double its defense budget. This means that real, physical increase is one hundred percent.

Moderator: I heard about operation Arctic Sentry, which translates as Arctic Guard. What is this supposed to be and has it been approved somehow?

General Pavel Macko: It hasn’t been approved yet. I’ll remind listeners that after there were those incidents in the Baltic Sea and cables were cut, so we have Baltic Sentry or Baltic Guard or Baltic Watch, maybe I would translate it that way. The same happened then after those attacks or incursions into Polish and Estonian airspace, where so-called Eastern Sentry was created, that’s increased air space patrolling, air space monitoring on the eastern flank. And now Arctic Watch is being considered.

It relates to the discussion about Greenland, relates to the discussion about increased movement and influence of Russians and China in this space, relates to how northern sea routes are gradually opening up. This means that allies, to satisfy Trump, to also ensure their security, are considering operation Arctic Watch. So far it’s in that position where there were such two exercises – Cold Response and another name that escapes me now, which are to be consolidated. And now it’s being considered in various forms how those increased operations would actually be carried out.

Basically it’s about monitoring the entire Arctic space, more detailed monitoring of that strait or that open maritime space that connects actually the Arctic space, where Russians are very strong and built massive infrastructure in recent decades, where China is also starting to assert itself, occupying or creating its Arctic fleet, even though it’s not directly an Arctic country. And this is actually the space between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom. Otherwise this was space that was always monitored. During World War II it was key space for supporting Europe.

In case of any larger conflict, it’s space that is absolutely critical for the alliance, so that Americans and Canadians can approach Europe. It’s space where when patrolling increases, it will be possible to monitor more, and this happened during the Cold War too, e.g. Russian nuclear submarines sailing from Kola Peninsula, where Russians have their main base.

I’ll say it’s not yet an approved operation, but planning instructions have been issued at the level of Supreme Allied Commander, SACEUR, or SHAPE, that allied command in Mons. And at the same time it’s said that there should be countries there, that those forces would be diverse, there would be naval groups – United Kingdom, United States, Norway, Canada, air capabilities, ground units, mainly from Finland and Norway, and intelligence assets.

Moderator: I heard that Americans released some command positions in NATO to Europeans. What’s happening? Are they leaving, or how should I explain this?

General Pavel Macko: Those are two things, several people asked me about this, and it needs to be explained. Those are two things. The first one is such superficial, that the United States actually said they’re handing over command of JFC in Norfolk, Joint Force Command Norfolk, that they’ll hand it over to a European general and also command in Naples, where traditionally since NATO’s creation and since that command’s creation the United States commanded. And as if they’re withdrawing. On the other hand, we see that the United States still retains command of that SHAPE, that Supreme Commander in Europe – SACEUR and has control over that Mons (SHAPE). And conversely, they take over command for transformation – ACT in Norfolk, which also sits in the same region. And at the same time Europeans would take over those other commands.

Here I’ll say just one thing – no need to worry, because these are multinational integrated commands. Only the flag of the officer from the country that commands that command changes, but these commanders are under international jurisdiction. And when I was in those structures, when I was commander in Bydgoszcz, I answered directly to superior commander in Norfolk, that ACT. And I reported to NATO Military Committee, meaning all our activities were always directed by North Atlantic Council. It doesn’t fall under national rules.

Moderator: And you weren’t accounting three times?

General Pavel Macko: I didn’t account three times. And the truth was that the only thing countries have in this is that salaries and personnel orders are issued nationally, all other activities are performed under international jurisdiction. But the second thing is, and this is true, NATO announced basically the largest reform of command structure of the North Atlantic Alliance, meaning those commands themselves, since 2011.

I’ll just remind listeners that there were three such changes. The biggest was in 2004, when I was starting in Heidelberg, where there was significant reduction of commands down to one third. Those were peace dividends. In 2011 this was somewhat corrected and there was further relocation of these NATO commands. And now we see opposite trend. New challenges came, new security environment. Quietly in between, in 2020 a third joint forces command was created in Norfolk, because before there were two in Brunssum and Naples.

Those formerly had geographically divided north and south. Then after that reform in 2004 they were interchangeable and alternated to those commands those NATO rapid reaction forces across regions. And now, to summarize what should happen. First – there should be higher agility, meaning ability of these commands to intervene faster. The Norfolk command is being strengthened, which gets more tasks in protecting precisely that Arctic space we mentioned in connection with that Arctic Sentry. The Brunssum command also changes those flags, where it will have more geographical responsibility for that entire northern part, basically above the Alps northward.

Moderator: And will there also be an eastern flank HQ?

General Pavel Macko: There will be, there will be. And I’ll finish that Brunssum, that it also geographically integrates Sweden and Finland. Then a new regional command east should be created, probably in Poland, command for the eastern flank. I don’t want to reveal, it’s not officially approved, where it could be. But the point is that already the commander of Multinational Corps in Szczecin, of which there are ten altogether by the way, has been saying for longer that such geographical competence should be given. Because if it’s on the eastern flank, we need quick reaction, so we can’t wait for that traditional process where forces start being assigned to commands later.

Interestingly, maybe for others, an allied command for cyber defense and hybrid threats is also being created, about which it’s also not known, which should bring NATO into the 21st century. All this serves the fact that after a period of slowing down these structures, as if slowing their reaction, now the opposite process is happening. We have regional defense plans, forces are created for them and now this should also complete the command structure. Greater weight should be on Europeans, but as we said a moment ago, it doesn’t mean Americans leaving these structures.

Moderator: Slovakia and Hungary will be visited this Sunday by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. What can be expected from this visit?

General Pavel Macko: Rubio is coming to Bratislava according to me not only because of nuclear energy and NATO, but also to have Washington verify where Slovakia belongs. Whether it’s closer to Warsaw or to Budapest.

Moderator: And what will he find out?

General Pavel Macko: Well, I’ll comment on that next week. But when I look at that official program that was there, when I look at that broader security, energy and political context, several things emerge for me. Rubio is now at the Security Conference in Munich and then immediately, if it ends 15th-16th he goes to Bratislava and Budapest. I think the primary goal of this trip is supporting Viktor Orbán. Despite Rubio being perceived as more moderate, he is a faithful cheerleader of President Trump. We saw this in that joint US Congress session, that with Vance and Hegseth these are big cheerleaders and unconditional supporters of President Trump. He is very loyal to Trump as well, but is more digestible for European partners.

So primarily it’s really to give support in Hungary before elections to Orbán. This will also be communicated by Fidesz and Viktor Orbán as great American support for his policy. It’s also a signal toward Central European allies and allied populists. And we actually now find ourselves having to decide where we’ll be more. Whether with that Viktor, or with Poland, which is becoming a significant player.

And when we talked about that command structure, for example one change in Brunssum is that long-term there was British-German command, that Germans always commanded and British were deputy. Then it was German-Italian, where commanders alternated like this and now it’s newest – and Poles already officially announced this – it will be Polish-German command. Thus we see how Poland’s reach is growing. Because in between, that responsibility of that Brunssum also significantly increased. It’s actually responsibility for half the Alliance, operational command. And a significant four-star Polish general will be stationed there as commander.

When I quickly look at Slovakia, security and NATO will probably also be a topic. There will be discussion about harmonizing those security interests. There will definitely be pressure for a clearer line from Slovakia in NATO and toward Ukraine. And confirmation whether we’re a reliable ally, Rubio will definitely ask about our NATO commitments. Short-term we’ll tell him everything is fine and long-term he won’t be able to check. And of course they’ll continue that communication and cooperation in nuclear energy.

360 Degrees

Moderator: How does tension between USA and Iran continue? This morning I caught news that the largest American aircraft carrier is heading to the Persian Gulf.

General Pavel Macko: The crisis between USA and Iran is deepening. Those negotiations and communication exchanges failed and thus Donald Trump as president tightened sanctions and rhetoric and talks about something very hard. The United States are thus considering and now it already looks like they decided to deploy another carrier strike group, because it’s not just an aircraft carrier. Those are cruisers, those are other platforms, submarines, mine sweepers. It’s always such purpose-built strike group. It’s not just protective wall around that aircraft carrier, but it’s also additional strike force. So they’re apparently setting this in motion.

Iran meanwhile brutally suppresses its protests. Both sides are in stalemate where the biggest risk is excessive escalation. The United States are escalating pressure but don’t want a big war. Because this is still not preferred in that Trump strategy – he would most like to have that big hammer, like in that movie with Thor, that I bang there, it shakes and everyone lines up. But President Trump definitely doesn’t want to go into any ground operations. We see those risks and tensions for those their forces that are in the region.

Moderator: And what are those risks?

General Pavel Macko: Well, an incident in Persian Gulf could be such trigger, whether attack on tanker, drone attack. It could close actually that Strait of Hormuz. And we know that large amount of hydrocarbons goes from there, that surroundings and Europe depend on it… It’s like when you have cardiovascular system, you have important artery, you squeeze it and you have problem. And it doesn’t have to be just that carotid or directly pulmonary, but it can be also somewhere, for example that femoral. It always makes big imbalance or disrupts that organism. This means this would be very dangerous.

An attack on American forces in Iraq or Syria could also happen, which are not invulnerable and Iran has these capabilities. Or Iran could proceed to that escalation in the region. Or that high concentration of forces could occur and unintentional escalation could happen. So we’ll watch this carefully. Trump bet on increasing economic and military pressure. Iran on the other hand shows hard line outwardly, but mainly does repressions at home. But those diplomatic channels are weak.

Closing Quote

General Pavel Macko: So last time we talked about negotiations and now we see also security conference, allied negotiations, we see Marco Rubio’s visit. So if you allow, I’ll give another quote also about negotiations.

„European negotiations are like making love to elephants. Everything happens at high level, a lot of dust is stirred up and it takes very long before anything comes of it.“

Said Willy Brandt, German politician and German chancellor from 1969 to 1974.

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Marco Rubio represents the highest-ranking American representative at this year’s conference. His speech was intended to serve as a tone correction after last year’s chaotic performance by J.D. Vance. Rubio finds himself in a challenging position where he must appease Europe while simultaneously maintaining the hard line of Donald Trump’s administration.

What did he say?

The civilized tone compared to Vance represented the first key element of his appearance. Recent disputes with allies, the fiasco of aggressive policy toward Greenland, criticism for dismantling the international system and demolishing transatlantic relations, together with the shocking report published by MSC about the demolition of the international system by the US administration, literally demanded a significant correction of approach.

Rubio devoted the largest part of his speech to returning to shared history and emphasizing the common civilizational path and shared values. In this way, he tried to refute partners‘ feeling that the USA is destroying rules and burning bridges behind them. He paraphrased it with the words: „The USA may dominate the western hemisphere, but we are still children of Europe.“

The second significant element was the rejection of the narrative that the USA is destroying international order. According to Rubio’s argumentation, the rules-based world system, free movement of people, liberalism, and climate agenda were incorrectly set up, are now broken, and our enemies have exploited them for their growth. They used them unfairly while we deindustrialized. According to him, the USA is not destroying the system but wants to build a new system that corresponds to the new geopolitical reality. Europe should join this process. He paraphrased it as: „We must build our own Western raw material supply chain independent from other centers of power.“

The third point was justification of steps toward Iran and Venezuela as necessary. The USA had to act because the world is failing. The UN and world community did not prevent the tragedy in Gaza or Ukraine, they didn’t even stop attempts to acquire nuclear weapons by the ayatollahs. Other powers outside the West are abusing the poorly set international system. The global world order needs to be redefined anew and fairly – competition of powers is reality and has replaced the system based on „poorly set“ rules.

The fourth element was emphasis on Christian heritage, character of civilization, and conservative values as defense of the ideology of the current American administration. According to Rubio, the USA is not a disruptor but a consistent defender of these fundamental values.

The fifth point concerned the complete failure of the UN, due to which the USA must act and invites partners to do so. It is necessary to reevaluate international formats and alliances. The USA wants a strong alliance with European allies, but not at any cost. It is desirable for Europe to be strong and thus strengthen our common Western civilization alongside the USA. He paraphrased it with the words: „The purpose of our alliance is to defend citizens, our countries and our interests, the meaning of the Alliance’s existence is not protection of the welfare state.“

It should be noted that pressure on increasing defense spending and fairer distribution of the burden of common defense was not so strong and straightforward, but rather implied.

The sixth point was assurance of US commitment to NATO, but with conditions. Europe must add more effort. The goal of the USA is not the end of the Transatlantic era. Europe must have means to be able to defend itself.

Conclusions and assessment

Regarding conclusions and assessment, the performance was good to listen to, but reality is far harsher. Messages about alliance with Europe were strong and clearly articulated. However, unpredictable steps by President Trump and his administration, absence of any transparent discussion with partners, and even threats of using military force against an ally relativize this and return us to harsh reality.

About Marco Rubio’s real priorities, which are in conflict with his speech, the cancellation of participation in the meeting with Zelensky and his allies testifies. Diplomatic talk about a packed schedule is a poor excuse. What had higher priority than this meeting with allies and Zelensky?

Europe must stand on its own feet. This will not spoil anything, it will be a better and more balanced partner to the USA. If American real politics would tear to pieces soaring speeches like Rubio’s, at least we won’t be left empty-handed.

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In the first decade of the third millennium, the American drone RQ-170 Sentinel allegedly flew deep into Chinese airspace on a secret surveillance mission. What’s shocking is that it returned unnoticed. This stealth drone, nicknamed the Beast of Kandahar, was designed to avoid radars. It gathered intelligence information including about nuclear facilities. The mission was classified for years and no one officially confirmed it. It showed how invisible drones can be – even to a superpower.

Rarely do you have the luck in life to not only observe but also be part of a great change. Drones were known in armies for a relatively long time. A narrow group of intelligence and reconnaissance specialists or experts in fire destruction worked with them. When I took office as chief of operations staff of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2007, such a change occurred.

We began to use drones more intensively not only for reconnaissance, but also directly for conducting combat from the air. The complex mountainous terrain of vast Afghanistan directly demanded such innovations. We began to use the already known MQ-1 Predator more massively. The drone was already modified – capable of carrying two Hellfire missiles or other ammunition. Suddenly we had a multifunctional tool at our disposal. While one drone maintained situational overview over the battlefield, with the second we could execute a quiet and effective air strike. We could immediately evaluate live the effectiveness of the executed strike – so-called battle damage assessment.

Such missions are classified to this day. But much has changed. During the mission in Afghanistan, I began exceptionally allowing the display of live footage from drones monitoring ongoing operations on one of the large screens at the operations center. Some soldiers were scandalized. They were bothered by the live display of combat. Today on social networks and the internet you can find plenty of footage from drones or FPV drone strikes from Ukraine.

In autumn 2007 we received significant reinforcement – the MQ-9 Reaper drone. It was larger than the Predator, lasted longer in the air and could carry more than ten times the combat payload. It could monitor the situation on the ground for entire hours from great height, transmit data to intelligence officers and then strike massively.

In civilian life few people suspected it, but soldiers from ISAF command knew about the use of Predators and Reapers. Besides that, another story was also unfolding out of sight of most ISAF members. At the end of 2007, grainy photographs began spreading on the internet showing a mysterious aircraft with bat wings parked at Kandahar airport in Afghanistan. Aviation enthusiasts were confused. The US Air Force remained silent. Only in December 2009 did it officially acknowledge the existence of the RQ-170 Sentinel, a stealth reconnaissance drone developed by Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works division.

One of its most dramatic roles? The RQ-170 allegedly flew over Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistani Abbottabad during Operation Neptune’s Spear in 2011. It transmitted live video to American commanders and to the White House. It provided oversight over how Navy SEALs executed the raid in which the world’s most wanted terrorist died.

The mystique around the drone deepened later that same year. Iran claimed it captured the RQ-170 intact. According to the Iranians, the drone was flying 140 miles inside their airspace. It was probably monitoring nuclear facilities. They claimed they hacked into its control systems and forced it to land. The US rejected this claim, but footage of a seemingly undamaged drone appeared on Iranian state television.

Pentagon Shaken by $26 Hack

At the end of 2008, American soldiers in Iraq arrested a Shiite militant. In his laptop they discovered something unexpected – hours of live video recordings from American Predator drones. The footage was captured using SkyGrabber software for $26. It was developed by a Russian company for downloading satellite television and media streams. One teenager came up with this trick.

The insurgents didn’t hack into the drone’s control systems. They simply intercepted unencrypted video channels. Information from these channels was transmitted from drones to ground stations and command centers. Because they weren’t encrypted, anyone with the right satellite antenna and software could tune into them.

The breach was first reported by The Wall Street Journal in December 2009 and later confirmed by CNN and other media. It turned out that the military had known about the vulnerability since the 1990s, already during operations in Bosnia. Encryption had been removed from many channels at that time to prevent latency problems with real-time monitoring.

The Pentagon reacted quickly after the hack information was published. Encryption protocols on UAV platforms were updated. The military began modernizing the ROVER system – Remote Operated Video Enhanced Receiver, which was used to share footage from drones with soldiers on the ground. Officials acknowledged that solving the problem was not trivial, because almost every drone in the fleet used similar connection for downloading information.

Although no missions were compromised, the incident was a wake-up call. It showed how low-tech solutions can exploit high-tech systems and how even the most advanced military tools can be vulnerable to digital espionage. This story shows that drone development is not just about engineering, but also about playing cat and mouse in cybersecurity and electronic warfare.

Aerial Torpedoes

According to Cambridge Dictionary, a drone is an aircraft or small flying device that has no pilot but is remotely controlled by someone on the ground. It is used for monitoring, filming or dropping payload. Key characteristics include the absence of an onboard pilot. It can have various propulsion systems such as battery, combustion engine and similar.

A drone is often part of unmanned aerial systems – UAS or Unmanned Aerial System, which include the drone itself, ground control station and communication equipment. Today the designation drone is no longer tied only to flying devices, but also to remotely controlled ground, surface and underwater devices.

Most people associate drones with the advent of digital technologies that enabled more precise remote control as well as live image transmission. But the history of drones begins much earlier, already during World War I.

The stalemate in trench warfare forced armies to look for innovative ways to attack enemy positions without risking pilots‘ lives. One idea was to develop aerial torpedoes – essentially flying bombs that could autonomously deliver explosives across enemy lines. These early concepts were predecessors of glide bombs, guided missiles and modern UAVs.

Several key initial projects got underway. One of the first was Britain’s Aerial Target project from 1917. It was a radio-controlled aircraft designed by A. M. Low, intended for intercepting German airships. Although the machine never entered combat, it represented pioneering effort in remote-controlled aviation. Low is often called the father of radio guidance systems.

Americans came up with the Kettering Bug in 1918. It was developed by Charles Kettering and the US Signal Corps. It was a small biplane powered by a four-cylinder engine. It used gyroscopes and a mechanical timer for flight guidance and payload dropping. It had a range of up to 120 kilometers and was supposed to be a disposable flying bomb.

At that time, digital technologies or devices for image capture and transmission were not available. Using such flying devices to destroy targets meant great technological challenges. Navigation was the biggest one. It was based on gyroscopes, barometers and mechanical counters. Remote control was in its infancy and reliability was low. Most prototypes were experimental and were never deployed in combat operations.

They left behind a legacy that paid off later. These initial efforts laid the foundation for future development of guided missiles, kamikaze drones and eventually reconnaissance UAVs. They proved the feasibility of pilotless flight, even though technology was not sufficiently advanced at that time for wide use. The idea of a pilotless aircraft for dangerous missions was revolutionary in World War I and remains central to UAV philosophy today.

Military strategy also began to change. These first attempts proved that risk-free reconnaissance and attacks were possible, which influenced the development of unmanned aircraft during the Cold War and modern doctrines such as persistent surveillance and targeted strikes. Every military conflict brings a revolutionary leap to the evolution of technologies. During World War II and the Cold War, these ideas matured into combat drones, spy aircraft and eventually combat UAVs like the Predator and Reaper.

Today’s UAVs use artificial intelligence, GPS and real-time data connections. But the main mission – performing tasks too risky or tedious for humans – remains unchanged. The connection between the Kettering Bug and the Tomahawk cruise missile is direct. Both are unmanned long-range weapons, precisely guided.

Secret Cold War Missions

After the end of World War II, the Cold War began between East and West. The competition moved from land, seas and air also to space. It continued intensively also in the field of unmanned vehicle development. The competing sides suspected each other and wanted to know what secrets the other side was hiding. Espionage and deep reconnaissance over enemy territory became a strategic task. The Ryan Firebee and Lockheed D-21 were two of the most important early American drones. Each represented a different philosophy of unmanned aircraft development during the Cold War.

The Ryan Firebee became a versatile workhorse. The first flight took place in 1952, a year later it was introduced into service. It was a response to the US Air Force’s request to develop a jet-powered target. Originally it was thus a target drone for fighter pilot training and testing missile anti-aircraft systems. Later it was modified into reconnaissance variants – the Model 147 series – during the Vietnam War and Cold War. It was used for electronic warfare, surveillance and even decoy missions.

It was equipped with jet propulsion, capable of reaching speeds close to Mach 0.96 and altitude over 18,000 meters. It could be launched from aircraft like the B-26 Invader, or from the ground with RATO – Rocket-Assisted Take-Off boosters. The RATO booster provided short-term but powerful thrust that allowed the drone to quickly leave the launch ramp. After fuel exhaustion, the RATO booster detached and the drone continued flight using its own turbojet engine. It was controlled by radio connection and equipped with parachutes.

Modified Firebees flew over China and North Vietnam and collected intelligence without risking pilots‘ lives. Some were destroyed by enemy defenses, but many missions were successful and helped shape UAV doctrine.

After the shooting down of the American U-2 spy plane over the USSR came the Lockheed D-21 spy drone. Its development began in 1962, the first flight took place in 1964. It was in active military service only briefly, from 1969 to 1971. It was intended for deep reconnaissance over enemy territory, mainly China and the USSR. It could fly at Mach 3.3 speed at altitude of approximately 27,400 meters.

It had a high-resolution camera and inertial navigation system. The drone was launched from M-21 Blackbird aircraft and later from B-52 bombers. After completing the reconnaissance mission, the machine could drop a film capsule and then proceed to self-destruct so enemies couldn’t capture it. Its use was accompanied by problems. One M-21 launch aircraft crashed during drone startup, killing a crew member. Operational missions over China were unsuccessful, leading to program cancellation in 1971.

During the Cold War, the US and Western countries developed and used several other types of unmanned aircraft, such as the Ryan Model 147 Lightning Bug, Lockheed Q-Star, and at the end of the Cold War, the Teledyne Ryan RQ-2 Pioneer.

The Ryan Model 147 was a reconnaissance drone derived from the Firebee. They used it for flights over North Vietnam, China and North Korea. It was equipped with cameras and radar sensors. Interestingly, it was launched from a DC-130 aircraft and after the mission recovered in the air using a C-130 with a hook.

The Lockheed Q-Star or Compass Cope was an experimental UAV for long-term reconnaissance. They developed it in the 1970s as an autonomous reconnaissance system with the ability to return to the launch site. The Teledyne Ryan RQ-2 Pioneer served for tactical reconnaissance. It was used by the US Navy and Marine Corps during Operation Desert Storm. It was one of the first UAVs used in combat conditions.

Soviets Respond

Countermeasures to American development also came from the Soviet bloc. After the U-2 incident in 1960, when pilot Gary Powers was shot down over Soviet airspace, the USSR realized the threat posed by high-altitude reconnaissance. The Soviets began developing unmanned systems that would match US capabilities and reduce dependence on vulnerable manned aircraft.

The key Soviet UAV was the Tupolev Tu-123 Yastreb. It was introduced in 1964 and intended for strategic reconnaissance over NATO territory. The drone was equipped with supersonic jet propulsion and had a preprogrammed flight path. It carried cameras and electronic reconnaissance equipment on board. It was a one-time mission, after which the machine dropped a film capsule and then self-destructed.

Later the Soviets introduced the Tupolev Tu-143 Reis for tactical battlefield reconnaissance. It was introduced into armament in the early 1970s. It was a subsonic machine with short range, a parachute was to serve for its rescue and recovery. It was used in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. In the former Czechoslovak Socialist Republic it was introduced under the designation VR-3 Reis. Its use was more similar to the Firebee and was used to obtain real-time battlefield information. It was introduced to Czechoslovakia in 1985 and used until 1995. Its role was photographic and television reconnaissance, radiation situation assessment, target tracking at depths of 60 to 70 kilometers.

During a 1988 incident, one of these drones fell by parachute into a kindergarten area in Prague, causing a stir. Officially it was then covered up by designating the VR-3 as meteorological apparatus. The drone was launched from a mobile launcher and could be used up to five times. One VR-3 specimen is now displayed at the Aviation Museum in Kbely and another in Lešany.

The Tu-143 drone went through several modifications and renewals. The M-143 was a target drone version introduced in the mid-1980s. The Tu-243 Reis-D was an improved version with longer range and improved engine. The Tu-300 Korshun was a further refined model with modern sensors and optional ammunition – development renewed in 2007. The Tu-143 system was deployed in Afghanistan by Soviet forces. Syria used it during the 1982 Lebanon War for reconnaissance of Israel. Ukraine during the 2022 war converted it into substitute cruise missiles or for revealing air defense.

Like the Americans, the Soviets also needed target drones for training their pilots and testing missile anti-aircraft systems. The solution was the Lavochkin La-17. They introduced it in 1950. It had a jet engine and was radio-controlled. Later the Soviets developed it into reconnaissance variants.

However, the Soviets faced several technological challenges. Their drones often relied on film cameras, which limited real-time intelligence. Navigation systems were less advanced than American ones and relied on inertial guidance. Recovery or extraction after mission was difficult, especially for dynamic missions or missions with deep penetration over enemy territory.

Soviet unmanned aircraft enabled surveillance over NATO forces and border areas. They were extensively used in Warsaw Pact exercises and some were exported to allies like Syria and Iraq. These programs laid the foundation for modern Russian UAVs including the Orlan-10 and Forpost.

Conclusion

After the end of the Cold War, few suspected what would come. With digitalization came enormous drone development and it continues to accelerate. In the next part we will look at four generations of modern drones, activities of key countries and drone diplomacy.

The post Evolution of Military Drones – Part One appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Note: The article was originally published in the journal .týždeň

The song goes round and round

Russians have always been fond of ostentation and grand strategic gestures. After all, it is the world’s largest country by area with a specific strategic culture that does not change. They have been demonstrating the same imperial policy and strategic thinking for centuries, during tsarist Russia, the Soviet empire, and in the current extremely nationalist phase of the Russian empire. Moreover, Russians are also a country of excellent chess players.

Russia has never been exactly the most advanced country, but it had enormous territory, almost bottomless reserves of raw materials, little respect for foreign nations and ethnicities, and de facto even for their own Russians. Their strategy was always built on strength, brutality and unpredictability, thanks to which they got into trouble several times with poor assessment of the opponent and their own capabilities. But they always insisted on inspiring respect.

Currently, however, two things have changed. After the initial decay after the end of the Cold War, the Russians nevertheless climbed out of the worst. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, they shrank geographically and relatively economically, and the world outgrew them. However, the rapid growth of the world and especially new economic giants like China and India, and the development of an almost united Europe, also caused enormous growth in demand for energy and raw materials, which significantly pulled the Russians up. The performance of developed economies is no longer measured by steel and coal production, but by services, digitalization and production with high added value. But Russia is figuratively returning to the era of oil and steel. Paradoxically, this was enough for economic growth – for raw materials they were able to buy almost everything after the lifting of export restrictions from the Cold War.

The second fundamental change was that NATO, while geographically expanding, was also massively disarming, and the West was collecting peace dividends. After all, who would dare attack us? The American global war on terrorism was running in the world, which was expensive and exhausting for the West, but did not force it to build and maintain potential for real war with high intensity combat operations, only stabilizing expeditionary operations.

As soon as the Russians avoided collapse and sensed that they were attractive and important again, and that the naive West thought it would control them through economic-raw material integration and increasing its dependence on Russia, they seized the opportunity. Already with Putin’s rise to power and the non-standard resolution of the crisis in Chechnya, it was clear that Russia’s course was changing. Putin clearly said where he was heading at the Munich Security Forum in 2007. Everyone pretended to listen, but no one perceived it.

The shock came in 2008. Russia invaded Georgia, literally suffered victory and withdrew. Again we did not understand, we thought it was just a summer storm, not climate change. But Russia launched a massive information offensive of global scope. Liberal rules and the rapid development of social networks and their penetration in society changed Russian doctrine and strategy.

Former censors changed the paradigm. Instead of limiting access to information, they did the exact opposite – they flooded domestic and especially foreign internet networks with information. Their own – modified, distorted, without a visible Russian watermark. They built a massive network of replicators in target countries, networks of trolls and today also armies of bots.

Credible propaganda needs something tangible. Russia therefore created the impression of an invincible army with miraculous weapons. It presented new super weapons to inspire respect – it caused doubts among experts, but convinced the broad masses and Western politicians. Annual military parades replaced the socialist five-year rhythm and built greater respect than Russia deserved. However, no one wants to test a nuclear power.

This image worked until the invasion of Ukraine. It began to stubbornly defend itself, which Russia did not expect and was not doctrinally and structurally prepared for. The West supported Ukraine, but not enough to force Russia to negotiate. So it gained time for recovery and transformation, especially with the help of undemocratic allies. Putin’s regime is fighting for survival, has nowhere to retreat, but at the same time is again demonstrating strength and threatening the future. We must correctly assess its real capabilities and intentions.

Miraculous weapons in determined hands

At least this is how the Kremlin chief’s requirement for Russia’s strategic image in the eyes of its rivals might look. To understand the extent to which this is true, we need not only good intelligence information, but also to look back a little at the last twenty years.

In the Georgian war, the Russians at first glance achieved their immediate goals, which were the defeat of Georgian forces and the establishment of control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But the performance of the Russian army in the 2008 war revealed significant shortcomings. These lessons catalyzed one of the most ambitious military reform programs in post-Soviet Russia. The main lessons and insights of the Russians from the Georgian war included the following problems.

Command and control deficiencies. Russian forces had problems with coordination between branches of the military and services, especially between ground and air units. The command structure was too centralized, which slowed decision-making and adaptation to battlefield developments.

Poor tactical implementation and logistics. Units lacked real-time intelligence and battlefield awareness, relying on outdated maps and communication. Logistical support was chaotic, supply lines were vulnerable and poorly managed.

Limited air force capability. Despite enormous superiority and technological dominance, Russia failed to establish air superiority at the beginning of the conflict. Due to poor coordination between air and ground forces, there were incidents of friendly fire. The air campaign lacked precision and effectiveness, revealing gaps in targeting and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities.

Obsolete equipment and training. Many units were equipped with outdated Soviet-era equipment and soldiers lacked modern combat training. The war revealed the inefficiency of Russian forces based on conscription, which prompted a shift toward professionalization.

Information and media management. Russian information warfare and strategic communication were underdeveloped compared to Western standards. The conflict emphasized the need for better media control and narrative shaping, which Russia later prioritized in Syria and Ukraine.

Although the Russians outwardly acted as sovereigns after the Georgian adventure, they very quickly introduced post-war changes caused by these lessons. Russia launched military reform under Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov.

They streamlined command structures and reduced the bloated officer corps by up to 60 percent. Instead of an army based on mobilization and divisions, the Russians began creating brigades of permanent readiness. Major investments went into modern equipment including UAVs, precision weapons and digital communication. They improved joint (combined arms) operations capabilities and strategic mobility.

An important step was the creation of a professional non-commissioned officer corps, which in the West is the core of leadership at the lowest levels. This addressed the lack of tactical command and improved small unit cohesion. Training was centralized, the original 65 military schools were merged into 10 main training centers. In the personnel area, there was a significant shift toward contract soldiers. Russia began reducing dependence on conscripts and focused on a force of 425,000 contract soldiers and 300,000 conscripts. Today, also due to the war in Ukraine, this ratio and the total number is significantly higher in favor of contract soldiers.

These reforms laid the foundation for Russia’s more agile and integrated operations in Crimea (2014), Syria (2015), and the initial phases of the war in Ukraine (2022) compared to the Georgian war.

Weapons programs and modernization formed a separate reform chapter. The Russians launched a state armament program 2011-2020 aimed at modernizing Russian military technology and addressing shortcomings revealed in Georgia. Key procurement priorities included air defense systems (deployment of S-400 and development of S-500 to counter NATO air superiority), new precision strike capabilities (introduction of Iskander-M tactical ballistic missiles and Kalibr cruise missiles), strategic deterrence (development of new ICBMs such as RS-24 Yars, Sarmat and hypersonic systems like Avangard and Kinzhal) and naval modernization (focus on Borei and Yasen class submarines and smaller missile ships for coastal warfare).

Another group of priorities was improving C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems). UAV programs expanded, although they still lagged behind Western capabilities. The last group was strengthening power projection and mobility. Rapid reaction forces and airborne units capable of rapid deployment were created. Emphasis was placed on strategic mobility including rail and air transport capacity.

Although these reforms improved Russia’s military performance in Crimea (2014) and Syria (2015), they also revealed persistent challenges. Corruption and procurement inefficiency slowed implementation. Mixed success was in professionalization, especially due to morale problems and personnel retention among contract soldiers. The Russians began to rely too much on elite units (for example VDV, Spetsnaz). This created a bottleneck in sustained operations, which continues to manifest today in the war in Ukraine.

Russian super weapons

On March 1, 2018, President Vladimir Putin presented six advanced weapons during his presidential address to the Federal Assembly (Duma and Federation Council), claiming they restore Russian strategic deterrence: Avangard (hypersonic glider), Kinzhal (aeroballistic hypersonic missile), Poseidon (underwater drone – nuclear-powered torpedo), Sarmat (heavy intercontinental missile with multiple warhead), Zircon (hypersonic anti-ship missile), Burevestnik (nuclear-powered cruise missile with „unlimited range“).

The propaganda goal was to signal technological superiority, strategic invulnerability and psychological deterrence to the world. The whole show was supported by a strong media strategy with animated videos, interactive displays and strong statements aimed at Western audiences and strengthening domestic pride. Even then, Western analysts perceived this presentation as a partial bluff, partly technical fetishism and part of reflexive control.

Reality differs considerably from Putin’s declarations. Avangard is supposed to overcome any missile defense thanks to speed and maneuvering. In reality, it is operationally deployed with at least two missile regiments, but still in limited numbers. So far it is mounted on older silo-launched SS-19 (UR-100 N) missiles from the 1970s, they also plan it for Sarmat missiles. Kinzhal was supposed to be unstoppable, designed for highly precise strikes. The characteristics were exaggerated and the Ukrainians were able to repeatedly shoot it down even with the relatively old Patriot system.

The first batch of Poseidons was produced in 2023, they are not yet deployed and experts question the declared ability to cause huge tsunamis. Sarmat is supposed to replace the SS-18 Satan. Tests were delayed and it is only now being introduced into service. The Russians tested the anti-ship missile Zircon also in Ukraine, the declared characteristics were not confirmed in full scope. Burevestnik is still in development, in 2019 the Russians had a serious radiation incident during failure. Newer tests showed progress, but it is not yet deployed.

These weapons are not meant to serve only military purposes, but also as a psychological weapon and strategic signaling. They are meant to harass and worry NATO and strengthen the image of Russian technological parity. Exaggerated capabilities are meant to provoke an exaggerated Western reaction, incorrect allocation of defense resources and doubts. Like Hitler, Putin also wants to appeal to domestic audiences and supporters and create a myth of Russian greatness. However, these super weapons in current numbers and quality do not yet represent an existential threat to NATO and do not give the Russians the possibility of a first disarming nuclear strike.

Russian reflexive control

Reflexive control is a strategy of Russian military thinking that manipulates the opponent’s decision-making process by influencing their perception, assumptions and decisions. The goal is not direct pressure, but shaping the opponent’s logic so that they themselves choose a procedure disadvantageous to them. According to Russian doctrine, it involves the transmission of purposefully prepared information that should lead the opponent to a decision desired by the initiator. The concept has roots in Soviet cybernetics and systems theory (Vladimir Lefebvre, 1960s-70s).

Reflexive control techniques include disinformation (distortion of assessments), provocations (eliciting predictable reactions), demonstrative and deceptive operations (military maneuvers signaling false intentions), cognitive overload (information chaos), mimicry (imitation of behavior), narrative framing (media and diplomatic manipulation of interpretations). Reflexive control is applied at strategic, operational and tactical levels – including psychological, cyber and kinetic operations.

In practice, Russia used it, for example, during the war with Georgia (2008), when it provoked a Georgian reaction. In Crimea (2014) it combined ambiguity, media manipulation and deployment of „little green men“ to paralyze resistance. Since 2022, it has been using reflexive techniques also in the military invasion of Ukraine: nuclear intimidation, warnings about false flags and propaganda about „miraculous“ weapons like Burevestnik, Poseidon or Oreshnik.

These systems serve not only for prestige, but also as a tool of strategic manipulation – to enhance perceived capabilities, create uncertainty and undermine Western confidence in security frameworks. Russian claims about capabilities such as bypassing US missile defense (Avangard, Poseidon) support the doctrine of escalation control. Propaganda creates an image of irrational or premature escalation, thereby complicating Western decision-making.

Russia presents these weapons as a response to American steps, especially withdrawal from ABM and INF treaties. Systems like Burevestnik and Poseidon are outside current treaty frameworks, which questions verification and compliance norms. Propaganda strengthens the idea that arms control is outdated, justifying unilateral development and deployment of new weapons. By overestimating capabilities and maintaining unclear deployment status, Russia forces opponents to plan for worst-case scenarios. These narratives shape Western perception, provoke internal debates and potentially lead to incorrect allocation of defense resources and undermine confidence in deterrence. Western public and policymakers may question the effectiveness of existing deterrence and defense systems.

Conclusion

Should we fear Russia attacking us within five years, or is it just a paper tiger for the next decade? Russia is too damaged for a major war with NATO, but still very capable of regional pressure, hybrid warfare and limited kinetic actions. In the short term, a large-scale conventional offensive is very unlikely. Ground forces are seriously weakened, industry under pressure and elite personnel suffered high losses. After freezing the conflict, they can strengthen the western district, strengthen missile forces, deep strike capability and air defense.

However, hybrid threats are real. Russia is not preparing to send tanks to Berlin. But it can intimidate neighbors, test NATO resolve in the Baltics, Black Sea or Arctic. It can carry out sabotage and terrorist operations on European soil. It has and will increase the capacity for massive missiles and drones, cyber capabilities, intelligence networks in Europe. The nuclear arsenal is intact and they are modernizing it. Russia is destined to become a dangerous, declining power with fewer options and higher risk tolerance. NATO must adapt because Russia is unstable, nuclear and still revisionist.

The post Run away, the Russians are coming! Or are they not and should we remain calm? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Note: The article was originally published in the journal .týždeň

The End of the Rules-Based System

Since the end of World War II, we have had an international rules-based system built on the foundation of the UN Charter. This was never ideal, but the powers competed only in proxy conflicts and avoided direct confrontation. The foundations of the UN were laid as early as January 1, 1942, when 26 countries in Washington signed the „Declaration by United Nations.“ The name „United Nations“ was coined by F.D. Roosevelt and was also the official name of the war coalition that committed to defeating the Axis countries and not agreeing to a separate peace.

From August to October 1944, a USA-UK-USSR-China conference was held in the USA, which created a proposal for the UN structure – General Assembly, Security Council, great power veto rights, International Court of Justice. This laid the technical foundation of the UN, which was politically confirmed by the great powers at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. The USA, UK and USSR agreed on the final form of the UN Security Council, confirmed veto rights and agreed on entry conditions for members. On June 26, 1945, in San Francisco, 50 states signed the UN Charter and after ratification by all great powers on October 24, 1945, the UN was officially established.

Unfortunately, as soon as World War II ended, the Cold War began. The world split into two competing blocs and a massive bloc of non-aligned countries. These were silent observers of the competition between the main blocs, objects of their efforts to win them to their side, and occasionally the scene of proxy wars. The USA and USSR led or managed their blocs, kept each other in check and avoided direct confrontation. The UN never functioned as its founders envisioned in 1945. During the Cold War it was paralyzed, after its end it had a brief golden era and today it is again overshadowed by great power rivalry. It is not a guarantor of peace, but an administrator of global chaos.

In Europe, the principle of immutability of post-war borders prevailed for a long time. This was further strengthened by the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act and the creation of the OSCE. The Helsinki Final Act was a paradox: in the short term it stabilized post-war borders and confirmed the Soviet sphere of influence, but at the same time it inserted principles into the system that eventually decomposed the Soviet bloc from within. Helsinki was thus both the peak of the post-war rules-based system and the beginning of its transformation. The 1975 Act was a „grand bargain“ between East and West. The OSCE became the institutionalized guardian of this order, until Russia began systematically destroying it after 2014.

All of this definitively fell on February 24, 2022, when Russia began a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and embarked on a path of revision and attempts to restore the former Soviet sphere of influence through brutal military force. Rules suddenly don’t apply, Ukraine is to cease to exist. The UN Security Council was paralyzed and unable to take a position and act against the aggressor. The EU, NATO, G7 and the democratic community condemned Russian aggression, military aggression cannot be a tool for revising state borders or liquidating their sovereignty. However, they did not find the strength and courage to end the aggression.

Powers like China and India were unable to take a clear stance on the aggression, and Iran or North Korea openly support Russia. North Korea directly joined the war. A shock comes from the USA with the advent of Donald Trump. He replaces the previously cautious principled stance with transactional pragmatism and acceptance of the use of military force. This thinking is based on the principle „everything is allowed if you have the cards.“ US leadership believes that peace is an enforced state based solely on force regardless of moral issues, legitimacy and justice.

A Dangerous Multipolar World

President Trump told the New York Times that he doesn’t need international law and that the only limit to his global power is his own morality. This is a fundamental departure from American post-war tradition and a serious signal for allies who rely on a rules-based world. This departure was formally expressed by the USA in its new security strategy and confirmed by the strike on Venezuela and the kidnapping of President Maduro. Despite Maduro’s depravity and his regime, such an operation has no place in international law. Trump used the law of the stronger and gave arguments to defenders of Russian aggression, as well as motivation to China and other potential aggressors.

The international rules-based system that the USA painstakingly built when putting together the United Nations is paradoxically collapsing thanks to the current US leadership. Current threats of violent takeover of control over Greenland also threaten key alliances that ensured that all of Europe did not fall into the hands of USSR-led communists. President Trump justifies considerations about taking over Greenland with US national security needs. This is an unacceptable argument similar to Vladimir Putin’s arguments and factually doesn’t fit. Arctic space security is vitally important not only for the USA, but also for their NATO and EU allies. Compared to the Cold War, only that China is more active in this space today has changed. But the basic military premises and arguments remain unchanged.

American presence in Greenland is neither new nor symbolic. The USA has been operating there since World War II. During the greatest threat from the USSR, the USA, by agreement with Denmark and in accordance with NATO interests, built a network of military bases in Greenland. The most important of them, today’s Pituffik Space Base, is still active and is among the key sensors for early warning against missiles and space monitoring. It operates based on a valid agreement with Denmark, within NATO, and is the northernmost American base.

Besides it, Americans had other large facilities in Greenland. Sondrestrom was a transit and meteorological base that the USA used until 1992. Narsarsuaq was important during the war for transatlantic flights and naval operations. And then there is Camp Century – an experimental city built in the glacier, even with a small nuclear reactor. All this shows that the USA had enormous possibilities in Greenland, which they later reduced themselves when their strategic priorities shifted elsewhere.

If Washington claims today that Greenland is necessary for American national security, then first it must be said that legal mechanisms already exist. The USA has a valid defense agreement, has a base, has access to infrastructure and can expand it in cooperation with Denmark and the Greenlandic government. Therefore, it is very difficult to defend rhetoric about annexation or military pressure against an ally. The United States does not need to own Greenland – it is enough for them to use the possibilities they already have, and which they themselves did not fully utilize in the past.

A US attack on Greenland would not be just another NATO crisis, but a systemic break: an alliance built on trust would lose its meaning. A world would emerge in which Europe would have to quickly learn to be a great power. Not out of ambition, but out of compulsion.

In reality, the world began changing as early as 2008. Authoritarian models began returning and gradually asserting themselves. Although the Communist Party rules politically in China, authoritarian capitalism has established itself in the country. Russia was taken over by revisionism and military imperialism. Theocratic expansionism is asserting itself in Iran. These models don’t want to be liberal democracy, are capable of surviving and cooperating. Power politics gradually began returning and manifested itself in the annexation of Crimea, the war in Syria, the war in Ukraine, Chinese expansion in the Indo-Pacific. There is an increasingly sharp competition for the Arctic, Africa, or Latin America. Spheres of influence are returning to the scene. Russia wants to forcibly control the post-Soviet space, China the Indo-Pacific, Africa and Latin America. The USA wants to control Latin America, Europe and the Pacific. Regional power projects of Turkey, Iran and India are joining these main powers.

Ideological competition has also returned. It is no longer about the competition between communism and capitalism, but liberal democracy and authoritarian capitalism compete, open society and closed society, rule of law and power state. These are today’s decisive ideological clashes that define the new multipolar world in which military force is again becoming a key tool of competition and advancing interests. Powers compete for their spheres of influence using military force, technology and economics.

Competing Powers and Their Ambitions

In a multipolar world, powers strive for a redistribution of the world. It is about defining not only new spheres of influence in a geographical sense, but mainly power, economic and technological influence. With increasingly sharp competition, the role of military potential grows and the willingness to actually use it to advance one’s interests or protect one’s sphere of influence. Not only arms races are beginning, but also the risk of serious military conflicts. Let’s look at what the main poles and powers are in the new multipolar arrangement, what their goals are and the main military development trends.

USA – Striving for Dominance

The first Trump administration still talked about great power competition. The second, however, moved to a doctrine that has no equivalent in post-war US history: unilateralism that relies on an aggressive reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The attack on Venezuela and threats against Greenland show that the USA is no longer talking about competition, but about dominance. And this changes the entire global system.

President Trump comes with a shocking demand for a military budget of $1.5 trillion. This would be a year-on-year increase in defense budget by 66%. This is more of a political signal than a realistic budget. Congress will probably reduce it, but it will still be the largest increase since the Korean War.

The goal of the USA is dominance in oceans, technologies and in the Western Hemisphere. The USA can realistically achieve dominance in the Western Hemisphere, which is their traditional sphere of influence that Washington considers „untouchable.“ The USA will want to maintain the largest projection of power at sea and the position of leader in technological standards in the field of AI, chips, cloud services and software. They will want to maintain their dominant influence in the Anglophone sphere – UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand. They will compete with China over the Indo-Pacific region. Europe can, according to the development of American politics, be either a solid ally or a zone of some kind of delegated security.

The USA is today undergoing the largest transformation of armed forces since the end of the Cold War. The goal is to prepare for conflict with an equal adversary, especially China. The Pacific is the main battlefield of the 21st century. The USA wants to reduce vulnerability to hypersonic weapons, move from a „heavy“ army to an „intelligent“ one.

Military dominance is to be ensured by key modernization projects. Americans are striving for a missile defense and space revolution. Golden Dome (new missile defense against hypersonic and ballistic threats) represents a massive project to create a „protective dome“ over the USA. It is to have a satellite layer for tracking hypersonic targets, space interceptors are also planned. The goal is to neutralize Chinese and Russian hypersonic weapons. The space hypersonic and ballistic sensor layer is to have satellites capable of tracking hypersonic missiles in real time. The goal is to gain information and decision superiority in the first seconds of an attack.

Navy modernization is to be ensured by the Golden Fleet project. The USA is building a fleet for the Pacific, which will include new classes of destroyers, modernized nuclear submarines, unmanned surface and underwater platforms, satellite and network systems for „distributed naval operations.“ The goal is to maintain dominance in the Pacific against the rapidly growing Chinese fleet. The new generation of aviation is to consist of new 6th generation stealth fighters F-47 „Dream Fighter“ and NGAD (Next Generation Air Dominance). The F-47 has AI-assisted control and the ability to lead swarms of combat drones. Extreme emphasis is placed on electronic warfare. NGAD is to be a „system of systems,“ i.e., a piloted machine plus autonomous wingman drones, which are essentially unmanned combat fighters. The goal of aviation modernization is to maintain air dominance after 2030.

The ground forces await the largest reorganization in a generation. The USA is implementing a fundamental reform that changes structure, equipment and the way of fighting. Old programs will be eliminated or limited. New priorities are long-range fires, autonomy and drones, AI in combat control, network command, anti-drone defense. TIC brigades (TIC = Transformation in Contact) are to be developed. This is a completely new type of brigade having hundreds of drones, autonomous vehicles, AI tools, satellite communication, new organizational structures. The goal is a brigade that fights like a swarm – quickly, distributed, autonomously.

China

Will concentrate on the core of Asia, the global South and economic ties. China will try to gain and maintain a dominant position in East Asia both economically and technologically. In the South China Sea area, it wants to achieve gradual control. It wants to dominate the Global South, i.e., Africa, Latin America and the Middle East economically, not militarily.

China’s main areas of competition will be in the Indo-Pacific with the USA, Japan and India. In Central Asia with Russia economically and with Turkey politically. However, China probably will not win India – it will always be autonomous, or Europe – it is too distant, too connected with the West. It will try to gain Russia as a vassal. Russia will be dependent, but not completely obedient.

The People’s Liberation Army is to be „world-class“ by 2049 – i.e., an army that can operate globally and defend Chinese interests anywhere, not just at its own borders. China’s strategic goals in the military are to ensure the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049. The army is a key tool to guarantee sovereignty, territorial integrity (especially Taiwan) and protection of Chinese interests at home and abroad. By 2027, it should achieve the ability to force Taiwan to submit and deter the USA from intervention. By 2035, a fundamental completion of modernization is expected – joint integrated forces capable of conducting „informatized and intelligent“ warfare. By 2049, it should be a full world-class force at the level of the USA in key domains such as navy, missiles, space, cybernetics and nuclear weapons. China’s ambition is a transition from local wars on the periphery to global power projection, i.e., to protection of sea lanes, investments, diaspora and corridors.

Russia

Russia’s strategic ambitions are to maintain the status of a great power and nuclear pole against the USA, to have the ability to militarily dictate to the near abroad and be a factor in Europe, the Arctic and the Middle East. The political goal is to have armed forces capable of supporting revisionist politics, i.e., changing borders, maintaining sphere of influence, blackmailing the West with nuclear and conventional forces. The operational goal is to be able to quickly deploy well-prepared forces in the neighborhood (Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus), intervene in crises outside the region (Syria, Africa). The long-term goal is to have an „at least sufficiently modern“ army – not necessarily as a technological leader, but capable of actually fighting and maintaining pressure on NATO and neighbors.

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine fully revealed Russia’s persistent weaknesses. However, despite problems in Ukraine, Russia is adapting and rapidly modernizing. The country is in a regime of economic mobilization of war production and the political leadership does not give up the ambition to militarily restore its sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe.

Europe

Europe’s security pillar is still NATO and the USA, not the EU. The discussion about „strategic autonomy“ returned after February 24, 2022, but the reality is that without the USA, Ukraine and the eastern wing can only survive with great difficulty today. Putin brutally reminded us that military force is back as the main language of politics, and thus paradoxically launched not only NATO, but also new debates about the European Defense Union. Trump and volatility from the USA, especially Trump’s statements that he „will not protect delinquent NATO members,“ were a shock and at the same time a catalyst. The EU today openly talks about Europe having to learn to „take care of itself,“ which can serve at least as insurance. The EU is therefore an economic giant, a regulatory superpower, but a military semi-finished product. This can be a deadly combination in multipolar competition.

Europe today stands in the middle of a great power storm as a rich but militarily immature actor. If it doesn’t want to be just a space that Washington, Moscow and Beijing decide about, it must do what it has avoided for 30 years: build its own defense capacity, unite the arms industry and protect its democracies as critical infrastructure.

What Awaits Us?

If today’s dynamics continue, the world will not be divided into territories, but into ecosystems. The USA will maintain oceans and technologies, China Asia and the global South, India autonomy, Russia only its region and Europe will have to decide whether it will be a pole or periphery. The division of the world in the 21st century is a competition for influence and power, not just for maps.

The world is heading toward harsh competition between three military poles – the USA, China and a nuclear-armed but weakened Russia. The decisive factor will be whether we manage to maintain competition in the regime of managed rivalry, or whether we break down into a fragmented, conflict environment in which small states will only be pawns in the game of great powers.

The post Are We Returning to the Law of the Stronger? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Note: This is a transcript of the original broadcast at .týžden in Slovak language

Moderator: Welcome to listening, and I can hardly believe it, to the 150th edition of the Security Radar of my friend General Pavel Macko. Welcome, Pavel.

Pavel Macko: Thank you very much, pleasant listening.

FOG OF WAR

Putin’s „Ceasefire“ on Ukrainian Infrastructure

Moderator: How did Putin’s ceasefire on attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure turn out?

Pavel Macko: It turned out like all the ceasefires that Putin declared – simply big talk. He actually used the time when he didn’t attack for those few days – he didn’t even keep to those 7 days. He used the fact that he accumulated missiles and drones and made an even more intensive attack, which was even harder for the Ukrainians to stop.

This means that his effect was far higher than if he had attacked every day. And that’s actually the result of Putin’s „ceasefire“.

But it’s essential that none of us normal people, who know this, expected Putin to make any fundamental turn. But the falseness, even complete monstrosity of these peace activists was confirmed, who are actually making a defense of such aggression and claim they are trying to achieve peace. In reality, they are trying to achieve Russian victory.

Overall Picture of the Week

When I look at this overall, the overall picture of the week on several levels is as follows:

▪️First: Russia is intensifying pressure on multiple front sections, but any advances are not large

▪️Ukraine is achieving local counter-attacks, especially near Kupiansk and Kostiantynivka

▪️This winter campaign is extraordinarily exhausting – after several years, actually for the first time during these 4 years of war, when it’s truly the toughest winter

▪️The impacts are enormous and meanwhile the Russians have also gained some additional resources

▪️Ukrainian air defense after 4 years is exhausted

▪️Russian losses are however record-breaking – in January they again lost 30 thousand soldiers

▪️On the other hand, they are massively replenishing equipment and continuing that long-term war economy

Diplomatically: Russia is again stalling for time, not retreating from its demands and actually negotiating only to prevent greater pressure, greater sanctions and a tougher stance from those countries and Ukraine that want to achieve that ceasefire and ensure that this war finally ends.

Situation on the Front Lines

Moderator: So let’s go to the front line and I suggest we go to Kharkiv and Kupiansk.

Pavel Macko: Good. When we look at Kharkiv and Kupiansk, there were partial counter-attacks by Ukrainian forces. Near Kupiansk, they managed to regain some positions again.

When we look, I have notes here that Russia has been pushing for a long time from the north and east. They also had such a bridgehead on the other side of the Oskil river and the Ukrainians managed to push back in these areas.

Other Front Sectors

Lyman, Siversk, Sloviansk: There we know that fighting is already taking place in Siversk. Russian units continued attacks toward Novoselivka, Vykhivka, Serednie, Drobysheve and Dybrova, but there was no fundamental advance there.

Near Kostiantynivka, Druzhivka: Ukraine conversely achieved significant successes.

Near Yablunivka: The Russians advanced slightly east of the city.

Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad: There the Russians were slightly successful. Reconnaissance-sabotage units penetrated directly into Myrnohrad and increased pressure along one of the main transport routes. Ukraine however repelled dozens of attacks around Rodynske.

Zaporizhzhia Oblast: The biggest battles around Hulyaipole have been continuing for a long time. West of Dobropillia. But it’s extreme there – the Russians attack 32 times daily on just this one small front section.

In Kherson: There the classic shelling continues. The Russians still claim in those negotiations that they want Kherson back, but de facto they want to completely destroy it just like the destroyed Vovchansk and all those cities on the contact line.

Middle East – Gaza and Israel

Moderator: Let’s go to the Middle East. Are there any changes in Gaza and Israel?

Pavel Macko: That overall picture is… The ceasefire formally continues, we were supposed to move to the second phase. But it’s actually eroding:

▪️Israeli activities continue

▪️Hamas reacts similarly or provokes clashes

▪️International mechanisms are not yet functioning

▪️Humanitarian crisis (the situation is difficult)

Indeed, now the crossing at Rafah has also been opened, but it’s insufficient, the UN components are not functioning there either.

Problems with Humanitarian Organizations

Israel called on Doctors Without Borders to leave the Gaza Strip because they again suspect them of collaborating with Palestinians – not the citizens they should serve, but collaborating with Hamas.

Moderator: I read such a report in the Israeli press – there was their own reporter who showed one Palestinian doctor who during the war appeared as a doctor, showed victims, everything. And in the end it turned out he was a Hamas officer. Good, let’s continue.

Pavel Macko: Exactly, there are also honest ones there, but by providing legitimacy or legend for that cover, it naturally irritates the other side.

Administrative Arrangement of Gaza

When we look further, the administrative arrangement of Gaza is unclear. The United States – we talked about Al-Shat here, who is supposed to be there, that former Palestinian Authority minister, could be the administrator, temporary head of that administration, some bureaucratic government. However, it’s not yet in the situation where it would really function.

Reconstruction is at a dead end, because as long as there’s no stable and secure environment, the donors don’t have confidence, don’t give money there and there are no mechanisms that would implement it.

Security Situation

As I indicated, there was a series of clashes and attacks. Hamas and its security components conducted operations against groups they designate as Israeli-supported gangs.

In other words, other Palestinians, who don’t identify with Hamas, who maybe have a different view on how things should function in Gaza, are already also targets, so Hamas is already attacking its own.

The Israelis consolidated somehow, adjusted that yellow line. Of course, this immediately caused Arab outcry that they want to reduce even more or reduce Gaza’s territory.

Creation of New Administration

Moderator: How is the creation of new administration in Gaza progressing? Because without that we won’t move forward.

Pavel Macko: Definitely. This is what I already indicated in that overview. The border crossing at Rafah opened. There’s a limited number of patients who can cross from one side to the other.

The US is pushing for that multi-phase plan– meaning a full transition to phase 2, including an international security mission and gradual reconstruction.

But since there’s no agreement on disarming Hamas, they haven’t moved anywhere, therefore territorial administration hasn’t moved either, because one is subordinated to or conditional on the other.

Therefore those players like the United Arab Emirates prepared a project of some Emirati complex in southern Gaza, where they want to actually house thousands of displaced Palestinians.

But the project is politically controversial, because again Palestinians reject relocation to zones controlled by Israel, because that’s in the part that’s behind that yellow line on the other side.

So nothing has been achieved there yet and these new institutions can’t establish themselves.

Fundamental Problem

Moderator: When I look at this as a layperson – because I am a layperson – it seems to me that without Hamas being dispersed, things won’t move forward there.

Pavel Macko: We’ve been saying this since the beginning, since October 7, 2023. Why don’t they disperse it? Because we’ve seen that it causes large collateral losses. Therefore everyone turned against Israel.

On the other hand, we see that President Trump already asked for a Nobel Peace Prize for this, but he didn’t get it. Good anyway, because that would be unfair. And now we see that even he can’t push this through.

This means that this conflict will continue as we’ve been saying for a long time. It can be stabilized only when there’s willingness from the Arab side, first directly from the ranks of Palestinians, whom Hamas has been indoctrinating for a quarter century, because it completely controlled there.

And precisely these clashes – this is exactly about the fact that as soon as there’s a slightly different opinion, people from Hamas immediately liquidate them there, murder and shoot their own.

Second: Arabs never gave up – and I mean Hamas and these radical components – they never gave up the goal of complete liquidation of Israel.

And as long as they don’t give this up and as long as international security forces don’t come there, who will run into the same thing Israel runs into – that they will have to do the so-called dirty work, that they will also have to militarily strike those unfortunates who won’t want to cooperate in that ceasefire – this will continue.

Situation in Syria

Moderator: What’s happening around Syria? We said that the biggest tension…

Pavel Macko: First, there are conflicts of interest between Lebanon and Syria, because there’s a part of those fled officers hiding in Lebanon.

There’s Hezbollah, which is no longer a political favorite in Syria after the replacement of Bashar al-Assad, because they fought against this al-Shar. So that’s one part.

It calmed down there, but recent weeks saw strong conflict between the new governmental power and SDF forces including Kurdish units.

Ceasefire and Integration

From January 20 a de facto ceasefire has been in place there. It looks like the situation is stabilizing.

Kurds are really in the weakest position in the last 10 years. They had to leave the western bank of the Euphrates river, had to move to the eastern side, but ended the fighting. They also ended in other areas.

What was originally promised when Bashar al-Assad fell is happening – that integration will occur. Only that integration is not now that the entire SDF would integrate at once, it’s integrating by individual regions, by individual cities and communities.

What is negative on one hand for those Kurds, because therefore they don’t create some compact whole.

From the governmental power’s perspective it’s advantageous in that no parallel command is created – because we see this in Bosnia and Herzegovina, how it looks: there’s that federation, but actually Republika Srpska does whatever it wants anyway.

This political-administrative arrangement of Syria still awaits its solution and the military one is such that the government is trying to integrate those armed components into a unified army.

Lebanon

In Lebanon the situation is still tense and there are some pockets of resistance, Israel had to react again.

And mainly it shows also there that similarly as in Syria, the political situation is very unstable. They had an interim government basically since that explosion – if listeners remember, since that huge explosion in the port in Beirut – there was such a provisional governmental regime.

And this continues. The only thing that changed is that Hezbollah’s role and position is weaker.

STRATEGIC BACKGROUND

Three-Party Negotiations on Ukraine

Moderator: Main attention focused on three-party negotiations on Ukraine. So can you somehow briefly evaluate them? But it seems to me that nothing is moving anywhere.

Pavel Macko: Basically you’re right. We’re already done with this conclusion. But I’ll still explain it a bit.

We had two rounds. The first round was January 23 and 24. We already partially discussed it. Then came the second round.

First Round of Negotiations

I’ll first recap that first round, because it’s important for understanding where we’ve moved.

In that first round there was actually direct contact between Ukrainians and Russians through – with the presence of the US as mediator after almost 4 years.

And it was the first round. No one had great expectations that peace would suddenly emerge there. It was at such a higher working level.

Ukrainian delegation:

▪️Rustam Umerov

▪️former defense minister, today head of security council

▪️Kirill Budanov

▪️former head of HUR and now head of presidential office

▪️Chief of General Staff

Here I need to explain – Syrsky is the main commander of Ukrainian forces. That means he is the commander. And what we have as chief of staff, they have as chief of general staff. And that general was also there.

Russian side had Dmitriev there – economic-political negotiator and had the head of Russian GRU there.

Results of First Round

That means, that format– first, what happened was that a framework and format for negotiations was established. Professional working groups were established in which details will be discussed.

Main topics were addressed:

▪️Territorial issues

▪️they didn’t agree on anything, there’s a key dispute

▪️Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

▪️also a problem

▪️Security guarantees for Ukraine

These are actually two such dealbreakers or showstoppers, as it’s said in English. These are the brakes, obstacles so far insurmountable. That means security guarantees and territory.

Because Russia still claims that Ukraine should give up territory that Russians haven’t been able to somehow encompass even after 4 years of war.

Atmosphere of Negotiations

Moderator: What’s the dynamic of those negotiations, what’s the atmosphere? That’s also important there.

Pavel Macko: Both sides claimed it was productive and substantive, meaning they had content. When I already hear the word „productive“…

Ukraine said that yes, these were substantial negotiations, that concrete steps and practical solutions were addressed, which set aside those two most important issues I mentioned.

The US also designated them as productive and appreciated what I also appreciated, that those technical military teams negotiated together, because the ceasefire also needs to be agreed upon military-technically, so that the first shot from one drunk soldier doesn’t restart the war. Because that can also happen.

Russians proved that they don’t have willingness for peace, but meanwhile intensively attacked and said that military operations will continue until Kyiv accepts their demands.

In other words, Russians probably both for domestic audience and for their audience in the third world, are playing such a game – this is called hardball in English, such a tough game.

Basically they want, even if they’ll have to concede from those demands of theirs, they want to sell it as their clear victory. Of course, everyone sees that’s not true.

And if Russians don’t catch the right moment that they won’t gain more, the exact opposite can happen, that they can also collapse. Ukraine can of course also collapse – it’s closer to it than Russia, but it’s a very complex situation.

Summary of First Round

So it was something new after 4 years. They didn’t insult each other after these negotiations, so it’s already important that the negotiation was substantive. I would summarize it that way.

Key conclusions:

▪️Created a framework but didn’t bring results

▪️Territories and security guarantees (this is simply the stumbling block)

▪️Russia uses parallel attacks as a pressure tool

▪️Therefore reducing trust from Ukraine and its supporters that those negotiations are sincere

▪️USA, to not lose face, is trying to keep these negotiations alive

It’s noteworthy that the State Department, foreign ministry, is not represented there, meaning those who are there are not classic diplomats.

Second Round of Negotiations

Moderator: How do you evaluate that second round?

Pavel Macko: That second round progressed, because quite logically, from what I explained in that first round, it was more about procedural issues, formats, who with whom, when, in which groups.

Now it was more about real negotiations, within individual groups they negotiated in more detail.

From what we have – of course, detailed record of these negotiations is not publicly available – so:

▪️That long-term dispute continues

▪️Security guarantees are still without concrete progress

▪️USA acts as mediator

▪️both sides remain relatively firm

Russian Provocations

Russians escalated energy attacks, and this even during the announced ceasefire, which of course Kyiv designated as violation of agreement. It was visible when they bombed a classic conventional power plant and then also a heating plant near Kyiv.

Russians thought that by this they would scare the rest, that if you don’t yield to us and won’t negotiate with us, or accept conditions, we’ll attack. They don’t want to negotiate, they just want Ukrainians to accept conditions – so somehow we’ll continue and you’ll be even worse off.

Of course, they’re abusing this time when there are extreme frosts there.

Positive Progress

But they moved forward in what Zelensky also expected and wanted. They moved forward in the expected prisoner exchange– 314 or 324, I’m not sure now what that number was. The first 150 were already exchanged.

It’s good that also on that Russian side, besides those nationalists, extremists and such clowns like Medvedev, who shouted that all those prisoners of war should be killed – for example from Mariupol, those who were now almost 4 years in captivity – so they returned from that captivity.

Because war also has its rules, we have Geneva Conventions for that and this is something that Russians should also observe.

Further Development

The rest is that they’ll continue, they’ll probably meet next in the United States.

But that Russian strong pressure rather causes greater support for Ukraine from its supporters.

NATO Reactions

Moderator: I noticed that when the NATO Secretary General was in Ukraine a few days ago, he got to taste how a massive Russian attack tastes. Can this somehow change NATO’s approach?

Pavel Macko:It’s already changing, because if I listened carefully to Rutte’s statements, for example his predecessor talked about Ukraine’s integration into NATO and so on, but that language was diplomatic.

Now Rutte had relatively harsh language toward these Russians, said unambiguously that this is proof that Moscow doesn’t want peace. And it’s not some pretext.

Russians thought that hard attacks would help– and otherwise they miscalculated strategically in this, just as they miscalculated on February 24, 2022, because they quickly jumped away from that negotiation. They were persuaded by Macron, by Joe Biden. Scholz called Putin several times, Macron called even a few hours before that invasion. Putin saying that invasion wouldn’t happen, but he wanted to play that tough game, attacked, knocked out his front teeth and still can’t get out of it.

And now it’s the same, that Rutte gave very sharp statements. I put it in a table because we prepared that scenario together.

He said – this is a quote: „This peace will be lasting not because papers are signed, but because it will be backed by hard power.“

Change in NATO Position

This means, if Russians now refused that no foreign soldiers would be there, no support for Ukraine, because Russia wanted a weakened Ukraine that would be a puppet in Russia’s hands, this is changing.

And when they decide in the future to take control of Ukraine, they can do it politically through their extensive agent network and install a new Yanukovych there, or they can do it again militarily, that they would complete what they haven’t managed so far.

After they gather strength – like now with those recent attacks – let’s imagine that we give Russians a year or two pause to re-arm, re-equip and then strike Ukraine again.

This is now changing, NATO’s position as a whole is also changing, where it says it will continue this support and interprets this Russian attack as an attempt at terror and pressure. And therefore arguments for those robust security guarantees are strengthened.

End of New START Treaty

Moderator: The last treaty on control of strategic nuclear weapons, New START, ended. So explain what that agreement was and why it ended?

Pavel Macko: I would probably also like us to make this today’s main topic, to get a broader perspective for our listeners.

What the New START Treaty Was

So first that New START– this was the last functioning agreement, signed by Barack Obama and the Russian president, which actually limited strategic nuclear weapons.

But I’ll say what the development was here.

Historical Development of Nuclear Agreements

During the Cold War, in the late 60s, these powers got into a situation where they achieved huge numbers of nuclear weapons, because that paranoia and mutual suspicion, where we found ourselves in arms races, ended in:

▪️Russians eventually had more than 40,000 nuclear warheads (today they have 5,400)

▪️United States at that peak had more than 32,000 nuclear warheads

A large part of this was also tactical. We had large-caliber artillery shells and such short-range missiles there.

This means that even for regular battlefield combat it was calculated that these nuclear weapons would be used in clashes between these states, while hydrogen bombs were rather mounted on those long-range means, whether intercontinental missiles.

First Negotiations

Those negotiations ran already 1968-1969, but somehow they didn’t manage to conclude. Of course, Nixon’s pressure and move also with China eventually convinced the Soviets.

I’ll just enumerate them. There was a whole series of agreements:

SALT– this was that first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1969-1979.

Very quickly then came SALT 1, where strategic carriers were also limited, meaning the number of missiles and those other means.

A second treaty SALT 2 was also negotiated in 1979, but it wasn’t ratified. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan then and they didn’t ratify it, but both sides more or less adhered to it.

ABM and INF Treaties

In 1972 the ABM treaty was also concluded – this was limitation of anti-missile defense, where the number was set at maximum 200, later adjusted to 100 anti-missile systems.

The problem is that when one side starts building too strong anti-missile defense, it forces the other to increase the number of those offensive means.

I forgot one important one – this was the INF treaty – it was called about banning medium and short-range missiles between Gorbachev and Reagan in 1987.

This was absolutely crucial for Europe. In Europe we were in the range of 3 to 8 minutes response time, meaning the risk of accidental nuclear conflict was enormous.

By completely eliminating these missiles, that space was cleared, and therefore only space for those intercontinental missiles was left. There’s at least half an hour for reaction there.

This means that even in case of some stupid escalation, the red phone could still be used, and those missiles could be sent to self-destruct and stop a potential attack. This couldn’t be done with these medium-range missiles.

START Treaties

Then after the end of the Cold War came the START agreement in 1991. From huge numbers, those numbers were reduced even more significantly and we actually got to today’s numbers.

There was START II, which also banned those multiple warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles, on those heavy ones. Because you can cheat there. You say you’ll have only 100 intercontinental missiles, but put ten of these warheads in each.

Russians have Avangard prepared this way. In the final flight stage it’s as if you again had ten missiles. Suddenly you have thousands instead of hundreds. So this treaty was important because of that.

New START

Then this agreement, when it ended, actually that new START was negotiated, where limits on warheads and carriers were set. And it was extended a few years ago for 5 years, but this extension expired, a new agreement wasn’t concluded.

New START parameters:

▪️1,500 deployed strategic warheads

▪️meaning those they can have in operational regime

▪️700 deployed carriers

▪️800 total carriers

▪️this includes strategic bombers

Control Mechanisms

So there were mainly detailed inspection mechanisms. Both sides announced where they have those forces, where the US has problems with those Russian mobile ones, but they always had to notify major movements.

And both sides could visit those places. Of course they didn’t go into the guts of these systems, but they could verify whether those measures are being observed, whether they secretly haven’t built additional forces, whether they secretly don’t have some additional missiles there. All this has now ended.

Why the Treaty Ended

When I say it formally, Russia suspended participation in 2023 and subsequently the United States also reacted, but formally the treaty was valid, no one violated it.

This happened mainly because when the war in Ukraine started, Russians supposedly for technical reasons started blocking these verifications, these on-site inspections.

The reason– on one hand I understand them, it was paranoid, because they were at war with Ukraine and feared that during those inspections Americans would learn something they could then pass to Ukrainians.

On the other hand Americans said– there’s no point going into such an agreement that can’t be verified, as we also said before with the Budapest Memorandum and so on…

So this was absolutely crucial. They considered the US as a hostile side. This was part of that Russian rhetoric, that Putin constantly says, because when he’s not succeeding, he says that first he wanted to denazify and demilitarize everything. And when he’s not succeeding, he says he’s actually fighting the entire West. And this is that propaganda that goes around.

Chinese Factor

Another thing was that there were also those negotiations and considerations that China announced a large nuclear program, even to triple the number of its warheads by the decade, it already has 600 warheads now.

China has such an ambition that by 2035 to have parity with the United States in some components and in its region or catch up with Russia and the United States.

And after 2040 China wants to already be an equal partner also in strategic nuclear weapons to the United States.

Chinese Triad

This means that China started building the so-called triad. The triad is that you have:

1 ) Those ground intercontinental ballistic missiles

2) You have them then on submarines

▪️these are well protected because they’re hard to detect, meaning it’s a second strike weapon or last judgment, that when everything fails, even if that country was destroyed, it has the ability either semi-automatically or even automatically to respond to that strike and destroy the other side

3) And there are then aviation means – strategic aviation.

Russians invested more in those aviation means in those cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, which they now use only with conventional warheads directly on Ukraine.

Why New START Finally Fell?

I said that it fell actually because:

▪️United States wanted a broader agreement

▪️Russia wanted a different agreement, because it conditioned it, wanted to balance and offset other things on it

▪️China didn’t want any agreement yet, said it’s not yet that player that should be regulated

Russian and Chinese Armament

Moderator: I notice that Russia demonstrated new weapons and of course we’ve seen it also with the Chinese. And those Russian conventional ones aren’t very trustworthy. But should we fear those Russian nuclear weapons? And what about the USA? Are they falling behind or not?

Pavel Macko: Several aspects. It’s true that Russia modernized and quite massively. I wouldn’t underestimate their nuclear arsenal.

Russian Nuclear Forces

First, insiders know that there are really elite troops there. These aren’t those bums called ground troops that they showed at the beginning of the war. It’s more professional there.

But we’ve seen accidents there too, but that was mostly during tests. This means we can’t say in what technical state those missiles that are in operational service are.

But we know that Russians demonstrated in 2018 a series of those displays – Avangard, Zircon, which can also have nuclear warheads.

Hypersonic Systems

Sub-warhead is a small missile inside that big missile. There are several of them. These are so-called hypersonic gliders, which can still maneuver.

They have their own engine, can change flight path and fly at that hypersonic speed, which by the way all ballistic missiles fly.

But the difference is that the glider can still maneuver and fundamentally change direction and can go hundreds of kilometers elsewhere than where the original missile would fall.

Russian Modernization

So Russians modernized. They have:

▪️New Yars and Sarmat missiles

▪️New submarine-launched ballistic missiles (which are launched Bulava)

▪️New submarines of Borei class

▪️New cruise missiles Kh-102 (Kh-101, which they used, this is some derivative)

▪️They have those Avangardes, Poseidon, Burevestnik

Principally Russians modernized, because the Soviet Union left them old junk. And they were aware that conventionally – and then they also introduced professional army – conventionally Russia didn’t have a chance not only against NATO, but also potentially against other rivals. And therefore invested asymmetrically in nuclear arsenal.

Chinese Expansion

What about China? China is expanding. But of course from that low base. China was that below-average student, below-average player, even lower than United Kingdom and France.

France has 290 and United Kingdom some roughly 250-245 of these warheads.

China started building its potential. Just as it builds its conventional army – visible that it has 5th generation fighters, stealth fighters already better than Russians, that it invests in other means.

It started investing in this too, but started from that low number:

▪️Had in 2010: 200 warheads

▪️Today has: 600

▪️Heading toward at least a thousand by the end of this decade

Chinese Triad

But it’s also building a triad. As it starts expanding in that Pacific and sees that the United States has dominance there, it’s building nuclear triad. That means new nuclear submarines and also hypersonic systems.

We’ve seen several of them now on parade and this is precisely because of that rivalry in Indo-Pacific and also fear of American anti-missile defense, which is strengthening. Now we’ve heard about Golden Dome.

American Nuclear Forces

Moderator: And are the USA falling behind or not?

This is interesting, because a lot in professional journals and so on was criticism when Russians introduced these hypersonic systems, then Chinese also conventional and potentially also nuclear systems, which are for example designed to destroy those aircraft carrier battle groups.

When you have a hypersonic missile, the opponent can’t stop it anymore, you put a nuclear payload there, so you can actually erase that American advantage – aircraft carriers, Americans are rulers of the seas with them. What the British Empire used to be.

They have 9 battle carrier groups– those are aircraft carrier battle groups, several fleets, they have large Pacific, Atlantic fleet.

Criticism of American Lag

When China developed this, many evil tongues say that the US fell asleep, don’t have hypersonic systems, didn’t pay much attention to it. But I’ll mention several aspects.

It’s really true that Minuteman III are missiles from the 70s, but technologically they were much more advanced than those Russian missiles that were in forces. But the US didn’t modernize them.

They have only one warhead, can’t even add others, while Russians meanwhile made an upgrade where they don’t have multiple warheads mounted, but can and know how to do it relatively quickly.

So in this segment the US seemed to lag behind.

New American Programs

Currently running is a program for Sentinel upgrade or replacement of Minuteman III. Otherwise Sentinel is also that invisible reconnaissance drone RQ-171, but these should be Sentinel missiles, which should be ready by 2030. That’s still 5 years, but it’s an extremely expensive project, so the question is whether it will be successful or not.

But the US has strategic aviation, where unlike Russian aircraft they have absolutely top-notch stealth bombers. B-2 were already excellent and now B-21 Raider are absolute world top.

China and Russia don’t have even a chance yet to catch up to them in this in the next decade.

American Strength in Submarines

Main US strength lies and there they modernized, or had highly advanced technologies – and those are missiles launched from submarines.

In this they are absolute top. Still their Trident 2 D5LE missiles are unmatched, so they don’t even need to modernize them.

Golden Dome

Currently, I won’t discuss this today, we’ll discuss it another time. Golden Dome is not only protection from space against missile attacks – those are just sensors, but Golden Dome is supposed to also ensure maintaining connection, that all those submarines and fleets in stealth mode, even after nuclear explosions, should function and should be able to communicate with each other.

Should We Fear Nuclear Arms Race?

Moderator: So tell me this one thing – should we fear that nuclear arms race or not?

Pavel Macko:There are several scenarios. It started when there were 30-40 thousand warheads on both sides. We’re far from that happening, it would cost enormous expenses and I believe it won’t go to this limit.

The truth is that absence of all agreements can cause distrust on both sides and we see that even Trump indicated they might resume nuclear tests. These by the way are also agreed to be banned, but that comprehensive ban treaty wasn’t ratified.

This means it’s not legally binding. Only so far it was quietly observed.

Possible Scenarios

So there are several scenarios:

1) Quiet voluntary continuity and waiting for a suitable time when they sit down for negotiations. This would probably capture what Trump said.

When Trump said that when New START expires, it expires, that we’re simply not under such pressure that we must accept any pressure from Russia and we want to have China in it too. So that’s the first scenario.

2) New arms race– that’s the worst, that new arms race comes, meaning Trump will invest money and launch it.

3) Trilateral negotiations– that all three nuclear players and basically also militarily biggest powers USA, Russia and China sit down and try to agree.

4) Fragmentation, regionalization of that nuclear deterrence – meaning Europe including France, United Kingdom and others. That it fragments and we already have 9 nuclear countries and more can be added.

5) Crisis escalation– absolutely worst scenario, unlikely but very dangerous, is crisis escalation, that simply at some moment these conventional conflicts get out of control and one side will demonstrate use of nuclear forces.

I think that currently we are in scenario A– meaning quiet voluntary continuity and attempt at negotiation.

Slovakia in Security Context

Moderator: And where do we find ourselves in this, Slovakia?

Pavel Macko: I’m looking for a decent word. We are disoriented, trampled in the ground. We buried ourselves there like moles, only we didn’t choose good terrain, because we buried ourselves in some swamp and it’s leaking into our mole hole from all sides.

Slovakia is being left out of all these security discussions. As I indicated those scenarios, we actually don’t know where security will move and how it will transform.

Problems of Fico’s Government

Into this comes hysteria of this Smer government, which does knee-jerk politics in four world directions and breaks its allied relations to the core.

We saw Epstein, that actually our top representatives get caught in traps… Even if it’s not confirmed that our prime minister met with Bannon or not, by the way Fico was at that same CPAC forum last year, where Bannon was hailing and after him Robert Fico… not right after him, but later Robert Fico spoke, while even such a leader of extremists from French National Front left after this hailing. Even for him it was too much. Our prime minister stayed there. And that’s a problem.

Lies About MiG-29

The last cherry on top is that the prime minister shouted at the previous government that they are traitors, that they disarmed Slovakia. Now the prosecutor, who was pro-Smer, and I dare say this, let them be angry at me or not, if needed, I would give dozens of arguments…

Moderator: Pro-Smer is not a good expression, she just helped Smer.

Pavel Macko: Yes, to be correct.

Even she found that the law regarding donation of MiGs and S-300 was not violated and prosecutor Remeta explained it in detail, how it really was. Fico lied yesterday at the press conference when he again said that S-300 was modernized.

And yet I know he has many generals, even loyal to him, who could have advised him and said it’s nonsense. But apparently he doesn’t ask anyone, because Fico doesn’t ask anyone about anything today.

From Fico’s foreign trips we have no outputs and conclusions. Not even the confidential ones. Simply there are no records from those negotiations, which is complete nonsense. This never was in Slovakia.

Tunneling of Slovak Army

Actually I’ll now remind you of one thing. And that’s something I probably also announce that I’ll likely file a criminal complaint, because if this government went to prosecute the previous one for that donation, then the prosecutor now confirmed what that government claimed, what I claim, that here enormous damage was arising during MiG maintenance.

When through the company of Fico’s friend Výboh subscription contract was made, where Russians committed that for that money they will maintain the number… I know that number, but I can’t say it because Minister Gajdoš refused to give it to me officially on my request, so I could publish it, how many of those 12 fighters we originally had should be permanently combat-ready, but it was roughly two thirds.

And we sometimes achieved only one tenth. And the prosecutor also said that at the end we had one fighter that was combat-capable and flight-capable, but we paid money for that full contract.

This means that not the previous government, but Fico’s governments tunneled Slovak armed forces and endangered the security of the Slovak Republic.

360°

Iran and Negotiations with USA

Moderator: Let’s look at developments around Iran. Will a new agreement be negotiated and the situation calmed, or will America have to strike there?

Pavel Macko: The question is whether America dares to strike there, because that’s actually why it didn’t strike during those protests.

They could actually provide an argument to that extreme Iranian government that it would unleash a kind of side conflict, that it would actually start some conflict in the Persian Gulf and therefore escalate the situation.

This would of course allow that government to make extreme measures at home, to suppress any opposition and could endanger American interests in that space, also American forces that are there.

American Military Preparation

Therefore Americans moved those aircraft carriers there, they have mighty force there now that could really strike.

I don’t think and Americans never indicate that they would want some ground invasion or landing, as we saw also in Venezuela, but they can very drastically strike those key targets in Iran.

But they also don’t want to do it, because it can be just a spark for a bigger conflict. Therefore there’s that offer for negotiation.

Today they should meet also with help of intermediary countries that try to give some negotiation format.

So that tension is very high, but it must be said that these negotiations today (February 6, 2026) are a real attempt at de-escalation.

Content of Negotiations

But chances for some fundamental breakthrough are small, we already have a long podcast, so I’ll just briefly say what those negotiations should be about.

First that dynamic or tension is illustrated by the fact that United States called on its citizens to immediately leave Iran.

Khamenei again said that if the US attacks, that conflict will change into regional war. That’s what I indicated.

Demands of Sides

When I return to those negotiations:

USA demands:

▪️Complete removal of enriched uranium stocks – Iran is willing to negotiate about this

▪️They want to also limit the ballistic program

▪️meaning those carriers

▪️And end support for regional militias like Hezbollah, Houthis and so on

Iran still insists that it’s prepared to negotiate only about that nuclear program, but ballistic missiles and those revolutionary guards and those various clones of revolutionary guards they bred throughout that region – those proxy groups – it doesn’t want to discuss this.

Qatar, Turkey and Egypt try to somehow act as intermediaries, but we’ll see.

Development Assessment

Simply, it will be first contact, that risk is high.

My assessment is that the US will balance between what I said, that risk of large escalation, but at some moment at least some limited strike may come.

I can even imagine they would strike directly at Khamenei.

Final Quote About Negotiation

Moderator: You spoke here today twice, or several times about negotiations and I know you prepared such a negotiation quote. So tell us and say who created that quote.

Pavel Macko: So: „If you approach negotiation with the assumption that the other person thinks the same way as you, you’re wrong. It’s not about empathy, but about projection.“

And it was said by Chris Voss– he’s a popular author of several books, former chief FBI negotiator.

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#EU #NATO #reflexive control #Russia #Russian Nuclear Threats #Russian War of Aggression #Ukraine

In the civilized world, it’s the opposite, we should help the victim of a rapist. Today’s Russia does not belong to the civilized world and should be treated as a depraved rapist.

Putin’s Russia has 1/7 of the world and all the resources to be a successful and attractive country without war crimes, pressure and nuclear terrorism. But it is led by the biggest thugs and mass murderers since Adolf Hitler. They have pillaged their own country and cover up their inability to improve it with military aggression against their neighbors.

They show us a miraculous nuclear torpedo, a miraculous cruise missile, presenting their country as an Empire of miracles. But the conquest of the small town of Pokrovsk has already taken them almost two years. Now they cry that it’s all the fault of the defending Ukraine and those who, in my opinion, still provide insufficient material help to Ukraine.

Russia’s criminal war in Ukraine has been illegitimate from the very beginning, is in deep contradiction with the UN Charter, and has been condemned twice by the UN General Assembly. Russia should have long had its membership in the UN Security Council suspended and been given a clear ultimatum to end the military aggression. Instead, the hypocritical world watches the continuing Russian madness on the threshold of the extermination of humanity.

There is no Ukrainian crisis, just the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. Russia started the war in Ukraine and Russia is prolonging it despite the fact that it evidently cannot win it. Moscow’s criminals are the greatest threat to the human race in history and have decided to play Russian roulette with the world. Yet they know well that an unjust war cannot be won. Hitler did not win it in the USSR, and neither will Putin win it in Ukraine.

To end the war, it is enough for the war criminals around Putin to stop sending Russian soldiers and recruited desperate people from all over the world to their deaths, to issue an order to end the war. Within 24 hours, there will be peace!

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#Beijing #China #coalition of willing #Gaza #Hamas #Israel #Lebanon #military parade #peace talks #Putin #Russia #security radar #Syria #Trump #Ukraine

Moderator: Welcome, Palo.

Pavel Macko: Thank you very much, pleasant listening to the audience.

Fog of War

Moderator: Let’s start with Ukraine. What’s the development on the battlefields?

Pavel Macko: I’ll begin by noting that August has ended, which means the main summer season is effectively over. Both the Ukrainian side and the Russian side have evaluated the spring-summer Russian offensive.

Let’s be realistic – the Russians haven’t achieved any miracles. They attempted several attacks, captured several dozen villages, took several hundred square kilometers of territory, but they couldn’t capture any major city. To make it look like they captured one, they placed a flag on a pole in Kupiansk using a drone, which the Ukrainians then took down.

Simply put, the fighting is intense. According to Ukrainian estimates, the Russians have suffered losses of over 200,000, up to 290,000 this year. But they’re preparing for some major offensive. However, they haven’t made progress yet.

When I evaluate the summer campaign, it wasn’t effective at all from the Russian perspective. They tried to bypass cities, but they failed to break them. And that’s likely why we’re now seeing movements and regrouping of Russian units.

The Russians applied pressure across the entire front and tried to find cracks. Where it starts to crack, like glass, or when you throw stones, they quickly deepen that hole. They almost succeeded in doing this near Dobropillia, but the Ukrainians managed to prevent it in time. They tried it in Sumy, they’re trying it at Kupiansk, they partially bypassed Pokrovsk from the southwest, and even penetrated into the Dnipropetrovsk region, but they didn’t achieve any operationally significant successes. That’s why they’re now regrouping.

Strategic Bombing

We see again that the Russians are „negotiating peace“ by intensifying attacks on civilian targets. They are now attacking more on the central and western parts of Ukraine.

The goal is clear:

▪️To destroy infrastructure facilities

▪️Railway transport hubs

▪️Factories

▪️To bring shock to villages and cities

At least half of the targets are explicitly residential buildings, hospitals, and schools. The reason is clear – the Russians are trying to indicate to Ukrainians that those who are further from the conflict zone have been living too comfortably, and they want to force Ukrainians to capitulate by undermining the morale and psyche of the people.

We saw massive attacks in Kharkiv. This is a paradox because it’s a Russian-speaking city that has always been Ukrainian and they felt Ukrainian, they just spoke Russian. Putin and his troops are punishing them for that – just from one attack there were at least 12 victims, dozens wounded, and 100,000 residents were left without electricity.

They attacked Dnipro with Shahed drones, and in Odesa they even used Kalibr missiles from the Black Sea. They hit port facilities and a humanitarian aid warehouse. Again, what a „highly strategic“ target – a humanitarian aid center! A Kalibr missile has an accuracy of up to 5 meters. That means they could hit the room we’re sitting in, at least its corner. And it’s something that doesn’t make sense, that they attack a humanitarian aid warehouse under the pretext that there must definitely be strategic ballistic missiles or atomic weapons there. Simply nonsense, just like the entire Russian aggression.

In Kyiv, attacks with Iskander ballistic missiles continued, and they also attacked command and military centers. The air defense reacted. In the south, whether in the city of Kherson or in the Zaporizhzhia region, there is permanent artillery shelling. They’re trying to make Kherson uninhabitable – when they were driven out of there, they punish the residents so they can’t live there. Unfortunately, the attacks continue and are escalating.

Ukrainian Attacks

Moderator: What about the Ukrainians, how are they doing?

Pavel Macko: They continue, they’re trying to counter, they’re also changing tactics. We saw the first real attack with Flamingo missiles on Crimea. Initially it was thought they were Neptune missiles, but they released footage of it.

Moderator: And what are those Flamingo missiles?

Pavel Macko: The Ukrainians introduced Flamingo recently. It was a „fast track“ development – rapid development over a year. It’s a cruise missile that has a range of up to 3000 kilometers, it has up to 1125 kilograms of combat payload. It’s right at the sound barrier, slightly subsonic, a large missile. It has an accuracy of about 20 meters.

I think they were testing them in Crimea. It’s one thing to produce and test on a training ground, and another to deploy in real conditions. There were skeptics who said it was too large and slow, so Russian systems might be able to intercept it. But they tested it over Crimea, which is relatively well protected. Belbek is one of the strategic airports in Crimea.

They tested them there and gave the Russians a psychological signal that not only is Crimea not untouchable, but they can try it elsewhere as well. Russia is huge. What is an advantage when you want to occupy it is a disadvantage when you want to defend it. No one can defend all facilities against air strikes. Not even Russia can do that.

Then we saw attacks on the Tula region, and those weren’t drones, but Ukrainian intelligence operating in Russia blew up an underground explosives warehouse in a chemical plant. They do this cyclically – Ukrainians have their people directly in Russia and can operate there. It wasn’t just those drones that were launched from trucks and remotely piloted in the „Spider“ operation. I think they’re spinning more of these „spider webs“ there and will continue to catch Russians in them.

Moderator: We saw attacks in Krasnodar region and on oil facilities. But what caught my interest, we were recording last Friday and just before that, on August 28, they struck with a drone near Vladimir Putin’s palace.

Pavel Macko: That was in Gelendzhik on the Black Sea coast. He has a huge dacha there. They hit it there, indicating to him that Vladimir isn’t safe even there.

Development of Fighting in Individual Areas

Let’s go through individual areas. In the Kursk and Sumy regions, the fighting was milder. We see a significant shift – in the Sumy region, the Russians seem to have come to terms with the fact that they won’t make a breakthrough there and won’t move towards Sumy. Sumy was a good target, it’s not so far from the borders, it’s a relatively large administrative center. The Russians had already occupied it once, the Ukrainians pushed them out at the beginning of the invasion. They tried to get there again, but they’re withdrawing troops from there.

Intense fighting is still ongoing in Kupiansk, Lyman, Serebriansk forest. Serebriansk forest – west of Kreminna – has become totally confusing. The Ukrainians can no longer establish a line defense there because the troops have intermixed. I saw videos where a Ukrainian soldier was walking, the Russians thought it was their soldier, and then he shot them.

This Lyman direction is one to remember. It could be a place where the Russians will try to get across the Zherebets River in larger numbers and continue further to Lyman, so they can get the entire rest of the Donetsk region into pincers – from the south from Pokrovsk and from the north from Lyman.

Of course, fighting continues in Pokrovsk, Toretsk, Kostiantynivka. In the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, we see a slight stabilization of operations.

Regrouping of Russian Troops

To summarize, we see regrouping of Russian troops. The Russians are withdrawing from the Kherson region – not all units, but important elements. They’re strengthening the Donetsk direction and also withdrawing units from the Sumy region.

From the Kherson area, they withdrew the 70th Motorized Rifle Division of the 18th Combined Arms Army. This was a newly created division after the invasion. They have three motorized rifle regiments, a tank regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, self-propelled artillery – a brigade. It’s about 10,000 men. They’re moving them to the Donetsk direction, down to Pokrovsk.

From the Sumy area, they’re withdrawing the 76th Airborne Division. This elite airborne division is a „firefighter“ – when there was a Ukrainian breakthrough, when the Ukrainians liberated Kupiansk and were advancing quickly, the Russians deployed this division there. When they had a problem, when the Ukrainians pushed in the south, they also deployed the division there and managed to stop the summer offensive of 2023 Ukrainians at Orikhiv.

What are they trying to do? The Perun portal (Czech drone operators who collect money for drones for Ukrainian forces) described it quite well as a „long ball“ – in sports terminology, it’s a pass where when the game is „grinding“ somewhere in the middle, a long pass is thrown down the wing and a player runs onto it. They’re trying to get the entire area into pincers.

Tactical Changes and Drone Warfare

Both sides are trying various tactics. Last time we mentioned that it wasn’t so advantageous for Ukrainians to thin out defensive lines with drone operators. They are highly effective, but they have only limited capacity and the targets are known. As soon as they make contact, the Russians also know about it and start bombing.

The Russians have gradually changed their tactics. At the beginning of the war, they tried for rapid movement, combined arms combat. We all expected the Battle of Donbas to come – major combined arms maneuvers, modern mechanized forces, air cover, armored vehicles on the ground. That didn’t happen. They were able to deploy and coordinate a maximum of two brigades together, because they couldn’t coordinate more.

Today they don’t have as many mechanized forces. We see attacks with small units on motorcycles, on all sorts of things. Now they do it by bypassing lines in small groups, catching hold in some village where there is no military presence. From there they can direct drones, do other things. It’s like seeping, when you stain wood.

Moderator: I read today that artificial intelligence is already functioning and the first swarms of drones have been deployed. The Ukrainians deployed it, did you notice that?

Pavel Macko: I noticed, I’m writing about it in the magazine as well. I talk there about how generations of drones are gradually evolving. They already tried it in the fall last year, they had the first attempts on a smaller scale in the Kherson region.

Moderator: And is it effective?

Pavel Macko: It has the hope of being effective, because swarms of drones with artificial intelligence are relatively autonomous. You don’t have to pull them on cables, you don’t need as many operators. The problem is that when you have an FPV drone, you need one person with goggles or a screen who navigates the drone until the end, but can’t navigate other drones.

When you have some master drone and a swarm of drones, you get them to the target area and they select their targets themselves. In that program, you can even program target priorities. When the system sees artillery or an air defense asset, it ranks them numerically highest and leaves the infantry for the end.

Summary of Development in Ukraine

To summarize, last year it was expected that there would be a waiting tactic, because neither side had enough forces for a major offensive. Not like in World War II, when there was Operation Bagration, where there was a major breakthrough. That operation brought the Soviets hundreds of kilometers behind German lines, broke through them through swamps, through difficult terrain in Belarus, and got into an area where they had a strategic advantage.

This didn’t happen. Last year, in order to show positive progress, the Russians sacrificed an estimated 450,000 soldiers (variously killed, wounded, some multiple times). These are huge losses and they actually achieved nothing visible.

This year I’m positively surprised that the Ukrainians held on, because many times it looked like it was about to fall. Some troll wrote to me that Kupiansk, they already have half of Kupiansk. No, they’ve been fighting for Kupiansk for 2.5 years. We mention it every other week. They still can’t capture it.

Now it looks as if the Russians feel they’re treading water. This isn’t the right thing. Basically, they decided to concentrate pressure even more on Donbas, because they’re also on a ticking clock and climatic conditions will be different in the fall.

The estimate of several observers is that the Russians will try to make a breakthrough, create Guderian-style wedges – arms from the north and from the south, to get behind the Ukrainian forces and interrupt supply routes. It can be assumed that from these troop movements, they will also try to generate more mobile mechanized formations.

This is their last chance in this immediate period. It’s risky for the Ukrainians – they need to be careful. But it’s also risky for the Russians, because it’s a moment when the sports rule „if you don’t score, you’ll concede“ applies. If they overdo it and fail, as at Dobropillia (a small tactical episode), and if they don’t succeed at the operational level either, they’ll break their teeth. It may happen that there will be a „reverse“ – the Ukrainians will find a weak spot and push.

The last thing – Ukraine must be asymmetrical. An attrition war in the Russian style can’t suit them. They don’t have as much personnel, as much equipment, which is why many recommend they continue with deep strikes.

I registered yesterday’s report this morning – Keir Starmer says that some European countries will give Ukraine the means for deep precision strikes, long-range missiles. We don’t know if it will be Taurus or something else, but they should receive them. This is retaliation or a reaction to the continuing Russian attacks on cities.

Middle East

Moderator: Let’s go to the Middle East, to the Gaza Strip. How are the Israeli army operations continuing there?

Pavel Macko: The airstrikes are intensifying. The Israeli Air Force carried out several precise attacks on Hamas positions in southern Gaza, especially in the Khan Yunis area. There were civilian casualties again.

These operations are important because the Palestinians are also giving arguments to Netanyahu – they fired rockets. This means the job isn’t finished. And that’s Netanyahu’s argument: „The job isn’t finished, and until they lay down their arms, we must finish it.“

Israel is mobilizing reserves. When we analyzed the operation, we said they need about 60,000 reservists, whom they’re calling up again. This process is underway. Not everyone is happy with it, some refused to report.

There’s internal political friction in Israel as well. Some are against scaling down the operation, others on the contrary say it needs to be intensified and accelerated.

Moderator: And what do you think?

Pavel Macko: I think it’s complicated. It needs to be done as quickly as possible, have a plan immediately for how to replace the Hamas administration with something else and withdraw. The view that they will also want longer-term military occupation may ultimately prevail. I think it’s difficult.

From my experiences in Afghanistan as well – it’s not a problem to conquer something, that’s what the Israelis are trying to do now. Clearing is complex, but maintaining and subsequently building is almost impossible in this environment. I would try to avoid it.

The Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Zamir, said that no one should be mistaken – even though there’s talk that the operation will be from October 7, he declares that it’s already running and they have 40% of Gaza City under control, that they’ve entered parts where they’ve never been before, and they’re trying to clear it. Meanwhile, civilians are also being evacuated to southern parts beyond the Netzarim corridor.

Syria, Lebanon and the Red Sea

Diplomatic negotiations are taking place between Lebanon and Syria. They’re creating joint committees or commissions to address sensitive topics:

▪️The fate of nearly 2000 Syrian prisoners in Lebanese prisons

▪️Locating missing Lebanese citizens in Syria

▪️Demarcation of the common border, which they don’t have precisely marked everywhere

They’re trying to normalize relations between the countries.

Regarding Lebanon, last time we discussed that the US, through its emissary Thomas Barack, proposed a plan for Hezbollah to be disarmed by the end of the year. Reciprocally, the Israelis would withdraw their troops from southern Lebanon. And moreover, next year the UNIFIL mission from the UN, which has been there for almost 50 years, would be ended, and thus Lebanon would take full control of its territory. Hezbollah, of course, resists this.

In Syria, the situation in the south has calmed down slightly. Negotiations are ongoing between Israel and Syrian representatives about easing tensions in border areas (conflict between Druze and Bedouins). The Syrian government is trying to normalize relations, starting to send its ambassadors to surrounding countries and negotiate with other partners. It is planning, for example, a visit by the ministers of foreign affairs and justice to Beirut.

They will also try to normalize relations with Lebanon, which was largely a victim of Syrian ambitions in past conflicts. There were Syrian so-called blue berets in Lebanon and so on.

Moderator: What about the Red Sea?

Pavel Macko: In the Red Sea, we saw that Israel decimated a significant part of the military and political leadership of the Houthis, who are threatening massive retaliation. They say they can destroy Israel in a few hours. Of course, this is just rhetoric – if they could do it, they would have done it already, they’ve tried. They can cause harm, but Israel has indicated to them that the more harm they cause, the harder the counter-strike may be.

Strategic Background

Moderator: It happened far away, but also close. What do you say about the Chinese military parade and the activities of Prime Minister Robert Fico among world dictators who clearly defined themselves against the West, despite the fact that Fico was there?

Pavel Macko: Let’s take it step by step and I’ll start right with Fico. We saw a series of events – the Shanghai Coordination Group meeting, then the parade. China took advantage of the fact that Indian Prime Minister Modi and other guests came, they discussed the Shanghai Group and immediately afterward showed a parade for the 80th anniversary of the end of the war.

Robert Fico found himself in such company – it’s as if I found myself somewhere among the Taliban or the Sátora gang. He’s a collaborator and it’s outrageous, because all those political messages were about forming an axis – I don’t want to call it an axis of evil, but it seems like that to me – an axis of dictatorial, corrupt and inhumane regimes that are frustrated with the West and are going explicitly sharply against the West.

And suddenly there is the Slovak Prime Minister – we are the West! Now it doesn’t matter where the political boundary of the Cold War was. We are the West in terms of civilization. In fact, since we „expelled“ Cyril and Methodius, we’ve clearly been the West. We’ve also been left with the Latin alphabet, we are part of Western civilization and we’ve never been part of the Orient, or God forbid, Asia.

What is our Prime Minister even doing there? I understand that he wanted to do business in China. But he was flirting with Putin there, flirting with dictators like Kim Jong-un, Xi Jinping. Being in the same party with these people is like if I were seen among a gang of vagabonds, extortionists. How could I show my face again?

Robert Fico in his video, and this interested me, said that he is the Prime Minister of a sovereign republic, legitimately elected. Well, to that I’ll say that he was elected with a different program. That program wasn’t that the Slovak Republic is going to war – so far ideological and possibly later physical – against its closest neighbors and allies. What, will we soon be attacking the Czechs or the Austrians just because they’re Western and we want to be some kind of „Chinese“? That’s not normal!

Secondly, we are a parliamentary democracy. The Prime Minister, regardless of what percentage Smer got (some 18 or 20, he didn’t get 50, but even if he did), is not a private person, nor a dictator, nor the boss of an armed gang or mafia, that he can say he is sovereign and decide to go somewhere. Let him look at our competence laws, let him look at what the role and position of the Prime Minister is.

The Prime Minister is the moderator of the government. One of the ministers, the „prime minister,“ who moderates the government. For such a foreign trip and the subject of negotiations, he must have a mandate from the government as a collective body. The government must have the confidence of parliament.

What Robert Fico is doing is bizarre. He is now openly spreading hatred against the West. And at a time when the West is negotiating security guarantees for Ukraine, Fico is threatening to undermine Ukraine and consulting about it with Putin. And he’s even pretending that he can do it!

I appeal to his party members and his coalition partners. We are a parliamentary democracy. None of you won the elections by saying that Slovakia would leave the EU, leave NATO, or that it would be inside NATO and the EU but as a pest that will, together with countries that are threatening to harm us, harm us.

Who does our Prime Minister represent there? Himself. It’s a terrible state, which hasn’t passed silently in the world media either. Our partners notice it. Sooner or later we’ll get a response like from Radek Sikorski, who recently indicated that we’ll get as much solidarity as we put into it.

Chinese Military Parade

Of course, the 80th anniversary of the war – there was demagoguery from China as well. When we realistically look at it, World War II in China was such that Chiang Kai-shek’s forces fought with the Japanese, while the communists harmed them behind their backs. Mao Zedong tried to steal what was liberated through guerrilla warfare. But it was Chiang Kai-shek’s army that eventually had to evacuate and go to Taiwan.

That’s why China is divided – the communists took over mainland China and Chiang Kai-shek’s soldiers remained on Taiwan. The Chinese island of freedom remained there.

The second thing is that, similar to Europe, there was massive aid from the United States. The US helped the Chinese the most in the Pacific region against the Japanese. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, they weren’t aiming to conquer the United States. They wanted to eliminate the US from the game so they wouldn’t interfere with their imperial goals. That’s what Russia is now trying to do with us – deter us, push us out. Why? So they can do what they want.

At the parade they showed:

▪️Hypersonic missiles

▪️Ballistic missiles with multiple warheads

▪️Laser defense systems

▪️Advanced drones including robotic fighters

I’m writing about it in the current issue completely by chance. In the continuation of the cycle about the development of military drones, we also write about a drone that China showed. It’s the „Loyal Wingman“ concept, where they presented this drone.

They also showed military robots, new fighters, tanks. It was a big parade – more than 10,000 soldiers in Tiananmen Square (4 km²). They showed a lot of equipment, a lot of soldiers.

What’s interesting and few people noticed – there wasn’t a single ordinary citizen there! Everything was cordoned off, isolated. Ordinary Chinese didn’t get there at all, everything was fenced off and cleared. Security measures. They had a lot of guests there. It’s atypical, because even in Red Square there are parades to build internal „awe“ among their own crowds. In this case, the Chinese relied only on big TV screens for their own people.

Moderator: You said they had a lot of weapons systems there. Are they really that good, or was it just a show? I remember how the Russians displayed their famous tank at Red Square, which they didn’t even manage to produce in the end.

Pavel Macko: China wanted to demonstrate, like every parade, power. It wanted to deliver several messages:

1) That it will resist the West

2) Xi Jinping’s speech was interesting (I don’t know Chinese, I rely on translations)

Xi Jinping always talked a lot about peace. It’s classic rhetoric, like our elected president – „president of peace“ in uniform with a submachine gun in hand. But they always emphasized it a lot. China has maintained a low profile line since the 70s. And now they seem to be baring their teeth – he talked less about peace, more about deterrence, intimidation. They also wanted to show technological superiority.

Are they really that good? Several aspects:

▪️Their weapons haven’t been demonstrated or tested in any combat operation yet (with the exception of a few older fighters that were in the Indo-Pakistani conflict and proved themselves)

▪️The Chinese don’t have direct military experience, so we don’t know if they can coordinate large formations and whether they would fall apart like the Russian ones that marched into Ukraine

But we must say that in some areas we see significant progress:

▪️Modern tanks – we don’t know how many they have, but they showed a lot of them. China is a large country and presumably can mass produce. We saw 4th generation tanks with reduced weight, increased survivability, they can network them – truly a modern tool.

▪️Hypersonic missiles – they’re a bit different from Russian ones. The Chinese have long concentrated on hypersonic missiles to destroy aircraft carriers. Why? Because the main competitor is the United States. The US is far away, but they have the ability to project power precisely on these platforms. Experts agree that they have this tested on mockups as well. We’ve seen various exercises in the South China Sea.

▪️Nuclear triad – its display wasn’t just a political effect. It’s a reality. China is intensively increasing its nuclear potential. It was a „younger brother“ like the United Kingdom or France. It’s starting to get into the triumvirate or trio of large nuclear superpowers.

▪️Drones powered by artificial intelligence – we definitely see that this has been tested.

The battle robots, the „wolves,“ were for show. We haven’t really seen them in action. Laser weapons too – they look good on the training ground when nothing is interfering, but in real combat we don’t know.

We don’t know about the coordination of troops, because rehearsing a show is something different. I practiced for Spartakiada – we rehearsed for a year and a half. We could turn an ordinary soldier into an athlete in gymnastics in a year and a half if you focus on it. But that still doesn’t mean we would really be such athletes or gymnasts in competitions.

And of course, those guests – it was clearly political theater and our Prime Minister played an undignified role for the Slovak Republic in it.

Convergence of China and Russia

Moderator: There’s a lot of talk about the convergence of China and Russia. It seems to me that Russia is already such a subordinate state of China, as if they were begging them. But another thing is that Trump is also trying to somehow win Russia over to his side. Does he even have a chance to attract them?

Pavel Macko: In my opinion, he doesn’t. It’s a misunderstanding of the dynamics and context. Trump wants to do something like a „reverse Nixon.“ Nixon with Kissinger at the beginning of the 70s drew China closer to the US, and that’s actually when China’s development began. Let’s be honest – we built up China from that backward country. It’s still at 71st place in GDP per capita, but it’s a large country, so 1.5 billion means something.

The Americans then attracted China, pulled it away from the Soviet bloc. But we need to state the context – the tension between the Soviets and China had been there since Mao Zedong came to power in the 40s, already during World War II. Mao accused the Soviets of not helping him enough against the internal enemy and in those external aspects as well. He wanted the Soviets to sacrifice even the western front just to help him.

There was rivalry, jealousy between them – what we see today in our government coalition. The coalition is failing, but they’re still competing with each other. This was also between the Soviet Union and China. The Americans took advantage of it and China got a „lollipop“ for it, which grew to gigantic dimensions and is today a comparable economy to the United States.

Can Trump achieve the same with Russia? He can’t, because Russia has removed that possibility that China had by its senseless annexation of Crimea and subsequently by its adventure in Ukraine. China grew on having a rich client – whether in the United States or in Europe. It wouldn’t have grown rich on African countries, nor on Latin American ones, which, even though they’re growing stronger, do so mostly for their domestic industry. And not to feed the Chinese.

We fed the Chinese. Just as we fed Arab countries in terms of oil. I mean the collective West. Slovakia didn’t, because we fed the Russians and we’re still feeding them.

The calculation is flawed, because Russia is already so economically dependent on China that a pivot to the US wouldn’t help it. It’s in subordination to China, despite the fact that it’s still a nuclear power with the most nuclear warheads, but that’s about all they have.

China showed at this parade that it’s no longer dependent on Russian technologies, that in aviation technology and stealth technologies it’s already far ahead of the Russians, and the Russians will have a hard time keeping up. China has a powerful economy, many times larger than Russia, and development potential.

The Chinese also function differently mentally. And Trump is trying to turn the chess pieces upside down and thinks they will stand. They won’t, because Russia is economically linked with Third World countries and China. Even if they ended the war immediately, they wouldn’t get back on such a scale that it would be strategically advantageous for them. They will continue in a close alliance with China and there’s no major conflict there.

Russians are always nationalists, chauvinists, they didn’t even like their own nationalities. Everyone who experienced Soviet troops knows this, how they treated officers from nationalities other than Russian. Russian nationalists look at the Chinese as monkeys, just as they do at Afghans, but that’s the Russian nationalistic mentality. The political system and state leadership, however, is aware that without China, Russia today cannot move anywhere.

NATO Responds to China’s Growth

Moderator: And is NATO responding somehow to this growth of China?

Pavel Macko: It’s responding. China is investing a lot of resources in capabilities like artificial intelligence, the development of artificial intelligence in the military. Their philosophy is that they won’t have such sophisticated weapons as the West. This was also seen with drones – they go for quantity and relatively good quality and try to connect it through artificial intelligence to achieve the strategic effect that they are equally effective even with cheaper devices.

Most recently, the North Atlantic Alliance – Mark Rutte after the parade said that China is beginning to be a global challenger and we need to look at it carefully, because it also conducts hybrid operations. It does them more cultivated than the Russians. NATO will have to very quickly add and develop cooperation with Pacific partners like Australia, South Korea, Japan, because China is becoming increasingly assertive.

Coalition of the Willing and Security Guarantees for Ukraine

Moderator: We’ll see if we can do that. But in Paris, the Coalition of the Willing negotiated security guarantees for Ukraine. While our Robert Fico was sitting somewhere in Beijing. What did they agree on in Paris?

Pavel Macko: In Paris, they claim they agreed on security guarantees for Ukraine. 26 countries offered their forces, which would even go to Ukraine at the moment when a ceasefire was concluded.

A controversy and discussion arose about whether Russia must agree. Mark Rutte said quite simply: Ukraine is still a sovereign country, and if peace is achieved, it can invite anyone to its territory.

Of course, we don’t know the details. As a soldier-expert, I can imagine that rules of engagement must be established, where the focus will be – whether they are to be monitoring, observation forces, or deterrent forces, or forces that would be able to stop the initial onslaught in case of a ceasefire violation.

They also communicated that it’s a coalition of the willing, because NATO as an institution won’t be involved in it. Since the United States, Slovakia, and Hungary will block Ukraine’s entry into NATO, they say it will be necessary to strengthen Ukraine’s military capabilities after achieving any peace solution.

For me, the statements of Yermak (I may not admire him in everything, but he’s the right hand of President Zelensky and deals with these issues systematically as the head of the presidential office) are important. He has repeatedly indicated that a good solution would be to move away from Russian megalomaniacal demands and freeze the conflict.

The Ukrainians can live with that – he gave a direct reference to Korea, where a peace agreement hasn’t been concluded to this day and the 38th parallel is still more or less a demarcation line. But the situation has stabilized enough that South Korea could grow economically, develop, and today is one of the very strong world economies, even in arms production it’s a relevant world player.

Moderator: And what should those guarantees be? We already gave guarantees to the Ukrainians in Budapest when they were giving up nuclear weapons, and we see how that turned out.

Pavel Macko: Let me look at both aspects. What should these guarantees be?

1) Military presence of guarantors – they would be on the territory of Ukraine. This is exactly why we also established military presence on NATO’s eastern flank – to be a clear political signal that if you violate the ceasefire, you’ll get into conflict with those guarantors as well.

2) Strengthening air defense – Germany proposed an annual improvement of 20% in the number and effectiveness of air defense systems. Start production in the West, help Ukraine produce some of it itself, and increase air defense capacity by 20% every year.

3) Support for ground forces – they would like to help build Ukraine four mechanized brigades or mechanized infantry brigades, which is about 480 combat vehicles per year.

In short, Ukraine is to receive such military potential that would be sufficiently deterrent – non-nuclear, but deterrent for the Russians. Weapons production in Ukraine would be strengthened. There would also be training support.

They also indicated that if Russia is not willing to sit at the negotiating table, countries are willing, if necessary, in cooperation with the United States, to impose new sanctions.

An important question, which is not finished and is to be completed, is American participation. What does „indirect American air support“ mean? I explained this on Czech television – that support must not only be for the situation when monitoring compliance with the ceasefire, but especially there must be a clear scheme of support in case there is a violation of the ceasefire and an escalation from the Russian side. Then there must be a clear and strong retaliation.

Moderator: I know you followed the Prague defense summit, which was also attended by the NATO Secretary General. It continues today. And we’ll return to that topic.

Pavel Macko: Next week in Piešťany, on September 12, we’ll have a live broadcast during the film festival. We look forward to all of you – to come see us, listen to us, but especially to give us tough questions that the two of us can’t think of ourselves.

Moderator: Well, I can think of tough questions, but I’m afraid to give them to you, whether you’ll be able to answer. But come to Piešťany, because even though we won’t be there as film stars, there will be a star sitting with me, Palo Macko, who knows what you’ll be interested in.

360 Degrees

Moderator: So, Pali, what’s on the radar?

Pavel Macko: We discussed the Shanghai Cooperation Group, we discussed the parade, so to finish it off, I would look more at that coordination group and at Taiwan, although we discussed Taiwan last week.

Moderator: And what would you take as the main point from that Shanghai Group meeting?

Pavel Macko: What comes out to me are those images of Indian Prime Minister Modi, Putin and Xi Jinping holding hands, talking amicably without interpreters and indirectly sending a message to Trump.

Of course, it was arranged for the cameras, because they don’t know each other’s languages, they can’t communicate without interpreters. The important thing is that Trump then looked (albeit in a later context, when he already saw Kim Jong-un at the parade as well), that they’re plotting against the United States.

But the reality is that when I focus on India, it needs to be seen as an epic failure of President Trump. I’ve analyzed this several times – India is, firstly, a democracy. Peculiar, but a democracy. It’s still a member of the British Commonwealth and the largest democracy in the world.

For the last 20 years, the United States has been building a strategic partnership with India to have a partner in the region, so that the world wouldn’t be hostile to them. And Trump has managed to completely disrupt this.

Joe Biden was building those relationships – he invited Modi during his previous term for a state visit directly to the White House. Trump has broken all of this like an elephant in a china shop, because the result is that Modi is now fraternizing with these „troublemakers.“

Modi is signaling by this that he will have a more sovereign foreign policy. This doesn’t mean he would fall into China’s arms. Neither does Putin really want to fall into China’s arms, but he can’t manage without it.

In the case of India and China, there are even more conflicts between them – five years ago they were shooting at each other. It won’t be such a warm friendship, just as the Shanghai Cooperation Group isn’t a warm alliance. It’s not a new NATO or some „East Asian“ grouping. It wants to appear that way, but we see that there are India and Pakistan, some countries are there just to control each other.

The important thing is that India is indicating by this that it will be opportunistic. Trump, for instance, made a mistake and wanted to impose sanctions against everyone. He assessed, similar to Europe, that India is a weaker opponent. He pushed only on India and China and left everyone else alone. So Modi said to himself: „If you treat me as a stranger, I’ll be a stranger, and you’ll still come yourselves and beg me for cooperation.“

It’s a pity. It doesn’t mean an immediate change in the world order, but we will really be in a regime of competing powers. India will potentially be economically stronger than China, because China is somewhere at the limits of its development. It’s said that India could, in 20-30 years, if it fulfills all the prerequisites, economically surpass China.

In the military field, I see it, I indicate it in the latest article coming out this week, that for example in the area of drones and unmanned fighters, India has progressed a lot and is trying to be independent, so it doesn’t have to buy either Russian, Chinese, or American ones.

Moderator: You often return to Taiwan. Why?

Pavel Macko: It’s an absolutely key neuralgic point. I indicated how Taiwan originated – by separation from China. China is trying to get it back, holds the so-called one-China policy. It’s very aggressive towards Czech politicians as well – if they negotiate with the Taiwanese, it immediately attacks them. Just as it’s sensitive about the Dalai Lama, it’s sensitive about Taiwan.

Now in Taiwan there’s of course an independent government, but I would like to return to how it would look if China attacked Taiwan. I was intrigued by publicist J.P. Linsley, a journalist who was, by the way, in Ukraine and survived the initial invasion there. He looked in more detail at how it would be if China attacked Taiwan.

Last week we saw an exercise where the Chinese again practiced landing on Taiwan and blockade. Many were afraid that when Putin attacked Ukraine, China would immediately attack Taiwan as well. They’re not ready for that yet, but they’re trying to build amphibious landing capabilities.

Many evaluated it that China „shifted from fifth to second gear“ when they saw how the Russians hit a wall in Ukraine, and slowed down their ambitions and pressure on Taiwan. That’s not entirely the case.

The problem is that if China attacked Taiwan, they wouldn’t be as unprepared as Russia was in Ukraine. Every month we see evidence that Chinese-Russian cooperation is very intensive. Behind the scenes, China supports the Russians. The Geran drones they produce, the Russians couldn’t produce without 80% Chinese components critical for these drones.

China is also taking military knowledge. There is a very intensive exchange of experiences in drone operations and all activities going on quietly. Everything negative that the Russians experienced in Ukraine, China is thoroughly analyzing. It’s getting direct data from the Russians.

There is intensive communication in the technological area. Intensive correspondence was detected between Rosoboronexport (Russian arms monopoly), a Russian research institute for control communication systems and Chinese components.

So in Russia there may be „chaos,“ but the Chinese are learning from it and trying to be prepared so they don’t surprise Taiwan (as Russia was surprised in Ukraine).

Moderator: And we’re at the end. Pali, a quote?

Pavel Macko: We may have already given it, I’m not sure, because 129 parts is a long time to remember each and every quote. Moderator: But you should remember them.

Moderator: It’s not about remembering the quote, but whether I’ve already used it. I have them archived, because I archive those numbers. Maybe we’ll publish them in a book now. Well, I have to react to how Robert Fico is acting uncollegially and against his „herd.“ So I’ll take the liberty of a quote from Benjamin Franklin.

Pavel Macko: But say it in English first, I’ll like that.

Pavel Macko: Yes, because there’s a good play on words in English – the same word is used in both the first part and the second part of that quote. Benjamin Franklin was supposed to say it when signing the Declaration of Independence of the USA. The quote goes in the original language: „We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.“ And in translation: „We must all hold together, or certainly we will all hang individually.“

Moderator. Thank you.

The post General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar 129 appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#ceasefire #drone #Fico #Israel #Peace negotiations #Putin #Russia #Syria #Trump #Ukraine #USA #War in Ukraine #Zelensky

Welcome to the 128th edition of General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar.

Moderator: Welcome, Palo.

Pavel Macko: Thank you very much, I greet the listeners and wish you a pleasant extended weekend and holiday.

Moderator: And I’d like to ask one more thing – today in Banská Bystrica we commemorate the Slovak National Uprising, and I haven’t read that Robert Fico would be there, so I’m curious if he will come at all.

Pavel Macko: Well, I’m curious about that too, but I’ll be honest, I don’t even want him to go there, because a person who shows neo-Nazi gestures to support one of his prosecuted friends probably doesn’t deserve to stand on the podium.

Fog of War

Moderator: So, General, what is the development on the two main battlefields? Let’s start with Ukraine.

Pavel Macko: I’ll go straight to the point. We always start with strategic bombing, and we had the opportunity to see it yesterday. The Russians attacked furiously again, it was one of the largest attacks.

We already have 21 dead and four dozen wounded. In total, yesterday they launched:

▪️598 Shaheds and various decoys (they release decoys to blind the air defense system)

▪️31 missiles, including two Kinzhals

▪️12-13 Iskander-M or KN-23 missiles (those are Hwasong missiles from North Korea)

▪️The rest were Kalibr missiles from vessels and Kh-101 missiles from aircraft, which the Russians regularly use

This time, the primary target was Kyiv, where they hit 17 different objects in multiple districts of the city, directly in the center. We have 48 wounded here in Poznan. That was the information in the morning when I prepared the materials.

Of course, among other things, the British Council in Kyiv was also hit (that’s their representation, similar to the Polish Institute in our country) and the location of the European delegation, which, by the way, is led by Slovak citizen Katarína Mathernová, the EU Ambassador.

This means that the Russians, with precision weapons that have an accuracy of up to 5 meters, hit the representative mission of the European Union. Any coincidence is ruled out there. It was intentional to have something explode near the EU diplomatic mission. The effect was perhaps greater than the Russians originally wanted to scare those people, but that’s the principle.

It is an absolute negation of any Russian interest in peace. They systematically continued these strategic attacks. Previously on western Ukraine – we even had an attack in Mukachevo, which is a district town very close to our borders, where they attacked an American factory.

There are only three conclusions to this:

1) The Russians will escalate these attacks; they have absolutely no interest in any negotiations

2) They will increasingly focus on infrastructure

3) And this is an important conclusion – I haven’t caught the Russians declaring that the mentioned factory produced anything for the defense industry. It’s ordinary consumer electronics. It cannot be ruled out that it might also do something for the army, but the Russians would be very happy to boast about it to justify the attack on this target.

But they actually attacked this factory directly. This is proof that the presence of American companies somewhere in Ukraine is not a security guarantee. And at the same time, that Russians attack anything that can harm Ukrainians. And they don’t care at all whether it’s a military target or not. Because if that factory wasn’t involved in anything and is located on the opposite end of Ukraine, it in no way contributed to Ukrainian military potential, nor did it threaten Russian aggressive forces that have no business being in Ukraine.

Moderator: Okay, and what about the Ukrainians?

Pavel Macko: The Ukrainians, of course, are trying to respond as well, escalating their campaign. We’ve seen that they’re now really focusing on the energy industry, Russian oil refineries, but also on important railway junctions.

So the Ukrainians, in return, managed to strike near Moscow, where they actually complicated the fuel supply of Moscow itself. Most recently, they also struck 170 km north of Moscow on an important railway junction, but those were diversionary-sabotage actions. That means they blew up trains with fuel, taking that station and junction out of operation for some time.

They attacked similarly in other areas as well. For example, what we saw – at the beginning of the week they attacked one refinery, then in the middle of the week in Novoshakhtinsk, a refinery in the Rostov region, which set the area on fire. Later it was the Siziran refinery in the Samara region, and the Volgograd refinery already cyclically.

They also attacked the Druzhba oil pipeline. This, of course, was met with great displeasure from the Slovak and Hungarian governments. It should be said here that the Hungarian and Slovak Republics have seriously jeopardized their own energy security, because they are aware that a 3.5-year war has been going on in that area, that this is a legitimate target, but even accidentally it can happen that there will be damage… After all, planes don’t fly over Ukraine precisely because there is a war.

And everyone must count on the same thing, that any critical infrastructure, whether intentionally or accidentally, can become the subject of an attack, or be damaged as a result of combat activities. This happens regularly. And we are shouting about Ukrainians that they are terrorists who are defending themselves, but an explosion next to the building of the European Union diplomatic mission, where our Slovak citizens are, that’s okay?

Not to mention that this is a clear attack on the European Union, the Russians are clearly demonstrating that they will continue to dare. And this confirms what I have been saying for a long time, that if we give the Russians an opportunity, if one presents itself, they will also attack the North Atlantic Alliance and then try to de-escalate very quickly by threatening to use nuclear weapons. This is a proven Russian doctrine, it does not change, it is officially exercised, trained, written, and is also implemented by Russian state bodies and Russian political leadership.

Moderator: And I’d like to ask one more thing. Well, why don’t the Ukrainians do the same? Why don’t they start bombing Moscow?

Pavel Macko: Higher moral standard, and the second thing is, the Russians do it – first, they are supported by rogue states, criminals such as the North Korean regime or Iran, and quietly by China, which is a communist regime, although in China communism as a social system no longer rules, but communists rule there and worse, because they actually use hard profit capitalism with perverse exploitation of child labor, but at the same time, it’s simply a gang of communist party leaders who actually have totalitarian power in the country.

And those regimes of Putin and Xi Jinping are very close to each other. Russia can afford, in quotation marks, to do what it wants because it has a huge nuclear arsenal, which Ukraine gave up according to the Budapest Memorandum, and Ukraine is dependent on the help of all the rest of us. And with politicians like Fico, Orbán, but of course others who are critical now, like Polish President Nawrocky, well, Ukrainians cannot afford to do the same in that war as would be demanded, like the Russians. They simply have to maintain that higher standard.

Moderator: Well, you also mentioned some Hungarian, but that’s not a Hungarian Hungarian.

Pavel Macko: Yes, he has the nickname „Magyar“, otherwise he is a Ukrainian of Hungarian nationality, Major Robert Brovdi, he has been known for a long time. He has always been very active since the beginning of the war, he is a Ukrainian patriot. This proves that it does not depend on ethnicity, but that identification with one’s state and the willingness to defend it against an external threat is primary.

And now, it’s a complete bizarreness, because the collaborationist, anti-Hungarian, and anti-European government in Budapest has even put this ethnic Hungarian fighting for Ukraine’s freedom against external aggression on a list saying that he must not enter the Schengen area for three years. To this, the Poles, again Radek Sikorski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, immediately responded that they are inviting him to visit Poland and that they will ensure his safety on Polish territory, which is also in the Schengen area.

And here I’ll just remind you, it’s good that you asked about that, that Hungary is the gateway and hole for Russian agents and various murderers and arsonists who come to the European Union, because Hungary has simplified the visa regime for Russian citizens at a time when a major war is being waged here.

This means that Hungary’s rhetoric is unpleasant, it is explicitly anti-Ukrainian. Hungary also has territorial claims on Ukraine, so there is a sense of predatory interest there. I’m just shocked and fascinated by where is Slovakia’s national-state interest, because in this case with Druzhba we are talking about the government of the Slovak Republic instead of ensuring energy security, because it knows that it can happen there by accident, stubbornly promotes the interests of a private Hungarian oligarchic company, which actually controls Slovnaft. We so generously privatized it under Mečiar and then our tunnel makers quickly passed it on to a Hungarian company. And actually, one private Hungarian company is now blackmailing two states and the entire European Union because it has political cover. This is a total betrayal of national and national-security interests by Robert Fico and his government.

Continuation of Fighting in Ukraine

Moderator: Let’s go to the battlefields. How are the fights continuing? Is that Russian penetration into the Dnipropetrovsk region serious?

Pavel Macko: Of course, it’s always something worthy of attention, because the Russians are indicating that they could continue beyond those four formally annexed areas, and by doing so, they are literally exposing themselves, I would say, because they reveal those primary goals, that they would really want at least all of Left-bank Ukraine.

I’ll explain for the listeners – Left-bank, when going in the direction of the river flow, everything that is to the left or east of the Dnipro River, so from Kyiv to the east (but the Russians would probably like to get Kyiv too), all the way to the estuary is everything that the Russians would like as a minimum goal. Lavrov confirmed that he wants all of Ukraine.

But when I look at it, so far that penetration is small tactically. On the contrary, the Russians also face the risk that if they get too far, the same thing could happen to them as at Dobropillia, that Ukrainian forces will close the loop around them and they will be surrounded. But the Russians are demonstrating their determination by this.

But there is a broader context here, which I wanted to get to even with those military operations. At that tactical level, the Russians are now systematically bombing bridges across the Dnipro. This means that they are really preparing conditions for the future to disrupt the supply of Ukrainian forces. If they happen to achieve a breakthrough, whether in the Donbas or somewhere else, so that they can advance as quickly as possible to the Dnipro River and to those large population centers of Zaporizhzhia and the city of Dnipro.

This is not imminent yet. When I make a roundup:

▪️In the north, intense fighting, but no change in situation or positions, I mean, whether in Kursk, Sumy, or Kharkiv regions

▪️When we look at Kupiansk, they attacked Sinkivka again. I’ll explain this because until now we’ve been talking about them being beyond the Oskil River in the north, near Kupiansk, where they created such a bridgehead. They are not succeeding in continuing further, so they are again increasing pressure on the opposite bank of the river, just on the northern outskirts of that town of Kupiansk, where Sinkivka is right in the way. So they attacked there now, but those attacks were repelled

▪️When we look at those other directions, Lyman, Toretsk, there are intense battles, attacks were repelled

▪️The situation around Pokrovsk is serious, but it is stabilized. The Ukrainians eliminated that Dobropillia penetration, but that is actually east of Dobropillia. The Ukrainians eliminated this and the situation is more or less static.

Only the Russian pressure is escalating in terms of aerial bombs and other materials. Otherwise, there is no significant breakthrough from either side. We also saw yesterday intensive bombing by Ukraine, whether by drones, even by gliding bombs, of Russian positions along the southern front, in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.

If this continued longer, we would start monitoring it intensively, because it could also indicate that Ukrainians might try to change the situation in this area, but so far it rather looks like it’s preventive.

Moderator: And it’s in the Kharkiv region, not in the Kherson region?

Pavel Macko: I said Kharkiv, I apologize. It’s in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, because I was talking about the south. And it’s exactly there that they attacked their bases, their warehouses, even trains with fuels. And it seems to me that at this moment I would assess it as prevention. Simply put, they are trying to reduce the Russians‘ capacity and strength so that they don’t happen to think about another attack or another offensive in the south.

Middle East

Moderator: The Middle East. Why hasn’t a ceasefire agreement been reached so far? How is the situation developing there?

Pavel Macko: The situation there is of course complicated, there are a lot of emotions around it, as well as many contradictory reactions from politicians on the international scene and the media. Of course, those media, when it’s Al Jazeera, is strongly pro-Palestinian, always looking at it from their angle, then there are international media that try to be objective, then there are Israeli media, which even when they are opposed to Netanyahu, portray the situation a bit differently. So it’s difficult to navigate sometimes.

Currently this week, what happened in the last few days – Hamas formally said that it publicly accepts the Qatari-Egyptian proposal for a 60-day ceasefire, where they would actually also release roughly half of those hostages.

Meanwhile, however, Israel has already approved the plan that we discussed here – a five-phase plan. Now the first phase is running, and that is a plan to conquer the Gaza Strip, to completely control Gaza City and Jabalia, which should complete Israeli control over this area, and then in further phases, the Israelis intend to clean it up, but at the same time later hand over control to some authority other than Hamas.

Why was no agreement reached? Israel first demonstrated that it is capable and ready to carry out that operation. The most intensive phase is to begin no later than October 7th. The preparatory phase is already running, which means that evacuation has occurred, people are being resettled, and at the same time Israel is tightening the noose, which means there is intensive bombing of Hamas positions.

In this area, they have not yet entered with the main force into that space, but they are creating such a closure around that city. To one side, they are letting refugees into camps that are being prepared in the more southern area, and at the same time, they are trying to increase pressure on Hamas.

Quite logically, an agreement was not reached because Israel, in a situation when Netanyahu got approval for this plan, and they also completed that detailed military operational plan last week, wants to increase pressure, because this is just another delaying step from Hamas. Israel wants to resolve it now.

Meanwhile, pressure is increasing to address the humanitarian situation that exists there. The losses are also escalating, and we have also seen large demonstrations in Israel. Because family members are impatient. This is understandable, but there is also the other side of the coin, which says that Hamas has not offered to return your relatives. He offered that part of them, mostly the dead and some of the living, will be returned. And that means, what will happen after those 60 days? The conflict will continue again.

It’s a difficult situation. When we look at the international scene as well, there is strong criticism, largely justified, of the way those operations are conducted by Israel. On the other hand, there is strong support from the United States.

Moderator: And the Czech Republic.

Pavel Macko: I know that, but militarily it’s not that significant.

Moderator: What’s happening in Syria, Lebanon, or in the Red Sea?

Pavel Macko: In Lebanon, the effort to disarm Hezbollah continues. At the same time, we know that next year the mandate of those UNIFIL units will end. And Lebanon, quite logically, in an effort to avoid a larger conflict with Israel, is trying to disarm Hezbollah instead.

Now is the opportune time, because conditions are not favorable for Hezbollah in Syria either. Iran is – I don’t want to say weakened, but certainly its influence is not what it was before, and it has other concerns. It needs to recover from the blow that was dealt to it several weeks ago.

When we look at Syria, the consequences of that conflict in Suwayda are still being addressed. That’s in the southern province, where there were attacks on Druze and fighting between Druze and Bedouins, in which government troops got involved. Israel responded to this. This week we saw strikes from Israel that were on the positions of some Syrian units near Damascus. Behind this is the fact that Israel had some of its reconnaissance-observation and eavesdropping devices, which these troops also attacked. So Israel was cleaning it up there.

The Syrian army – it is not a compact unit. There were various armed factions there, which tried to integrate Kurds in the north. In the south, they integrated various tribes. Today’s president was previously a leader from that main group, which overthrew the government of Damascus with finality. He is trying to integrate it, but we are talking about more than two dozen different groups there. Israel still suspects some of them of being too closely connected with Hezbollah and is trying to eliminate this threat.

I’ll also mention, since the Houthis attacked Israel again, and that was around August 22nd, that’s last time, if we were recording the radar, they sent rockets to Israel, cluster rockets with cluster munitions. And to this, of course, Israeli planes struck back at locations in Sanaa and in other areas at warehouses with fuels and weapons. This means that Israel is responding to this and trying to maintain the safety of navigation in the Red Sea, but mainly to respond to these Houthi attacks.

Strategic Backstage

Moderator: Today I read such an article that the German Chancellor declared that there will be no meeting between Zelensky and Putin. So, the German Chancellor is apparently well informed and knows well what is happening. Palo, what is the state of those preparations for negotiations between Zelensky and Putin?

Pavel Macko: What I’ve been indicating before is being fulfilled, even when we were with Martin Svarovsky at your place in that video, that it will eventually be decided elsewhere. The Russians are looking for pretexts to prevent Putin and Zelensky from meeting. We now saw that attack on Kyiv.

Lavrov has again confirmed that the conditions are not there for it. Putin is willing to meet with Zelensky even when he has in his hands an agreement with which he will definitely agree. At the moment, Putin feels that such an agreement should be the unconditional surrender of Ukraine. Of course, Ukraine not only doesn’t feel up to that, but it can’t do that either.

The latest news also includes those security guarantees about which the Russians spoke so „positively“ and vaguely in Alaska. I have pointed out in several other interviews that we are amateurs even at the highest diplomatic level, that we don’t want to read those nuances. When the Russians say something, what is the nuance there, one needs to weigh not just every word, but every comma, period, and accent mark, because it can completely change the meaning.

The Russians actually just needed to gain time. They are trying to play a big strategic game with the United States and with President Trump, where Putin is gaining the upper hand, because Trump does not have the strength and determination to use the tools he has. He still thinks that for some big deal he will get the Nobel Peace Prize. Of course, he won’t get anything, and the conflict continues.

Trump has now approached India more strongly and increased those secondary tariffs to 50%. That’s a kind of selective approach, because he doesn’t have this resolved with China, but on the other hand, it’s at least an indication that in a situation when the Nobel Peace Prize is not in sight, and he looks like a loser in these negotiations, he has to do something and does what is logical. And there is also talk about some sale of longer-range missiles.

Let’s wait, because we’ll find out when those missiles are already flying. There is, of course, such controversy that meanwhile they were restricting the use of longer-range weapons on Russian territory, but there is also some disharmony between the Ministry of Defense and Trump himself, because that has already happened once with the export of those weapons that had already been approved by the previous government to Ukraine.

When I return to the core of the question – the Russians do not want to negotiate, and most recently they said that under no circumstances do they want security guarantees that would consist of having some troops from NATO member countries. They will not accept that.

This means that the fight will continue to the total exhaustion of one side or the other, and we have to think carefully about what we will do. I mean we collectively, the West including Slovakia, although I give the Slovak government zero chance of helping anything. On the contrary, it is capable of carrying out sabotage against Ukrainians, but at least it has been doing political diversion for a long time.

But it can be expected that it will have to come to increased supplies for Ukraine. Ukraine must withstand this. I don’t quite understand the Russian strategy, because for example this attack on Kyiv was senseless, because they had a far greater number of militarily more significant targets they could attack, and simply they are trying to continue conducting that psychological warfare.

But by doing so, they are actually undermining their efforts. Really that Russian warning finger, that caution, we can also hit your European mission, even that is not safe. That is completely before any efforts for a ceasefire, which paradoxically can unite the EU except for exceptions of these two countries.

Moderator: I heard that Erdogan is preparing some steel dome in Turkey. Is it some kind of equivalent to that Israeli Iron Dome? Or what is it actually about?

Pavel Macko: At the very least, by that naming, because they called it Steel Dome, they are trying to imitate something. Iron Dome is iron as such, and Steel is this hardened iron, which is steel. They deliberately chose that name – Golden Dome was also invented by President Trump.

Turkey previously bought S-400 from the Russians, that didn’t meet with much response. Most recently, it has turned out that the Triumf system is not such a triumph as many would imagine.

Turkey, which by the way, and I wrote about it, and I’ll give advertisement to the continuation of that saga about drones, so in the magazine .týždeň in the latest issue I wrote that Turkey is one of the strong players in the field of military drones and is trying to build something like air sovereignty. After seeing that it is occasionally the subject of some sanctions, because we know that they were excluded from the F-35 program, temporarily also from F-16. They regained that with the nod to the entry of Finland and Sweden, that they will be able to maintain F-16 in an operational state.

This week they presented a system, which is actually something similar, but Iron Dome. That Israeli system is a short-range system and is also for such high intensity of those artillery shells and for lower targets and for rockets, but not for that long distance. This Turkish system is from Turkish manufacturers, they also use their own rockets there. Its plus is that it’s quite an interesting solution according to what is publicly available. It is also designed against drones.

This means that it already reacts, the development is such that this integrated complex system of medium and short range responds to drones and can similarly up to those 30, maximum 50 kilometers act also against rockets. This means that it is also an anti-missile shield.

They should also protect the area around the Dardanelles, Bosphorus, where it is absolutely key infrastructure. It’s such a combination. They have ground stations, they have mobile launchers, 47 launchers. It’s in the first package they put together. But there is also a combination of radars, sensors, both on land and at sea. This means also from naval platforms. And some firing means are also from naval platforms. So I will definitely follow it.

Moderator: But the Turks must not find out that you’re watching it.

Pavel Macko: But no. They know that it is being watched by more significant people than me. And therefore they kept the details relatively secret, because parameters of such a system are commonly given. The Turks kept them secret. This means we don’t really know what the reach, range is there.

Slovak National Uprising and Its Legacy

Moderator: We have already mentioned the 81st anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising in the introduction. At this very time, when we are recording the podcast, the speaker of parliament and the president should already be speaking in Banská Bystrica. We still don’t know if Prime Minister Fico is there as well. So we’ll see when we finish recording this podcast. What would you like to say about the Slovak National Uprising?

Pavel Macko: It seems almost absurd to me that this gang of semi-fascists goes to honor the Slovak National Uprising. They stole the Slovak National Uprising from the Slovak nation. It was appropriated by extremists whose rhetoric is purely neo-Nazi, or then extreme.

A prime minister who, in support of some Bombic or Danny Kollár, shows a White Power gesture, or some right-wing extremist gestures, which are very close to fascism. That’s just something that’s terrible. When you take everything they do, who they ally with, that they’re also thinking about integration with Republika, that they already count on them as a future possible partner, given that Andrej Danko is not able to deliver some MPs, even last time he brought such nobodies there to parliament, and he remained the only one from the Slovak National Party, so it’s bad.

But I’ll put it in context. What do I want to convey? First, I want to greet all the still living veterans of the Slovak National Uprising who fought. When I was still serving, at one of the previous anniversaries I had the honor to present medals to 793 of them on behalf of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces as a deputy chief of the general staff. Unfortunately, it is natural with that age, most of them are no longer alive, there remain just a few. Some of them are active, some less so, but respect and honor belong to all of them.

The message of the Slovak National Uprising is, in my opinion, underappreciated and also profaned by what we just talked about, but also by attacks of such as the Kotleba people, who not so long ago were hanging a black flag on the county office in Banská Bystrica on the anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising.

It should be said, because there will now be many historians talking, and there will be many outputs on this uprising, that that’s why we also left out World War II today. But I’m not going to analyze the uprising itself in detail either. But I want to say, it was an uprising of the Slovak nation, it wasn’t just a handful of rebels. It was that healthy part of the nation, which stood up primarily against domestic fascists, against the domestic regime, which collaborated with Nazi Germany.

And of course the uprising was prepared for a long time. It was then finally accelerated, in the end there was a betrayal, so it had to take place earlier than planned, there was no synchronization of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps, the Soviet army, that they should pass through Dukla and start liberating the territory as quickly as possible together with those two East Slovak divisions, which were actually supposed to let those troops through.

What was essential was that it was primarily an uprising against one’s own domestic Ludak regime, where that healthy part of the Slovak nation rejected this totalitarian regime, which murdered its citizens and even paid for it to Nazi Germany in Reich marks for each killed Jew or Roma. That is something incredible.

The message is also in the fact that they fought. Despite knowing that they were going against overwhelming odds, they fought. They also fought against the Nazis, but it wasn’t a pure uprising just against the Nazis, it was an uprising against a regime that was then supported by the Nazis and who then, when they saw that the regime might collapse, also decided on a massive occupation of Slovakia. But the cause and effect were clear there – the primary cause was dissatisfaction with this regime, which was a pro-Nazi regime.

These heroes, whom I still salute, and the government of moderation and others, proved that one should not say that one must not fight against overwhelming odds. Because we’re now hearing from our government representatives that the occupier will leave one day. No, they stood up and started fighting, because they knew that it was important to stand up to evil, and that when that evil uses weapons, you have to stand up to it with a weapon in your hand.

Today, these government representatives, in a forum other than that podium in Banská Bystrica, would probably say that they were some charlatans who fought instead of capitulating and unnecessarily prolonged losses and war. It’s the opposite. Simply put, there are moments when one needs to resist, and fortunately, the Slovak nation had this moment in that uprising, and it is one of the strongest historical moments. Our nation stood up against evil and did not look at whether they had a chance to win or not. It simply stood up because it was the right thing to do, and therefore I think we should value the message of this uprising.

The current situation is bad and is coming to a head, so we need to say again what all the bad things were that the insurgents rebelled against. What all happened after the suppression of the uprising, that Slovak citizens also participated in it, or mainly in some cases, and what rhetoric they used to discredit these insurgents. What rhetoric some politicians use today to discredit democracy in Slovakia or to discredit Ukraine’s effort to survive under the pressure of external aggression.

360°

Moderator: What’s on your radar?

Pavel Macko: I would mention two things. First, Taiwan and again Africa. Unfortunately.

Moderator: And why Taiwan again?

Pavel Macko: Chinese military exercises are currently taking place around Taiwan. It’s called „Joint Sword“ or „Common Sword“ in that strait. These are Chinese military maneuvers. They were launched last week on August 26th. They continued for several days and practiced a blockade of Taiwan. Precise strikes on key targets.

In short, they wanted to demonstrate that when they decide militarily, they are able to block maritime routes in that strait – the Taiwan Strait. That is the area between Taiwan and mainland China. They also had their own aircraft carrier there. They involved fighter planes and the coast guard there.

One should also mention the political context here. Beijing again labeled the Taiwanese president as a parasite and declared that as soon as he will push for complete independence of Taiwan, that means war.

It is strategically important for us. We’ve already discussed it here in that Taiwan is one of the key manufacturers, a completely dominant manufacturer of semiconductors. Today we can’t move without semiconductors. In one such better upper-middle class car, e.g., in a German one, there are 37-40 thousand different electronic components, while Taiwan produces:

▪️100% of advanced chips for artificial intelligence

▪️More than 90% of advanced chips overall

▪️60% of all semiconductors.

Moderator: Okay, and what about Africa?

Pavel Macko: Well, in Africa, Sudan. We haven’t talked about it for a long time. And that conflict really isn’t subsiding, but is escalating. On one hand, there is a complex situation in Darfur. The Sudanese army and those RSF forces or Rapid Support Forces, or rapid reaction forces, rapid support, are fighting there. Those are those rebellious generals who have their own agenda.

And actually, the siege of the capital in Darfur has been going on for a long time. The fighting continues intensively, recently those government troops have seemingly partially gained the upper hand. On the other hand, we see that in the eastern part there are other rebel groups, which the Sudanese government accuses of being fed and supported by Eritrean forces and politicians.

The situation is deteriorating. If we last talked about 5.6 million internally displaced refugees, today we are talking about 10.8 million people. With that, 25 million people have problems with nutrition and food, who are in immediate danger of famine breaking out.

Of course, the international community is not able to somehow organize, suppress this. That conflict is too strong, we don’t have the capacity and probably not the will to go into such a conflict, because it has already been experienced in Somalia, when in the early 90s those fights were taking place between individual factions. The Americans, when they came to help, in the end it ended with the retreat after the fall of that Black Hawk, because those conflicts are very complicated.

Always, when an external player comes there, and it doesn’t matter what kind of international unit, so always the problem is then that in the end somehow the domestic hostile factions group against external forces. So I mention that conflict because RSF tried to declare as if a competing government. The UN Security Council rejected it against that government, because actually there is still a threat of the disintegration of Sudan.

In a situation when we see that that whole sub-Saharan belt, we talked about it last time, is already in disarray, so this is a further deterioration of the situation. A conflict that has been going on since April 2023 has also exceeded more than two and a quarter years.

Moderator: Unfortunately, the Russians are also meddling in their own way in this conflict. Why? Is it so?

Pavel Macko: Unfortunately, in that we see that the Russians are daring, and that they are that source of instability in the world. And there isn’t even any ideology behind it anymore, just ordinary, God-forsaken stealing and plundering of resources.

Moderator: We’re at the quote, so we’re at the end. Sorry, Palo, let me intervene.

Radovan Macko (publishing director): I would like to announce to our listeners that we are planning to come to them. I’ll interrupt you again. This, who is speaking, is Macko, but not the general. It’s Rado Macko and he’s the publishing director.

I am now announcing an important message to you. Dear listeners, we are coming to you this time on September 12th. We will be broadcasting our security radar with General Pavel Macko at Cinematic in Piešťany at 5:30 PM. We cordially invite you and look forward to seeing you.

Pavel Macko: I am also looking forward to it and will be on the road directly. I will be returning from France, where I have some lectures, but I will be even more motivated to get to the domestic audience.

Quote

Moderator: So, a quote. We mentioned the Slovak National Uprising. Today is a holiday, the anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising. I suggested that it wasn’t just a small group of people. That it wasn’t even just a communist uprising, as it was then profaned during socialism, that the communists appropriated that uprising.

Pavel Macko: So I’ll allow myself such a quote from Kornel Filo, a member of the Slovak National Council for the Democratic Party from 1946:

I must emphasize that this was truly and in all consequences a nationwide uprising, a spontaneous explosion of the entire Slovak nation against Nazi neo-paganism, oppression and enslavement. That part of the nation, which our ill-wishers today so gladly label as reactionary, participated in this national uprising. On the fronts of the Slovak National Uprising, ladies and gentlemen, up to 60,000 Slovak Catholics fought.

See also:

General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar 127 – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar 126 – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar – episode 125 – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

The post General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar 128 appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#coalition of willing #Fico #France #Putin #Russia #security guarantees #Slovakia #Ukraine #USA #War in Ukraine #Zelensky

Leaders of Nordic and Baltic states are discussing possibilities to increase pressure on Moscow at today’s summit in Denmark. Later in the afternoon, they will move to Paris for bilateral negotiations, from where they will connect with other allied leaders tomorrow, together with French President Emmanuel Macron.

The aim of the meeting is:

▪️Clarify what security guarantees the „coalition of the willing“ can provide to Ukraine after the war

▪️Ensure that Russian aggression does not repeat

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte will also join online. „We expect that tomorrow or soon after, it will be clearer what we can provide together. We also want to involve the American side more and clarify how they want to participate in the implementation of security guarantees,“ officials said.

Current Situation in Ukraine

The Ukrainian Air Force reports that it repelled attacks by more than five hundred Russian drones and twenty-four missiles during the night. Residents of Druzhkivka in the Donetsk region faced artillery fire. In total, Russian night strikes injured at least 12 people and caused fires in many places.

Unmanned aircraft also targeted Kyiv, where the British Defense Minister arrived this morning.

„The main targets were civilian infrastructure, especially energy facilities, transport hubs, and even garages and apartments, which the Russians have become accustomed to attacking. Dozens of residential buildings in various regions of our country were damaged during the night.„

Interview with Pavel Macko

Moderator: From tomorrow’s meeting of the coalition of the willing with the participation of Volodymyr Zelensky, can we expect that it will bring clarity to the form of security guarantees for Ukraine? That after this meeting, the guarantees will be more concrete than before?

Pavel Macko: It is definitely a diplomatic effort by President Zelensky and Western leaders. The essential point is that they will discuss what guarantees Ukraine can receive, as it is quite clear that most of these leaders have come to terms with the fact that during the Donald Trump era, Ukraine will not become a NATO member country.

However, what is essential is something completely different, and that is whether we will even reach the point where these security guarantees could be activated. That is, whether we will reach some peaceful settlement or stopping or freezing of the conflict, and some at least temporary peace agreements with Russia. Such a peace agreement would then presuppose ensuring the security and maintenance of the achieved ceasefire or peace, which would be the so-called security guarantees.

Significance of Ongoing Negotiations

In any case, the discussion is important because it addresses what forces, capabilities, and mechanisms should be put in place for such a security guarantee to be provided at all. Of course, all of this will then be the subject of negotiations with Russia, because otherwise the only chance for the implementation of security guarantees would occur if Russian troops were pushed out of Ukraine, which is unrealistic at this moment.

This means that regardless of what they agree on, it will also depend on Russia whether it will agree to it. Especially when Russia is clearly not preparing for peace or a ceasefire, which complicates the preparation of those guarantees – it is not clear what the target state is for which the guarantees are intended.

„It is absolutely fundamental. Simply put, without knowing whether these guarantees will be acceptable to the other side, you are preparing for the unknown.“

During these talks, they are certainly also discussing how to even reach a state where it will be possible to implement these security guarantees. In other words, how to force Russia to enter negotiations on ending this war:

▪️By strengthening economic sanctions

▪️By strengthening Ukrainian capacities

▪️By strengthening Ukrainian capabilities

In short, for Russia to recognize that it no longer has the ability and capacity to gain anything further. After all, the Russians are regrouping and trying to do something because in the last three-quarters of a year, they have not actually achieved any significant success in this war and are constantly prolonging it.

Parameters of Security Guarantees

The parameters of these security guarantees without cooperation with Russia are very broad. Simply put, they must also consider such war plans as what would happen in case these security guarantees were not respected. If, for example, some troops were deployed, what would then be the mechanisms for their activation and possible involvement in suppressing any disruption of the agreed peace process?

Moderator: Let’s move on to what is being considered in more concrete terms. The participation of the United States will be essential. In this context, it is being said that it would consist of American air support for European soldiers deployed in Ukraine, the sharing of intelligence information, and the sharing of command and control systems. Would this form of American participation be sufficient to make the guarantees ultimately functional and deter Russia sufficiently from further attacks?

Pavel Macko: It would be, assuming there would be more than just support during ceasefire monitoring and security status. If the United States provided:

▪️Intelligence support

▪️Strategic air bridge for ongoing support and rotation of these troops (the EU has significant deficits in this area)

It is essential that the United States be prepared to activate massive air support in the event that these peace agreements are actually violated and there is potential contact with Western countries and their armies.

Strategic Significance of American Support

The logic is clear – it is on the European continent, primarily a question of European security, and quite logically, the United States demands that European countries participate in it to the maximum extent possible.

On the other hand, the United States is a key and strategic ally of European countries in NATO and cannot leave them in the lurch. This means that we should pay attention to the words of Mark Rutte, who says that in the classified parts of the talks, the United States must declare unequivocal determination and readiness for maximum possible support in case of escalation, that is, if a ceasefire is violated.

The United States has at its disposal:

▪️Strong air forces directly in Europe and the surrounding area

▪️The ability to project power – to move additional capacities in a short time using aircraft carriers

▪️Naval forces and submarines from which they can launch Tomahawk cruise missiles or similar means

Now it’s about getting this into those agreements and making it visible to Russia as well. Any possible violation in the future could mean massive escalation and a hard hit, including intervention by the United States. This must be clearly communicated to avoid misunderstanding or miscalculation on the Russian side.

Buffer Zone Between Front Lines

Moderator: Is it a realistic idea to create a buffer zone between the Ukrainian and Russian front lines? I’m asking because it would most likely mean the withdrawal of one side or the other from territories that it currently controls.

Pavel Macko: Nothing is impossible, but of course it is a very complicated step. In this situation, it would mean that Ukraine would have to abandon its fortified positions, which are currently holding despite great Russian pressure.

The Russians would also withdraw, but if they maintained an offensive formation, a perhaps 40-kilometer buffer strip – no man’s land – would be created. But if there were no obstacles in it, whether passive, in the form of barriers or minefields, then in case the Russians decided to violate this ceasefire in the future, they would be able to very quickly overcome this buffer zone and continue further.

Strategic Disadvantages of the Buffer Zone

If Ukraine did not build strong new defensive positions at the edge of this buffer zone, and if the peacekeeping forces provided by the guarantors were not able to occupy, monitor, or stop the advance of Russian troops in this zone, it would clearly give an advantage to Russian forces.

Russians simply do not need fortified defensive positions for an offensive, while Ukrainians would need them for possible defense against renewed aggression, or they would need another force that could stop that aggression – and immediately.

Reaction to the Slovak Prime Minister’s Stance

Moderator: I’m interested in one more thing. What do you think Ukrainian President Zelensky will answer when, at a joint meeting, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico protests against Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries, as he promised in China before Vladimir Putin?

Pavel Macko: I think this matter is completely clear. Robert Fico in this case is playing with false cards. If he wants energy security for Slovakia, he should have diversified sources in the first place.

President Zelensky will probably tell him that:

1) Russia has attacked Ukraine

2) Ukraine is defending itself

3) The entire area is a war zone

Therefore, it is logical that even the only source that Robert Fico relies on may be subject to attacks. Ukraine does this in the interest of protecting the lives of its own citizens and as part of self-defense.

Counterproductive Stance of Slovakia

Robert Fico can at most at this moment threaten Ukraine that he will be disloyal and that he will somehow try to block the reverse flow that also supplies Ukraine – whether it’s gas, oil, or the interconnection of energy networks. But that would also be counterproductive, because a detour can be made through other countries. It only puts Slovakia in the position of not a non-cooperating partner, but a neighbor who is stabbing a dagger in the back of an attacked country.

In short, Zelensky will certainly express understanding for Robert Fico’s concerns regarding our energy security, but we have long known that a military conflict is ongoing, that there is a war, and that such infrastructure can also accidentally become the target of an explosion or accident. So I don’t think Fico will achieve anything more.

Moderator: Pavel Macko, thank you.

Pavel Macko: Thank you for the invitation. Have a nice day.

The post Negotiations on Security Guarantees for Ukraine appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

The possible warming of relations and ending of the war from the Trump-Putin summit in cold Alaska quickly cooled down. Allies are discussing security guarantees, which however will not be according to NATO’s Article 5. Hamas would now agree to a temporary ceasefire, but Israel already has a military operation plan.

#France #Macko #Peace negotiations #Putin #Russia #security guarantees #security radar #Trump #UK #Ukraine #USA #War in Ukraine #Zelensky

Transcript of a popular podcast prepader together with the weekly .týždeň.

Moderator: Welcome to listening to the 127th edition of General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar. Welcome, General.

General Macko: Thank you very much, pleasant listening.

Fog of War: Developments in Ukraine

Moderator: What is the development on the two main battlefields? Let’s start with Ukraine.

General Macko: I’ll start traditionally, let’s go to the strategic bombing. Despite intensive negotiations taking place at all possible levels and diplomatic messages, the clearest message of how the Russians mean it was precisely by sending missiles and drones to Ukraine. This makes it clear to everyone what they are after – to drag out time.

The most massive attack was on the night of August 20, where they hit Lviv, Mukachevo, Lutsk, attacking mainly western Ukraine. In Mukachevo, just a few kilometers from the Slovak and Hungarian borders, they attacked an American factory. This is also an answer to those who say that when the United States will mine minerals there, it will be a sufficient security guarantee. This resonated sometime after February, but it’s not like that.

They also attacked the Pavlohrad Mechanical Plant. The Russians still declare that they destroyed stocks of Sapsan missiles. I don’t know that, Ukraine of course doesn’t confirm it anywhere.

Similar to how Ukrainians recently showed the Flamingo missile… In this case, it’s better to stick to the principle „don’t shout hop until you’ve jumped“. Why? It’s clear that Zelensky needs to say such things to boost the morale of his own population and soldiers. But here it’s better to maintain operational security. Russian intelligence services have indications, but they never have precise information, we shouldn’t give it to them.

It’s not good to hint at what I have and what I can do with it. If the Ukrainians wanted to create a real psychological shock, they should have fired that Flamingo at a proper Russian base. It is said that they have already done so, but probably not yet.

The point is that the first moment of surprise is key. Flamingo is a large missile with a large radar signature. It’s a subsonic missile that flies like a cruise missile. This means it will be detectable by Russian systems. The Ukrainians should have done exactly what the Russians do – release a large swarm of drones, confuse Russian systems, and in between send them one proper hit.

We’ll see if the Ukrainians will use those Sapsan or Grim-2 ballistic missiles. Russian claims about their destruction are probably a hoax, just like claims that they destroyed twice as many HIMARS as were ever delivered to Ukraine. And despite that, HIMARS are still firing.

Ukrainian Counterattacks

When we look at the Ukrainian side, of course Ukraine also tried to return these attacks and was relatively successful. They had a massive drone attack from the night of August 19 to 20. The Russians claimed they didn’t cause damage, but independent sources report infrastructure damage in several places.

The Volgograd oil refinery and the railway station in Voronezh were attacked again. Something exploded in the Ivanovo region. Ukrainian intelligence claims that Konstantin Nagayko, the Russian commander responsible for the attack on Kharkiv, was injured in an explosion. It was probably an action by Ukrainian intelligence services.

Summary of the Situation

To summarize, my comment would be that the Russians are dragging out peace negotiations (they claim they no longer want a ceasefire, only peace) and currently, from a strategic bombing perspective, they are concentrating on Ukraine’s industrial base. They are trying to undermine it to the maximum extent possible and intersperse it with attacks on the civilian population. Of course, as winter approaches, they will again concentrate on energy infrastructure to take away their breath.

Developments on the Battlefields

Moderator: How are the Ukrainians doing? Did they manage to stop the breakthrough at Dobropillya?

General Macko: It looks like yes. That initial hit was very successful. This means that Ukrainian forces brought in reinforcements, divided the Russian formation into several parts, but couldn’t completely finish it off. The Russians are of course reinforcing it, but the Ukrainians…

We don’t have a visual aid, of course, we’re in the radio version, but imagine something like an oval with an arm coming out of it – like when you inflate a glove and a thumb sticks out. That was the protrusion at Dobropillya. The Ukrainians blocked it, divided it into several parts, but now they are trying to further attack the base from which that protrusion came, to release the „steam“ from this area.

The Ukrainians are relatively successful at this. It is true that the Russians have the 8th Combined Arms Army there, they have the 51st Combined Arms Army, they attacked there with elements of at least three brigades. Of course, the forces are thin on both sides. If we’re talking about a brigade, it’s certainly not 3,500-7,000 soldiers, because Ukrainians had even larger brigades than the Russians. But the Russians are pushing reinforcements there because they know exactly that if they lose momentum there, they won’t be able to threaten the rest of Donbas.

So now it has stabilized a bit, but it’s basically a success for the Ukrainians – they contained it, pushed back. They also had a small success around Pokrovsk, where for the first time they cleared the interior of Pokrovsk from sabotage reconnaissance groups and slightly its surroundings as well.

On the other hand, the Russians slightly advanced in the vicinity of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk. Not that they would control those cities, but they got a bit further beyond them. They slightly advanced by one settlement in the Dnipropetrovsk region, but from the Russians‘ perspective, this is probably propaganda, suggesting that they could attack in that direction as well.

The last thing I would like to mention – there are signals emerging that the Russians could shift pressure, since they’re not succeeding directly in Donbas, more to the Zaporizhzhia region, to the southern front.

Addition to Dobropillya

General Macko: I have just one note about that. I caught quite a good analysis from the Czech profile Perun. They are guys who have been working with drones for a longer time. They talked about why the breakthrough at Dobropillya happened – the Ukrainians thinned out the defensive lines there. We discussed this a few episodes back, we said that instead of a continuous line, they created „strongholds“ or support points with drone operators.

But of course, the other side also reacts. The Russians have a unit and system called Rubikon, which we also discussed. They use Rubikon in such a way that they don’t attack directly just the first line, but mainly the supply routes, convoys, and destroy the troops‘ supplies. This proved successful for them in the Kursk region, and that’s why the Ukrainians eventually withdrew. They had good terrain there, but it also had a disadvantage – it was channelized, they had only a few valleys and roads through which supplies could be delivered.

Now it’s interesting that NATO has also started building a drone wall or drone barrier in the Baltics. The wall alone is not enough. It needs to be said that you always need a combination of means. In the end, war is always about will, and there must also be a soldier with will.

Moderator: When you mention drones, everyone imagines only those that fly, but now I notice that Ukrainians use many ground drones. Is that real?

General Macko: It is real. I’ll also do a bit of advertising for the weekly, because I started writing a series about drones. This issue contains the history of drones, which might surprise many – drones go back to the First World War. So it’s nothing new.

I recommend getting the latest issue of the weekly. But to return to the question – yes, Ukrainians are significantly progressing with ground drones. They were successful with naval ones, they cleared the Black Sea Fleet from Crimea, and now they are more significantly deploying ground drones.

My conclusion from this is that it’s important. The battlefield is becoming more technological, nobody can stop that, but in the end, every war is a battle of wills. Where there is will, those defend themselves. When we don’t have will, no technology will help us.

Middle East

Moderator: Let’s move to the Middle East. How is the situation developing there? Hamas allegedly already agrees with a 60-day ceasefire. I’ll allow myself an assessment – it’s certainly the result of Israeli pressure that they agree.

General Macko: Definitely, because Israel announced that it’s no longer going to negotiate. They approved the decision to go and occupy the rest of Gaza. We discussed those goals and stages in detail last time. Last week, Israel started planning a detailed military plan. They had a strategic plan, which we discussed, and the detailed military plan, which I hinted at last time, Israel has now announced that they have completed it.

The Americans pressed Hamas or the Palestinians to engage in negotiations. Hamas announced that it is ready to negotiate. Because they said they are ready for another 60-day ceasefire.

Netanyahu, of course, said: „You know what, we’ve already decided and we’re going to strike you, we have a military plan.“ Netanyahu has now suspended those operations, but again, it’s more of a negotiating strategy, a communication strategy, because militarily he already has things prepared. After all, we all know that those measures were set up so that only preparatory military activities are to take place now. The main task is only from October 7, because they said they would start at the earliest on October 7, and they would also symbolically start the sharp combat phase on the anniversary of Hamas‘ attack from October 7, 2023.

So now these are the so-called „shaping operations“ or „forming operations“, where they are building conditions… On August 8, they already issued an evacuation order for people to leave Jabalia and Gaza City. Now logistical infrastructure is being built in the south. So regardless of what Netanyahu said, the main combat operations would not have started anyway. But he created space and pressure on Hamas by that: „You know what, this is the last chance, we’ll suspend it, and this is the last chance for you to come to an agreement. We won’t go and kill all of you, but you won’t be in power anymore, you must leave the Gaza Strip, there will be some other authority instead of you, and you must demilitarize.“

And they don’t want that. They don’t want it because again the trick with the two-month ceasefire is: „Okay, so out of those 50 hostages, we might return 30 dead ones and 10 live ones, and we’ll keep those 10 again and we’ll drag out time again.“

Despite all the criticism of Israel at this moment, it’s good that Israel is pretending to be more restrained and wants to wait and see what Hamas actually agrees to. And if it doesn’t meet its parameters, it will pressure them: „Okay, I’ll pull out not from the drawer, but from those topographic pouches, the battle plans, and we’ll go and finish it.“ Or we’ll agree in such a way that we won’t have to negotiate on another ceasefire, that this will already be a permanent ceasefire.

We’ll see how it develops, but in the meantime, during that week, exactly what happened was that they completed that military plan. Operational and tactical planning has some time sequence. I’ve been dealing with this for years, also at allied levels. Those large contours of the plan were clear, different alternatives, so-called „branch plans“ – branching of plans, what will be if… – to calculate all possible reactions. And Israel has now completed this.

Meanwhile, some security operations continued. There was bombing again in southern Lebanon. Here I just remind that Lebanon is disarming Hezbollah. The Lebanese government has issued clear instructions to disarm Hezbollah.

Netanyahu appears a bit controversial, with his tough talk and speaking about Greater Israel. That’s fine to some extent, but what disturbs me, and maybe it’s counterproductive, is the further expansion of settlements in the West Bank, because it will provoke further reactions that divert attention from the core of the problem, which is now in Gaza.

Moderator: I would like to ask about those settlements, because to laypeople like me, it sounds like: „Well, they’ll build a few houses there, so what? What could bother anyone about that?“ What is the principle issue with building those settlements?

General Macko: The principle is that the West Bank, according to the original UN resolutions when the state of Israel was created, was assigned to the Arabs. After the Arabs expelled… we were saying here that Israel, when it was established, had about 750,000 inhabitants. And the Arabs in that first Arab-Israeli war, when Czechoslovakia was still supplying weapons and aircraft to Israel for it to survive at all, in response to their being unsuccessful in that war and not destroying the state of Israel, expelled 850,000 Jews from their countries where Jews had lived for centuries. That’s more than the population of Israel itself.

So the Israelis placed them on their territory, but it was dense there and there isn’t water everywhere. In the desert, it’s not easy. So these Israelis, for at least 20 years, or Jews, were in refugee camps. Many established settlements, they said: „Okay, when you expelled them from your countries and we no longer have space in what was allocated to us,“ so they established settlements and settled those Jews also in territories originally assigned to Arabs and built some settlements there.

Now it’s controversial because if some two-state solution is to be made in the future, then Israeli settlers, when there is suitable land, want to go there and they go into the risk that they will be in that hot cauldron with a population that doesn’t want them there, and they still build settlements there.

It’s exactly like when the Russians bring their own people everywhere… That’s why it’s controversial, because it disrupts the compactness of the territory, and the Arabs fear that in the future, when there is some arrangement, Israel will also claim that part of the territory because it already has settlements there.

Strategic Backstage: Trump-Putin Negotiations

Moderator: Since the last radar, the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska took place, followed by Zelensky’s negotiations with Western leaders in Washington. It even looked like a trilateral Putin-Trump-Zelensky meeting could take place this week. But I didn’t believe it at all. But it’s starting to get complicated again. How do you personally evaluate that development? You certainly see it through slightly different eyes than we laypeople.

General Macko: What we more or less agreed on with Martin Swarovsky, when we were last at your place in a joint video before the negotiations, is being fulfilled – that we don’t have great expectations from these negotiations.

Why? Because I also have to look at the symptoms that accompany it. If you give an ultimatum to someone like Putin, and then you yourself send your emissaries, that was Witkoff, who went to Moscow two days before the ultimatum expired, and that meeting in Alaska was arranged, which is fine…

I also supported it, because the United States, unlike our Minister of Foreign Affairs or Prime Minister, have that displacement and are the player that can contribute to ending the conflict. They have all the tools for which the Russians would have to think whether they want to go into confrontation with the United States, or they realize that they cannot win that war anyway, so it’s better to end it.

The problem is that when you send negotiators and then the ultimatum expires and despite that, the Russians don’t agree to a ceasefire, you’re sending a signal that you don’t have the will to continue and bring things to an end. It could have been done like this: „Okay, we’ll negotiate in Alaska, but a ceasefire must occur by August 8, and when it doesn’t… then we won’t negotiate.“ Or: „We’ll negotiate, but when a ceasefire doesn’t happen, I’ll impose sanctions in the meantime, and when we agree in the negotiations, I can suspend or cancel them, but since I’ve given an ultimatum once, I must keep it.“

Otherwise, we teach the opponent that we are not so determined, we are not so decided, and therefore they will drag out time with us. And that’s exactly what happened.

I laconically noted on social network X that the problem today is that the Russians have nothing, but they have a lot of vodka and will. And we have almost everything, but we don’t have that will. And therefore, in the end, not our economic strength, not the military strength of the collective West, not Ukrainian determination, but Russian will to continue in that war will prevail, and the Russians will drag out time.

So very briefly: In Alaska, there were indications that the negotiations could lead to a result, but neither side said the complete details. The good news was that Trump, after Merz and company intensively negotiated with him before, and Zelensky too, doesn’t dare to accept something right away, but he didn’t want to appear as the bad one who would a priori accept Russian demands. That’s why he adjourned it and said that we’re almost close to an agreement, but… this is a quote: „Until everything is agreed, nothing is agreed.“ That’s what President Trump said at that press conference, where he gave the first word to Putin.

Then he said he would consult with allies. He consulted with allies, the allies even with Zelensky traveled to the White House. Those negotiations were constructive, but with two major strategic conclusions:

1) The first was that the US will not provide troops for potential security guarantees. What is leaking, although no one will confirm it to you, is that more or less internally, the United States is reconciled with the fact that Ukraine will have to cede territory – but not just any territory for any territory, but Donbas, that it will have to cede. And that is the „Fortress Donbass“ or „Donbass fortress“, which has been fought over not for 3.5 years, but for 11 years.

I’ll remind you that when that Russian war started, the Russians occupied, with those so-called rebels, who were actually members of the Russian intelligence service, or Wagner Group members, or „soldiers on vacation“ (Russian soldiers on vacation), also Sloviansk. Ukrainian forces conquered it and pushed them out, and that’s when they built that strong defense in Donbas. And that was also Lysychansk, that was also Severodonetsk, which later fell. Then Bakhmut also fell, but they still have that rampart, fortification, and those economically important cities.

So the Ukrainians cannot surrender this, because firstly, the Russians were not able to conquer it militarily. Maybe they will gain it in 10 years, but until then, if the West did exactly what it should, Russia would collapse and economically would have to accept other conditions.

So it was said that the United States does not support Ukraine in NATO. Well, strategically, they probably agreed with Putin: „We won’t provoke you, you need guarantees.“ Putin himself said in Alaska that Ukraine also needs guarantees. So it was agreed that they would agree. And that’s always such… I say that what happens behind the scenes is important.

Western allies, since they knew that the United States would not go into direct confrontation, that they don’t have too much will to push for sanctions, and that at the same time Trump is impatient and wants to have it over with as quickly as possible, so they said they would give security guarantees. And those were then negotiated during the week.

So if it won’t be Article 5, we all knew that Ukraine cannot be admitted to NATO now during the war, but until the last moment, not only Jens Stoltenberg, but also the new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, assured that it’s only a matter of time before Ukraine will be in NATO. And now we’re deviating and saying that we’ll give it other security guarantees.

I don’t want to say I don’t believe them, but it’s important for Putin to believe it. Because if something is to deter you, you must be convinced that the other side will do it. I’ll translate it for laypeople: If we say that we’ll give security guarantees such that peace will be agreed and we’ll put troops there to supervise the implementation of the agreement and the Russians will also know about it, then the Russians would have to agree with it, because otherwise they won’t sign the peace or it will be a pretext for them to continue the war.

Theoretically, we wouldn’t have to ask the Russians. But it would have to be credible, because all those security guarantees lie in the fact that it doesn’t matter whether you put 5,000 or 500,000 soldiers there. In the end, it must be that if after the conclusion of peace, Russia attacks Ukraine again, those who provide security guarantees go to war with Russia. I don’t mean by that that they go to destroy Moscow, but at minimum they will go into a sharp war with it to kick it out of Ukraine. And until Putin has the feeling that this is absolutely guaranteed, he won’t believe it.

2) The second thing is the United States, and here I will be positive towards the United States. The United States said they won’t put troops on the ground. It’s quite logical, because it’s really the case that we, Europe, have the primary interest in security in Ukraine. And therefore quite logically, J.D. Vance, with whom I don’t have to agree on everything, says: „So put your own troops then.“

But the United States must have a firm commitment, even if they won’t have a commitment in Article 5 to Ukraine, they must have a firm commitment to their allies. And they also said that they will support us from the air. And that air support can be logistical. They have a huge transport fleet, so they can quickly bring in supplies and reinforcements for allied troops.

It can also be combat. They have combat aircraft, we’ve seen that they can, with those aircraft carriers and aircraft they have in Europe today, and with tankers they can bring in, get to that area very quickly. They can maintain what they maintained over Iran – continuity of combat operations. Not that we fly for 3 minutes, fire a missile, and have to land. They can keep aircraft in the air, they can create continuous pressure, they have means like long-range missiles and the like. So theoretically, they could do it.

And now we see Russia’s reaction – at this moment, Russia is starting to speculate. They say that China should also be in those security guarantees. Logically, it seems fine. On the other hand, we in Europe can probably say that we don’t need it. The Russians are creating an axis with China and North Korea. And besides North Korean soldiers, we don’t need Chinese soldiers in Europe either. Let China guard its space in Asia nicely and not stick its horns into Taiwan, the Philippines, and beyond, where it’s pushing. Certainly not into Europe. Because that wouldn’t be a true guarantee.

And the Russians want such a guarantee… I can imagine, for example, Turkish troops as separation troops. Because the Turks have relatively good relations with both sides. We’ll see how it develops. But I’m starting to suspect that the meeting, as you suggested, won’t happen. Already now, the Russians are saying that they first need to negotiate things at the working level. Trump has actually already said that the Russians and Ukrainians should go to negotiations themselves.

And here I’ll give a final anecdote. President Trump boasted. First, he said that he had already closed or ended 5 wars. Then 7. Now he said 7. I’ll leave it for another podcast, but I want to say that, for example, between Serbia and Kosovo, there was no imminent war threat. That was virtual from Trump.

Where credit can be given to him is certainly in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, because those parties also negotiated with the White House. And they also humiliated Putin because they went to close it in Washington with the assistance of the United States. And the United States is also involved there in the corridor between Karabakh and Armenia.

When we look at India and Pakistan, Pakistan nominated Trump for the Nobel Prize and India says you had no hand in it at all, you weren’t involved. And finally in Cambodia and Thailand, yes, China and the United States assisted with that, pushed, but the mediator was ASEAN. The Prime Minister of one of the ASEAN countries was the main sponsor who secured that agreement. But of course, these two big ones, the USA and China, gave that political-strategic signal that they are behind that agreement, they are pushing for it, and so it happened.

Weapons Deliveries for Ukraine

Moderator: How will it be with weapons deliveries for Ukraine?

General Macko: These weapons deliveries continue, various formats are being negotiated. What was said holds true, that the United States will sell those weapons to NATO and NATO will pass them on to Ukraine. Financial mechanisms are being sought for how to finance it. I think this will continue.

Several initiatives have been announced, because here we need to have a clear scenario: As long as Russia keeps dragging out the war, Ukraine needs that support and help. We’ve seen that Trump is even using his so-called „presidential drawdown authority“. This means that without Congressional approval, he can reduce part of the army’s supplies. Here we’ve returned to the regime that was roughly under President Biden.

But for domestic politics, President Trump now has an excuse, because he’ll say: „I did everything for there to be peace, but the Russians won’t listen, so I have to help the Ukrainians.“

Moderator: Yesterday he even said that Biden forced the Ukrainians only to defend themselves, that war cannot be won by defending and that the Ukrainians should attack. Did I explain it correctly?

General Macko: Bingo! That’s exactly what I said back in April of last year, when I said that everyone says Trump is unpredictable. We knew that. I said, prepare for a roller coaster.

But what was essential was that I said that Trump, if he gets angry, can go into it radically. And those are the remarks about whether Zelensky is willing to attack Moscow and so on. Because it’s like this: Even if Ukraine doesn’t want to defeat Russia on Russian territory, in defense you can avoid losing. But you can never win. No war was ever won by defense.

Anniversary of August 21, 1968

Moderator: Yesterday we commemorated that sad anniversary of August 21, when the Russians invaded us. You, from what I know, were also at some memorial events. But I would first ask you if you could comment on such a simple fact that Prime Minister Fico didn’t say a word about it.

General Macko: I think it’s completely clear. In ’68, the world was divided into two camps. And our ancestors had no choice. And despite that, they had collaborators here who legitimized the entry of Soviet troops.

As Juraj Mesík wrote yesterday in a commentary for one newspaper – let’s tell the truth, that people didn’t write about Soviets anywhere when those Russians came here. They wrote „Russians go home!“ And by Russians, they meant that empire. Now we’re not talking about nationalities that they drove into it from their country and those partner states.

But when they came here, we still had collaborators who sanctified it. But back then our ancestors couldn’t help themselves against that enormous superiority that rushed in here during the night. But today we can choose. And today we have collaborators here who are again speculating to go this same path, and it’s outrageous that the Prime Minister did not comment on this.

But something else is also outrageous. Foreign Minister Blanár did comment. And purely technically, if I didn’t know what he said before and who he is, what he said was correct.

Even the President expressed himself. I allowed myself to needle him and troll him yesterday, because the President said that we must be in the European Union and NATO to not experience something like this, for it not to be repeated. So I’ll remind everyone, and I’ll be bad and biased, that the President began his presidential campaign by taking a photo with the Russian Federation’s Ambassador Bratchikov. And that testifies to his sincere interests in Russia, where he still hasn’t understood that Russia is an aggressor, that Russia has been conducting this imperial policy for the last 300 years, and that we should be on guard against Russia, and not collaborate with them or collect points from misguided citizens who would even today welcome these occupation troops on our territory.

Moderator: And where did you spend yesterday?

General Macko: I spent it in Trnava. It’s true that Patrik Lenghart, a university teacher, an activist, convinced me to also join a civic association, an activity called „Wednesday,“ where we are trying to limit the influence of foreign powers, in this case Russia, here, because the Russians are trying to create again an atmosphere in Slovakia like the one that preceded the invasion in ’68.

So I was with Michal Kocáb in Trnava, there were also artists who supported it. It was a more than two-hour event, we were reminiscing about the symbolism of these events, but also those threats and what is happening in Ukraine, what is the connection between what is happening in Ukraine, the year ’68, and what can happen to us if we’re not careful.

This same thing was expected from our government. It didn’t have to explicitly attack Russia, but it should have given a clear signal to citizens: „This is happening in Ukraine and that’s why we’re going to support Ukraine and our common interests within Europe.“

And do you know what the Prime Minister did? It’s not that he didn’t express himself. The Prime Minister also made the headlines of Indian newspapers. I follow those English-language and Indian ones, where he made headlines. And for what does our Prime Minister make world headlines? He didn’t get there with any reform, he didn’t get there with anything extraordinary that would be in Slovakia. Slovakia got to the headlines of world media the most during his governments when they killed Kuciak, when he attacked Macron and called everyone in the West warmongers. And now again, because he said that Slovakia will block all European support activities towards Ukraine.

History of the Second World War

Moderator: Let’s go to history, the cycle from the Second World War. Last time we discussed the Balkans, if I remember correctly. What was happening to the east of us?

General Macko: This worked out for us and factually it’s not a plan, I can tell the listeners. Because the original plan was that we would get to the Slovak National Uprising, but that can’t be realized, that war was longer, more complex.

We’re missing from that picture, when we take from the year ’40 to ’41, the Soviet Union and what was happening in its surroundings. And a lot was happening there. Outwardly, the Russians or Soviets pretended to be a neutral power, but in reality, they were very active.

I’ll remind that we discussed the Winter War, and it ended in March 1940 with some peace agreement. The Winter War with Finland. The Russians understood that they wanted to have that Karelia to secure the defense of Leningrad then, but they knew that they couldn’t turn Finns into Russians, so they left the rest alone, because they got a beating right in that first phase anyway. In the second phase of the Winter War, they were a bit more successful.

But what continued? The Soviets continued to cooperate very intensively with Nazi Germany. They were allies. When we look at spring-summer 1940, they expanded and occupied – they did an Anschluss – the Baltic states: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia under the pretext of protecting their western border. They called it „securing the western border“. And as if they were protecting these nations. So in June they occupied them. And in July they immediately annexed them. They created Soviet republics in these three countries and annexed them.

In June 1940, the Soviet Union also forced the cession of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia from Romania. That’s today’s Moldova. In the fall, the Soviets under Stalin tried to conduct diplomacy. They plotted even more with the Nazis.

I remind that the Soviet Union on September 17, 1939, attacked Poland, 17 days later than Slovakia and Nazi Germany. And they divided Poland between them. So Stalin, based on those Molotov-Ribbentrop pacts, tried to get closer to Hitler and Nazi Germany. They wanted to divide Europe and the world.

So Molotov in November 1940 visited Berlin, where he negotiated about the possible entry of the Soviet Union into the pact of three powers, which was Germany, Italy, and Japan. In short, the Soviet Union still in November 1940, for its dirty imperial interests, after it stole the Baltics, after it stole Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, wanted to become part of the fascist axis of Germany, Italy, and Japan. I’m just reminding all those Russophiles.

On June 22, 1941, a breach was made to that, when the Germans attacked the Soviet Union. That’s why the Soviets say, because you have to translate those words, „treacherous attack“, because even under communist propaganda, you’re older, Jeno, you remember it, that they always said „treacherous attack on the Soviet Union“. That was in those Czech documentary films. Treacherous in that they were the closest allies of Nazi Germany and it betrayed them when it already saw that they weren’t sufficiently prepared, and implemented Operation Barbarossa.

Moderator: What military operations did the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, so this word I’ve already removed from my vocabulary, undertake in this period, besides that Winter War?

General Macko: Let’s say directly Bolshevik Russia – the Bolshevik Communist Party was then called the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). Literally.

Well, that occupation of the Baltics, that was a lightning military operation without a declaration of war, where they actually sent units, occupied strategic points, and forced governments to resign. Now, that’s why I’m reminding of this, this is exactly like through carbon paper, this is what the Russians do systematically. They did it in ’68 here, they landed at Ruzyně, stole, took our political leadership to Moscow, and subsequently established their regime here, installed their people here, with whom they then ruled.

They even forced on us a treaty, which our Prosecutor General Maroš Žilinka, an associate of this Petrushev, where he goes to the Hermitage and walked with him a few years ago, talked about, and that’s such a shame. He said that it was an excellent treaty, that it was far better than the defense cooperation agreement with the United States.

And this is Slovakia, and this is what we don’t realize – those threats, that the Russians are coming, and it doesn’t matter whether it was Tsarist Russia, whether it’s Bolshevik Russia, whether it’s now post-imperial Russia. The Russians have always done this – they occupied key squares on the chessboard, replaced the pieces, took control, when they couldn’t control, they destroyed everything with bombs, missiles, tanks.

Moderator: How did the neighbors react to everything that those Russians got up to?

General Macko: Well of course, and that’s another explanation of why history sometimes happens as it happens. Because besides this, they also conducted covert operations and repressions in those occupied territories.

Just as here after 1945, even before the communists took power here, they exported people illegally to gulags, they did this in these countries too. The NKVD, which was the predecessor of the KGB, the Soviet secret police, carried out extensive purges, deportations, arrests in newly occupied territories, to destroy potential resistance and ensure Sovietization. This is what would await Ukrainians if Ukraine fell, this is what would await all of us if they fell.

So the reaction of those countries was quite clear. Poland was dismantled. There was only domestic underground resistance there, but it was dismantled. Finland, since it lost territory in that war, after the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union, quite understandably joined the German side, because they hoped to at least recapture lost Karelia.

Romania also had to cede that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in 1940, so later it joined the German invasion against the Soviet Union. Hungary was watching very carefully, because when they occupied that Bessarabia and Bukovina, the Russians came closer to the borders of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, which was then in Czechoslovakia, but the more southern part was Hungarian-speaking, and the Soviets pushed in there. So Hungary also joined the war against the Soviet Union alongside Germany.

I mentioned Poland, and the Slovak state – we had relatively normal relations with the Soviet Union and under the influence of those events, we also joined and sent the Rapid Brigade on June 22, 1941.

In other words, with its disgusting imperialist policy, Russia pushed those countries, which could have been either neutral or perhaps even allies with them, into Hitler’s fold, because in the end, those countries had no other choice if they wanted to survive. They had to join where they thought they would be better off.

360°: Africa

Moderator: What’s on your radar, Pali?

General Macko: I have several things there, but it’s Africa again. That’s a beautiful area. The main thing that caught my interest from those agency reports is that the Nigerian army reported on a significant operation in the Lake Chad basin, where they eliminated the highest leader of Boko Haram.

This drew attention also because of the importance of that region, because we’re talking about Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. The operation is considered quite a big blow to the jihadist group, which has been plaguing that region with violence for more than 10 years. These are just hard-core jihadists.

Besides that, there was an interesting incident that a bomb exploded near a military air base in Colombia, as if violence was returning there. There was a fight there also with Maoists who were hiding in the mountains. Tension in Syria, intra-Syrian tension, was renewed in connection with the 12th anniversary of the deadly chemical attack near Damascus. These are such unresolved problems.

But what stood out to me the most was that Boko Haram.

Moderator: And what actually is Boko Haram?

General Macko: Boko Haram was founded in Nigeria, in the northeast, by some Muhammad Yusuf in 2002. By the way, it’s similar to how Hamas was formed. There was also a Yusuf there who founded Hamas.

It started as a religious movement that opposed Western-style education. Actually that „Boko Haram“, „haram“ means forbidden, and that „Boko Haram“ was like „we don’t want this Western education“. Just as the Taliban started in Madrasas somewhere in Pakistan, and also tried to return to Islamic conservatism, Sharia law.

But of course, subsequently it began to radicalize there. Yusuf was killed outside of court during skirmishes, they had a new leader, and he was no longer concerned with education or culture, but with a hard jihadist uprising. First they focused on Nigeria, then they went to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger and exploited the permeability of borders and those various ethnic ties. And they started to stick their necks out.

I remember that they kidnapped schoolgirls, raped them, but that’s less known now. In 2015, they then pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. The Islamic State was supposed to be a worldwide caliphate, Islamic, that would control the whole world. And they declared themselves as the West African province of the Islamic State.

And just a statistic: That uprising caused 350,000 deaths, 3.2 million displaced people in that area, in the Lake Chad basin. Of course, agriculture, trade, access to health services were significantly disrupted.

So a multinational joint operational group was then formed there, composed of units from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, who tried to fight against them. Then we had units in Mali, even international ones, and a European mission, which also tried to help locals in Mali against these Islamists.

But in Mali, what then happened was that a military junta seized power and kicked out these units as well.

Moderator: And what do the Americans, French, and Russians do with these juntas, with those local ones, in this area?

General Macko: And this is interesting, because we discussed within the Security Radar that a belt of those West African juntas was created. ECOWAS was 15 countries that were in that sub-Saharan area and West Africa, which cooperated as an economic association like the European Union or something similar. And they broke away, because there is a junta in Mali, in Burkina Faso, and also in Niger. We discussed this recently.

And now what happened? The United States, along with the French, had a base in Niger, from where, in cooperation with those local governments, they helped fight against these Islamists, jihadists. After the junta took power in Niger, they kicked them out, so the United States and France withdrew their troops and left that area.

Moderator: And imagine who is there…? Can I guess? Russians.

General Macko: Exactly. The Russians wormed their way in there, the Wagner Group came there first, and now the Russians have done it in such a way that they created the Africa Corps. By the way, the Africa Corps is a Nazi legacy from the past, Erwin Rommel commanded it. So the Russians have now built, following the model of those Nazis, the Africa Corps. These are basically successors to the Wagner Group, but the Russians now openly admit that they are supported, financed, and sponsored by the Russian Ministry of Defense.

These are trying to do several things there. First, to keep those juntas in power, to help them against the Islamists, because they disrupt order there, and mainly to mine diamonds and other minerals. To earn money.

Russia is strategically focused on this – they are trying to monopolize. This is also in Ukraine. There are large gas deposits around Crimea and in some parts of Ukraine. When the Russians take it, Europe will still be dependent only on Russian gas or from the rest of the world.

This is something that happened – after the collapse of the colonial empire, the Western world seemed to be less interested in Africa, abandoned it. 65% of natural resources today are controlled by China, and Russia is trying to grab the rest as quickly as possible.

Moderator: And what about the French?

General Macko: The French, unfortunately, are gradually leaving from there. They are losing influence there, even though they were former French colonies.

And the Russians, exactly as always. Let’s take it. In Europe, the Russians say that they still celebrate victory over fascism, even though they brought the second totalitarianism. And a moment ago we said that they were close allies – the Soviets and the Nazis. So although the Russians say, they maintain that tradition that they fight against fascism, at the same time they are the biggest sponsor and supporter of these extreme right-wing movements throughout Europe.

And in Africa, they do the same – they say that they help countries against former colonialists and the like. And gradually, in silence, they build their Russian colonies there. I just remind that in reality, Russia, where its territory is today, never built colonies and went straight to annexation. As Putin said, where the foot of a Russian soldier steps, it is ours. „This is ours.“

And this is a message probably also in connection with the anniversary of August 21, 1968, and the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Russian troops have already entered here twice. And that’s why Putin still thinks he has a claim to this whole Central and Eastern Europe. And it would be ideal for him if there were puppet governments here, like in Belarus. Because Lavrov also said this week that it’s not just about some territories in Ukraine. That they want to have such a political regime in Ukraine that they need and want.

And this is actually a warning and the main message of this week. Beware, these are permanent Russian imperial interests, here and in Africa. They will have cutthroats, killers there just to keep those countries under their influence.

Quote at the End

Moderator: What could perhaps be a quote for this difficult week?

General Macko: I’ve been saying for a long time that Russian imperial policy has not changed from Tsarist Russia through Bolshevik Russia to the present day. It’s just called differently. And that Putin dreamed of re-establishing Greater Russia. He’s a man from the KGB, raised on one teat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other from the KGB, and that stayed with him.

And that these people, supporters of Russia, like our red revolutionary Blaha and similar ones, actually still preach some Red Revolution, which, regardless of the victims, is supposedly the best for society.

So I’ll remind what none other than Sir Winston Churchill said about this regime: „Everyone sees how communism decomposes the soul of a nation, makes it miserable in peace and vile in war.“

Read also:

https://pavelmacko.sk/2025/08/14/general-pavel-mackos-security-radar-episode-125/

Analysis of the Situation on the Ukrainian Front with General Pavel Macko – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

The post General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar 127 appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#360 #Alaska Summit #Fog of War #Macko #peace talks #Putin #Russia #stategic bombing #strategic backgroung #Trump #USA #War in Ukraine #Zelensky

Full transcript of the popular podcast in weekly .týždeň . Originally released Aug 15, 2025 (in Slovak).

Welcome to listening to the 126th edition of General Pavel Macko’s security radar, whom I welcome here.

Pavel Macko: Thank you, have a nice day.

Fog of War

Moderator: Trump and Putin’s meeting will begin literally in a few hours. We’ll return to the preparation and expectations in the background. On the battlefield, or even in the rear, nothing indicates that the war should end. So, Pali, what’s the development?

Pavel Macko: Exactly. We see that both sides are trying to achieve the maximum until the last moment. That means, no slackening of troop activity, that they are preparing to take some advantageous defensive positions, but intense fighting is taking place.

Moderator: I’ll start with strategic bombing. I just read that Ukrainians attacked some cargo ship with weapons.

Pavel Macko: I just caught this from you, that it’s an Iranian cargo ship in a port in the Caspian Sea, where they were transporting Shahed drones. This is a sign that both sides are going all out until the last moment. When we look at Russian strategic attacks, it has quieted down a bit in terms of cities. Nevertheless, the Russians attacked Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro on the 8th. On 10.08, they attacked in the Dnipropetrovsk region and claim to have destroyed 4 Patriot launchers and a radar, which should probably affect air defense. On the 14th, they attacked in Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk.

Russian intelligence says they focused on Sapsan or Grim-2 missile systems. They claim to have eliminated Ukraine’s capability in the area of these deep strikes.

I’ll comment on this a bit. The destruction of Patriots wouldn’t be something exceptional; we’ve seen it before. 4 launchers, that’s about half of a fire battery. It’s a serious loss because they’re looking for every single launcher. Here’s just my note, because even before, when they destroyed some part of a Patriot near Kyiv more than a year ago, it turned out that it had been sitting in one place for too long.

This is a mobile device. It is, of course, used for strategic defense in the case of Ukraine, but it needs to be moved. That means moving and implementing measures that the Iranians experienced – that we must have these devices protected. Not only against those large missiles that shoot it down but also against drones and other devices that its radar doesn’t normally see. That means, multi-layered defense must be done.

We’ll see if this is confirmed or not. Of course, it would be unpleasant, but again, this is a big war where neither side can remain without losses.

As for the destruction of Sapsan, I’m not sure if they really managed to liquidate these factories. Whether they tried to do it, whether it wasn’t just about the launchers somewhere in Sumy, but that there are those military armories in Dnipropetrovsk.

Here, I would say that sometimes silence is golden. I understand that President Zelensky needs to boost morale and that he talks about „we have already tested those rockets, we are ready,“ but when he presents it too publicly, he draws a lot of attention, because the other side will evaluate it as a real threat and will do everything to destroy it. It would be more sensible to produce a few hundred and then announce it and the next day make a flurry. But whether they really destroyed it or not, we will see by whether the Ukrainians will use them.

Moderator: Well, and what about the Ukrainians then, how are they doing?

Pavel Macko: The Ukrainians were also extremely active. You already mentioned that last event now, which I haven’t studied in depth yet, but when we look, they attacked virtually every day:

▪️August 9 in the Volgograd region – a refinery in Volgograd, by the way, the smoke can still be seen even now

▪️August 10 in the Belgorod region – ammunition depot

▪️August 11 in the Bryansk region – a railway junction used for military logistics (by the way, this was also part of that Kursk operation, that there was a possibility to eliminate several of those directions)

▪️August 12 in the Krasnodar Territory – they attack there often, but now they attacked fuel storage tanks, and not with air drones, but with naval drones

That means, they actually sailed across the entire Black Sea and hit with naval drones, which are in the Sea of Azov and hit coastal storage tanks. So it wasn’t quite the eastern Black Sea coast, but it was in the Sea of Azov. That means, they had to get to it or pass by Kerch unobserved under the Kerch Bridge.

Moderator: So that definitely caught my interest. I’m just waiting for when that Kerch Bridge will come up.

Pavel Macko: I think that at the moment it’s not such a priority that they would invest too much in it. The Russians are guarding it, and it wouldn’t give any operational advantage to the Ukrainians at the moment.

Moderator: And what about Pokrovsk? Is it really such a serious breakthrough as they say?

Pavel Macko: Well, now let’s look at those battlefields. The situation on that Donetsk front is, of course, tense. It’s like a tightly stretched string, where you just wait for it to snap.

I’ve been saying for a long time that the Russians are increasing that pressure, they have numerical superiority, they’re trying different tactics. And they managed a breakthrough with smaller units, they seeped through inconspicuously. And actually, under normal circumstances, if I looked at a 10-kilometer shift – well, that’s not like from Lužná to Bratislava. And I’ll say that in such a big war, it’s nothing.

Of course, but given that despite that enormous effort, enormous losses, we see those Russian advances – step by step, house by house, trench by trench, and it took them a year and a half – they actually made about a 10-kilometer advance over the course of this week.

Towards Dobropilia. I’ll just explain it, we don’t have a map, so it’s like:

▪️They’re fighting at Kupiansk. The fighting still persists there, nothing fundamental is changing. They’re trying to capture Kupiansk through that bridgehead, across the Oskil River.

▪️They’re fighting at Chasiv Yar, where they’ve already gotten behind that area, behind Chasiv Yar, but the Ukrainians are still holding in the northwestern part of Chasiv Yar.

▪️Kostiantynivka is free, but they’re kind of bypassing it.

▪️Battles similar to those in Chasiv Yar are also in Toretsk.

And to that, there’s also the area that is Pokrovsk. At Pokrovsk, they got from the south to Dachne, that’s southwest, that they bypassed Pokrovsk. But to Dobropilia, when they got further, there’s actually that road that goes from Pokrovsk and then goes north between Dobropilia and Kramatorsk. It’s such an important road that the Russians are trying to reach, because that would significantly affect logistics.

Despite the fact that terrain vehicles and the like are also used – the Russians at the beginning of the invasion, and the Ukrainians now need paved communications for large logistics. So it’s serious, mainly because they caught the Ukrainians being careless. Despite knowing that there’s huge pressure there, they allowed the Russians to make such a wedge with which they penetrated 10 kilometers. In this case, it’s quite a lot.

Because it allows, if it were to fall, for example, that Kostiantynivka, it would allow the Russians to open a gate for a larger attack or for the siege of Pokrovsk. But it’s not something that would mean that everything will collapse now and they’ll start advancing tens of kilometers. But the Russians will increase that pressure there.

We’re still talking about them looking for a place to push. Of course, the Russians don’t control 30% of the Donetsk region. And even if they didn’t encompass it, they want to have the most advantageous position, so that if by chance in the future, even after some ceasefire, the fighting is renewed, they would get as far as possible.

Moderator: We might talk about this tomorrow morning together, after the Trump-Putin meeting. You’ll be wiser, I probably won’t be, but you will be. Alright, let’s go to the criticism of Syrskyi.

Criticism of Syrskyi

Pavel Macko: Well, and this is related to precisely these battles. When we were talking here about him replacing Zaluzhnyi, we said, well, it’s a legitimate thing for President Zelensky, but by doing so, he’s also putting his hands more into those operations.

Syrskyi is exactly the person who has that long screwdriver and actually tries to manage, even micromanage, every unit. And here I would say that the criticism is partly justified, partly not.

Simply, no one changes. Zelensky took Syrskyi because he was the less rebellious one and asked less than Zaluzhnyi. On the other hand, it was known about Syrskyi that he’s that Soviet soldier. That he’s simply that unyielding one, that he commands. When he defended Bakhmut, he held Soledar for a long time, I criticized it, because they sacrificed three brigades in Soledar.

So the criticism is partly justified, but of course, you have to fight with what you have. You won’t have better ones. Here’s a different trend. When I was doing that study with those German colleagues from that first phase of the war, Ukraine still had those experienced soldiers from Donbas. And they really used mission command, or command through objective, they were independent.

But many of them also fell, many of them were rotated. And actually what happened is that we’ve now reached the stage that they had to mobilize and they’re using those officers who have those old Soviet habits. And really it’s as the Wall Street Journal wrote, that „a big Soviet army is destroying a small one.“

But that’s the worst thing the Ukrainians could have done. I’ve been criticizing it for at least a year and a half, that they must not adapt to Russian tactics, because Russian tactics are based on massive artillery strikes, aviation, and quantity.

It’s not true, as Tomáš Forró was writing now, that the Ukrainians are also lacking personnel, which is true, but that therefore they have no chance of winning and will lose sooner or later. That’s not true, because in history, rarely has pure quantity alone won. But of course, it’s a complex situation, the Ukrainians have to deal with it.

Middle East

Moderator: So, the Middle East. What’s new there? How is it developing?

Pavel Macko: The situation is influenced by the Israeli cabinet’s decision to occupy and clear Gaza. Currently, it’s such that preparatory work is underway. The General Staff is still planning the parameters of that operation. As we said in the introduction, a massive heat wave has hit not only Slovakia but also Israel. There, of course, it means something completely different.

At the moment, the order has already been issued for the evacuation of those people from the Gaza Strip. But the conditions or camp in the southern part of the Gaza Strip are not yet prepared.

Intense military operations were taking place. Israel again bombed several Hamas positions. There were also higher casualties. Thus, the humanitarian crisis is deepening. Although in one day, the Israelis released more, but significantly more trucks are prepared than they can let through continuously into that area.

What definitely caught the attention of all media were the protests and the killing of journalists. Up to six of them. Of course, Israel immediately said that the journalist, one from Al Jazeera, is or was… I saw photographs where he was photographed with those terrorists. That he was the head of a Hamas cell. That means, at that moment, he became a legitimate target, because that’s exactly the controversy, like when an unnamed „woodpecker“ in Slovakia infiltrated the media as a member of SIS [Slovak Intelligence Service].
Well, Peter Tóth.

Moderator: I was thinking, who is the woodpecker. Peter Tóth.

Pavel Macko: Well, that’s exactly where the boundaries end in a democratic society. Here we’re talking about when someone cooperates with terrorists, they can’t hide behind a microphone.

Of course, controversy was also caused by the statement of Bezalel Smotrich, a minister from those radicals, who again is considering expanding settlements in the West Bank. That’s not really the best time and the best topic to be opening now.

Moderator: Last time, last week, you mentioned that Israel wants to evacuate as many Palestinians as possible from Gaza City down south, by October 7 at the latest. And yesterday I read that they are also negotiating with some African country.

Pavel Macko: Well, and that’s interesting, because Sudan was divided, there’s also South Sudan, and actually Israel is also negotiating with South Sudan about potentially relocating parts of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to South Sudan.

Moderator: Permanently?

Pavel Macko: As soon as they come there temporarily and stay there for more than a year, it will be permanent, because these conditions are worsening in the Gaza Strip.

The city if it will be… because there was a conflict between Israeli forces, the Chief of General Staff says let’s besiege, they’re going to combine siege tactics directly through entry into the city or so-called „clearing operations.“ That’s why the evacuation orders were issued.

The problem is that conditions in the southern part of the Gaza Strip, in that open space where some tent city for 600,000 and more people is supposed to arise, don’t exist yet. I can’t imagine it, it’s also humanitarianly complex.

But on the other hand, these people will be pushed out of that area because of those operations, because otherwise there are huge losses threatened on both sides. And there’s also another risk, exactly the opposite, that Hamas, on the contrary, will try to forcibly keep those people in the Gaza Strip and in Gaza City. They will persuade some to stay, and some will be held there by force.

Moderator: I was completely shocked by the air supply and the fact that one of those packages hit a young Palestinian and killed him. How is it with that supply?

Pavel Macko: Overall, there have already been 23 such incidents. What’s the context? Gaza would need about 600 trucks daily to have such a smooth flow. There are several thousand trucks that are de facto already on the way, and now there are several problems.

The Israelis don’t recognize some unknown NGOs that help, because they don’t consider them partners. Part is stuck on some security checks and suspiciousness, so Israel wants to control each cargo, which delays it, but technically they could probably do it by putting more personnel there, making several control checkpoints, and getting a larger number of trucks into circulation.

To this comes an airlift, in which countries participate. Canada is extremely active, but also Spain and other European countries, which actually drop this aid. But that pallet has about one ton, that’s really the most crisis aid. There I would rather understand if some medical aid, medicines, and such things were dropped to get them as quickly as possible.

Israel allowed it because it trusts those partners that they won’t be dropping weapons and explosives there. But of course, those people are desperate. We’ve experienced this in Africa, we experience it in various conflict zones, that those people desperately lunge for that aid until the last moment. But that pallet is not a parachute with a person, it falls relatively quickly, which means, unfortunately, that accident happened, and there are several problems.

Strategic Background

Moderator: Strategic background. So in a few hours, what will happen?

Pavel Macko: Well, a meeting between Donald Trump and President Putin.

Moderator: And what do you expect from it? Are you optimistic?

Pavel Macko: Well, I have mixed feelings, to be honest. But Trump in his recent statements sounded quite reasonable, he was sending indirect signals to Putin, in my opinion.

But the risk is that he wants to meet one-on-one. This last happened, I think, in Helsinki in 2018, and nobody was enthusiastic about it, because he actually came with such very accommodating steps in favor of Putin.

Moderator: So one former colleague wrote that she wanted to faint to interrupt that negotiation.

Pavel Macko: Yes, I read that somewhere too. Well, what’s the risk? It needs to be said that Trump is not a professional diplomat and he’s up against a KGB agent, who has actually led the state all his life, has these Machiavellian methods under his skin, commands the world map, commands all these nooks and crannies.

It turned out that even with Kim Jong-un, that Trump is… I don’t want to disparage, he’s a president elected by 77 million Americans, so I’d prefer not to comment on him, but simply, he’s a person who is naive in this. Simply, he doesn’t have it studied, that’s the difference compared to Biden, because Biden was a long-time diplomat, a long-time politician. Trump was a real estate agent.

Well, and the problem is that he sometimes nods to something in good faith. It’s not that he’s bad, or too accommodating to Putin, but he simply nods in good faith to something that he thinks is fine, and then finds out that it’s completely different or off, because he sometimes has such childish…

Moderator: Maybe he doesn’t even realize.

Pavel Macko: Well, take for example, he was signing after being elected and after inauguration, he was signing some decrees and some orders, even with Spain, and he asked if it’s a country in BRICS. So Spain, that’s one of the bigger partners in NATO. A schoolboy here would probably know that, but again I say, this is the risk that simply the charm of personality, and we don’t know yet, of course, I wouldn’t go into these conspiracies, what all they have prepared for Trump.

From his statements, I saw a sincere effort that he won’t give it so easily to Putin. But Putin will try to use this situation, because he delayed everything, fulfilled nothing, and still demanded a meeting. Trump said he would mainly listen to him. Let’s hope it will be so.

But actually, it will all be about Putin wanting to open several questions and give that lollipop on which he wants to lure him, because we know that Trump, even in the election campaign, said that he would like to reduce armaments, that he would like simply… Because the INF treaty on those short and medium-range missiles. This strategic agreement fell. The last START is falling. And thereby there’s no replacement for those disarmament treaties from the times of the deep Cold War, and there’s a threat that a new round of the arms race will really be unleashed. Well, and the Russians are offering him that they could negotiate about this.

Moderator: Exactly. And that’s why the signaling needs to be seen in this context as well, because this is called diplomatic signaling. There will be the Zapad [West] exercise, and among other things, the Russians are communicating that in mid-September, they will practice with the Belarusians the use of tactical nuclear weapons, the use of „oreshniki“ [nut-crackers].

Pavel Macko: All this is supposed to make a bait and atmosphere. This is reflexive control. That’s exactly what influences the actions of the other side.

So let’s wait for the results. It’s a few hours. I’m curious myself, because it can go awry in all directions, but one thing is certain. We also discussed this with Martin Svárovský, that in the end, it won’t work without Ukraine. Ukraine has been at war for too long, has been defending itself for too long, and is too big to just accept a new Munich Dictate with the blink of an eye.

Moderator: In connection with tomorrow’s meeting, Chancellor Merz initiated a whole series of meetings of European leaders. How do you evaluate those activities?

Pavel Macko: I think it was necessary. I actually spoke on this topic, I think, on Czech Television last week, that this is exactly what they should be doing, that diplomacy should now be taking place behind the scenes.

Of course, there was something for the cameras, some of it was signals towards Putin, some towards Trump, so that it was also said publicly where some „red lines“ are in quotation marks, so that Trump would also be in the situation that he has to perceive it and can’t then subsequently say that he didn’t know about it.

But I would just pick out two aspects from it. First, what is actually like a prerequisite, on which the partners agreed. Because the atmosphere was good, everyone evaluated it positively. We know that behind the scenes it was probably ugly, as they say in English, so it’s less nice, but there was no discord in advance.

That means, what they at least agreed on was that the format of the negotiations should be such that any final agreement must be with the participation of Ukraine, perhaps other partners as well. Trump also promised that if they agree now, they could quickly proceed next week to trilateral negotiations, and perhaps there would be other partners there as well.

The second thing is that a ceasefire is an absolutely basic condition, that there must be some security guarantees, and the United States indicated that they could be engaged in this, we don’t know yet how, well, and that Russia will not have a veto, even though Trump said that he won’t let Ukraine into NATO anyway.

Moderator: Alright, and what if Putin doesn’t back down?

Pavel Macko: Well, if he doesn’t back down, then we’re in a situation where Trump has lost his pants and image, because in that case, he will look like a very weak negotiator, because he gave an ultimatum, which he even shortened. The ultimatum expired, but he didn’t actually implement anything. Meanwhile, of course, to avoid this stress, he sent Witkoff to persuade Putin. I think it’s on a good path, but I don’t trust Putin too much.

So I caught such a statement, from Trump’s first administration was Marshall Billingslea. He’s such an expert, a plenipotentiary precisely for sanctions, and he’s actually saying what would need to be done. Complete blocking, that simply those sanctions must come. And that would mean complete blocking against all financial institutions, completely cutting off the Russians from the SWIFT system, but also sanctioning secondarily all foreign banks that would try to produce some secondary, some parallel settlement system that the Russians could use.

Furthermore, immediately impose sanctions on several Chinese banks that have, for example, financed exports to Russia and to the aviation and defense sector. Because that machinery for the aviation defense sector went there.

Another thing is to announce sectoral sanctions on all Russian energy transactions, including secondary sanctions, that means, for the time being, there could also be those 25% sanctions that were announced, or tariffs on India, on China. This could be done immediately, and then that law could also come, which is actually in the American Congress. That’s Senator Graham and also Blumenthal. They have 84 co-submitters, so there’s strong pressure there.

And one important thing is that they could also add and expand sanctions on the Russian grey fleet. The United Kingdom did something, the European Union did. In total, there are more than 500 ships that are leased in Russia in all sorts of ways. They would be able to block them in some way.

Of course, if these measures were done, they would be able to throttle Putin by 600 million dollars a day and at the same time, those interests from these frozen parts or from those frozen assets that are there could be given to buy American weapons for Ukraine for the time being. So this would certainly help.

But these are things that we’ve known for, let’s say, three years. And with those sanctions, progress is so terribly slow that the Russians always manage to avoid parts of those sanctions in some way.

VAT on Arms Production

Moderator: Alright, let’s go to Slovakia. Some government politicians, and even the Slovakia movement, have an idea that they want to increase VAT on arms production and maximize the tax and license fees on arms companies, because they allegedly make extreme profits. That seems fine at first glance, you’re making money on weapons. What do you think about it?

Pavel Macko: Well, it has several problems. I would say it bluntly, that it’s dangerous stupid populism and in the end, it would harm Slovakia. Also our defense capability and it would prolong the modernization of the army. And it could drive those manufacturers out of Slovakia.

I’ll try to break it down a bit in two minutes.

First, increasing VAT doesn’t make sense. Those weapons and ammunition are sold primarily abroad, and VAT is applied at the final consumption in our territory. That means, when we increase VAT, on one hand, we’ve increased the defense budget, and right away we take it, because actually, the state pays that VAT to itself. That means, you just recycle your money, which would mean a significant increase in the cost of modernizing our army, which is probably not the best thing we could do in this situation.

As for those licenses and tax increases, well, we have some tax laws, as generally from the point of view of the rule of law. Making up special taxes, that’s like when they invented a special pension for Prime Minister FICO and wanted a special pension for the Attorney General, but not every one, but precisely that Žilinka. This is simply nonsense. This simply isn’t done, because it’s legally non-standard. There should be clear rules.

But quite essential is that good arms factories have always been a lucrative business. But this would actually make the sale of these weapons and ammunition to Ukraine even more expensive. That means, I’m surprised at the Slovakia movement, that apart from that lack of knowledge of economic principles, that we’re actually increasing VAT at home for our own army and making our modernization more expensive, that we’re going to penalize even the Ukrainians, because we’ve caught on to some statement by Robert Fico that „not even a bullet to Ukraine.“ Now we criticize him that he exports more there, that’s okay that we criticize him, but we don’t criticize him for the fact that those arms factories, those weapons are exported there. We criticize him for the hypocrisy that Robert Fico is actually presenting with this.

But now imagine, it’s supposed to be up to 5% of defense expenditure. And so, do we want to buy everything from abroad? Or will we sink our arms factories, or create an environment for them. I would, on the contrary, reduce income taxes precisely to motivate increased production and development of the sector and reduce taxes, or for example, give some state support.

Let’s take, in Vlkanová we have a Slovak arms factory, which grew on a green meadow, which built a quad – a combat vehicle, but the main thing is what’s on it. It’s actually one of the main tools for example for fighting against drones, which are becoming dominant on that battlefield, and they can export it, and we’re actually going to burden them with taxes now and punish them for success.

Simply, this is exactly wrong, when we look at the economy having just 0.2% growth now, one of the smallest in the entire European Union and in the eurozone. That curve of growth decline is horrible when we look at the last year and a half, and that’s not even fully reflecting all those consolidation measures, which are literally suffocating the economy. Let’s not rake and poke into what works.

World War II – Balkans

Moderator: So let’s go to the continuation of the cycle about World War II. Last time we analyzed the Battle of Britain here, and today we’re moving to the Balkans. What was happening there?

Pavel Macko: So briefly, there was the battle for the Balkans, for Greece. Albania was annexed by Italy already in 1939, but Mussolini was looking at Greece. Now he was frustrated by how the Germans were advancing everywhere with blitzkrieg. So he decided without coordination with the Germans to attack Greece. And it didn’t end well. It ended well for the Greeks, but only temporarily, unfortunately.

When we talk, these are battles in the Balkans, which eventually includes the occupation of Yugoslavia and ended with the battle for Crete. So I’ll briefly just first say those events:

On October 28, 1940, Italy attacked Greece from Albania with about 70,000 soldiers. It started with the Italians giving an ultimatum to the Greeks to allow them to advance at sea and to essentially surrender, submit, and subordinate themselves to Italian interests. But the war didn’t develop according to Italian expectations. The Greeks, first of all, stood their ground and said they wouldn’t back down and started fighting.

And subsequently, they even pushed those Italians back into Albania in early November. In December to January, in winter, Greek units advanced deep into southern Albania, to key cities, key mountain passes.

And in February, Britain got involved in it. I remind you that at that time, Cyprus was part of the British Empire. The British had interests in the eastern Mediterranean, and of course, Italian expansion into the Aegean Sea would have threatened their interests. So the British began helping the Greeks with the help of the Royal Air Force and their commando soldiers.

And the Italians got a thrashing. Then the Germans launched Operation Marita in April 1941, and on April 27, the Germans finally conquered Athens. Greece came under Axis occupation. And finally, on June 1, 1941, the resistance on Crete also ended.

Moderator: Well, you already mentioned at the beginning that the main cause of the Italian-Greek war was Mussolini’s imperial megalomania. And what was going on in Yugoslavia?

Pavel Macko: Well, I would still go back a bit to that Mussolini and maybe to those parameters, that when we look, Italy deployed 6 divisions and later increased it to 29 divisions and 400,000 soldiers. But they were poorly equipped, had very low morale, simply it wasn’t going well for them.

Greece started with 4 divisions and 50,000 soldiers, expanded it to 13, but they had strong defensive tactics, high morale, it was in the mountains. The United Kingdom then got involved, and finally Germany attacked in April with 24 divisions, led by Field Marshal List.

When I return to those causes, Mussolini imagined a new Roman Empire. He wanted to achieve all this in the Mediterranean, he wanted to expand Italy’s influence to Greece, to Yugoslavia, to the Balkans. And it was also such frustration, he was jealous of the Germans, that in that Axis, where he was together with Germany and Japan, he played second fiddle.

With Greece, there was of course long-term tension. By the way, October 28 is a very significant, memorial day in Greece. It’s called „Oxi“ day. Oxi was „no,“ because the Italians gave an ultimatum to the Greeks, and the Greek prime minister said that they shouldn’t submit, that simply they would defend themselves. Literally, that was the statement, „so there will be war then.“

And actually, when I now return to Yugoslavia, that’s an interesting development. Because Yugoslavia at the beginning was forced by the Axis countries to sign an agreement with these Axis countries and was like an ally, but that lasted only a few days. In March 1941, it reluctantly signed that tripartite pact under pressure from Germany and Italy.

Two days later, on March 27, there was a coup d’état in Yugoslavia led by pro-British officers. Yugoslavia became a monarchy, they installed King Peter II as the ruling monarch. This angered Hitler, because he counted on using Yugoslavia for his goals. Suddenly it was unreliable for him and a threat to his Balkan strategy.

The Italians also disappointed him, so he decided to solve things himself and directly. On April 6, 1941, Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria launched a coordinated invasion of Yugoslavia. It fell in 11 days, Belgrade was heavily bombed. They divided that Yugoslavia. Germany occupied Central Serbia, Italy annexed parts of Slovenia, Kosovo, and Dalmatia. Hungary and Bulgaria also took a part, the Hungarians the north. And the Independent State of Croatia was established in that territory.

But a resistance movement emerged in Yugoslavia, and the country became a focal point of partisan warfare. This then had an impact on the entire course of World War II and further courses of battles in the Balkans, but even on the Cold War.

If we look at it, that resistance had two parts. One were the Chetniks. That was led by General Draža Mihailović. Later, however, those Western allies opposed him, because they suspected him of helping the Nazis in the fight against partisans. And the partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito, they fought in the mountains. They then received great support from the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the USA, and eventually gradually liberated that Yugoslavia.

The significance was that the March coup (1941) in Yugoslavia diverted German troops. They had to delay the operation for the invasion of Greece. Thereby, however, the Barbarossa plan was also delayed. The Germans didn’t manage to get to Moscow after the invasion of the Soviet Union before winter, and actually, it all broke for them. So that was probably the most important thing. And of course, Mussolini’s collapse.

360°

Moderator: 360° Pali, what’s on your radar?

Pavel Macko: Well, again, the situation in Congo, in western Africa, and in the Sahel region is becoming more complicated. The UN is paying increased attention to this. And the problem is that the Security Council holds such regular briefings. So they did such a briefing. It actually got like to the top. It also lit up red on my radar, because the Security Council was discussing it.

There’s a quite difficult humanitarian situation there. There are large such inter-tribal attacks. Well, and actually this something, if you remember that conflict between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda, that was a very bloody conflict, so this is actually still about the same thing. That this area is such a hot cauldron, where it boils and at the moment it’s bubbling and boiling over again.

Moderator: Alright, and what kind of conflict is it? Where does it have its roots?

Pavel Macko: Well, that conflict, it’s a long-term conflict. It goes actually back to the colonial era, because there are several groups there, actually large numbers of inhabitants were relocated there.

And when I look, there was always some war there. Actually, this current situation is that in the Kivu area, there’s such an M23 movement – rebels, who have actually been fighting for a long time for some self-determination. There’s a big escalation of violence, they’re dragging Rwanda, Uganda into it.

But when I take it that those roots go really back to the fact that actually during Belgian colonial rule, large numbers of those Hutus and Tutsis were forcibly relocated from Rwanda to eastern Congo. And that of course caused long-term ethnic tension. Those ethnicities compete or vie for survival, for their living space, for access to food, to resources.

And there was a whole series of wars there. The Masisi War in 1993, then there was an uprising in 1996, which was led by Tutsis in Kivu and it grew into further regional wars, which drew in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi. There was the so-called Second Congo War. And that is sometimes called the African World War. It was in the years 1998 to 2003.

Europe tried to intervene there, as did the UN. And actually, what happened then was that 9 countries and dozens of armed groups actually fought each other, everyone against everyone. So it’s very complex there, it will continue to be complex, there are those cycles of violence and various militias, and there are of course also geopolitical factors. Simply, there are long-term fights and unrest in the Congo area. It’s actually a country rich in gold, tin. But also other minerals that are mined there, some, for example, important for the electronics industry. There’s 80% of the world’s reserves of coltan, where there are two types of such elements, which are actually used in the electronics industry.

Moderator: You mentioned regional influences. How does it affect neighboring countries?

Pavel Macko: At the moment, it’s such that the whole surroundings are destabilized, and we have just in North Kivu 2.5 million people who have been displaced. And thousands more people are hiding in individual areas. There’s a total collapse of healthcare. Well, and there’s a lack of access to basic food.

This potentially threatens that if it doesn’t manage to be dampened, and the world’s largest UN mission is operating there between them, then we have a huge conflict, which can again change to the fact that more of these countries will actually get involved with each other. And that will also mean huge pressure on already broken countries, like Mali, Niger, and those others. And those refugees will simply move somewhere, presumably only northward.

Moderator: Last week we were talking here about Cambodia and Thailand. Those two countries were also filling world media. It’s somehow quieted down. Is there anything new there?

Pavel Macko: Positive, because so far the ceasefire is being observed. There was also some diplomatic development. Cambodia and Thailand held a meeting of that General Border Committee, or what we would call, that demarcation commission, in Kuala Lumpur on August 7. They agreed in detail on a 13-point ceasefire plan. The movement of troops was frozen. There’s a ban on attacks on civilians. ASEAN observer teams are being deployed there. So it’s a fortunately good development so far.

But even that short conflict has its humanitarian and economic impact. When I look at my notes, 130,000 evacuated in Cambodia, they report injured children. GDP in Cambodia will decrease by 3% this year and as a result of a 20% decline in tourism. And there’s a problem that they have rotating, migrating workers there. That movement will also be restricted. So here you can see that even such a very short conflict can have quite strong consequences.

Final Quote

Moderator: So let’s go to the quote.

Pavel Macko: This week I was thinking that we all have such great expectations. In the end, we’ll probably be disappointed. I would give one from Samuel Huntington, the author of the book about the clash of civilizations, very famous, popular, which came out in the 90s. And he says that „expectations should not be taken for granted, because you never know when you will be disappointed.“

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Pavel Macko: Good day to you.

Moderator: Looking at the front as a whole, how would you evaluate it? Where is Russia achieving certain territorial gains and where is the advance stagnating or where do Ukrainians have a slight advantage?

Pavel Macko: From a long-term perspective, the front is static when I compare the positions year-on-year. Currently, the most intense battles, where Russians are making the most progress, are in the Donbas. It’s primarily in the area around:

▪️Pokrovsk

▪️Toretsk

▪️Chasiv Yar

▪️all the way to Kupiansk

The Russians have made their largest advance in a year in recent days, when a few days ago they moved approximately 10 kilometers deep into the Ukrainian formation, breaking through the so-called defensive barrier in the Donbas. The Ukrainians are managing to stop this for now.

Ukrainians, on the other hand, have pushed the Russians back or stopped the attempted Russian incursion into the Sumy region. Fighting is taking place in practically all sections of the front, but the biggest battles are around the mentioned cities and around Pokrovsk, where the Russians are trying to encircle the city.

Moderator: What tactics has Russia been using lately? I’ve read that they use small sabotage and reconnaissance groups to penetrate between thinned Ukrainian lines, entrench themselves, and then attack from the rear.

Pavel Macko: The Ukrainians have built defensive ramparts, which means they have multiple linear defensive positions, but these are not fully manned. Ukrainians have switched to a tactic where they set up positions for drone operators and tried to create something like a drone wall.

The Russians attacked this with smaller units, as you indicated, but with high mobility, using any fast means of transportation:

▪️motorcycles

▪️scooters

▪️anything that allowed them to move quickly.

They try to penetrate into the given area as quickly as possible and gradually insert reinforcements in small groups. When they have a sufficiently concentrated force, mostly with the help of drones, possibly also air support, they make a larger strike and again try to move the line a little further.

Moderator: It looks like Pokrovsk and this entire area is now a priority for the Russians. President Zelensky claims that they are moving thousands of more elite troops, paratroopers, naval infantry, especially from the Sumy region. Does Ukraine have a chance to stop this advance? Or could the Russian plan to capture these places – Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, Toretsk and Chasiv Yar – by the end of August or September be fulfilled?

Pavel Macko: I would be skeptical that the Russians will succeed in capturing it so quickly. Of course, Ukrainians are under great pressure because they made a few mistakes in the direction of Dobropillia, which is northeast of Pokrovsk.

But we need to realize that they have prepared defensive positions there and have now also brought in a brigade from the Azov Corps. The Russians also need to regroup troops in order to advance anywhere. And when we look at it:

▪️They’ve been trying to capture Kupiansk for almost two years

▪️Pokrovsk for more than a year

▪️Chasiv Yar still hasn’t been captured.

This means, yes, they may succeed in capturing some of these cities, but I don’t expect such a breakthrough as we saw at the beginning of the war, when they were advancing tens or hundreds of kilometers a day. Of course, the pressure is increasing – it’s like a tightly stretched string, where we’re waiting to see if it will break somewhere or hold.

Moderator: To what extent is the advance on the front tied to the upcoming negotiations in Anchorage? Because on the one hand, as we said, in the mentioned area, the Russians are advancing, but on the other hand, they have at least relatively limited air strikes on Ukrainian cities, as noted by the Institute for the Study of War.

Pavel Macko: First of all, it can be expected that Putin will try to play it in such a way that he will present Ukraine as an uncooperative party, despite the fact that he himself has been refusing a ceasefire and does not comply with the ultimatum.

The reality is that the Russians are trying to gain the most advantageous positions, because even a possible ceasefire does not yet mean the end of the war. The Russians would like to have the best possible positions that would suit them in case of renewed fighting, from which they could very quickly launch back into attacks.

If there were a ceasefire, units would regroup, replenish supplies, replenish numbers, and monitor each other. So the Russians are trying to:

1) Gain the most advantageous position before negotiations

2) Send a signal and create the impression for President Trump that the situation of Ukrainian forces is untenable

3) Show that if they continue, they can achieve far better results

But three and a half years is a long enough time to have already shown their true capabilities.

Moderator: From the information leaked to the media probably from American negotiator Steve Witkoff, I got the impression that Russia is now prioritizing the rest of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, while in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions it might be willing to freeze the front. Is that so? Does it make military sense?

Pavel Macko: It makes absolute military sense, because in the Kherson region, the Russians had to retreat behind the river and preparing a large offensive there, they don’t have the forces for that. Similarly in the Zaporizhzhia region:

▪️Zaporizhzhia is a city of million

▪️the northern part of the Zaporizhzhia region is full of various terrain obstacles and canals

▪️it’s a terrain that’s easy to defend.

On the contrary, in the Donbas, the Russians are still in front of the rampart. Although they partially broke through that rampart and the Ukrainians are trying to „patch“ it in quotation marks, but if Ukraine were to withdraw – and there was a request for a part of the territories in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions to be returned to it – in exchange, the Russians would want the Ukrainians to leave the still 30% free part of the Donetsk region.

This would put the Ukrainians behind their defensive lines. The terrain there is also completely different:

▪️there are no large rivers

▪️there are no terrain obstacles

▪️Ukraine would be left with a completely open space.

I would compare it to the situation when Czechoslovakia ceded the Sudetenland and the Germans gained direct access to the Czechoslovak or Czech valleys. Something similar would happen in the case of Ukraine if it ceded these territories. This is something that Ukrainians will certainly not accept.

Moderator: Yes, and those bunkers and fortresses, basically that whole Czechoslovak line then fell into German hands, and thus the territory was indefensible.

In conclusion, I would ask: Belarus announced that Belarusian and Russian forces will jointly practice planning the use of tactical nuclear weapons and Oreshnik ballistic missiles in mid-September. Is this rattling weapons before the summit?

Pavel Macko: It’s not just before the summit, it’s part of the Russians‘ longer-term strategy. They still use that reflexive control with which they try to influence our negotiations and actions. The agreement on medium and short-range weapons (INF Treaty) has been denounced since 2019.

The Russians are now suggesting that… They have already deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and are now suggesting that they will also deploy Oreshnik missiles.

It’s escalatory intimidation. It’s no longer nuclear deterrence, but the Russians have moved to a strategy of intimidation with nuclear weapons and are significantly escalating the situation.

It’s not directly related to this, but since most agreements between the Russians and Americans have already fallen or expired, Putin indicated before this meeting that they would like to negotiate on bilateral talks and wants to offer the Americans new nuclear agreements.

Moderator: That was Lieutenant General in reserve, former highest representative of Slovakia in NATO structures, Pavel Macko. Thank you very much for your analysis and for your time. I wish you a nice day.

Pavel Macko: I wish you a beautiful summer day.

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Trump’s ultimatum has expired. The end of the war, however, is nowhere in sight, but everyone is already looking forward to a possible meeting between Putin and Trump. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is considering occupying the entire territory of the Gaza Strip.

Welcome to listening to the 125th edition of General Pavel Macko’s security radar.

Moderator: Paľo, welcome.

Pavel Macko: Good day.

Fog of War

Moderator: We’ve already discussed possible Trump negotiations, negotiations in Moscow on our website and in the video I recorded with you, Paľo. Let’s go straight to the situation on the battlefields.

Strategic Bombing in Ukraine

Paľo Macko: I’ll start by saying that strategic bombing continues from both sides. Incidentally, this was also one of the rumors that the Russians might want to offer a suspension of these strategic attacks. But that would be unilaterally advantageous for the Russians, despite them increasing the production of drones and missiles.

Ukrainians, by counter-attacking deep into Russian territory and destroying their factories and bases, are weakening the Russians‘ capacity that could be thrown onto the battlefield itself.

Record Russian Drone Attacks

Russians are breaking records again. I have statistics here for the last month:

▪️In June, Russians launched approximately 5,400 Shahed drones at Ukraine

▪️Last month it was already 6,443 drones

▪️That averages over 200 drones per day

The attacks are massive. We’ve seen multiple records broken in July, and attacks in the last week that were very massive. They are based on Shahed technology.

Ukrainians destroyed one storage facility, but according to Ukrainian intelligence, Russians are now capable of producing around 170 drones per day. Compared to May, they’ve increased it by another 70; at that time, they were producing about 100. The formal goal is 300 drones per day by the end of the year, but realistically it’s about 190-200 drones.

What does this mean? Russians are able to accumulate these drones. When we saw 700 drones in one day, these attacks could be even stronger. They also use rocket attacks, and this could lead to such a volume that we might experience up to 2,000 drones in a day.

Ukrainian Attacks on Russian Positions

Ukrainians are also trying to attack. This week there were again attacks by Ukrainians on Russian positions. I’ll look at the list; there were many targets hit:

▪️Oil refinery in Novokuibyshevsk in the Samara region

▪️Storage and launch site for Shahid drones in the Primorsko-Akhtiarsk region

▪️Elektropribor plant

What’s important is that there’s quite successful coordination of Ukrainian forces – the SBU security service, HUR military intelligence, and unmanned systems forces can coordinate and comprehensively plan such operations.

Situation on the Battlefields

Kursk and Sumy Regions

Fighting continues in the Kursk and Sumy regions. In the Kursk region, Russians tried to renew their offensive, but it was extinguished.

Looking at the Sumy region, more complex reports emerged about how Ukrainian commandos got into the rear of Russian units and eliminated several companies. A small diversionary group managed to cause casualties of around 330 dead and several hundred wounded. They had it prepared. When they made contact, Ukrainians were able to support the attack with drones and other means, and the losses on the Russian side were large.

Russians still hold a smaller buffer zone in the Sumy region. I’d pause here. They say it’s a buffer zone, but in reality, it looks different. Sumy is a city of 250,000. It’s a big city and relatively close to the borders. Here the Russians could try to take the city or make a gray zone out of it, because then they would keep Ukrainians in check and have another area. And if not capture it, then destroy it.

We see that Russians are now pushing in negotiations for recognition of control over the Kherson region. But Ukrainians drove them out of Kherson. Zaporizhzhia region – Russians don’t control Zaporizhzhia as a large city of a million people, nor do they currently have a chance to control it.

It cannot be ruled out that Russians might try to make a larger offensive in this direction and then pressure Ukrainians: „Okay, we’ll leave Sumy alone, but you have to give us Zaporizhzhia…“ That’s a rogue tactic.

Kharkiv Region and Kupiansk

Fighting is taking place in the Kharkiv region. So far, Russians have failed to consolidate the two protrusions – Lyptsi and Vovchansk, which form Russian force protrusions in Ukrainian territory.

The situation is most complicated near Pokrovsk, where they’re advancing from both the southwest and northwest. Pokrovsk is not surrounded, but the main supply route between Pokrovsk and Dnipro is gradually coming into the firing range of Russian forces.

Moderator: You mentioned Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. I don’t know if you want to add anything to that.

Paľo Macko: No, I would perhaps return to Kupiansk, because this is the second hot spot. Russians declared that they’ve moved further, but it appears that in villages west of the Oskil River, where they have a bridgehead, Russians don’t have complete control. It’s more like the operation of diversionary reconnaissance groups that show some presence there, do something. Optically it looks like they already have it under control, but Kupiansk is holding.

All these cities are in a difficult situation – whether Toretsk, Kupiansk, or Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk – but all have been holding for more than a year, some for more than two years. Russians are advancing, but there’s no sign of any great force that could break it quickly. But they will try to do so.

Middle East

Moderator: Alright, let’s go to the Middle East. Yesterday, overnight from Thursday to Friday, Israel’s war cabinet met and decided, simply put, to occupy the Gaza Strip.

Paľo Macko: Well, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip until 2005, or had full security control there, then handed it over to the Palestinian authorities. Hamas took power in Gaza in 2005, and since then the entire coastal strip, which we call the Gaza Strip, has been isolated. Israel built a protective fence there, and on October 7, 2023, we saw how that ended. Terrorists from Hamas and Islamic Jihad came out through the protective barrier around the Gaza Strip.

I wouldn’t talk about occupation, but there is pressure that they want to get the entire Gaza Strip under security control. This has, of course, sparked controversy in Israel, but I’ll focus more on what the plan would mean.

It should be a 4-5 month ground operation that would begin with the occupation and control of the entire Gaza Strip. One thing is to break military resistance and get in, but another is to maintain control. In this case, it would mean establishing security forces at least temporarily throughout Gaza, with the need to fight among the population. At the same time, after the fighting ends, they would have to maintain control, patrol the streets, and maintain order. It’s a risky operation, but it should be for about 4-5 months.

Moderator: Okay, wait, I’ll interrupt you. Do they have any other option? If they can’t agree with Hamas, and Hamas doesn’t want to agree, they don’t have many options.

Paľo Macko: It carries risk because there’s quite a lot of resistance even in Israeli security forces. They look at it in terms of what risks it carries.

The goals are:

▪️Remove Hamas – clear, legitimate

▪️Ensure the release of hostages – a completely great goal, because it’s been going on for almost two years. Hostages are in a miserable state, and Hamas uses this for blackmail, trying to divide Israeli society. Those who have relatives as hostages have been protesting from the beginning, which is natural. They’re demanding major concessions to Hamas, just to get their people home. To this, another part of the population says: „Fine, but that puts everyone else at risk.“

▪️Ensuring that Gaza does not pose a threat to Israel

All these goals are quite legitimate, but it means fighting in densely populated parts of the city. Therefore, not all foreign partners support it. There are security risks and the possibility of higher casualties on the side of Israeli forces and the population. And that’s what they objected to in the security forces – whether it’s worth it to them.

There are two philosophies:

1) Take control of the territory and clean it up

2) Isolate it and let it do what it wants inside

These are the plans and possible consequences of those plans.

Current Situation in Gaza and Surrounding Areas

Moderator: What major battles and events have occurred in Gaza, Israel, and Syria in the past week?

Paľo Macko: Fighting still continues. There were some airstrikes, strikes. There were allegedly also collateral casualties, Palestinian civilians killed. The profile of the fighting is difficult. Hamas knows it needs to hide among the population, provokes some action, then a strike follows. And usually, the strike unfortunately also carries casualties of innocent civilians who happen to be there at that moment.

We’ve already talked about the security cabinet meeting, but unfortunately the hostage crisis continues. We’ve seen footage of miserable hostages, and they’re still not liberated.

On the West Bank, Operation Iron Wall continues, which has been ongoing since January 2024. Again, it’s an effort to keep the security situation under control.

Moderator: I want to ask, is it true that the Lebanese government called on Hezbollah to hand over weapons?

Paľo Macko: Yes, this is true. This has been being addressed for several days and weeks. Now the pressure is escalating. The Lebanese government sees:

1) That Hezbollah is weakened

2) That it no longer has support in Syria and Iran is far away and also has its problems

3) That it constantly provokes pressure from Israel – whenever Hezbollah does something, a counter-strike follows

Lebanon wants Hezbollah to abide by the agreement with Israel, where it promised to leave the buffer zone, that there would be no weapon and no fighter there. This is an agreement from the previous conflict in 2006, which was violated, and now the new ceasefire is supposed to renew this agreement. So it’s completely logical that the Lebanese government is putting pressure on Hezbollah.

Moderator: And what’s new in Syria?

Paľo Macko: In Syria, the ceasefire is fortunately holding. It continues even after those intense momentary clashes where there were quite large casualties. Tension is still there. There are more than 192 thousand civilians who have been displaced – these are so-called internally displaced persons. They had to move and are temporarily bivouacking somewhere in other parts. It will be a problem to get them back.

There were large casualties – more than 500 dead on the side of fighters, but also more than 400 Syrian soldiers. And one more piece of information – Israeli Druze don’t perceive borders as a barrier. They simply migrate back and forth because they try to help their communities.

Strategic Background

Moderator: Paľo, today we’ll skip the history of World War II, but this week we commemorated another anniversary – 80 years since the dropping of atomic bombs. What do you have prepared in the background today?

Paľo Macko: I have several topics here; it was really a rich week. Everything we’ve seen, including those Moscow negotiations. But I would go to other things that are more in the background.

Interview with Kyrylo Budanov

First, I would mention an interesting interview with the head of Ukrainian intelligence defense service, Kyrylo Budanov. He had a philosophical moment, a reflection, where he discussed how Ukraine should continue its resistance against Russians and that national unity needs to be maintained.

It needs to be put in context that these were his subjective expressions, but he was quite on point in saying that if the country internally starts to fall apart or fragment into various interest groups, there will also be an erosion of independence and risks. If those in power break away too much from the chain, there’s a risk they’ll break away from the people. And that was in Ukraine – after the Orange Revolution, Tymoshenko ultimately failed, then we saw Poroshenko’s government, which was also kind of „neither here nor there.“

Into this come these negotiations, where there might be some ceasefire, but not everyone will be satisfied with it. As long as you’re under pressure, you stick together like a flock. But when that pressure eases, differences can surface.

Moderator: I’ve heard that Ukrainians got access to data from a Russian submarine that’s part of the nuclear triad. Is that true?

Paľo Macko: Yes, that’s right. It’s a shock. For Russians, it’s a serious matter. Ukrainian intelligence gained access to classified specifications. We’re talking about a Russian nuclear submarine, not some older one, but one of those modern Borei-class that carries 16 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each with multiple warheads.

It’s a means of retaliation. Countries keep these submarines precisely because they’re always in an unknown location and are a guarantee that even if they were attacked with nuclear weapons, they wouldn’t be disarmed, because they can counter-strike from submarines.

It’s a fiasco if Ukrainian intelligence service got access to:

▪️Security measures on the submarine

▪️Procedures and protocols

▪️Even the crew list

This doesn’t speak well of the protection of Russian strategic capabilities. Of course, this could cause escalation. Maybe it wasn’t even good that they published it, that they know it. We don’t know what all they know, but the fact that they published it is already on the edge, when even Russians have in their doctrine an attack on their nuclear facility as one of the triggers. But they’re not affecting or attacking the submarine so far.

The problem is that Russians already had a mishap a few years ago when they lost control of the so-called nuclear briefcase. It was when they had their Russian „Air Force One“ parked at the Moscow airport, and some thief broke into it. They claim it was a thief, but someone got in there and had access to electronic systems and everything related to it. So for a nuclear superpower, this is quite irresponsible.

Joint Weapons Purchase for Ukraine

Moderator: What about the joint weapons purchase for Ukraine that was talked about so much?

Paľo Macko: A lot was talked about it, but the process in dozens of Ramstein formats was always chaotic. Only now is it starting to come together, coordination is taking place.

At this moment, the European Public Procurement Agreement for Ukraine has been created. The Czech Republic, Denmark, and the Netherlands have launched a joint program worth $1 billion for the delivery of American weapons to Ukraine. This is already about planning, coordinating with a clear time horizon and a clear order. It should be for air defense systems and artillery.

The impact is that it’s moving from donations to structured procurement, when there’s not much left to donate. Thus, it can be put into some consolidation, and arms factories can better plan their capacities.

The important thing is to maintain strategic unity. If we know we need to help Ukraine, not primarily for them, but also for ourselves, then it needs to be done – and it needs to be done sensibly, in a consolidated manner, and not chaotically, where there’s a different idea every week.

Call from Israeli Security Leaders

Moderator: In Israel, there’s an interesting call from the security elite, who are calling for a stop to the fighting in Gaza. What’s that about?

Paľo Macko: In August, about 600 former Israeli security leaders, including former heads of Mossad, Shin Bet (their counterintelligence), and the General Staff, signed a call for an immediate end to the war in Gaza.

They claim that the main military objectives have already been met, Hamas has lost key capabilities, it doesn’t represent a great real force. There are its remnants, but it’s more a political matter from their perspective than a military one. Therefore, they say they wouldn’t need to engage further.

We don’t have to agree with them, but it’s a signal from people who stood at the head of the General Staff and these components, have insight into these things, and are weighing on the scales: what they can achieve and what it will cost them. And on the other side of the scales is: what all it can cause and what risks it carries. They’re trying to balance those risks.

This call resonated in the media as well. Of course, it’s just a call from a „council of elders“ that has no formal position. Netanyahu is the one who, in the end, whether we like him or not, is the prime minister who bears the immediate responsibility, is responsible for the functioning of the state, the security of citizens, and security forces. He has the mandate to decide as he sees fit.

It’s an indication that Israeli society is still free; it’s not like Russia. In Russia, not only Putin decides, but also the „top.“ War hawks may not only be in the Kremlin but also in the Duma and other components, where they still dream of a great victory and the destruction of the entire West. And that’s dangerous. That’s why we listen to those programs on Russian state television, where they want to bomb us with nuclear weapons, kill us, destroy our cities, and rename Paris to Vladimir and the like. This is dangerous – the fascization of Russian society continues.

View of the World – 360°

Moderator: So what does your radar show?

Paľo Macko: The ceasefire between Cambodia and Thailand is holding so far. We saw the delimitation commission working for the first time on Monday. This week I would like to return to Iran.

Moderator: And what’s there? Is the ceasefire working, not working? Or is there currently some silence around Iran?

Paľo Macko: The ceasefire is working, but I was doing a comprehensive monitoring of crisis areas in the world, and I must say that over the past week, apart from the Russian-Ukrainian war and the conflict in the Middle East, Iran resonated the most. But a little differently than we might expect.

Iranian Covert Operations

Iran came to the forefront in connection with the increase in Iranian covert operations, especially assassinations and kidnappings targeting individuals in Europe and throughout North America. It’s a big problem; even a coordinated report came out where 11 intelligence services drew attention to this.

When we consider that we saw a 12-day war between Israel and Iran, which ended with US intervention, subsequently a ceasefire was concluded at US pressure, but they were threatening even then. Many took it as if the regime is already weak, that it will collapse any moment, but it has, like in Romania, when securitate fought even when it was clear that the regime had fallen, an extensive network and is doing hybrid activities.

It’s not just Russians, it’s not just North Koreans, but Iran is extremely active, has its diasporas all over the world. I’ve already mentioned the warning issued by the USA, UK, France, and 11 other countries.

Iranian agents have narrowly focused on:

▪️Dissidents

▪️Journalists

▪️Their former officials living in Western countries

They’re after them, trying to attack them, and using classic methods of hybrid threats:

▪️Surveillance

▪️Cyber intrusions

▪️Kidnapping attempts

Many of which were thwarted or foiled at the last minute by counterintelligence in these countries.

The global impact is that it has diplomatic consequences. They summoned Iranian ambassadors and said: „Wait, these are already hostile activities, what are you allowing yourselves on our territory?“ They had to increase protection for multiple individuals, and joint investigations of Iranian networks are being conducted.

It’s like with Russians here – they’re spread through various agents, secondary collaborators, poor fellows who work in alternative media and for 500 euros will sell their own country and endanger the lives of their fellow citizens. Unfortunately, this is also happening from Iran.

Moderator: Let’s go to those activities. Can you name some?

Paľo Macko: I would divide them into blocks:

1) Expanded activity of foreign intelligence service – Iranian operatives were tracking journalists and officials

2) Espionage techniques and cyber attacks – Iranians were always good at hacking. Not only did they become victims of their centrifuges being hacked, but they themselves are very good.

3) Hezbollah – looks like half-dead, but there’s still space. People were partially disarmed, but Iran can still eventually use it to destabilize Lebanon.

If I were to follow up on the previous question – Lebanon realizes that people do desperate acts, and this Hezbollah, which has lost significance, may lose interest in being a major political force in Lebanon. They participate in power, have deputies there, but when they lost their influence, they can degenerate into destabilization – they’ll start causing harm.

Of course, there’s also nuclear tension, because we still don’t know how much nuclear material remained and where. And if Iran has embarked on such diversionary, espionage, cyber, and terrorist activities, it can use that material for purposes other than we originally thought.

Quote for the End

Moderator: Let’s go to my favorite section, and that’s the quote.

Paľo Macko: The times are hectic. We’ve been discussing the biggest military security crises. But at the beginning of July, exactly a month and two days ago, the Dalai Lama, who is a symbol of resistance against Chinese rule in Tibet, a moral authority and spiritual leader of Lamaist faith, turned 90. Amazing age.

For someone who has lived almost his entire life in exile, he has had a disproportionately large positive influence in the world, including through his spiritual message. So in honor of his 90 years (and we wish him, of course, the longest and most fruitful life), I would like to offer a thought from him:

„Live a good and honest life. When you get older and look back, you will be able to rejoice a second time.“ – Dalai Lama

The post General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar – episode 125 appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

In August 1945, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were devastated by the first—and so far only—use of nuclear weapons in war. Over 200,000 lives were lost, many instantly, others slowly through radiation sickness and long-term suffering. The bombings marked the end of World War II, but they also opened a terrifying chapter in human history: the nuclear age.

Eighty years later, the shadow of that moment still looms. While the Cold War has passed, the threat of nuclear conflict has not. Rising geopolitical tensions, modernization of arsenals, and the erosion of arms control agreements remind us that the danger remains real.

For 80 years, we have lived in an era in which nuclear weapons were a deterrent tool to deter potential aggressors from trying to destroy a defending country. Today, 9 countries around the world have nuclear weapons. Since the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, these weapons have never been used.

From nuclear deterrence to nuclear blackmail and terrorism

Today, we are on the threshold of a new era. From nuclear deterrence, we are moving into an era of nuclear blackmail and terrorism. Religious and other fanatics are trying to get their hands on nuclear weapons. An imperialist superpower with significant elements of the Nazi regime threatens nuclear bombing of our cities virtually  every day through the mouths of high state officials. Not to deter us from attacking. They are the ones who attack and want to gain respect, obedience and consent to their imperialist expansion.

The criminal regime embarked on a senseless war of aggression with the aim of subjugating its neighbor. When he cannot win it, he systematically threatens with nuclear weapons both those who resist and those who support them in accordance with the UN Charter. The lunatics in the Kremlin believe that a limited nuclear war is possible and they would win it. And they try to convince others of this. Their state television spreads hateful Nazi ideology every week and prepares viewers for a „victorious“ nuclear cataclysm.

We do not know whether humanity will be able to deal with the era of nuclear blackmail and whether it will survive it at all. Thus, this anniversary is not only a time to mourn—it is a call to remember, to reflect, and to recommit to peace. The survivors, the hibakusha, have long urged the world: “Never again.” Their voices must guide us as we navigate a world where the power to destroy humanity still exists.

Foto: Stanley Troutman, via Associated Press

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#aerial attacks #air defence #Chasiv Yar #drone #Pokrovsk #Russia #Russian aggression #Shahed #Ukraine #War in Ukraine

Latest attacks on both sides

Flames engulfed dozens of shops. According to local authorities, there were no casualties in the attacks. In the Kherson region, Russian shelling of the village of Antonivka caused the death of one man.

Ukraine also attacked. According to local reports, an unmanned aerial vehicle that hit a railway station in the Volgograd region in southwestern Russia damaged power lines. A fire broke out at the site.

The most significant damage in Odesa occurred at an electronics shopping center, where stores with electronics and household appliances caught fire. Rescuers, together with volunteers, also extinguished a fire in an abandoned building near the railway tracks.

Ceasefire negotiations and the threat of sanctions

US envoy Steve Whitkoff could negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine in Moscow on Wednesday or Thursday. President Donald Trump announced this and again warned that Russia would face severe sanctions if it did not agree to stop the fighting by Friday when the specified ten-day deadline expires.

Trump said he plans to impose up to 100% import duties on countries that buy Russian oil. Such a measure could particularly affect Brazil, China, and India.

„We will impose sanctions, but it looks like they are quite good at circumventing them. You know, they are cunning people, so we’ll see what happens.“ – Donald Trump

„It is unacceptable for India to continue financing this war by purchasing oil from Russia. It may be shocking for people to learn that India is essentially at the same level as China in purchasing Russian oil. It presents itself as one of our closest allies, but it doesn’t buy our products.“ – Steve Miller

Interview with General Pavel Macko

Moderator: We will continue discussing the current development of the war in Ukraine in the ČT 24 studio in the following minutes. Pavel Macko, Lieutenant General (Retired), former commander of the NATO Joint Forces Training Center, is already with us. Good afternoon.

Pavel Macko: Good day.

Moderator: Ukraine today confirmed a drone attack on an airport in Crimea, where it reportedly destroyed one fighter jet and damaged four other aircraft. How significant is this strike from a military perspective, especially regarding Russia’s ability to maintain air superiority in the region?

Pavel Macko: We have seen several such Ukrainian attacks over the last two to three days. Regarding Crimea and the attack on the Saky base, where a Su-30MS fighter was destroyed, another such fighter was damaged, and three Su-24 fighter-bombers were damaged, this was carried out by the Ukrainian SBU service, Team Alpha. This means that it was likely done using shorter-range drones, but directly from Crimean territory or its immediate vicinity.

But meanwhile, we have also seen massive attacks deep into Russian territory. The attack on the Volgograd region was already mentioned in the report, but we also saw attacks in the Krasnodar region on the Sochi base or Sochi airport, where there is also an oil terminal of the Russian company Rosneft. That was burning too. We saw Ukrainian strikes on multiple industrial facilities.

This means that Ukraine is gradually improving its ability to penetrate Russian air defense and simultaneously destroy not only military objects but also the military-industrial complex – factories that supply either electronic components or radio-electronic warfare systems for Russian weapon systems.

The Russians are responding by trying to fortify facilities being built in Milerovo, Gvardeysk, and also in Crimea, where the Russians are trying to build improved shelters for air equipment, even after the successful „Spider web“ operation that the Ukrainians carried out in early July.

Moderator: Ukraine has also admitted responsibility for hitting a fuel depot in Sochi. Is this more of a signal for the Russian leadership, or potentially the Russian public, or does it change something about the current balance of forces?

Pavel Macko: It’s not just a signal. Simply put, Ukraine is gradually trying to equalize in the capability of long-range attacks. The Russians attack with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and especially Shahed drones. Ukrainians have a wider spectrum of these long-range drones, they are developing other drones as well, and we will see increasingly frequent attacks on these bases.

The Russians are improving aircraft positions, fortifying all facilities, trying to strengthen air defense, but similar to how Ukraine has problems intercepting Russian drones, this applies to the opposite side as well. Through this, Ukraine is clearly demonstrating that Russia is not invulnerable.

Basically, for Ukraine, this is the only effectively possible way to defend against increasing Russian aggression – to act asymmetrically, disrupt the Russian rear, meaning logistical and air bases, and thus not allow the Russians to escalate the transfer of forces and offensive means to the Ukrainian battlefield.

Moderator: How challenging is it to hit such targets without direct air support, only with the mentioned drones, and what does this possibly tell us about the current capabilities of the Ukrainian army?

Pavel Macko: The Ukrainians have demonstrated not only on land but also at sea that they can equip these resources with relatively good navigation and communication tools. Thus, they can control them remotely, or they operate in a semi-autonomous mode. In any case, they need to guide them to the target area.

This means that the Ukrainians have this communication relatively resistant, the Russians cannot completely jam it and cannot destroy all these targets. As a result, Ukrainians penetrate deeper and deeper into these areas, and that’s why the Russians are resorting to mechanical fortification of objects.

Of course, it’s a never-ending story, because Ukrainians will escalate these attacks. Ukrainians are definitely advancing technologically. It’s a kind of duel – we see that in the drone area, the basic cycle is 3 to 6 months. This means that what works well today may not work in 3 months because the other side has a counter-tool.

For example, the Ukrainians recently put into operation Interceptor 2.0. It’s their own product, but there are also components from Western countries. It’s a drone designed to hunt Russian drones, and this will likely continue on both sides.

Drone warfare and production capacities

Pavel Macko: First of all, Ukraine is significantly ramping up drone production and is also receiving increased aid. Most recently, Britain announced that it would deliver around 100,000 drones, and these are mostly combat drones for contact combat.

Ukraine specializes primarily in long-range drones, but it is also developing ballistic missiles, which it has already tested, and now they are waiting for serial production to start. Similarly, Ukraine is trying to produce cruise missiles.

Moderator: And what do we actually know, or conversely, don’t know at all, about Russian reserves and Russian production capacities? Because during July, according to Ukrainian authorities, Russia attacked with 6,300 long-range drones and sent 198 missiles and rockets, which in the case of drones is the most per month, and there were more missiles only in June. So how long can Russia still maintain this?

Pavel Macko: It’s a battle for survival on both sides and a race against time. Both sides are escalating production. The Russians are capable of producing about 120 missiles of various types per month.

In their latest use, the Russians also deployed missiles such as the Kh-22, which is an anti-ship missile originally designed to destroy aircraft carriers or as a nuclear weapon carrier. It is very inaccurate, by the way – it has an inaccuracy of up to 600 meters, which is why it is extremely dangerous to use it in built-up areas and very difficult to intercept.

The Russians are producing around 100 to 150 Shahed drones daily, and their planned capacity is that they would like to achieve a capacity of up to 300 drones per day by the end of the year. This would mean a significant increase in the use of these drones from the 5,000 in June, and 6,000 plus in July.

Simply put, after depleting their resources in artillery, where primarily the artillery systems themselves are failing, the Russians are shifting a large part of the focus to drone technology. This is both in contact combat on the front line and in deep attacks.

In short, Shahed drones and their Geran derivatives, which have been modernized, will be the main combat tool of the Russians in the coming months. And the same is happening on the Ukrainian side, but there it’s for the opposite reason – the Ukrainians never had very numerous artillery, and therefore were forced to resort to the dronization of the entire fight.

Strategically important points on the front

Moderator: On the front, the greatest attention is now focused on the locations of Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar. What exactly are the Russians trying to do? Why is this section of the front important?

Pavel Macko: When I consider Pokrovsk, it’s an important logistical hub, which would allow the Russians, if they controlled it, to proceed then from the salient northward and in a kind of arc maneuver try to open up the space of the so far unoccupied Donbas. Of course, in connection with further attacks, or they also have the alternative to continue further into the Dnipropetrovsk region.

Simply put, it’s an important supply route for Ukrainian forces from the direction of Dnipro. Dnipro is a large industrial center, a supply center, and has further connections to central Ukraine.

If we look at Chasiv Yar, it’s a kind of elevated terrain and is actually a direct gateway to the basin where Sloviansk and Kramatorsk are located. Of course, there are other villages there as well.

In the case of Chasiv Yar, the Russians have it almost under control after 16 months, but the Ukrainians are still holding on in the western part. As far as Pokrovsk is concerned, they haven’t directly attacked it, although some reconnaissance and sabotage groups have penetrated there. The Russians are concentrating more on a bypassing maneuver, where they are trying to bypass Pokrovsk from the southwest and from the north and gradually isolate it, interrupt supply routes directly to Pokrovsk, and subsequently either exhaust it or try to take control of it.

In short, both of these cities are important. One is in the western part, the as yet unoccupied part of the Donetsk region, the other is more in the west-central part, that’s Pokrovsk. And it allows the Russians, if they were to acquire them, to contemplate a further attack towards the as yet unoccupied part of the Donetsk region.

Nuclear rhetoric and deployment of American submarines

Moderator: One last thing. The deployment of American nuclear submarines closer to Russia. Is this, in your opinion, an adequate reaction from Donald Trump to the words of Dmitry Medvedev, and does it potentially have any escalation potential? Because spokesman Peskov has already called for caution, saying that everyone should be very, very careful with nuclear rhetoric.

Pavel Macko: It’s good that Dmitry Peskov is saying this, because Russia has been constantly intimidating, literally blackmailing with nuclear weapons for three and a half years. President, ex-president Medvedev is not just anyone, because he is after all a deputy of the Security Council and doesn’t say anything into the wind without it being approved from the Kremlin. Or if he were speaking arbitrarily, they would silence him very quickly.

This means that Russia has long been conducting this so-called reflexive control, where it is constantly hinting, suggesting that it is prepared to use nuclear weapons. We hear this from Russian state television every week, that Europe should look forward to an attack, President Putin himself has repeatedly threatened a nuclear „solution.“

And then, of course, came just a verbal reaction from President Trump, which from a military perspective doesn’t have any real significance, because part of these submarines with nuclear missiles is permanently in combat service and is permanently hidden in such areas where the adversary doesn’t know about them.

It’s part of the nuclear triad, and it’s precisely these submarines that are meant to guarantee that in the case of even a first strike from the other side, the one who has these submarines retains the capability of a retaliatory strike. From this perspective, it should be seen only as signaling from President Trump.

Some may have criticized it as an unfortunate word. He used it on an unofficial platform, on his social media. But it was a clear message to the Russians that today’s „language“ from the Russians cannot go on indefinitely. And he implied by this that the United States, like Russia, also has nuclear weapons, and both sides know well that they have the capability of mutual self-destruction. And thus the reproach from Dmitry Peskov should primarily be directed within the Russian ranks.

Moderator: Says Pavel Macko, former commander of the NATO Joint Forces Training Center. Thank you very much for your time. Have a nice day.

Pavel Macko: Thank you for the invitation. Have a nice day.

See also:

How Long Will Russians Continue to Escalate Terror Against Civilians?

Is Russia provoking President Trump?

The post Is Ukraine Balancing the Forces in Deep Drone Strikes? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#aerial attacks #Chasiv Yar #drone #Kupiansk #Kyiv #missile #Pokrovsk #Russia #Russian war in Ukraine #Sumy #Ukraine

Battles for the strategic city of Chasiv Yar

Ukraine denies reports that it has lost the important city of Chasiv Yar. Russians, on the other hand, claim that they have managed to occupy it after a 16-month bloody battle. According to Ukrainians, however, defenders remain in fortified positions in its western part. They are also under heavy pressure from the aggressors in another strategic city, Pokrovsk. Russian bombs were also killing in the inland areas.

The battle for the city of 12,000 began with the landing of Russian paratroopers last April. The vast majority of residents were replaced by Ukrainian soldiers, who fortified themselves in cellars and the ruins of buildings. However, the encounter turned into a cruel war of attrition, which turned the industrial settlement into ruins.

For 484 days already, the Russians have been showering Ukrainian positions with grenades, rockets, and suicide drones. Kyiv denies Moscow’s boastful reports that its forces have broken through on the extensive front and occupied the city. According to sources from Czech television, defenders are still holding out in its western part.

Another key city, Pokrovsk, is also falling. Fighting for it has been going on since last July. Here too, Ukrainians lack infantry. Massive Russian attacks with the help of drones often cover the often suicidal advance of small units. Where they manage to break through, the aggressors immediately deploy reinforcements and enlarge the breakthrough. The defenders then have no choice but to retreat.

Attacks on Ukrainian inland

Russians also attacked in the Ukrainian inland. Kyiv was hit in two waves:

▪️First, swarms of Russian drones circled over the city

▪️Then the Russian army fired missiles

In one of Kyiv’s districts, an Iskander missile destroyed part of a residential building.

Interview with Pavel Macko, former commander of the NATO Joint Forces Training Center

Moderator: Good evening to you.

Pavel Macko: Good evening.

Moderator: So if we first stop at those Russian air strikes on Ukrainian territory, they have been much more massive lately. What tactics do the Russians use in them and how does the Ukrainian air defense manage to respond?

Pavel Macko: Well, they are already combining those attacks, whether with missiles or drones. But they are already flying in with those drones from all directions. In this way, they are trying to saturate basically the entire air defense system. Meanwhile, they have also improved the design of those drones. And it’s harder for Ukrainians. They still had a 95% success rate last year. Now it’s about 79%. And against missiles, of course, they are gradually running out of those ground-to-air resources, and the effectiveness reaches about 50%. So this is actually the main way Russians are trying to break through that defense – to saturate it with the maximum number from all directions.

Moderator: When I turn it around, how successful is Ukraine in its air strikes on Russia, and can it match Russia in the production of unmanned machines, or missiles?

Pavel Macko: Ukraine is catching up in the production of these unmanned machines, and of course we are talking about different categories. Russians primarily threaten Ukraine with those Shahed clones, which they are now producing themselves. And Ukraine has made very significant progress, has greater reaches into the depths of Russian territory. Those strikes are increasingly effective and really inflict severe blows to that Russian infrastructure, but also to the Russian military-industrial complex. For example, strong Russian air defenses cannot prevent all these strikes. And additionally, Ukraine is also working on ballistic missiles and they almost have a range of up to 700 kilometers and is also working on its own cruise missiles derived from the Neptune missile.

Moderator: If we look at the front, we’ve already mentioned it, Ukraine today denied the Russian claim that the Russians captured the city of Chasiv Yar. What information do we have about what’s happening on the ground, and how important is this city?

Pavel Macko: This city is tactically significant. I know that it’s used in the media as a strategic target, but it’s a tactically significant place. Its possession or control could fundamentally influence the course of fighting in that immediate vicinity. Namely, it would increase pressure on Konstantinovka, and if that fell too, the Russians would open up space for a stronger attack into that northwestern part of the Donetsk region around Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

It’s also an elevated city, where it’s advantageous tactical terrain for defense, because from it you can also control that surrounding area if the Russians tried to bypass Chasiv Yar. And it’s also advantageous for supporting a possible penetration into the depth of that territory. So it’s important to monitor it.

Ukrainians still hold positions there according to the latest information, but if they lost that city, the Russians would gain such a local tactical advantage. But basically they have to finish, and if they wanted success in that entire Donbas, they probably have to complete the operation in the area of Toretsk and Pokrovsk as well. Or then bet a lot of forces on one breakthrough. But that’s also risky in that they could get to advanced positions and then be subsequently under Ukrainian fire.

Moderator: You mentioned Pokrovsk, which lies about 60 kilometers south of Chasiv Yar. What is the situation there, how important a section of the front is it? Or, where are the key sections of the front now, where the Russians are pushing the most?

Pavel Macko: Let’s start with Pokrovsk. The Russians are trying to bypass Pokrovsk from the southwest, they are actually already beyond Pokrovsk, heading west and also on the northern side. They are using a similar tactic as they used at Vuhledar, that they don’t go for a direct attack on the city and don’t conquer it as at Toretsk, Kupiansk, or mainly at Chasiv Yar for 16 months, which is an extremely long time. So they try to bypass it and gradually isolate the city.

The same thing is happening in Toretsk, where Toretsk is still partially under Ukrainian control and Ukrainians are waging the most intense battles, besides these areas. Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, Toretsk. Precisely in the Kupiansk area, where the Russians are again attacking for more than a year and are trying to create a bridgehead and are bypassing that Kupiansk from the north. But they haven’t succeeded so far from the southern side, so they couldn’t surround it. Kupiansk is important because it’s an important hub for supplying Russian troops from that entire area from central or western Russia. At the same time, if the Russians wanted to contemplate any offensive into the Kharkiv region in the future, then they need that Kupiansk under control.

Moderator: Does anything suggest that the Russians might manage a more significant breakthrough in the foreseeable future?

Pavel Macko: Not yet. That Russian offensive is still expected, but it’s running de facto. The Russians are testing the strength of the Ukrainian defense in various places and are trying to break through it. But they haven’t created something that I would call operational reserves. That means at some depth distance from the combat line, that they would have some reserves that they could immediately deploy into that breakthrough, as the Ukrainians did in the case of that breakthrough almost three years ago, when they were attacking precisely in the Kharkiv region.

That means that the Russians will try to break through the defense somewhere. And then they will do the regrouping afterwards by taking from some part of the front and will transfer forces to that breakthrough point as quickly as possible. But that’s mostly by rail and it doesn’t mean that we could expect some massive breakthrough from day to day. Simply put, they will try for such tactical successes. But we see that conquering a city of 12,000 for 16 months is probably not something that could be called modern maneuver warfare.

Moderator: What price are the Russians paying for advancing on the front?

Pavel Macko: That price is enormous. For Chasiv Yar itself, it’s said that those losses could be approaching 10 thousand. Last year, for those 4 thousand square kilometers, the Russians paid with enormous losses. Those are wounded and fallen, not just fallen – 427 thousand soldiers. These losses at this pace are very high.

Ukrainians, although they have a smaller number of personnel, but still using drones and other measures, they manage to quite intensively destroy these Russian attacks. It means that the Russians continue at the cost of those massive waves, when they actually oversaturate that ground defense of Ukrainians, but those Russian losses are disproportionately high. They are high, but apparently it’s not some factor that would influence Russian decision-making.

Moderator: We’re talking about Russian pressure, but do Ukrainians have more initiative in some parts of the front?

Pavel Macko: It’s kind of alternating. Of course, overall, the Russians have the tactical initiative and at this moment also the operational initiative, which means they open those combat encounters. They decide where the attack is mostly happening. But Ukrainians repeatedly in that northern part near Pokrovsk, or in the western part near Chasiv Yar, they repeatedly pushed back even in the last few days.

Back to those Ukrainian units. We saw in the Sumy region that the Russians tried, after the Ukrainians withdrew from the Kursk region, they tried to push towards Sumy through the Sumy region. There, the Ukrainians pushed them back. The same thing happens continuously then at those other main points, whether at Toretsk, or also around Chasiv Yar. The city itself is of course now a gray zone, where they are actually fighting for control of the rest of that western part of the city.

Moderator: Says the former commander of the NATO Joint Forces Training Center Pavel Macko. Thank you very much for the interview. I wish you a nice day.

Pavel Macko: Thank you for the invitation. Have a nice evening.

Note: The original video in Czech and LSovak language you can see here:
https://youtu.be/QsOahqIJa6M?si=prFZA2B8HYRclOBD

The post How Long Will Russians Continue to Escalate Terror Against Civilians? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#Attack on Kyiv #Kyiv #Putin #Russain war of agression #Russia #Trump #Trump’s ultimate #USA #War in Ukraine

We are discussing the military and political consequences of the current situation in Ukraine with General Pavel Macko.

Interview with General Pavel Macko

Host: Welcome to JOJ24 broadcast. Good evening. General, why did the Russians decide to launch such a massive attack at this particular time?

General Macko: The Russians are now cyclically conducting at least one major attack on Kyiv every week. This is happening in the middle of the summer fighting season, while there’s also some ultimatum running which they are downplaying, and despite this, they want to damage Ukrainian infrastructure to the maximum extent possible. They want to hit as many targets as possible and use such massive combined attacks for this purpose.

Today’s attack wasn’t exceptional in this regard, since it’s cyclical as I said – these records are being broken all the time. What could be emphasized, however, is that for the first time, the attack began with a massive drone assault from all directions on Kyiv. This was meant to saturate the air defense system, followed by the launching of cruise missiles Iskander-K.

These are similar to Iskander ballistic missiles, except these fly at a low altitude above the ground. They are very precise missiles with a standard accuracy of less than 5 meters. And since we see what they hit, it’s clear that this was a completely deliberate Russian strike on a civilian area, because apart from the apartment building that was destroyed, there were only other civilian objects all around. So any error or accident is ruled out. Simply put, they did it deliberately.

Russian military doctrine and destruction of civilian infrastructure

The reason is that while the Russians don’t formally have in their doctrines that they can violate the Geneva Conventions and attack civilian targets, they do have in their military doctrine the destruction of civilian infrastructure – whether transportation or energy. They use it as a tool to undermine will, as part of psychological warfare and also as a tool of political pressure.

The fact that it doesn’t work is another matter, but simply in that portfolio of options they have available, the Russians have used this too. This is also the case with the „Oreshnik“ on Dnipro, where it has a large dispersion – on the contrary, it cannot hit precisely – and is also meant to cause as much damage, chaos, and panic as possible in the middle of the city.

They are trying to indicate that they will continue the attacks, that they will escalate, and that Ukrainians should not rely on sanctions or secondary sanctions or international pressure. The only chance – this is Russia’s message – is for Ukrainians to surrender, comply with Russian terms, and maybe then the Russians will change their approach.

Host: In recent months, Russia has also been escalating attacks on Ukrainian cities and towns far behind the front line. Is this a Russian tactic and what is it aimed at?

General Macko: This is what I’ve already indicated. They’ve been doing this since the beginning of the conflict, but of course as Ukrainian air defense gradually weakens and as the Russians gradually find tactical approaches to make attacks more effective, they are precisely aiming to create panic and chaos throughout the country and, of course, weaken infrastructure.

Attempt to weaken the Ukrainian economy and defense industry

This is also an important aspect. Ukraine is increasingly producing defense equipment on its own. For this, of course, it needs energy, it needs factories. The military ones are mostly underground and are well protected from the Soviet era – Ukraine was like an armory of the Soviet Union. But of course there are supply chains, there are also regular factories.

As a result, the Russians are trying to disrupt this Ukrainian economy as much as possible, to „cut its veins“ so that the economy cannot generate as many defensive resources. This makes Ukraine less dependent on external supplies and less dependent on political decisions and cycles within those external supplies, as we have seen that supplies were repeatedly interrupted.

So this is also a key objective of Russia – if they attack somewhere in central or western Ukraine, they attack precisely with the aim of disrupting the functioning of the Ukrainian economy and especially the military-industrial complex to the maximum extent possible.

Host: Could Trump’s shortened ultimatum also have been a catalyst for the Russian attack? The Russians firmly rejected it. What do you think will be the reaction of the American administration?

Trump, sanctions and the US response

General Macko: I’ll start with a reflection on whether it was a reaction. The Russians have been systematically escalating these attacks, so it’s hard to say. It would be speculation if I said that now they are actually sending signals to Trump as well. They have been doing this systematically since the beginning of the year and have been doing it since Trump took power.

After rejecting a possible ceasefire and ceasefire offers in April, the Russians began to escalate the pressure. Thus, they are trying to do something about the conflict. They probably also have their own economic problems.

When it comes to President Trump’s ultimatum, he has to some extent fallen into the trap of his own statements. This means he will have to do something. He has now threatened secondary sanctions – that means sanctions on all countries that will buy from the Russians certain products that will be subject to sanctions, as the United States itself does not buy many of them.

Here’s the problem where, at least with China, it could end up that Trump will not be able to enforce this and China will continue to buy oil from Russia as well as gas. And if the Americans came with those sanctions, the chapter of tariff and trade war would open again.

Trump has also indicated a very tough stance toward India, where it at least appears that he could really impose secondary tariffs and that those negotiations could be very tough. India, despite having built better relations with the United States in recent years, trades very intensively not only in arms products but also in oil products with Russia. This, of course, undermines Donald Trump’s effort to force Russia to end the fighting and sit at the peace table.

Planned American support for Ukraine

But there is also another aspect – Donald Trump is apparently preparing the ground for a more radical announcement of further deliveries of weapons systems to Ukraine, including offensive weapons systems. There is currently a bill in Congress in the Senate that should allow a regular model of financing and supplying Ukrainian forces with American weapons through NATO allies, where at least $8 billion a year should go to this type of support.

Host: As you mentioned yourself, Ukraine is facing a summer offensive, during which Russian forces are making advances in areas that have been relatively spared since the beginning of the war. Moscow has announced that its troops have captured the city of Chasiv Yar, which was an important stronghold of the Ukrainian army in the east of the country. What might this mean for Ukraine’s negotiating positions and for the further development of the conflict?

The significance of the capture of Chasiv Yar and the situation at the front

General Macko: It doesn’t fundamentally change the situation yet, because the fighting for Chasiv Yar has been going on for 16 months, so the city is totally destroyed. We’re talking about a town the size of Holíč or Šamorín – a 12,000-person city that the Russians have been conquering for 16 months. The actual fighting for Chasiv Yar has been going on since the fall of Bakhmut in May 2023, which means more than two years, because the first phase was to get to the Donbas water canal, which was a kind of natural barrier on the border of Chasiv Yar. When the Russians overcame it, they spent another 16 months conquering the city.

The situation is similar in Kupiansk, where for more than a year the Russians have been trying to capture the city. It’s the same with Pokrovsk, in Toretsk – they are in the city, but the fighting for the city has also been going on for over a year.

This means that even if the Russians captured these cities, even if the capture of Chasiv Yar was confirmed, it would tactically give them an advantageous position. There is higher terrain there that provides a good view of the surrounding area. They could further attack Konstantinovka, and if they gained that too, they would open a gateway for a larger grouping of troops, which we don’t see anywhere yet. They would have to move it from somewhere, and then they could start attacking in the direction of Kramatorsk and Slavyansk.

Limits of Russian advance and negotiating positions

But even if they were successful in this, Russia’s negotiating position is that they still demand that Ukraine cede parts that have not been occupied so far, which they either never occupied at all, such as Slavyansk, Kramatorsk or Zaporizhzhia, or which they occupied temporarily, such as Kherson, from where they were pushed out.

This means that the negotiating position will not change in any fundamental way. The Russians would need a bigger breakthrough to occupy the rest of Donbas, but so far it doesn’t look like they have the capacity for that – unless the Ukrainians make some huge mistake. We don’t see any operational reserves, any larger grouping of troops that would be somewhere close to the front line and waiting to be deployed where the front line is broken through.

This means that even if the Russians break through the front line, they will more or less prioritize and take troops from some other parts of the front section and quickly strengthen the breakthrough area. But of course, this takes some time and also gives the Ukrainians time to regroup their forces.

Russian tactics and slow progress

The Russians are simply taking advantage of the fact that they have numerical superiority and that Ukrainians have a problem with personnel, which they compensate for with greater use of drones. The Russians are throwing all forces into battles, but progress is relatively slow. For larger cities, they are creating conditions for their encirclement and then gradual capture, but so far there is no sign of any dramatic speed in terms of advancing tens of kilometers a day.

Host: That was General Pavel Macko. Thank you for the interview and your time. Goodbye.

General Macko: Thank you for the invitation, have a pleasant evening.

Host: I will add to the viewers that you can also watch the entire interview on our website joj24.sk in the Studio JOJ24 section.

Videorecording of the interview you can see here:

https://youtu.be/r8Tzk3clOzg?si=lwRL_7fzxM-6AErE

See also:

Ukrainians and Russians are Learning. What About Us?

Ukrainian War for Existence – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

Analysis: Is a lasting and just peace within reach? – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

Trump sends nuclear submarines near Russia after Putin aide’s ‘dead hand‘ threat

The post Is Russia provoking President Trump? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

But fighting without vision and strategy is not enough. It’s important to know why we fight and what we fight for.

#EU #NATO #Putin #Russia #Trump #Ukraine #USA #War in Ukraine #Zelensky

Pavel Macko reporting for Týždeň magazine. Full transcript of the podcast https://youtu.be/GmSQTqTEAQA?si=QePWcXi8HiZLAVVC

Eve of War

In Europe, at the beginning of 2022, we sensed that something terrible was brewing, but most of us didn’t want to admit it. Neither citizens nor politicians. We were still enjoying the euphoria of three-quarters of a century of peace and over three decades of general freedom.

The public and politicians not only in the Baltic states but throughout Europe anxiously watched Russian maneuvers around Ukraine’s borders. They also perceived the continuing diversionary actions of Russian intelligence services and „vacationing“ soldiers in eastern Ukraine. These were accompanied by artificial hysteria about an impending Ukrainian attack on two separatist republics.

Russia had more than 100,000 armed soldiers on the borders, bringing in blood supplies, field hospitals, and additional troops. Meanwhile, pro-Russian collaborators there were already talking about a Ukrainian invasion in autumn 2021 and organizing forced evacuation of the population. Ukrainians showed not even a hint of any troop regrouping. President Zelensky even downplayed warnings from Western intelligence services.

After Russian ultimatums in December 2021, when they demanded Ukraine’s disarmament and its reintegration into the „Russian world,“ as well as the annulment of NATO expansion after 1997, the tension was palpable. But few could imagine a major war. It made sense to no one except Putin.

Slovak Anomaly

Slovakia was already an anomaly on a global scale at that time. Politicians of today’s ruling coalition organized protests and, under the pretext of peace, openly supported Russian aggression and demands. They even accused the West, especially the USA, of trying to provoke aggression against Russia. They organized a hunt against our MPs for supporting the defense agreement with the USA and threatened, together with today’s department head, a general strike. All in support of Russian interests, not Slovak ones.

Whether they did so out of complete confusion or were coordinated from the Russian embassy may one day be discovered by historians and investigators. Today, these are under the thumb of Maroš Žilinka, who as late as February 8, 2022, threatened parliamentarians with „the judgment of history“ for not wanting to hear his desperate fight against the agreement with the USA. Just before that, he praised the benefits of Soviet occupation.

Fight for Independence and Freedom

In July, we commemorate the anniversary of the American Revolution – the war for independence that culminated in the declaration of independence of American colonies. Since then, July 4 has been Independence Day in the USA. The French Revolution began with an attack on the Bastille and was a war for freedom. The French commemorate July 14 as Bastille Day.

Ukrainians today are fighting a combined war – for the bare existence of their own nation and their own free state. How this war turns out will determine our future history. In Slovakia’s case, probably also the existence of our state in its current form and borders.

Let’s analyze in two parts what happened, what is still happening, and what it means for Europe and Slovakia. What we have believed in so far is gradually disappearing, fears are being fulfilled.

Historical Parallels and Putin’s Strategy

To many people, President Putin’s approach just before the invasion of Ukraine resembled Hitler’s strategy during the Munich Dictate. Historical parallels are always somewhat flawed, but there might be something to it.

Russia had been conducting hybrid operations for a long time to prepare the international audience for a new reality. After the West’s strategic blunder of ending operations in Afghanistan and the massive disruption of normal life during COVID, Russia gained the impression that the West was tired. They thought it was self-absorbed and people were frightened of losing comfort.

Political leaders were at odds and trying to solve one cascading crisis after another, as well as strategic adaptation to rapid climate change. For Russia, like all autocratic regimes, this was a secondary matter. The primary concern is maintaining and strengthening power.

Ukraine and the entire West were strategically disturbed, unable to concentrate on the existential threat. The Russians evaluated this as an opportunity to capitalize on long-term disruptive activities in the world, into which they had invested billions of dollars for years.

Putin’s Ultimatum

But Putin’s ultimatum failed. Not so much because the West felt strong and united. Rather, they underestimated Putin and his determination.

The nearly 200,000 troops around Ukraine in late January 2022 looked threatening but not convincing enough that Russia could really engage in a major war. So the US rejected Putin’s ultimatum.

He maneuvered himself into a situation where he didn’t have many options left:

◾️Either admit he was bluffing and his costly show of force didn’t work

◾️Or attempt a lightning action, this time with the risk of high losses compared to the occupation of Crimea without a shot

But if he quickly achieved strategic goals, he would be able to politically sell it to his domestic and international audience. The West and the rest of the world would, according to Putin’s reasoning, come to terms with the new reality.

Beginning of the Invasion

The order to start the invasion came. In the early morning hours, around 5 AM on February 24, 2022, a large-scale invasion of Ukraine began.

Similar to Hitler, who attacked Poland early in the morning at 4:45 AM on September 1, 1939, Putin counted on a Blitzkrieg – a rapid advance into Ukraine’s interior and its rapid collapse.

Like the Nazis in Poland, the Russians quickly attacked Ukraine from three strategic directions:

◾️From the north toward Kyiv

◾️From the east toward Kharkiv and Donbas

◾️ In the south to Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and further along the Mykolaiv-Odesa axis

The entire maneuver was supported from the first minutes by strategic bombing of key defensive points and critical infrastructure. The cherry on top was to be a strategic airborne operation in Hostomel and the rapid occupation of Kyiv’s center and key political-administrative facilities.

Stalled Blitzkrieg

An exemplary lightning chess game, which the Russians had doctrinally and practically rehearsed and tested multiple times in the post-World War II period. It always went smoothly. Now the Russians suddenly got stuck.

Although the media still talks about a „three-day war,“ according to available information, the Russians had planned the entire operation for 10 days. In 10 days, they wanted to control not only Kyiv but the entire Ukraine, break its armed resistance, install a puppet government, suppress resistance hotspots, and stabilize the situation. This is what empires have been doing for centuries in rebellious provinces or with disobedient small neighbors. They know that any long conflict is exhausting and a strategic risk.

All of this failed for the Russians. The world was shocked not only that the Russians engaged in a war we haven’t seen since 1945 – that is, a war where a strong opponent attacks a relatively large neighbor with all means, who effectively defends itself.

Strategic Shocks for Russia

The Russians experienced several strategic shocks and couldn’t withdraw from the conflict in time. Regardless of the current state on the battlefield after more than three years, they strategically lost at the beginning. But they can still gain operational and tactical victory at an enormous cost.

First Strategic Shock

The biggest strategic shock for the Russians was that Ukrainians began to spontaneously defend themselves – ordinary citizens with Molotov cocktails. What was an advantage for the Russians – an attack on a more than 2,200-kilometer-long front, which was to ensure the overloading of Ukrainian defense and rapid collapse – turned into a Russian nightmare.

Their own troops became overloaded, their logistics failed, they couldn’t generate what everyone expected from a military superpower: massive dynamic combined arms maneuvers of large military formations with full support from the air, artillery, and mobility.

Second Strategic Shock

The second strategic shock for the Russians was the rejection of the invasion by Russian-speaking Ukrainians. The entire „liberating“ myth about the invasion fell.

Third Strategic Shock

The third strategic shock for the Russians was the vigorous and unified approach of the EU and NATO, which managed to respond within 24 hours with a clear political message. This then gradually transformed into breaking the barrier of fear of Russia and gradual aid to bleeding Ukraine.

Long Exhausting War

Instead of a lightning conquest of Ukraine, the Russians ended up in a long exhausting war. Ukrainians are fighting for bare survival.

Meanwhile, this war, with more than a million human casualties on the Russian side alone, has turned into a war of survival for the Russians as well. First and foremost, it’s about the survival of Putin’s regime and Putin personally. In the long term, it’s also about the survival of Russia as a strong and respected empire.

Russia is being exhausted, internal tension is growing, and on its borders, it has not only increasingly sovereign former colonies but also a numerically superior and economically stronger China.

Despite the failure of the lightning war, the Russians managed to destroy hope for a peaceful life in Europe. The Russians totally destroyed the post-war model of peaceful coexistence of countries and the OSCE security mechanism. There is a deep furrow not only between Russia and Ukraine but also between Russia and the West. Unfortunately, this is also within our societies. It is a consequence of the long-term hybrid war that the Russians are waging against us.

Life in a Different World

On February 24, 2022, in my very first media commentary on the beginning war, I expressed the opinion that regardless of whether the Russian invasion ends the next day or lasts for years, from 2/24/2022, we live in a different world, and our children will probably never experience the era of relaxation like all of us after November 1989. War is returning as a common political-historical phenomenon into our lives.

That’s why it’s important to analyze what happened, what is happening, and where it might lead. The Russian war in Ukraine has and will have a transformative effect on warfare and socio-political conditions for the next generations.

From Blitzkrieg to Gradual Dying Out

The war still continues. But it already is and will be a source of numerous studies and analyses. It will shape an entire generation of politicians, soldiers, and experts. I myself had the opportunity to participate in one of the first extensive studies. Our international three-member team attempted to generalize the lessons from the first ten months of the war. We provocatively named the report „How to Defeat Russia.“

Another two years have passed since then, and dozens of similar analyses have appeared. The situation on the battlefield has also changed and continues to evolve.

Distorted Intelligence Information

The Russian invasion was based on distorted intelligence information and poor strategic assessment. Putin was hungry for war, and no one had the courage to tell him that Russia, despite the relative weakness of Ukraine, was not prepared for a major war.

The Russians calculated that the population would quickly reconcile with the fall of Zelensky and Russian power. The Russians had practiced combat operations for several months, but they were not prepared for real combat.

Logistics Failure

The structure of Russian logistics was not adapted to conducting intensive combat operations for a longer period on foreign territory. The Russians had their so-called operational logistics outsourced to a state civilian company at that time.

At the tactical level, Russian troops carried with them only two calculation days of supplies at the battalion and at the brigade or regiment level. This was far from enough for the tens to hundreds of kilometers of advances in the first days. NATO has up to seven days of supplies at the same level.

Ukrainian tactics and weather also played their part. The Russian war machine got stuck. The rapid conquest of Ukraine turned into long-term battles in multiple dimensions.

Moreover, despite strategic bombing, the Russians failed to suppress Ukrainian air defense and gain air superiority. This has marked the entire course of the war so far.

Three Phases of the War

If we take into account the key factors and the prevailing character of activities, we can talk about three phases of the war.

First Phase (2022)

The first phase of the war took place in 2022. Briefly, it can be said that the Russians suffered a Ukrainian defensive shock, and Ukraine’s counteroffensive repelled the Russian advance at Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson.

Ukrainians even rapidly liberated a large part of the occupied territories, pushing the Russians into heavy defense. They had to resort to partial mobilization to prevent the collapse of front lines in southern Ukraine.

Western aid increased sharply, allowing precise strikes and recapturing territory. But Ukrainians partly became victims of their own success, and by the end of 2022, aid slowed down.

Second Phase (2023)

The second phase took place in 2023. Ukraine maintained tactical initiative almost the entire year but failed to turn it into operationally significant success. A stalemate ensued.

Russia strategically adapted, abandoned ideas of a quick victory, and dug in in eastern and southern Ukraine. Surovikin’s multi-layered line was too tough a nut to crack for Ukraine’s limited offensive formation.

Ukraine’s summer offensive stalled amid fortified lines saturated with a new generation of Russian drones. Ukraine shifted toward attrition warfare. What normally serves to shape the operational environment became the main content of combat activities aimed at logistics, command centers, and the enemy’s rear infrastructure.

It was confirmed that recapturing one’s own occupied territory, if the aggressor shifts to strategic defense, is extremely difficult.

Third Phase (2024 – Present)

The third phase of the war has been ongoing from the beginning of 2024 until now. It could be called hybrid escalation and technological transformation.

Although the Russians have operational initiative all the time, they cannot perform a fundamental rapid operation that would move the battlefield. Attempts at modern combined arms maneuvers of large formations have failed; instead, tactics have shifted toward constant small tactical attacks.

The battlefield is fully transparent, nothing can be hidden, soldiers often have only 10 minutes for combat maneuver and taking a new position. Moreover, it is saturated with all-seeing and all-destroying drones.

Ukraine has expanded drone and missile attacks deep into Russian territory, for example, in the case of Kursk. Russia has intensified aerial bombing and pressure on the Donetsk and Kharkiv fronts. The battlefield is becoming increasingly fragmented, decentralized, and technologically driven.

Main Factors for Ukraine’s Survival

When the invasion began, many experts believed we were seeing an atypical war, a clash of two post-Soviet armies irrelevant to Western armies.

The truth is that in the first months of the war, Ukrainians had the tactical and doctrinal upper hand. Especially that part of the Ukrainian army that had experience with operations in Donbas and had undergone Westernization. Commanders were independent, able to make decisions flexibly according to the situation, and mastered the principles of so-called mission command, where you only assign a goal to the unit, not a rigid procedure.

Russians were the exact opposite at the beginning – rigid, unable to make independent decisions, always looking at their superior and his detailed instructions. This has changed in the meantime. Russians are learning too.

Despite this, Ukrainians have so far managed to resist regardless of Russian numerical superiority and Russian superiority in strategic weapons.

Hybrid Model of the Ukrainian Army

The Ukrainian army has evolved from post-Soviet forces into a hybrid model that combines NATO-style mission command, asymmetric tactics, and targeting with AI support.

Russia, despite failures, has also adapted its Soviet-era doctrine and strengthened it with multi-layered defense, electronic warfare, mass artillery, and finally strong air support at the line of contact.

The course of the war so far shows that if Ukraine wants to survive, it must prioritize the strategic neutralization of the stronger Russia over a decisive victory on the battlefield. Ukraine’s victory may not come in the form of a signed treaty or complete restoration of territory. Instead, it may depend on the strategic neutralization of Russia and its aggression, making Russian aggression futile, even if the war persists.

Five Key Factors for Survival and Success

From this perspective, these 5 key factors for survival and success can be identified:

1) Disabling and Denying Russian Operations

◾️Ukraine must continue to paralyze Russian offensive capacity through drone warfare, remote mining, and attacks into the strategic operational depth of the adversary

◾️Functional defeats of enemy capabilities, such as disabling a bomber base or oil infrastructure, can shift the war from attrition to operational insignificance of that Russian capability

2) Sovereignty of the Defense Industry

◾️Ukraine started in a very difficult situation. It could rely only on limited supplies from the Soviet era, a weakened defense industry, and foreign aid

◾️Today, it can produce up to 52% of its needs itself, and this share is rising despite Russian bombing

◾️Domestic production of drones, artillery, and air defense systems is essential

◾️European partners are financing Ukrainian weapons production to reduce dependence

3) Civil-Military Integration

◾️In war, not only the armed forces but the entire country is involved. Not only because rockets and drones fall everywhere, but mainly because Ukraine correctly introduced the concept of total defense and resilience

◾️Territorial defense forces, volunteer battalions, and civilian mobilization form the backbone of Ukraine’s resilience

◾️Protection of critical infrastructure and maintaining societal continuity are as important as success on the battlefield

◾️For example, the ability to quickly repair damaged railways and the inability of Russians to hit moving targets deep in Ukrainian territory were the main reasons why the Russians failed to stop growing foreign aid

4) Strategic Deterrence

◾️Ukraine’s victory plan has partly fallen by the wayside, especially after the advent of the Trump administration in the US

◾️But it correctly proposes a package of non-nuclear deterrence including capabilities for long-distance strikes and joint defense operations with future partners

◾️Deterrence must be credible, sustainable, and anchored in Ukraine’s post-war security architecture

5) International Support and Political Unity

◾️Continued Western assistance – financial, military, and diplomatic – is essential

◾️Ukraine’s survival depends on maintaining global attention and fighting war fatigue, especially amid changing US politics

This applies not only within Ukraine but also in Slovakia and the West. In Ukraine, our security and free existence are being fought for. If Russia succeeds, the chance that we will find ourselves under Russian control again or live in constant fear of what the Russians will do will dramatically increase. Such a state would not only have political and psychological impacts but would mainly significantly cut into our resources. It would be the end of our security and relative prosperity.

Peace is Still Not in Sight and Democracy in Crisis

„It was supposed to be resolved within 24 hours.“ It’s hard to estimate whether Donald Trump’s pre-election statements were just conscious populist lies or the self-indulgent naivety of a politician whom the Russians bailed out of problems several times as a businessman.

No one expected President Trump to actually end the war in one day, but the US administration’s approach so far has been a huge disappointment and hasn’t brought the end of the war closer. It’s nowhere in sight.

Ukrainians so far cannot push the Russians out, and they cannot defeat Ukraine. But they can cause increasing suffering to civilians. This is due to the increasingly exhausted Ukrainian air defense, periodic blocking of American aid, and the inability of Americans and the West to produce more means to combat Russian missiles, drones, and heavy bombs.

Bad American Strategy

The Americans chose a very bad strategy. Despite knowing for decades that only a tough stance works against the Russians and their expansionism, they tried to buy the Russians at the cost of unilateral pressure on Ukraine.

If it had worked, Ukrainians might not have liked it, but at least it could be said that the end justifies the means. But the exact opposite happened. Putin stopped taking the Americans and their president seriously. Behind polite diplomatic phrases is mockery and even greater arrogance and brutality from the Russians. They rejected all of Ukraine’s offers for a ceasefire and negotiation and indicate that they only accept complete capitulation of Ukraine and humiliated forgiveness from the West.

Instead of stopping the war, long-time allies quarreled because of it. Europe is putting together a coalition of the willing in case it’s no longer possible to count on the Americans. But without American capabilities, Europeans will still be players in a supporting role for a long time if it comes to direct confrontation with Russia.

NATO in Crisis

Meanwhile, the Americans are giving them (Russians) too much space. It’s not just about American pragmatism and focusing more on China as the main competitor, but also about the inability, even after more than three years, to increase production of critical systems and missiles for air defense.

The recent NATO summit thus threatened a major dispute or even catastrophe. Some European politicians like Fico and Orbán were even prematurely celebrating Russian victory and new orders in Europe.

President Trump eventually had his way. NATO countries committed to increasing defense spending up to 5% of GDP. The crisis was temporarily averted. But the commitment to increase defense spending has no clear timeline and also includes a lot of room for creative accounting. So real strengthening of defense may not come quickly enough.

Moreover, Russia’s 5th column in NATO, led by Fico, has already made it known that they won’t give an extra cent for their defense. On the contrary, even from the current 2% of GDP for defense, they will significantly cut for explicitly civilian projects and openly talk about leaving NATO.

This was founded not only for defense against the aggressive Soviet Union and today’s Russia, but was also built on common values. How long this alliance will last in times of business politics and permanent trade and tariff war between the US and the rest of the allies is unclear.

Ukraine Must Help Itself

Ukraine, fighting for its survival, will primarily have to help itself. Just as it spontaneously did from the first day and hope that then others will help it too.

Battle to the End?

Under the given circumstances, it’s important for Ukrainians and for all of us not to lose attention and not to get tired. If a solution to the conflict doesn’t come on the diplomatic field, Ukraine must endure it militarily as well.

The current situation is extremely complex. The Russians cannot significantly advance on land, but they attack all the more from the air. The intensity of Russian attacks on civilian targets and critical infrastructure is constantly rising.

Ukrainians have eliminated part of the strategic bombers, and then they have many long-range missiles from flat flight paths, but the Russians can compensate with ballistic missiles and especially long-range drones. They modernized originally Iranian drones and today can produce hundreds of them daily. In June alone, Russians launched more than 5,400 drones at Ukraine.

At the same time, the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defense is gradually declining. In 2022, they could eliminate 95% of drones and 74% of missiles. Today it’s only 79% and 50%.

Situation at the Front

The Russians still have tactical and operational initiative and are pushing practically across the entire front. Fortunately, they have so far failed to capture any major city except Vuhledar. The second year, there is fighting for Kupiansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk. The Russians have also approached Kostiantynivka and penetrated the edge of the Dnipropetrovsk region.

The question arises whether Ukrainians still have a chance to endure. According to my estimate and the estimate of colleague experts, they still have a chance, and mainly they have no other option.

Transformation of Warfare

Ukrainians, aware of this, are not resting on their laurels. Both sides are coming up with innovations. The character of combat has fundamentally changed. It’s not just a solution out of necessity. It’s rather a fundamental transformation of warfare.

What otherwise takes years has been shortened to months. The innovation cycle, for example, in the field of drones, lasts only 3 months. Today’s tactical advantage may be marginal or completely irrelevant by the end of the year.

Although the Russians have an apparent advantage in the amount of personnel, they are not without problems either. They cannot just deploy conscripts in operations on Ukrainian territory. Training new contracted or called-up soldiers is complicated on both sides, and neither side has enough instructors.

Ukraine is more vulnerable in that training takes place in a war zone, but it can compensate for this with training from its allies and supporters.

Ukrainian Capabilities

Ukraine still has approximately 1 million men and women in arms, who are tired from long-term deployment but also have greater motivation.

Ukraine can produce more and more weapons systems by itself. For example, they can produce up to 250 self-propelled howitzers annually, which is more than all of NATO combined. Despite the massive use of drones, heavy equipment and artillery are still needed. Only the way they are used is changing.

Ukraine is gradually increasing the capacity of its air force with donated F-16 fighters and French Mirage 2000-5F fighters. The fact that they have already lost three of them is not a catastrophe but proof that they are using them more frequently and riskily.

Technological Edge

Despite significant Russian numerical, economic, raw material, and technological superiority, Ukrainians manage to keep pace with them and achieve technological excellence.

Ukraine is today a global leader in the production and use of drones. They have achieved absolute excellence with the help of Western companies in the field of artificial intelligence utilization.

An innovative way of processing data in the cloud and digitalizing the use of relatively outdated technology has brought a dramatic change in the field of target determination, targeting, and their destruction. Even with a smaller number of weapons systems of varying quality, they can achieve extremely effective fire destruction.

Strategic Asymmetry

The greatest advantage of Ukrainians lies in their strategic approach to changing doctrine. Aware of Russian numerical superiority and the unavailability of some strategic weapons and means with operational reach, Ukrainians focused on strategic asymmetry in their military operations.

They focus on mobility, deep precise strikes, and increasingly use guerrilla warfare and special forces operations deep in Russian territory. They have made the protection of air and sea routes and the long-term building of their own capabilities and capacities a strategic priority.

Despite long-term political fatigue from the war and the unpredictability of Americans, they can still rely on their allies. Support from countries of the Ramstein format continues to function, and partners help finance Ukrainian armament programs or technology transfer.

Self-Preservation Instinct and Will of the Nation

The instinct of self-preservation can mobilize and stimulate heroic performances. This applies equally to nations as to individuals.

Ukrainians are fighting an existential struggle. Every single Russian drone strike, every single rocket in the city center brings destruction. But instead of the depression and defeatism expected by the Russians, these motivate Ukrainians and mobilize the civilian population.

If before the invasion Putin dared to claim that Ukrainians don’t even exist and everyone has always belonged to the „Russian world,“ today he has a consolidated and confident nation before him.

The will of a nation to fight has been one of the main sources of strength of nations and the key to success in all long and great wars so far.

All these are factors that don’t make Ukrainians doomed to defeat by any means. The Russians experienced three strategic surprises right at the beginning. If Putin today relies on lasting longer in this war, he may experience a fourth and final strategic surprise.

Ukrainians can still withstand Russian aggression, but meanwhile, it may happen that we won’t withstand it, here in Slovakia.

Lessons from the War for Us in the West

Regardless of how Russian aggression and Ukraine’s fight for survival eventually end, we must learn from this war. It revealed the fragility of European security assumptions, the urgency of civil defense, and the need for strategic clarity and mobilization.

Slovakia and Europe as a whole – this conflict is not a distant crisis but a mirror reflecting our own vulnerability and choices.

Hundreds of treatises have already been written about this war today, although not all are fully understood and especially accepted by politicians who decide and citizens whom it concerns. Many assumptions will change, as will their final evaluations. But the main trends are clear today.

This war is already fundamentally changing views on warfare and military-political competition, as well as concepts of state survival. The long-term consequences of the Ukrainian conflict are extensive and deeply transformative – regionally and globally. Together they create a whole series of domino effects.

Main Consequences of the War

Let’s mention at least some:

Geopolitical Realignment

◾️Geopolitical realignment is occurring, and a new cold war dynamic is emerging

◾️The war has cemented the gulf between Russia and Western democracies

◾️NATO and the EU are strengthening ties and expanding military capabilities

◾️Russia is increasingly aligning with China and other non-Western powers, potentially reshaping global alliances and trade routes

◾️Countries that were traditionally non-aligned are reassessing their positions and balancing economic interests with security concerns

Security and Military Changes

◾️European countries are increasing defense budgets and weapons production. This applies not only to the Baltic states and Poland but also to Germany or Sweden

◾️NATO has rapidly expanded as a result of the war. Finland and Sweden’s entry into NATO represents a significant strategic shift in Northern Europe

◾️The conflict has accelerated the use of artificial intelligence, drones, and cyber tools in modern warfare, creating new precedents for future conflicts

Economic and Energy Disruption

◾️Sanctions, disrupted supply chains, and energy shortages have triggered inflation and economic instability worldwide

◾️Europe is rapidly diversifying away from Russian oil and gas, investing in renewable energy sources and alternative suppliers

◾️Even after the conflict ends, many sanctions against Russia will likely persist, changing global trade and investment flows

Human Rights and Social Consequences

◾️Massive casualties, emigration, and declining birth rates are accelerating Russia’s demographic crisis

◾️Widespread human rights violations, including torture and forced deportations, will leave lasting scars and complicate future reconciliation

◾️With millions of displaced Ukrainians, rebuilding communities and infrastructure will likely take decades

Strategic Uncertainty

◾️Frozen conflicts will continue to haunt the world. Even if active fighting ceases, unresolved territorial disputes and political enmity can persist for years

◾️New arms races are coming, and the importance of deterrence is growing. The war has renewed interest in hypersonic weapons, cyber capabilities, and nuclear deterrence strategies

◾️Global governance and cooperation are failing

The war in Ukraine is also bringing a completely new revolution in warfare. Doctrine and tactics are completely changing. The view of the right mix of military capabilities, strategic deterrence, defense, civil defense, and country resilience is fundamentally changing.

Views on the professional army and compulsory service are changing. Concepts of comprehensive mobilization of society await a fundamental revision.

These issues and their impact on Europe and Slovakia will be addressed in the second part of the podcast.

And that’s all for today. I look forward to listening to the second part of the podcast. Thank you for your attention.

The post Ukrainian War for Existence appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

While the Americans talk about peace within reach, the Russians are escalating attacks on civilians. Analysis of proposals for peace in Ukraine.

The American Dictate as an Innovation of the Munich Dictate?

U.S. negotiators have unveiled Trump’s alleged seven-point peace plan to halt the fighting in Ukraine. At the same time, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio could not hide his frustration. Just before Easter, he indicated that if the warring parties do not accept Trump’s peace at any cost, which is to be paid mainly by the Ukrainians, the Americans may as well end their mediation mission and devote themselves to something else.

From what has been communicated in public, this would be a humiliating surrender of Ukraine. In fact, even worse than the Munich Dictate to Czechoslovakia under Hitler’s arrangement. During the Munich Dictate, at least Neville Chamberlain and Édouard Daladier naively and cowardly hoped that by curtailing the territory of Czechoslovakia, they would satisfy the aggressive Hitler and prevent war. President Putin uses the same rhetoric as Hitler, only translated from German into Russian and with modified geographical names.

But in the case of Ukraine, Russian aggression has already begun, and we have had a war here for the twelfth year, including a full-fledged war waged for the fourth year. We have not seen a war of this magnitude here in eighty years since the last world war. Ukrainians resisted Russian pressure. Putin did not wait for negotiations, lied to President Macron and Chancellor Scholz until the last moment, and unscrupulously attacked Ukraine. Ukrainians defended themselves spontaneously, even civilians with Molotov cocktails. They proved to the whole world that the Russians do not have what it takes to defeat them in more than three years.

Ukrainians have paid a huge price for this in lives, health, millions of refugees, enormous material and moral damage. And now they are supposed to succumb to some ultimatum, desecrate all those victims and submit without a fight to an external dictate contrary to international law, the UN Charter and morality? Chamberlain and Daladier may have underestimated Hitler and believed his propaganda.

But in the case of Putin, Trump has repeatedly seen the perfidy of his promises and his brutal acts of aggression. If he transformed his self-centeredness and effort to throw everything at his predecessor President Biden into an effort to pander to Russia and humiliate Ukraine, then the consequences will be borne by Ukraine, Europe, but also the United States. President Trump will not be able to make excuses for not being able to count on how Putin will behave.

After two rounds of negotiations, in Paris (April 17) and then in London (April 23), it looked like we had a difficult diplomatic rift ahead of us. Bigger than the one between Trump and Zelensky in the Oval Office of the White House. The Americans presented their „ultimate“ proposal.

The Ukrainians, together with their supporters, especially the United Kingdom and France, later put forward their counter-proposal. We did not know the details, we only had incomplete information from the negotiators mediated through the media. Reuters eventually managed to obtain the texts of both proposals.

On the eve of the funeral of Pope Francis, the American negotiator Witkoff met with President Putin. At the funeral of the pope, President Zelensky met with President Trump, as well as the quartet of Trump, Zelensky, Macron and Starmer met together.

Everyone briefly says that the talks were positive. But we don’t know the details yet. So, let’s discuss in more detail how these proposals for achieving peace differ.

Differences between the American and European-Ukrainian proposals

On April 17, the Americans presented both Russia and Ukraine with what they described as a final proposal to both sides. Although the media referred to Trump’s proposal as a seven-point plan, according to Reuters,  it  is concentrated in four areas – ceasefire, security guarantees, agreements on territories and economic development.

Ukraine had serious reservations about this proposal, which is why Marco Rubio canceled his participation in the negotiations in London on April 23. Ukraine and its allies have put forward a counterproposal. So, let’s compare these two proposals.

Truce

The American proposal envisages a permanent ceasefire. Both sides would immediately start negotiations on technical details and conditions. Translated into plain language, the U.S. envisages a permanent ceasefire. Therefore, both sides are to start negotiations on the technical conditions for the implementation and verification of the ceasefire. And this is where the risk lies. In recent days, we have seen that a ceasefire without clear rules and verification is very difficult to implement.

Ukraine and its partners are putting more emphasis on this area. An immediate and unconditional ceasefire on land, in the air and at sea is considered by Ukraine and its allies to be the very first and conditional step. That is, an unconditional ceasefire should come first and only then talks about territories and other issues. That is why they are proposing immediate negotiations on technical conditions with participation of the US and European countries.

Compliance with the ceasefire would be monitored from the beginning by the Americans with the support of third countries. The Russians have so far rejected this and then violated all agreements. Ukraine wants transparency. In addition, Ukraine and its European allies demand that part of the ceasefire is that  the Russians unconditionally allow the return of all deportees and illegally displaced children. Both sides would exchange all prisoners of war. Russia must release all civilian prisoners.

Security guarantees for Ukraine

The Americans suggest that Ukraine will receive robust security guarantees. The guarantor states will be an ad hoc grouping of European states plus willing non-European states. Ukraine will not seek to join NATO. Ukraine may pursue EU membership.

Learning from the failure of formal declarations and guarantees, as in the case of the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine is demanding stronger, in their opinion, real security guarantees against the resumption of Russian aggression. They want Ukraine to receive robust security guarantees, including from the US (an agreement similar to Article 5 of NATO), while there is no consensus among the allies on NATO membership. No restrictions on the Ukrainian Defense forces.

The Ukrainian proposal also envisages an ad hoc grouping of military forces of European and willing non-European countries. Ukraine proposes that there should be no restrictions on the presence, weapons and operations of foreign forces on the territory of Ukraine. There is no contradiction regarding EU membership.

Territory

In this area, there are the most fundamental and so far, irreparable contradictions and incompatible overall philosophies of approach. The U.S. formally (de jure) recognizes the Russian control of Crimea. The US will de facto recognize Russian control over the Luhansk region. The US will de facto recognize Russian-controlled of the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. The territories in the Kharkiv region will be returned to Ukraine. Ukraine will regain control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant through US control and administration, with electricity distributed to both countries. Ukraine will have free passage of the Dnipro River and control of the Kinburn Spit.

This American proposal caused a great wave of resentment not only in Ukraine, but definitely pleased President Putin. This proposal is the destruction of a decade of international order in force and unilaterally rewards the aggressor and potentially incentivizes aggression around the world to acquire territories.

According to the Ukrainian proposal, territorial issues will be discussed and fully decided only after a full and unconditional ceasefire. That is, a ceasefire should be reached first, and only then should these issues be resolved. Negotiations on territories will begin on the basis of the line of control.

Thus, Ukraine is aware that it is not currently able to push the Russians out of the occupied territories. But it is interested in resolving the fates of abused and imprisoned people, it wants the return of kidnapped children. But most importantly, it cannot formally recognize the permanent loss of territory. President Zelensky and the parliament do not even have the right to do so according to the constitution. In addition, it would be a guide to further aggression a few years later.

Economy

Under Trump’s proposal, the U.S. and Ukraine will implement economic cooperation in the field of minerals. Ukraine is to be fully reconstructed and financially compensated. Sanctions against Russia resulting from this conflict since 2014 will be removed. U.S.-Russian cooperation in the field of energy and other industries.

The Ukrainian counterproposal is not fundamentally contradictory but rather specifies some details. In the case of reconstruction and financial compensation, it proposes that they will also include Russian sovereign assets will remain frozen until Russia compensates damage to Ukraine.

The view on the timing and pace of lifting US sanctions against Russia is also different. These are to be gradually released once sustainable peace is achieved and can be restored in the event of a breach of the peace agreements.

Conclusion: It is quite certain that these differences were the subject of conversation between Presidents Zelensky and Trump, as well as in other conversations. But how much these positions have converged and whether they are relevant to Russia at all remains to be seen.

The post Analysis: Is a lasting and just peace within reach? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.