Run away, the Russians are coming! Or are they not and should we remain calm? #Avangard#Burevestnik#Kinzhal#Oreshnik#Poseidon#Russia#Zirkon
Russians are baring their teeth, showing nuclear cruise missiles, nuclear torpedoes for radioactive tsunamis, and social networks are flooded with Russian propaganda. Instead of fears and panic, we should calmly sit down and rationally evaluate this reflexive campaign.
Note: The article was originally published in the journal .týždeň
The song goes round and round
Russians have always been fond of ostentation and grand strategic gestures. After all, it is the world’s largest country by area with a specific strategic culture that does not change. They have been demonstrating the same imperial policy and strategic thinking for centuries, during tsarist Russia, the Soviet empire, and in the current extremely nationalist phase of the Russian empire. Moreover, Russians are also a country of excellent chess players.
Russia has never been exactly the most advanced country, but it had enormous territory, almost bottomless reserves of raw materials, little respect for foreign nations and ethnicities, and de facto even for their own Russians. Their strategy was always built on strength, brutality and unpredictability, thanks to which they got into trouble several times with poor assessment of the opponent and their own capabilities. But they always insisted on inspiring respect.
Currently, however, two things have changed. After the initial decay after the end of the Cold War, the Russians nevertheless climbed out of the worst. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, they shrank geographically and relatively economically, and the world outgrew them. However, the rapid growth of the world and especially new economic giants like China and India, and the development of an almost united Europe, also caused enormous growth in demand for energy and raw materials, which significantly pulled the Russians up. The performance of developed economies is no longer measured by steel and coal production, but by services, digitalization and production with high added value. But Russia is figuratively returning to the era of oil and steel. Paradoxically, this was enough for economic growth – for raw materials they were able to buy almost everything after the lifting of export restrictions from the Cold War.
The second fundamental change was that NATO, while geographically expanding, was also massively disarming, and the West was collecting peace dividends. After all, who would dare attack us? The American global war on terrorism was running in the world, which was expensive and exhausting for the West, but did not force it to build and maintain potential for real war with high intensity combat operations, only stabilizing expeditionary operations.
As soon as the Russians avoided collapse and sensed that they were attractive and important again, and that the naive West thought it would control them through economic-raw material integration and increasing its dependence on Russia, they seized the opportunity. Already with Putin’s rise to power and the non-standard resolution of the crisis in Chechnya, it was clear that Russia’s course was changing. Putin clearly said where he was heading at the Munich Security Forum in 2007. Everyone pretended to listen, but no one perceived it.
The shock came in 2008. Russia invaded Georgia, literally suffered victory and withdrew. Again we did not understand, we thought it was just a summer storm, not climate change. But Russia launched a massive information offensive of global scope. Liberal rules and the rapid development of social networks and their penetration in society changed Russian doctrine and strategy.
Former censors changed the paradigm. Instead of limiting access to information, they did the exact opposite – they flooded domestic and especially foreign internet networks with information. Their own – modified, distorted, without a visible Russian watermark. They built a massive network of replicators in target countries, networks of trolls and today also armies of bots.
Credible propaganda needs something tangible. Russia therefore created the impression of an invincible army with miraculous weapons. It presented new super weapons to inspire respect – it caused doubts among experts, but convinced the broad masses and Western politicians. Annual military parades replaced the socialist five-year rhythm and built greater respect than Russia deserved. However, no one wants to test a nuclear power.
This image worked until the invasion of Ukraine. It began to stubbornly defend itself, which Russia did not expect and was not doctrinally and structurally prepared for. The West supported Ukraine, but not enough to force Russia to negotiate. So it gained time for recovery and transformation, especially with the help of undemocratic allies. Putin’s regime is fighting for survival, has nowhere to retreat, but at the same time is again demonstrating strength and threatening the future. We must correctly assess its real capabilities and intentions.
Miraculous weapons in determined hands
At least this is how the Kremlin chief’s requirement for Russia’s strategic image in the eyes of its rivals might look. To understand the extent to which this is true, we need not only good intelligence information, but also to look back a little at the last twenty years.
In the Georgian war, the Russians at first glance achieved their immediate goals, which were the defeat of Georgian forces and the establishment of control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But the performance of the Russian army in the 2008 war revealed significant shortcomings. These lessons catalyzed one of the most ambitious military reform programs in post-Soviet Russia. The main lessons and insights of the Russians from the Georgian war included the following problems.
Command and control deficiencies. Russian forces had problems with coordination between branches of the military and services, especially between ground and air units. The command structure was too centralized, which slowed decision-making and adaptation to battlefield developments.
Poor tactical implementation and logistics. Units lacked real-time intelligence and battlefield awareness, relying on outdated maps and communication. Logistical support was chaotic, supply lines were vulnerable and poorly managed.
Limited air force capability. Despite enormous superiority and technological dominance, Russia failed to establish air superiority at the beginning of the conflict. Due to poor coordination between air and ground forces, there were incidents of friendly fire. The air campaign lacked precision and effectiveness, revealing gaps in targeting and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities.
Obsolete equipment and training. Many units were equipped with outdated Soviet-era equipment and soldiers lacked modern combat training. The war revealed the inefficiency of Russian forces based on conscription, which prompted a shift toward professionalization.
Information and media management. Russian information warfare and strategic communication were underdeveloped compared to Western standards. The conflict emphasized the need for better media control and narrative shaping, which Russia later prioritized in Syria and Ukraine.
Although the Russians outwardly acted as sovereigns after the Georgian adventure, they very quickly introduced post-war changes caused by these lessons. Russia launched military reform under Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov.
They streamlined command structures and reduced the bloated officer corps by up to 60 percent. Instead of an army based on mobilization and divisions, the Russians began creating brigades of permanent readiness. Major investments went into modern equipment including UAVs, precision weapons and digital communication. They improved joint (combined arms) operations capabilities and strategic mobility.
An important step was the creation of a professional non-commissioned officer corps, which in the West is the core of leadership at the lowest levels. This addressed the lack of tactical command and improved small unit cohesion. Training was centralized, the original 65 military schools were merged into 10 main training centers. In the personnel area, there was a significant shift toward contract soldiers. Russia began reducing dependence on conscripts and focused on a force of 425,000 contract soldiers and 300,000 conscripts. Today, also due to the war in Ukraine, this ratio and the total number is significantly higher in favor of contract soldiers.
These reforms laid the foundation for Russia’s more agile and integrated operations in Crimea (2014), Syria (2015), and the initial phases of the war in Ukraine (2022) compared to the Georgian war.
Weapons programs and modernization formed a separate reform chapter. The Russians launched a state armament program 2011-2020 aimed at modernizing Russian military technology and addressing shortcomings revealed in Georgia. Key procurement priorities included air defense systems (deployment of S-400 and development of S-500 to counter NATO air superiority), new precision strike capabilities (introduction of Iskander-M tactical ballistic missiles and Kalibr cruise missiles), strategic deterrence (development of new ICBMs such as RS-24 Yars, Sarmat and hypersonic systems like Avangard and Kinzhal) and naval modernization (focus on Borei and Yasen class submarines and smaller missile ships for coastal warfare).
Another group of priorities was improving C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems). UAV programs expanded, although they still lagged behind Western capabilities. The last group was strengthening power projection and mobility. Rapid reaction forces and airborne units capable of rapid deployment were created. Emphasis was placed on strategic mobility including rail and air transport capacity.
Although these reforms improved Russia’s military performance in Crimea (2014) and Syria (2015), they also revealed persistent challenges. Corruption and procurement inefficiency slowed implementation. Mixed success was in professionalization, especially due to morale problems and personnel retention among contract soldiers. The Russians began to rely too much on elite units (for example VDV, Spetsnaz). This created a bottleneck in sustained operations, which continues to manifest today in the war in Ukraine.
Russian super weapons
On March 1, 2018, President Vladimir Putin presented six advanced weapons during his presidential address to the Federal Assembly (Duma and Federation Council), claiming they restore Russian strategic deterrence: Avangard (hypersonic glider), Kinzhal (aeroballistic hypersonic missile), Poseidon (underwater drone – nuclear-powered torpedo), Sarmat (heavy intercontinental missile with multiple warhead), Zircon (hypersonic anti-ship missile), Burevestnik (nuclear-powered cruise missile with „unlimited range“).
The propaganda goal was to signal technological superiority, strategic invulnerability and psychological deterrence to the world. The whole show was supported by a strong media strategy with animated videos, interactive displays and strong statements aimed at Western audiences and strengthening domestic pride. Even then, Western analysts perceived this presentation as a partial bluff, partly technical fetishism and part of reflexive control.
Reality differs considerably from Putin’s declarations. Avangard is supposed to overcome any missile defense thanks to speed and maneuvering. In reality, it is operationally deployed with at least two missile regiments, but still in limited numbers. So far it is mounted on older silo-launched SS-19 (UR-100 N) missiles from the 1970s, they also plan it for Sarmat missiles. Kinzhal was supposed to be unstoppable, designed for highly precise strikes. The characteristics were exaggerated and the Ukrainians were able to repeatedly shoot it down even with the relatively old Patriot system.
The first batch of Poseidons was produced in 2023, they are not yet deployed and experts question the declared ability to cause huge tsunamis. Sarmat is supposed to replace the SS-18 Satan. Tests were delayed and it is only now being introduced into service. The Russians tested the anti-ship missile Zircon also in Ukraine, the declared characteristics were not confirmed in full scope. Burevestnik is still in development, in 2019 the Russians had a serious radiation incident during failure. Newer tests showed progress, but it is not yet deployed.
These weapons are not meant to serve only military purposes, but also as a psychological weapon and strategic signaling. They are meant to harass and worry NATO and strengthen the image of Russian technological parity. Exaggerated capabilities are meant to provoke an exaggerated Western reaction, incorrect allocation of defense resources and doubts. Like Hitler, Putin also wants to appeal to domestic audiences and supporters and create a myth of Russian greatness. However, these super weapons in current numbers and quality do not yet represent an existential threat to NATO and do not give the Russians the possibility of a first disarming nuclear strike.
Russian reflexive control
Reflexive control is a strategy of Russian military thinking that manipulates the opponent’s decision-making process by influencing their perception, assumptions and decisions. The goal is not direct pressure, but shaping the opponent’s logic so that they themselves choose a procedure disadvantageous to them. According to Russian doctrine, it involves the transmission of purposefully prepared information that should lead the opponent to a decision desired by the initiator. The concept has roots in Soviet cybernetics and systems theory (Vladimir Lefebvre, 1960s-70s).
Reflexive control techniques include disinformation (distortion of assessments), provocations (eliciting predictable reactions), demonstrative and deceptive operations (military maneuvers signaling false intentions), cognitive overload (information chaos), mimicry (imitation of behavior), narrative framing (media and diplomatic manipulation of interpretations). Reflexive control is applied at strategic, operational and tactical levels – including psychological, cyber and kinetic operations.
In practice, Russia used it, for example, during the war with Georgia (2008), when it provoked a Georgian reaction. In Crimea (2014) it combined ambiguity, media manipulation and deployment of „little green men“ to paralyze resistance. Since 2022, it has been using reflexive techniques also in the military invasion of Ukraine: nuclear intimidation, warnings about false flags and propaganda about „miraculous“ weapons like Burevestnik, Poseidon or Oreshnik.
These systems serve not only for prestige, but also as a tool of strategic manipulation – to enhance perceived capabilities, create uncertainty and undermine Western confidence in security frameworks. Russian claims about capabilities such as bypassing US missile defense (Avangard, Poseidon) support the doctrine of escalation control. Propaganda creates an image of irrational or premature escalation, thereby complicating Western decision-making.
Russia presents these weapons as a response to American steps, especially withdrawal from ABM and INF treaties. Systems like Burevestnik and Poseidon are outside current treaty frameworks, which questions verification and compliance norms. Propaganda strengthens the idea that arms control is outdated, justifying unilateral development and deployment of new weapons. By overestimating capabilities and maintaining unclear deployment status, Russia forces opponents to plan for worst-case scenarios. These narratives shape Western perception, provoke internal debates and potentially lead to incorrect allocation of defense resources and undermine confidence in deterrence. Western public and policymakers may question the effectiveness of existing deterrence and defense systems.
Conclusion
Should we fear Russia attacking us within five years, or is it just a paper tiger for the next decade? Russia is too damaged for a major war with NATO, but still very capable of regional pressure, hybrid warfare and limited kinetic actions. In the short term, a large-scale conventional offensive is very unlikely. Ground forces are seriously weakened, industry under pressure and elite personnel suffered high losses. After freezing the conflict, they can strengthen the western district, strengthen missile forces, deep strike capability and air defense.
However, hybrid threats are real. Russia is not preparing to send tanks to Berlin. But it can intimidate neighbors, test NATO resolve in the Baltics, Black Sea or Arctic. It can carry out sabotage and terrorist operations on European soil. It has and will increase the capacity for massive missiles and drones, cyber capabilities, intelligence networks in Europe. The nuclear arsenal is intact and they are modernizing it. Russia is destined to become a dangerous, declining power with fewer options and higher risk tolerance. NATO must adapt because Russia is unstable, nuclear and still revisionist.
NASPAŤ