Two important negotiations in Geneva #Geneva#Iran#Peace negotiations#Russia#Ukraine#USA

Analysis of the situation related to upcomming negotiations in Geneva. Transcript of an interview to the Czech TV station ČT24.

And we are joined by retired Lieutenant General Pavel Macko. Welcome. Good evening.

Good evening, I wish you.

So let’s discuss both meetings in Geneva together. First, let’s go to those two-day trilateral negotiations on ending the war in Ukraine. Do you expect any fundamental breakthrough from them, which simply hasn’t happened in those previous negotiations so far? Will it happen now in Geneva?

Trilateral negotiations USA-Ukraine-Russia

Quite honestly, I don’t expect any fundamental breakthrough. Nevertheless, those negotiations are important. But it must be said that we had two rounds of negotiations in Abu Dhabi, where they made progress, where it was also good that those negotiations got some format and some structure, where there are actually several working groups for different areas. It’s good that in both delegations there are people who have a military background, whether it was – I don’t mean Kyrylo Budanov there as the former head of that intelligence GUR, but I mean including the chief of staff from Ukraine and the head of GRU from the Russian Federation. There was an economic component and generally a political component in these negotiations. However, what’s essential is that the key issues that prevent any conclusion of agreements are: first, Russia doesn’t accept any security guarantees from the West and any Western influence or Western assistance to Ukraine after a possible conclusion of peace agreements. Second, Russia has large territorial demands, and third, Russia also has demands for changing the political regime in Ukraine and even demands for further fundamental geopolitical concessions from the West, in Europe and generally in relation to Russia. This is further underlined by those current statements of Russian representation, when already on January 14th at a public assembly, regime representatives and Putin indicated that they have more than those territorial demands, than formal recognition of those four illegally annexed regions, but that they would actually be interested in additional regions as well. Subsequently, Lavrov clarified that they would be interested in Kharkiv region, Dnipropetrovsk region, Odesa region and thus also Mykolaiv and Kherson, and this is something that is completely outside the framework. And moreover, Russians are increasing additional demands. The latest statements from February 9th and 10th and from February 14th even go further, where Russia clearly basically signals that it’s interested in such a solution that would mean de facto absolute capitulation of Ukraine. That pattern can perhaps be found in history only in connection with the approach of Nazi Germany, when actually today’s Russian rhetoric speaks about wanting a pro-Russian and friendly Ukraine, de facto some Russian protectorate, where Russians would decide what will be in that truncated remainder of Ukraine. And these are likewise problems and likewise insurmountable contradictions in that vision of future possible arrangements. These, in my opinion, will lead to the fact that although they will negotiate about some minor details and those peripheral matters of peace agreements, it will get stuck precisely on these hard demands. And the change in the very head of the delegation by Medinsky coming again indicates this hawkish position of Russia, which will probably predetermine the results of these negotiations as well.

Russian play

So what does this mean, that Russia is playing for time, that it’s delaying?

Unambiguously, Russia still feels in the position that it still has trump cards in its hands. It’s raising its stakes and actually any concession or attempt at an accommodating step, whether from Ukraine or the United States as a sponsor of these negotiations and simultaneously a supporter of Ukraine, it interprets as disunity and weakness and thereby raises its stakes and systematically attacks Ukraine. It tries to use maximum economic, military and psychological pressure. After all, winter is still peaking in Ukraine and massive energy attacks on energy facilities have an effect. Zelensky confirmed over the weekend during the Munich Security Conference that practically every single power plant in Ukraine is affected in some way and damaged. Russians continue in this and will continue on the front as well. Even though we see there that Ukrainians have some partial tactical successes on the border of Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions, Russians still have the feeling that by this postponement of a possible solution to that conflict they can gain more and that militarily, even if very slowly and at the cost of high casualties they are advancing, so currently Russians will still push to gain as much as possible from a possible agreement. Moreover, rejecting security guarantees gives the possibility to repeat such aggression in the near future and try to bring it to the end. That means, all this is the result of Russian ambitions that perhaps exceed their real possibilities and capabilities, but so far they see that it allows maintaining a certain disunity in support of Ukraine. We see that Europe doesn’t have sufficient capacity – it’s hesitant – and the United States also changes actually those its approaches to supporting Ukraine and to pressure on Russia all the time. Russia senses some chance in this, that by such stretching and partial concessions and then again raising stakes, it can actually stretch time and undermine that unity or that position of Ukraine and its allies and supporters.

End of war in June 2026?

Washington wants to end the war by June according to Volodymyr Zelensky. We’ve heard similar deadlines in various statements, as you’ve already indicated, but without results. Can the American administration succeed this time and also, above all, how? Because Zelensky talked about Americans wanting to exert pressure on both Ukrainian and Russian sides. So what could this be about? What kind of pressure has the White House not yet resorted to?

Here we need to start perhaps from the end, that this deadline is given by the internal politics of the United States, because they have midterm elections or those partial elections to the American Congress. And so far it looks like the support for the Republican Party is quite small and that therefore the Donald Trump administration could lose the majority not only in the Senate, but even in the lower chamber, that means in the House of Representatives. Thereby that possibility of such sovereign rule of the current administration would be significantly limited. Congress could start blocking many steps of President Trump. That means, if he talks about this deadline, it’s not at all some effort to end the conflict at any cost in favor of Ukrainians or Russians. Simply, Donald Trump wants to present some result. As for those possibilities of pressure and tools, well, we’ve already seen the entire spectrum. First, after the American administration took office, he tried it on Ukraine in that famous discussion in the Oval Office, which was even before the actual negotiation and de facto ended the negotiation. Trump pressured Ukraine and said it has no cards, he wanted to achieve a quick result, it didn’t work. Then we saw a series of various concessions, pressures, ultimatums. We saw that in Alaska Trump thought he had achieved some agreement with Russia, but de facto he only gave Putin legitimacy and gave him a podium and red carpet. He abused that. Then came harsh or demands for harsh oil sanctions. Finally, a law is passed in the American Congress. We see that the United States started seizing tankers of that shadow fleet. That means, this is probably the path by which if the United States wanted, they could pressure Russia. But honestly, I think that if such a settlement comes or at least a cessation of fighting by June, it won’t be exclusively the result of American pressure, but rather it will be a combination of several factors, where also that American pressure, but also continuing sanctions and worsening conditions for the Russian economy and for oil export could lead to such a situation that Russia would get to a point where it would already see that it has no possibility to gain more and with a certain degree of frustration would agree to some negotiations. It’s less than 50 percent probability that such a thing will happen. Of course, some sudden break, reversal, something like a collapse on one side or the other can also come, because we really don’t know in depth even that Russia, which still pretends to have the upper hand and wants to gain more, how it really is. Those strongman speeches and this raising of stakes can also be a negotiating tactic that’s supposed to cover up that Russia is not doing as well as it tries to present outwardly.

Iran nuclear program

Let’s go to those second negotiations in Geneva. The second round of indirect nuclear talks between Iran and the USA will also begin. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in this regard announced to Donald Trump that a potential nuclear agreement must include stopping the uranium enrichment process by Iran and also dismantling the entire Iranian nuclear infrastructure. Is this something that Tehran will agree to, in your opinion?

Hard to say, but probably not. We see that the previous nuclear agreement, from which the United States withdrew, had some gaps even in the vision of Donald Trump and his administration. Currently it’s such that Donald Trump is pushing that vision of absolute prohibition of any uranium enrichment. This is something that will be rejected, because Iran will object that it’s prepared to give up the military program, but that it cannot give up that civilian program, which is vitally important for its energy system. Iran faces many problems. It has oil, which is under embargo and practically only China buys it, but on the other hand it has huge problems with water resources, it has large economic problems. We saw a massive wave of unrest that was originally caused rather by economic problems and subsequently came even that political frustration. Iran is currently conducting military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz and indicates that in case of escalation it could put up armed resistance or try to expand or provoke conflict in the wider Persian Gulf region. This would of course complicate global trade in oil products and liquefied gas. So these negotiations will involve complex bargaining. Currently, however, it doesn’t look like the negotiation should reach some quick agreement. It will probably get stuck precisely on the fact that Iran won’t be willing to agree to such ultimatum demands that would completely deprive it of any control over its nuclear program, including that energy nuclear program. The United States will increase that pressure, because Trump also cannot actually accept just some partial agreement. Moreover, in the US Congress in connection with the previous agreement, a law is also passed. And thereby such a nuclear agreement would have to be submitted by Trump to Congress for approval and there are also various opinions and rather opinions on a hard policy toward Iran prevail, regarding control of its nuclear facilities.

Retired Lieutenant General Pavel Macko was speaking. Thank you very much for your time and for your commentary and I wish you a peaceful night if possible.

Thank you for the invitation and likewise a pleasant evening.

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