Note: This article is based on english trascription of the original podcast by .tyzden in slovak language. You can listen to it in a form fo podcast here:

Security radar of General Pavel Macko – 151st edition – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

Moderator: Welcome, Pavel.

General Pavel Macko: Thank you very much, warm greetings to the listeners. We also have the Munich Security Conference in the headlines, unfortunately I’m not there this year, but we’ll bring its conclusions on the pages of Týždeň magazine and evaluate it next time.

Fog of War

Moderator (Eugen Korda): As always, what is the security situation in Ukraine?

General Pavel Macko: Very bad. We see the continuation of that tragedy, as we announced – intense fighting is ongoing, intense bombardment. The Russians are trying to keep the Ukrainians in winter and darkness. We see that infrastructure in Kyiv is seriously damaged, but this is happening across the entire country. When I evaluate it overall, the front has hardly moved. The fighting was extremely intense, especially in Donbas. The Russians carried out the largest drone attack last weekend and then we saw yesterday again a large drone and missile attack. They are concentrating on destroying Ukrainian infrastructure. Ukraine also struck energy facilities in Belgorod and Ukrainian command is dealing with air defense problems. Russia is trying to gain and improve its tactical position before the spring season. We see the same from Ukraine’s side.

Moderator: And what’s happening on the front?

General Pavel Macko: When I take it, let’s do a quick overview. In the east, the biggest fighting concerns Bakhmut, Chasiv Yar, Kramatorsk – there the Russians continued pressure west of Bakhmut. Near Chasiv Yar, they are trying to push toward Slovyansk. The most intense fighting was near Klishchiivka, Ivanivske and Kalynivka. When we look at Kharkiv region, the Russians slightly advanced in this Kharkiv region.

Going back to this Donbas, there was also intense fighting on the Avdiivka, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove direction – on this section. There the Russians tried to expand control southwest of Avdiivka. Ukrainian command states that the attacks are massive but ineffective. The reality is that we really haven’t seen any major movement of that line.

If we look further south, there is also intense fighting. We saw such tactical counterattacks by Ukrainians, especially after Starlink went down, so the Russians lost contact. It’s not something significant, it’s more about equalizing positions and showing the reality on the battlefield, because the Russians were using tactics where they infiltrated, settled somewhere and then it looked like they controlled the area. Now this actually allowed them to say that they really no longer control it.

There’s a nice tidbit for listeners – when they lost those Starlink connections, the Russians tried to find Ukrainians who would give them access codes. It’s like with us – these are our satellites, they blackmailed them. But they didn’t know this was tapped, that actually a Ukrainian division created fake accounts and a call and lured about 2,500 Russian accounts, from which they discovered their location and coordinates. And this is probably also visible in that tactical success.

Moderator: Overall picture?

General Pavel Macko: The overall picture, as I already indicated, is not moving in any fundamental way. The situation is stable, but the number of clashes is enormous. Of course, these are smaller units, but the number of clashes is enormous. When I evaluate it overall, the Russians are still slowly advancing. Over the past month they had about 150 to 300 square kilometers of territorial gains, but nothing suggests that one side or the other would have any major fundamental breakthrough.

Moderator: How do you assess Russian missile and drone attacks deep into Ukraine?

General Pavel Macko: It’s an outrage, it continues and here it must be said that whether in the attack of February 7th or now in the latest one – the Russians combine, they learned this over those four years. They combine hypersonic missiles, cruise missiles and drones are added to that, using the fact that they modernized those drones and today they can attack even moving targets. This means, if they have sufficient information from some collaborators on the Ukrainian side or their agents, they can attack moving targets. It’s something Ukraine must deal with. Ukrainian air defense was engaging, destroyed a large number of drones, but still the strikes were strong, cyclically plunging Ukraine into darkness, also damaging Ukrainian production, because obviously for large military production you need a lot of energy.

Moderator: Good, and what about the Ukrainians?

General Pavel Macko: So the Ukrainians also attacked. They attacked Belgorod and Bryansk, there they also attacked those energy facilities. We witnessed an attack with five Flamingos, those are their large missiles. It looks like they’re good. Russia claimed it shot down all five, but despite that we saw secondary explosions in the area. This was attacking a facility of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate, or glavnoe raketno-artilleriyskoe upravlenie (GRAU). These are also large warehouses. It’s in Volgograd region about 350 kilometers, 320 kilometers from the battle line and state border in Russian depth. Overall, Ukrainian strikes are aimed mainly at energy, logistics and ammunition depots. Their goal is to weaken the Russian rear before the spring combat season, similar to what the Russians are trying to do.

Moderator: But I read that Zelensky quite criticized that defense.

General Pavel Macko: Yes, because obviously Ukrainian air defense hasn’t undergone any fundamental changes since 2022. It was successful, but it’s being exhausted. Now I read that Germans will provide 35 Patriot missiles. So for yesterday’s attack they would need about 80. And on top of that they would need to operate against drones. So it’s clear there’s a disproportion. This confirms that, if we look at it in a broader context, the West hesitated for a long time and actually blocked Ukraine and didn’t want to supply them with those longer-range weapons, when that was the only thing that could be done. Not catching every missile, every drone, but destroying those sources from where they come.

But of course, air defense also needs to be improved and there were failures, mainly in those multiple regions. Zelensky criticized this leadership and ordered immediate changes. In some regions, air defense is being rebuilt practically from scratch. We’re talking about those small observer teams, those small strike units up to that large air defense – they had to be restructured, the layers are changing, tactics and command methods are to be changed. And at the same time Zelensky ordered to accelerate drone and weapons supply, supplement personnel and made some personnel changes toward those regional leaders, because this also belongs to territorial defense. And mainly there, where reaction to attacks failed – basically it’s the largest reorganization of Ukrainian air defense since 2022.

However, we won’t analyze this in detail, nor are the information available, because obviously even the Ukrainians won’t reveal everything to open media and won’t give Russians instructions on how to overcome it again.

Moderator: And Zelensky sent a message to the world that for me was almost incredible, that there could be elections and a referendum there.

General Pavel Macko: I take it as part of negotiating tactics. The United States is brutally pressuring Zelensky, they jumped on that Russian propaganda and question Zelensky’s legitimacy. Not all of them, but there are those American hawks, mainly from that MAGA movement. So Zelensky made a clear tactical move, where he said fine, so potentially there could be elections in April, and a referendum on peace agreement and territorial changes, which would create conditions for concluding that peace. And of course the next day came the correction after this caused a wave of displeasure in Ukraine, where he said clearly – provided we reach a ceasefire, because it’s clear that under those bombs and missiles you see day and night, we won’t and cannot hold elections. But we have good will, we’re ready for it. But it’s in the hands of the Ukrainian people to decide, but when you shoot at them and drop bombs, they can’t decide about anything.

Moderator: Gaza and Israel, are there any changes?

General Pavel Macko: Not any major ones. I must say that over the past week tension continued directly in Gaza, it’s still a fragile ceasefire, regularly disrupted by Hamas activities and then retaliatory Israeli strikes and raids. In that past week, no major ground operations were reported, but those air and drone strikes against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) infrastructure continued. This is actually a continuation of those tensions that are there. Simply put, Hamas is still quite strong.

Moderator: Good, what about the rest of Israel? West Bank? By the way, Jews no longer want to call the West Bank the West Bank, but I think Samaria, according to the historical name.

General Pavel Macko: Yes, it’s historical. After all, those who go to church sometimes hear in those biblical texts some references to this territory. But there’s that trend, it’s also subject to criticism. So first, operation Iron Wall continues there, which are actually raids and elimination of those various terrorist cells and groups. But second, there is quite – and this is due to the composition of Netanyahu’s government, where there are also representatives of those more radical streams in Israeli society – and actually expansion of settlements is taking place there. This of course meets with displeasure of that Palestinian population. They are also targets of criticism from outside, even the United States said they should restrain this activity.

Of course, we don’t know now to what extent the real situation is such that it looks like they’re preparing new annexation of the West Bank, because this is what mainly Arab sources suggest, and what is only consolidation of that situation and an attempt to ensure security and at the same time moderate even those most radical voices in Israel.

I also looked at how Israeli media see this. A broader spectrum starting with Haaretz ending with Jerusalem Post and there the summary is that they report on Gaza as precise strikes by Israeli security forces. The topic of hostages still dominates and those echoes on the West Bank. There’s emphasis on Israeli security forces‘ raids and political tension. Internal political crisis is still being communicated and if we look at southern Lebanon, there’s such dry technocratic stating that there’s occasional exchange of fire, but it’s controlled escalation.

Moderator: And how did the creation of technocratic administration in Gaza progress?

General Pavel Macko: Laconically, if I had to say it, I would say that the technocratic government for Gaza exists only on paper, in the field there’s really a vacuum. And now actually – there exists that international plan. We mentioned it here, including that former minister who is supposed to be the head there, he’s ready, but Hamas doesn’t want to disarm. Based on that, Israel then blocks actually this activity and the result is that it’s all on paper. But really nothing fundamental is succeeding. This means we’re still in that position where it’s a good plan, super plan that looks like something worthy of Nobel Prize, but really it can’t be set in motion.

The United States is therefore already pushing a more moderate model, talking about something like demilitarization under supervision, but Israel considers this too soft. Hamas is weakened but not defeated. It still has tunnels, has weapons, has support from part of the population. As we said last time – those who were killed are being replaced by new recruits. And real disarmament is so far only a political declaration, but we don’t see any process heading toward that.

Strategic Background

Moderator: Last week there was a meeting of NATO defense ministers. What did they agree on?

General Pavel Macko: It’s a regular meeting, so-called ministerial. Two weeks ago there was a ministerial of foreign ministers, now defense ministers and next will follow a summit on July 7th and 8th, if I remember correctly, in Ankara. This is such a regular cycle, these ministerials happen at least twice a year and always one is such big, working one, one is more social also with those social activities and team building. In this case it was a working meeting.

At such a ministerial, the agenda for the upcoming summit is also communicated. This means, that level of foreign ministry gives such political guidance, those big political agreements and at such defense ministerial it’s already transformed or translated into the language of numbers, into the language of concrete measures. So at this summit there were several main points.

Monitoring or reporting of progress in fulfilling the two percent GDP for defense commitment was done. Then they talked about building those capabilities, so-called national goals, which are determined within those puzzle pieces or that mosaic that NATO must assemble to be able to defend itself. These are those goals we also have – mechanized brigade and similar. So this was discussed. They talked about strengthening deterrence and defense. They also talked about international projects and some agreements were signed between groups of these members. For example, on joint procurement and technology development, including deep precision strikes, those are mainly long-range missile fires, ballistic protection, protection of underwater infrastructure, so-called Task Force Baltic. And the NATO-Ukraine council also convened. A separate meeting took place with Ukraine’s defense minister.

If we look at it, there was agreement on some issues. Potential disagreement is maybe more in the area of pace of increasing weapons production. Some allies object that we still focus on increasing that GDP percentage, but the increase is not followed by sufficient production, meaning production needs to be accelerated. Rutte openly said that NATO needs more production, faster and in larger quantities. There are also differences in the pace of fulfilling two percent, some countries are already significantly ahead, but for example Germany announced that while it won’t reach those percentages, but actually compared to previous years it’s already going to double its defense budget. This means that real, physical increase is one hundred percent.

Moderator: I heard about operation Arctic Sentry, which translates as Arctic Guard. What is this supposed to be and has it been approved somehow?

General Pavel Macko: It hasn’t been approved yet. I’ll remind listeners that after there were those incidents in the Baltic Sea and cables were cut, so we have Baltic Sentry or Baltic Guard or Baltic Watch, maybe I would translate it that way. The same happened then after those attacks or incursions into Polish and Estonian airspace, where so-called Eastern Sentry was created, that’s increased air space patrolling, air space monitoring on the eastern flank. And now Arctic Watch is being considered.

It relates to the discussion about Greenland, relates to the discussion about increased movement and influence of Russians and China in this space, relates to how northern sea routes are gradually opening up. This means that allies, to satisfy Trump, to also ensure their security, are considering operation Arctic Watch. So far it’s in that position where there were such two exercises – Cold Response and another name that escapes me now, which are to be consolidated. And now it’s being considered in various forms how those increased operations would actually be carried out.

Basically it’s about monitoring the entire Arctic space, more detailed monitoring of that strait or that open maritime space that connects actually the Arctic space, where Russians are very strong and built massive infrastructure in recent decades, where China is also starting to assert itself, occupying or creating its Arctic fleet, even though it’s not directly an Arctic country. And this is actually the space between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom. Otherwise this was space that was always monitored. During World War II it was key space for supporting Europe.

In case of any larger conflict, it’s space that is absolutely critical for the alliance, so that Americans and Canadians can approach Europe. It’s space where when patrolling increases, it will be possible to monitor more, and this happened during the Cold War too, e.g. Russian nuclear submarines sailing from Kola Peninsula, where Russians have their main base.

I’ll say it’s not yet an approved operation, but planning instructions have been issued at the level of Supreme Allied Commander, SACEUR, or SHAPE, that allied command in Mons. And at the same time it’s said that there should be countries there, that those forces would be diverse, there would be naval groups – United Kingdom, United States, Norway, Canada, air capabilities, ground units, mainly from Finland and Norway, and intelligence assets.

Moderator: I heard that Americans released some command positions in NATO to Europeans. What’s happening? Are they leaving, or how should I explain this?

General Pavel Macko: Those are two things, several people asked me about this, and it needs to be explained. Those are two things. The first one is such superficial, that the United States actually said they’re handing over command of JFC in Norfolk, Joint Force Command Norfolk, that they’ll hand it over to a European general and also command in Naples, where traditionally since NATO’s creation and since that command’s creation the United States commanded. And as if they’re withdrawing. On the other hand, we see that the United States still retains command of that SHAPE, that Supreme Commander in Europe – SACEUR and has control over that Mons (SHAPE). And conversely, they take over command for transformation – ACT in Norfolk, which also sits in the same region. And at the same time Europeans would take over those other commands.

Here I’ll say just one thing – no need to worry, because these are multinational integrated commands. Only the flag of the officer from the country that commands that command changes, but these commanders are under international jurisdiction. And when I was in those structures, when I was commander in Bydgoszcz, I answered directly to superior commander in Norfolk, that ACT. And I reported to NATO Military Committee, meaning all our activities were always directed by North Atlantic Council. It doesn’t fall under national rules.

Moderator: And you weren’t accounting three times?

General Pavel Macko: I didn’t account three times. And the truth was that the only thing countries have in this is that salaries and personnel orders are issued nationally, all other activities are performed under international jurisdiction. But the second thing is, and this is true, NATO announced basically the largest reform of command structure of the North Atlantic Alliance, meaning those commands themselves, since 2011.

I’ll just remind listeners that there were three such changes. The biggest was in 2004, when I was starting in Heidelberg, where there was significant reduction of commands down to one third. Those were peace dividends. In 2011 this was somewhat corrected and there was further relocation of these NATO commands. And now we see opposite trend. New challenges came, new security environment. Quietly in between, in 2020 a third joint forces command was created in Norfolk, because before there were two in Brunssum and Naples.

Those formerly had geographically divided north and south. Then after that reform in 2004 they were interchangeable and alternated to those commands those NATO rapid reaction forces across regions. And now, to summarize what should happen. First – there should be higher agility, meaning ability of these commands to intervene faster. The Norfolk command is being strengthened, which gets more tasks in protecting precisely that Arctic space we mentioned in connection with that Arctic Sentry. The Brunssum command also changes those flags, where it will have more geographical responsibility for that entire northern part, basically above the Alps northward.

Moderator: And will there also be an eastern flank HQ?

General Pavel Macko: There will be, there will be. And I’ll finish that Brunssum, that it also geographically integrates Sweden and Finland. Then a new regional command east should be created, probably in Poland, command for the eastern flank. I don’t want to reveal, it’s not officially approved, where it could be. But the point is that already the commander of Multinational Corps in Szczecin, of which there are ten altogether by the way, has been saying for longer that such geographical competence should be given. Because if it’s on the eastern flank, we need quick reaction, so we can’t wait for that traditional process where forces start being assigned to commands later.

Interestingly, maybe for others, an allied command for cyber defense and hybrid threats is also being created, about which it’s also not known, which should bring NATO into the 21st century. All this serves the fact that after a period of slowing down these structures, as if slowing their reaction, now the opposite process is happening. We have regional defense plans, forces are created for them and now this should also complete the command structure. Greater weight should be on Europeans, but as we said a moment ago, it doesn’t mean Americans leaving these structures.

Moderator: Slovakia and Hungary will be visited this Sunday by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. What can be expected from this visit?

General Pavel Macko: Rubio is coming to Bratislava according to me not only because of nuclear energy and NATO, but also to have Washington verify where Slovakia belongs. Whether it’s closer to Warsaw or to Budapest.

Moderator: And what will he find out?

General Pavel Macko: Well, I’ll comment on that next week. But when I look at that official program that was there, when I look at that broader security, energy and political context, several things emerge for me. Rubio is now at the Security Conference in Munich and then immediately, if it ends 15th-16th he goes to Bratislava and Budapest. I think the primary goal of this trip is supporting Viktor Orbán. Despite Rubio being perceived as more moderate, he is a faithful cheerleader of President Trump. We saw this in that joint US Congress session, that with Vance and Hegseth these are big cheerleaders and unconditional supporters of President Trump. He is very loyal to Trump as well, but is more digestible for European partners.

So primarily it’s really to give support in Hungary before elections to Orbán. This will also be communicated by Fidesz and Viktor Orbán as great American support for his policy. It’s also a signal toward Central European allies and allied populists. And we actually now find ourselves having to decide where we’ll be more. Whether with that Viktor, or with Poland, which is becoming a significant player.

And when we talked about that command structure, for example one change in Brunssum is that long-term there was British-German command, that Germans always commanded and British were deputy. Then it was German-Italian, where commanders alternated like this and now it’s newest – and Poles already officially announced this – it will be Polish-German command. Thus we see how Poland’s reach is growing. Because in between, that responsibility of that Brunssum also significantly increased. It’s actually responsibility for half the Alliance, operational command. And a significant four-star Polish general will be stationed there as commander.

When I quickly look at Slovakia, security and NATO will probably also be a topic. There will be discussion about harmonizing those security interests. There will definitely be pressure for a clearer line from Slovakia in NATO and toward Ukraine. And confirmation whether we’re a reliable ally, Rubio will definitely ask about our NATO commitments. Short-term we’ll tell him everything is fine and long-term he won’t be able to check. And of course they’ll continue that communication and cooperation in nuclear energy.

360 Degrees

Moderator: How does tension between USA and Iran continue? This morning I caught news that the largest American aircraft carrier is heading to the Persian Gulf.

General Pavel Macko: The crisis between USA and Iran is deepening. Those negotiations and communication exchanges failed and thus Donald Trump as president tightened sanctions and rhetoric and talks about something very hard. The United States are thus considering and now it already looks like they decided to deploy another carrier strike group, because it’s not just an aircraft carrier. Those are cruisers, those are other platforms, submarines, mine sweepers. It’s always such purpose-built strike group. It’s not just protective wall around that aircraft carrier, but it’s also additional strike force. So they’re apparently setting this in motion.

Iran meanwhile brutally suppresses its protests. Both sides are in stalemate where the biggest risk is excessive escalation. The United States are escalating pressure but don’t want a big war. Because this is still not preferred in that Trump strategy – he would most like to have that big hammer, like in that movie with Thor, that I bang there, it shakes and everyone lines up. But President Trump definitely doesn’t want to go into any ground operations. We see those risks and tensions for those their forces that are in the region.

Moderator: And what are those risks?

General Pavel Macko: Well, an incident in Persian Gulf could be such trigger, whether attack on tanker, drone attack. It could close actually that Strait of Hormuz. And we know that large amount of hydrocarbons goes from there, that surroundings and Europe depend on it… It’s like when you have cardiovascular system, you have important artery, you squeeze it and you have problem. And it doesn’t have to be just that carotid or directly pulmonary, but it can be also somewhere, for example that femoral. It always makes big imbalance or disrupts that organism. This means this would be very dangerous.

An attack on American forces in Iraq or Syria could also happen, which are not invulnerable and Iran has these capabilities. Or Iran could proceed to that escalation in the region. Or that high concentration of forces could occur and unintentional escalation could happen. So we’ll watch this carefully. Trump bet on increasing economic and military pressure. Iran on the other hand shows hard line outwardly, but mainly does repressions at home. But those diplomatic channels are weak.

Closing Quote

General Pavel Macko: So last time we talked about negotiations and now we see also security conference, allied negotiations, we see Marco Rubio’s visit. So if you allow, I’ll give another quote also about negotiations.

„European negotiations are like making love to elephants. Everything happens at high level, a lot of dust is stirred up and it takes very long before anything comes of it.“

Said Willy Brandt, German politician and German chancellor from 1969 to 1974.

The post Security radar of General Pavel Macko – 151st edition appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#Beijing #China #coalition of willing #Gaza #Hamas #Israel #Lebanon #military parade #peace talks #Putin #Russia #security radar #Syria #Trump #Ukraine

Moderator: Welcome, Palo.

Pavel Macko: Thank you very much, pleasant listening to the audience.

Fog of War

Moderator: Let’s start with Ukraine. What’s the development on the battlefields?

Pavel Macko: I’ll begin by noting that August has ended, which means the main summer season is effectively over. Both the Ukrainian side and the Russian side have evaluated the spring-summer Russian offensive.

Let’s be realistic – the Russians haven’t achieved any miracles. They attempted several attacks, captured several dozen villages, took several hundred square kilometers of territory, but they couldn’t capture any major city. To make it look like they captured one, they placed a flag on a pole in Kupiansk using a drone, which the Ukrainians then took down.

Simply put, the fighting is intense. According to Ukrainian estimates, the Russians have suffered losses of over 200,000, up to 290,000 this year. But they’re preparing for some major offensive. However, they haven’t made progress yet.

When I evaluate the summer campaign, it wasn’t effective at all from the Russian perspective. They tried to bypass cities, but they failed to break them. And that’s likely why we’re now seeing movements and regrouping of Russian units.

The Russians applied pressure across the entire front and tried to find cracks. Where it starts to crack, like glass, or when you throw stones, they quickly deepen that hole. They almost succeeded in doing this near Dobropillia, but the Ukrainians managed to prevent it in time. They tried it in Sumy, they’re trying it at Kupiansk, they partially bypassed Pokrovsk from the southwest, and even penetrated into the Dnipropetrovsk region, but they didn’t achieve any operationally significant successes. That’s why they’re now regrouping.

Strategic Bombing

We see again that the Russians are „negotiating peace“ by intensifying attacks on civilian targets. They are now attacking more on the central and western parts of Ukraine.

The goal is clear:

▪️To destroy infrastructure facilities

▪️Railway transport hubs

▪️Factories

▪️To bring shock to villages and cities

At least half of the targets are explicitly residential buildings, hospitals, and schools. The reason is clear – the Russians are trying to indicate to Ukrainians that those who are further from the conflict zone have been living too comfortably, and they want to force Ukrainians to capitulate by undermining the morale and psyche of the people.

We saw massive attacks in Kharkiv. This is a paradox because it’s a Russian-speaking city that has always been Ukrainian and they felt Ukrainian, they just spoke Russian. Putin and his troops are punishing them for that – just from one attack there were at least 12 victims, dozens wounded, and 100,000 residents were left without electricity.

They attacked Dnipro with Shahed drones, and in Odesa they even used Kalibr missiles from the Black Sea. They hit port facilities and a humanitarian aid warehouse. Again, what a „highly strategic“ target – a humanitarian aid center! A Kalibr missile has an accuracy of up to 5 meters. That means they could hit the room we’re sitting in, at least its corner. And it’s something that doesn’t make sense, that they attack a humanitarian aid warehouse under the pretext that there must definitely be strategic ballistic missiles or atomic weapons there. Simply nonsense, just like the entire Russian aggression.

In Kyiv, attacks with Iskander ballistic missiles continued, and they also attacked command and military centers. The air defense reacted. In the south, whether in the city of Kherson or in the Zaporizhzhia region, there is permanent artillery shelling. They’re trying to make Kherson uninhabitable – when they were driven out of there, they punish the residents so they can’t live there. Unfortunately, the attacks continue and are escalating.

Ukrainian Attacks

Moderator: What about the Ukrainians, how are they doing?

Pavel Macko: They continue, they’re trying to counter, they’re also changing tactics. We saw the first real attack with Flamingo missiles on Crimea. Initially it was thought they were Neptune missiles, but they released footage of it.

Moderator: And what are those Flamingo missiles?

Pavel Macko: The Ukrainians introduced Flamingo recently. It was a „fast track“ development – rapid development over a year. It’s a cruise missile that has a range of up to 3000 kilometers, it has up to 1125 kilograms of combat payload. It’s right at the sound barrier, slightly subsonic, a large missile. It has an accuracy of about 20 meters.

I think they were testing them in Crimea. It’s one thing to produce and test on a training ground, and another to deploy in real conditions. There were skeptics who said it was too large and slow, so Russian systems might be able to intercept it. But they tested it over Crimea, which is relatively well protected. Belbek is one of the strategic airports in Crimea.

They tested them there and gave the Russians a psychological signal that not only is Crimea not untouchable, but they can try it elsewhere as well. Russia is huge. What is an advantage when you want to occupy it is a disadvantage when you want to defend it. No one can defend all facilities against air strikes. Not even Russia can do that.

Then we saw attacks on the Tula region, and those weren’t drones, but Ukrainian intelligence operating in Russia blew up an underground explosives warehouse in a chemical plant. They do this cyclically – Ukrainians have their people directly in Russia and can operate there. It wasn’t just those drones that were launched from trucks and remotely piloted in the „Spider“ operation. I think they’re spinning more of these „spider webs“ there and will continue to catch Russians in them.

Moderator: We saw attacks in Krasnodar region and on oil facilities. But what caught my interest, we were recording last Friday and just before that, on August 28, they struck with a drone near Vladimir Putin’s palace.

Pavel Macko: That was in Gelendzhik on the Black Sea coast. He has a huge dacha there. They hit it there, indicating to him that Vladimir isn’t safe even there.

Development of Fighting in Individual Areas

Let’s go through individual areas. In the Kursk and Sumy regions, the fighting was milder. We see a significant shift – in the Sumy region, the Russians seem to have come to terms with the fact that they won’t make a breakthrough there and won’t move towards Sumy. Sumy was a good target, it’s not so far from the borders, it’s a relatively large administrative center. The Russians had already occupied it once, the Ukrainians pushed them out at the beginning of the invasion. They tried to get there again, but they’re withdrawing troops from there.

Intense fighting is still ongoing in Kupiansk, Lyman, Serebriansk forest. Serebriansk forest – west of Kreminna – has become totally confusing. The Ukrainians can no longer establish a line defense there because the troops have intermixed. I saw videos where a Ukrainian soldier was walking, the Russians thought it was their soldier, and then he shot them.

This Lyman direction is one to remember. It could be a place where the Russians will try to get across the Zherebets River in larger numbers and continue further to Lyman, so they can get the entire rest of the Donetsk region into pincers – from the south from Pokrovsk and from the north from Lyman.

Of course, fighting continues in Pokrovsk, Toretsk, Kostiantynivka. In the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, we see a slight stabilization of operations.

Regrouping of Russian Troops

To summarize, we see regrouping of Russian troops. The Russians are withdrawing from the Kherson region – not all units, but important elements. They’re strengthening the Donetsk direction and also withdrawing units from the Sumy region.

From the Kherson area, they withdrew the 70th Motorized Rifle Division of the 18th Combined Arms Army. This was a newly created division after the invasion. They have three motorized rifle regiments, a tank regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, self-propelled artillery – a brigade. It’s about 10,000 men. They’re moving them to the Donetsk direction, down to Pokrovsk.

From the Sumy area, they’re withdrawing the 76th Airborne Division. This elite airborne division is a „firefighter“ – when there was a Ukrainian breakthrough, when the Ukrainians liberated Kupiansk and were advancing quickly, the Russians deployed this division there. When they had a problem, when the Ukrainians pushed in the south, they also deployed the division there and managed to stop the summer offensive of 2023 Ukrainians at Orikhiv.

What are they trying to do? The Perun portal (Czech drone operators who collect money for drones for Ukrainian forces) described it quite well as a „long ball“ – in sports terminology, it’s a pass where when the game is „grinding“ somewhere in the middle, a long pass is thrown down the wing and a player runs onto it. They’re trying to get the entire area into pincers.

Tactical Changes and Drone Warfare

Both sides are trying various tactics. Last time we mentioned that it wasn’t so advantageous for Ukrainians to thin out defensive lines with drone operators. They are highly effective, but they have only limited capacity and the targets are known. As soon as they make contact, the Russians also know about it and start bombing.

The Russians have gradually changed their tactics. At the beginning of the war, they tried for rapid movement, combined arms combat. We all expected the Battle of Donbas to come – major combined arms maneuvers, modern mechanized forces, air cover, armored vehicles on the ground. That didn’t happen. They were able to deploy and coordinate a maximum of two brigades together, because they couldn’t coordinate more.

Today they don’t have as many mechanized forces. We see attacks with small units on motorcycles, on all sorts of things. Now they do it by bypassing lines in small groups, catching hold in some village where there is no military presence. From there they can direct drones, do other things. It’s like seeping, when you stain wood.

Moderator: I read today that artificial intelligence is already functioning and the first swarms of drones have been deployed. The Ukrainians deployed it, did you notice that?

Pavel Macko: I noticed, I’m writing about it in the magazine as well. I talk there about how generations of drones are gradually evolving. They already tried it in the fall last year, they had the first attempts on a smaller scale in the Kherson region.

Moderator: And is it effective?

Pavel Macko: It has the hope of being effective, because swarms of drones with artificial intelligence are relatively autonomous. You don’t have to pull them on cables, you don’t need as many operators. The problem is that when you have an FPV drone, you need one person with goggles or a screen who navigates the drone until the end, but can’t navigate other drones.

When you have some master drone and a swarm of drones, you get them to the target area and they select their targets themselves. In that program, you can even program target priorities. When the system sees artillery or an air defense asset, it ranks them numerically highest and leaves the infantry for the end.

Summary of Development in Ukraine

To summarize, last year it was expected that there would be a waiting tactic, because neither side had enough forces for a major offensive. Not like in World War II, when there was Operation Bagration, where there was a major breakthrough. That operation brought the Soviets hundreds of kilometers behind German lines, broke through them through swamps, through difficult terrain in Belarus, and got into an area where they had a strategic advantage.

This didn’t happen. Last year, in order to show positive progress, the Russians sacrificed an estimated 450,000 soldiers (variously killed, wounded, some multiple times). These are huge losses and they actually achieved nothing visible.

This year I’m positively surprised that the Ukrainians held on, because many times it looked like it was about to fall. Some troll wrote to me that Kupiansk, they already have half of Kupiansk. No, they’ve been fighting for Kupiansk for 2.5 years. We mention it every other week. They still can’t capture it.

Now it looks as if the Russians feel they’re treading water. This isn’t the right thing. Basically, they decided to concentrate pressure even more on Donbas, because they’re also on a ticking clock and climatic conditions will be different in the fall.

The estimate of several observers is that the Russians will try to make a breakthrough, create Guderian-style wedges – arms from the north and from the south, to get behind the Ukrainian forces and interrupt supply routes. It can be assumed that from these troop movements, they will also try to generate more mobile mechanized formations.

This is their last chance in this immediate period. It’s risky for the Ukrainians – they need to be careful. But it’s also risky for the Russians, because it’s a moment when the sports rule „if you don’t score, you’ll concede“ applies. If they overdo it and fail, as at Dobropillia (a small tactical episode), and if they don’t succeed at the operational level either, they’ll break their teeth. It may happen that there will be a „reverse“ – the Ukrainians will find a weak spot and push.

The last thing – Ukraine must be asymmetrical. An attrition war in the Russian style can’t suit them. They don’t have as much personnel, as much equipment, which is why many recommend they continue with deep strikes.

I registered yesterday’s report this morning – Keir Starmer says that some European countries will give Ukraine the means for deep precision strikes, long-range missiles. We don’t know if it will be Taurus or something else, but they should receive them. This is retaliation or a reaction to the continuing Russian attacks on cities.

Middle East

Moderator: Let’s go to the Middle East, to the Gaza Strip. How are the Israeli army operations continuing there?

Pavel Macko: The airstrikes are intensifying. The Israeli Air Force carried out several precise attacks on Hamas positions in southern Gaza, especially in the Khan Yunis area. There were civilian casualties again.

These operations are important because the Palestinians are also giving arguments to Netanyahu – they fired rockets. This means the job isn’t finished. And that’s Netanyahu’s argument: „The job isn’t finished, and until they lay down their arms, we must finish it.“

Israel is mobilizing reserves. When we analyzed the operation, we said they need about 60,000 reservists, whom they’re calling up again. This process is underway. Not everyone is happy with it, some refused to report.

There’s internal political friction in Israel as well. Some are against scaling down the operation, others on the contrary say it needs to be intensified and accelerated.

Moderator: And what do you think?

Pavel Macko: I think it’s complicated. It needs to be done as quickly as possible, have a plan immediately for how to replace the Hamas administration with something else and withdraw. The view that they will also want longer-term military occupation may ultimately prevail. I think it’s difficult.

From my experiences in Afghanistan as well – it’s not a problem to conquer something, that’s what the Israelis are trying to do now. Clearing is complex, but maintaining and subsequently building is almost impossible in this environment. I would try to avoid it.

The Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Zamir, said that no one should be mistaken – even though there’s talk that the operation will be from October 7, he declares that it’s already running and they have 40% of Gaza City under control, that they’ve entered parts where they’ve never been before, and they’re trying to clear it. Meanwhile, civilians are also being evacuated to southern parts beyond the Netzarim corridor.

Syria, Lebanon and the Red Sea

Diplomatic negotiations are taking place between Lebanon and Syria. They’re creating joint committees or commissions to address sensitive topics:

▪️The fate of nearly 2000 Syrian prisoners in Lebanese prisons

▪️Locating missing Lebanese citizens in Syria

▪️Demarcation of the common border, which they don’t have precisely marked everywhere

They’re trying to normalize relations between the countries.

Regarding Lebanon, last time we discussed that the US, through its emissary Thomas Barack, proposed a plan for Hezbollah to be disarmed by the end of the year. Reciprocally, the Israelis would withdraw their troops from southern Lebanon. And moreover, next year the UNIFIL mission from the UN, which has been there for almost 50 years, would be ended, and thus Lebanon would take full control of its territory. Hezbollah, of course, resists this.

In Syria, the situation in the south has calmed down slightly. Negotiations are ongoing between Israel and Syrian representatives about easing tensions in border areas (conflict between Druze and Bedouins). The Syrian government is trying to normalize relations, starting to send its ambassadors to surrounding countries and negotiate with other partners. It is planning, for example, a visit by the ministers of foreign affairs and justice to Beirut.

They will also try to normalize relations with Lebanon, which was largely a victim of Syrian ambitions in past conflicts. There were Syrian so-called blue berets in Lebanon and so on.

Moderator: What about the Red Sea?

Pavel Macko: In the Red Sea, we saw that Israel decimated a significant part of the military and political leadership of the Houthis, who are threatening massive retaliation. They say they can destroy Israel in a few hours. Of course, this is just rhetoric – if they could do it, they would have done it already, they’ve tried. They can cause harm, but Israel has indicated to them that the more harm they cause, the harder the counter-strike may be.

Strategic Background

Moderator: It happened far away, but also close. What do you say about the Chinese military parade and the activities of Prime Minister Robert Fico among world dictators who clearly defined themselves against the West, despite the fact that Fico was there?

Pavel Macko: Let’s take it step by step and I’ll start right with Fico. We saw a series of events – the Shanghai Coordination Group meeting, then the parade. China took advantage of the fact that Indian Prime Minister Modi and other guests came, they discussed the Shanghai Group and immediately afterward showed a parade for the 80th anniversary of the end of the war.

Robert Fico found himself in such company – it’s as if I found myself somewhere among the Taliban or the Sátora gang. He’s a collaborator and it’s outrageous, because all those political messages were about forming an axis – I don’t want to call it an axis of evil, but it seems like that to me – an axis of dictatorial, corrupt and inhumane regimes that are frustrated with the West and are going explicitly sharply against the West.

And suddenly there is the Slovak Prime Minister – we are the West! Now it doesn’t matter where the political boundary of the Cold War was. We are the West in terms of civilization. In fact, since we „expelled“ Cyril and Methodius, we’ve clearly been the West. We’ve also been left with the Latin alphabet, we are part of Western civilization and we’ve never been part of the Orient, or God forbid, Asia.

What is our Prime Minister even doing there? I understand that he wanted to do business in China. But he was flirting with Putin there, flirting with dictators like Kim Jong-un, Xi Jinping. Being in the same party with these people is like if I were seen among a gang of vagabonds, extortionists. How could I show my face again?

Robert Fico in his video, and this interested me, said that he is the Prime Minister of a sovereign republic, legitimately elected. Well, to that I’ll say that he was elected with a different program. That program wasn’t that the Slovak Republic is going to war – so far ideological and possibly later physical – against its closest neighbors and allies. What, will we soon be attacking the Czechs or the Austrians just because they’re Western and we want to be some kind of „Chinese“? That’s not normal!

Secondly, we are a parliamentary democracy. The Prime Minister, regardless of what percentage Smer got (some 18 or 20, he didn’t get 50, but even if he did), is not a private person, nor a dictator, nor the boss of an armed gang or mafia, that he can say he is sovereign and decide to go somewhere. Let him look at our competence laws, let him look at what the role and position of the Prime Minister is.

The Prime Minister is the moderator of the government. One of the ministers, the „prime minister,“ who moderates the government. For such a foreign trip and the subject of negotiations, he must have a mandate from the government as a collective body. The government must have the confidence of parliament.

What Robert Fico is doing is bizarre. He is now openly spreading hatred against the West. And at a time when the West is negotiating security guarantees for Ukraine, Fico is threatening to undermine Ukraine and consulting about it with Putin. And he’s even pretending that he can do it!

I appeal to his party members and his coalition partners. We are a parliamentary democracy. None of you won the elections by saying that Slovakia would leave the EU, leave NATO, or that it would be inside NATO and the EU but as a pest that will, together with countries that are threatening to harm us, harm us.

Who does our Prime Minister represent there? Himself. It’s a terrible state, which hasn’t passed silently in the world media either. Our partners notice it. Sooner or later we’ll get a response like from Radek Sikorski, who recently indicated that we’ll get as much solidarity as we put into it.

Chinese Military Parade

Of course, the 80th anniversary of the war – there was demagoguery from China as well. When we realistically look at it, World War II in China was such that Chiang Kai-shek’s forces fought with the Japanese, while the communists harmed them behind their backs. Mao Zedong tried to steal what was liberated through guerrilla warfare. But it was Chiang Kai-shek’s army that eventually had to evacuate and go to Taiwan.

That’s why China is divided – the communists took over mainland China and Chiang Kai-shek’s soldiers remained on Taiwan. The Chinese island of freedom remained there.

The second thing is that, similar to Europe, there was massive aid from the United States. The US helped the Chinese the most in the Pacific region against the Japanese. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, they weren’t aiming to conquer the United States. They wanted to eliminate the US from the game so they wouldn’t interfere with their imperial goals. That’s what Russia is now trying to do with us – deter us, push us out. Why? So they can do what they want.

At the parade they showed:

▪️Hypersonic missiles

▪️Ballistic missiles with multiple warheads

▪️Laser defense systems

▪️Advanced drones including robotic fighters

I’m writing about it in the current issue completely by chance. In the continuation of the cycle about the development of military drones, we also write about a drone that China showed. It’s the „Loyal Wingman“ concept, where they presented this drone.

They also showed military robots, new fighters, tanks. It was a big parade – more than 10,000 soldiers in Tiananmen Square (4 km²). They showed a lot of equipment, a lot of soldiers.

What’s interesting and few people noticed – there wasn’t a single ordinary citizen there! Everything was cordoned off, isolated. Ordinary Chinese didn’t get there at all, everything was fenced off and cleared. Security measures. They had a lot of guests there. It’s atypical, because even in Red Square there are parades to build internal „awe“ among their own crowds. In this case, the Chinese relied only on big TV screens for their own people.

Moderator: You said they had a lot of weapons systems there. Are they really that good, or was it just a show? I remember how the Russians displayed their famous tank at Red Square, which they didn’t even manage to produce in the end.

Pavel Macko: China wanted to demonstrate, like every parade, power. It wanted to deliver several messages:

1) That it will resist the West

2) Xi Jinping’s speech was interesting (I don’t know Chinese, I rely on translations)

Xi Jinping always talked a lot about peace. It’s classic rhetoric, like our elected president – „president of peace“ in uniform with a submachine gun in hand. But they always emphasized it a lot. China has maintained a low profile line since the 70s. And now they seem to be baring their teeth – he talked less about peace, more about deterrence, intimidation. They also wanted to show technological superiority.

Are they really that good? Several aspects:

▪️Their weapons haven’t been demonstrated or tested in any combat operation yet (with the exception of a few older fighters that were in the Indo-Pakistani conflict and proved themselves)

▪️The Chinese don’t have direct military experience, so we don’t know if they can coordinate large formations and whether they would fall apart like the Russian ones that marched into Ukraine

But we must say that in some areas we see significant progress:

▪️Modern tanks – we don’t know how many they have, but they showed a lot of them. China is a large country and presumably can mass produce. We saw 4th generation tanks with reduced weight, increased survivability, they can network them – truly a modern tool.

▪️Hypersonic missiles – they’re a bit different from Russian ones. The Chinese have long concentrated on hypersonic missiles to destroy aircraft carriers. Why? Because the main competitor is the United States. The US is far away, but they have the ability to project power precisely on these platforms. Experts agree that they have this tested on mockups as well. We’ve seen various exercises in the South China Sea.

▪️Nuclear triad – its display wasn’t just a political effect. It’s a reality. China is intensively increasing its nuclear potential. It was a „younger brother“ like the United Kingdom or France. It’s starting to get into the triumvirate or trio of large nuclear superpowers.

▪️Drones powered by artificial intelligence – we definitely see that this has been tested.

The battle robots, the „wolves,“ were for show. We haven’t really seen them in action. Laser weapons too – they look good on the training ground when nothing is interfering, but in real combat we don’t know.

We don’t know about the coordination of troops, because rehearsing a show is something different. I practiced for Spartakiada – we rehearsed for a year and a half. We could turn an ordinary soldier into an athlete in gymnastics in a year and a half if you focus on it. But that still doesn’t mean we would really be such athletes or gymnasts in competitions.

And of course, those guests – it was clearly political theater and our Prime Minister played an undignified role for the Slovak Republic in it.

Convergence of China and Russia

Moderator: There’s a lot of talk about the convergence of China and Russia. It seems to me that Russia is already such a subordinate state of China, as if they were begging them. But another thing is that Trump is also trying to somehow win Russia over to his side. Does he even have a chance to attract them?

Pavel Macko: In my opinion, he doesn’t. It’s a misunderstanding of the dynamics and context. Trump wants to do something like a „reverse Nixon.“ Nixon with Kissinger at the beginning of the 70s drew China closer to the US, and that’s actually when China’s development began. Let’s be honest – we built up China from that backward country. It’s still at 71st place in GDP per capita, but it’s a large country, so 1.5 billion means something.

The Americans then attracted China, pulled it away from the Soviet bloc. But we need to state the context – the tension between the Soviets and China had been there since Mao Zedong came to power in the 40s, already during World War II. Mao accused the Soviets of not helping him enough against the internal enemy and in those external aspects as well. He wanted the Soviets to sacrifice even the western front just to help him.

There was rivalry, jealousy between them – what we see today in our government coalition. The coalition is failing, but they’re still competing with each other. This was also between the Soviet Union and China. The Americans took advantage of it and China got a „lollipop“ for it, which grew to gigantic dimensions and is today a comparable economy to the United States.

Can Trump achieve the same with Russia? He can’t, because Russia has removed that possibility that China had by its senseless annexation of Crimea and subsequently by its adventure in Ukraine. China grew on having a rich client – whether in the United States or in Europe. It wouldn’t have grown rich on African countries, nor on Latin American ones, which, even though they’re growing stronger, do so mostly for their domestic industry. And not to feed the Chinese.

We fed the Chinese. Just as we fed Arab countries in terms of oil. I mean the collective West. Slovakia didn’t, because we fed the Russians and we’re still feeding them.

The calculation is flawed, because Russia is already so economically dependent on China that a pivot to the US wouldn’t help it. It’s in subordination to China, despite the fact that it’s still a nuclear power with the most nuclear warheads, but that’s about all they have.

China showed at this parade that it’s no longer dependent on Russian technologies, that in aviation technology and stealth technologies it’s already far ahead of the Russians, and the Russians will have a hard time keeping up. China has a powerful economy, many times larger than Russia, and development potential.

The Chinese also function differently mentally. And Trump is trying to turn the chess pieces upside down and thinks they will stand. They won’t, because Russia is economically linked with Third World countries and China. Even if they ended the war immediately, they wouldn’t get back on such a scale that it would be strategically advantageous for them. They will continue in a close alliance with China and there’s no major conflict there.

Russians are always nationalists, chauvinists, they didn’t even like their own nationalities. Everyone who experienced Soviet troops knows this, how they treated officers from nationalities other than Russian. Russian nationalists look at the Chinese as monkeys, just as they do at Afghans, but that’s the Russian nationalistic mentality. The political system and state leadership, however, is aware that without China, Russia today cannot move anywhere.

NATO Responds to China’s Growth

Moderator: And is NATO responding somehow to this growth of China?

Pavel Macko: It’s responding. China is investing a lot of resources in capabilities like artificial intelligence, the development of artificial intelligence in the military. Their philosophy is that they won’t have such sophisticated weapons as the West. This was also seen with drones – they go for quantity and relatively good quality and try to connect it through artificial intelligence to achieve the strategic effect that they are equally effective even with cheaper devices.

Most recently, the North Atlantic Alliance – Mark Rutte after the parade said that China is beginning to be a global challenger and we need to look at it carefully, because it also conducts hybrid operations. It does them more cultivated than the Russians. NATO will have to very quickly add and develop cooperation with Pacific partners like Australia, South Korea, Japan, because China is becoming increasingly assertive.

Coalition of the Willing and Security Guarantees for Ukraine

Moderator: We’ll see if we can do that. But in Paris, the Coalition of the Willing negotiated security guarantees for Ukraine. While our Robert Fico was sitting somewhere in Beijing. What did they agree on in Paris?

Pavel Macko: In Paris, they claim they agreed on security guarantees for Ukraine. 26 countries offered their forces, which would even go to Ukraine at the moment when a ceasefire was concluded.

A controversy and discussion arose about whether Russia must agree. Mark Rutte said quite simply: Ukraine is still a sovereign country, and if peace is achieved, it can invite anyone to its territory.

Of course, we don’t know the details. As a soldier-expert, I can imagine that rules of engagement must be established, where the focus will be – whether they are to be monitoring, observation forces, or deterrent forces, or forces that would be able to stop the initial onslaught in case of a ceasefire violation.

They also communicated that it’s a coalition of the willing, because NATO as an institution won’t be involved in it. Since the United States, Slovakia, and Hungary will block Ukraine’s entry into NATO, they say it will be necessary to strengthen Ukraine’s military capabilities after achieving any peace solution.

For me, the statements of Yermak (I may not admire him in everything, but he’s the right hand of President Zelensky and deals with these issues systematically as the head of the presidential office) are important. He has repeatedly indicated that a good solution would be to move away from Russian megalomaniacal demands and freeze the conflict.

The Ukrainians can live with that – he gave a direct reference to Korea, where a peace agreement hasn’t been concluded to this day and the 38th parallel is still more or less a demarcation line. But the situation has stabilized enough that South Korea could grow economically, develop, and today is one of the very strong world economies, even in arms production it’s a relevant world player.

Moderator: And what should those guarantees be? We already gave guarantees to the Ukrainians in Budapest when they were giving up nuclear weapons, and we see how that turned out.

Pavel Macko: Let me look at both aspects. What should these guarantees be?

1) Military presence of guarantors – they would be on the territory of Ukraine. This is exactly why we also established military presence on NATO’s eastern flank – to be a clear political signal that if you violate the ceasefire, you’ll get into conflict with those guarantors as well.

2) Strengthening air defense – Germany proposed an annual improvement of 20% in the number and effectiveness of air defense systems. Start production in the West, help Ukraine produce some of it itself, and increase air defense capacity by 20% every year.

3) Support for ground forces – they would like to help build Ukraine four mechanized brigades or mechanized infantry brigades, which is about 480 combat vehicles per year.

In short, Ukraine is to receive such military potential that would be sufficiently deterrent – non-nuclear, but deterrent for the Russians. Weapons production in Ukraine would be strengthened. There would also be training support.

They also indicated that if Russia is not willing to sit at the negotiating table, countries are willing, if necessary, in cooperation with the United States, to impose new sanctions.

An important question, which is not finished and is to be completed, is American participation. What does „indirect American air support“ mean? I explained this on Czech television – that support must not only be for the situation when monitoring compliance with the ceasefire, but especially there must be a clear scheme of support in case there is a violation of the ceasefire and an escalation from the Russian side. Then there must be a clear and strong retaliation.

Moderator: I know you followed the Prague defense summit, which was also attended by the NATO Secretary General. It continues today. And we’ll return to that topic.

Pavel Macko: Next week in Piešťany, on September 12, we’ll have a live broadcast during the film festival. We look forward to all of you – to come see us, listen to us, but especially to give us tough questions that the two of us can’t think of ourselves.

Moderator: Well, I can think of tough questions, but I’m afraid to give them to you, whether you’ll be able to answer. But come to Piešťany, because even though we won’t be there as film stars, there will be a star sitting with me, Palo Macko, who knows what you’ll be interested in.

360 Degrees

Moderator: So, Pali, what’s on the radar?

Pavel Macko: We discussed the Shanghai Cooperation Group, we discussed the parade, so to finish it off, I would look more at that coordination group and at Taiwan, although we discussed Taiwan last week.

Moderator: And what would you take as the main point from that Shanghai Group meeting?

Pavel Macko: What comes out to me are those images of Indian Prime Minister Modi, Putin and Xi Jinping holding hands, talking amicably without interpreters and indirectly sending a message to Trump.

Of course, it was arranged for the cameras, because they don’t know each other’s languages, they can’t communicate without interpreters. The important thing is that Trump then looked (albeit in a later context, when he already saw Kim Jong-un at the parade as well), that they’re plotting against the United States.

But the reality is that when I focus on India, it needs to be seen as an epic failure of President Trump. I’ve analyzed this several times – India is, firstly, a democracy. Peculiar, but a democracy. It’s still a member of the British Commonwealth and the largest democracy in the world.

For the last 20 years, the United States has been building a strategic partnership with India to have a partner in the region, so that the world wouldn’t be hostile to them. And Trump has managed to completely disrupt this.

Joe Biden was building those relationships – he invited Modi during his previous term for a state visit directly to the White House. Trump has broken all of this like an elephant in a china shop, because the result is that Modi is now fraternizing with these „troublemakers.“

Modi is signaling by this that he will have a more sovereign foreign policy. This doesn’t mean he would fall into China’s arms. Neither does Putin really want to fall into China’s arms, but he can’t manage without it.

In the case of India and China, there are even more conflicts between them – five years ago they were shooting at each other. It won’t be such a warm friendship, just as the Shanghai Cooperation Group isn’t a warm alliance. It’s not a new NATO or some „East Asian“ grouping. It wants to appear that way, but we see that there are India and Pakistan, some countries are there just to control each other.

The important thing is that India is indicating by this that it will be opportunistic. Trump, for instance, made a mistake and wanted to impose sanctions against everyone. He assessed, similar to Europe, that India is a weaker opponent. He pushed only on India and China and left everyone else alone. So Modi said to himself: „If you treat me as a stranger, I’ll be a stranger, and you’ll still come yourselves and beg me for cooperation.“

It’s a pity. It doesn’t mean an immediate change in the world order, but we will really be in a regime of competing powers. India will potentially be economically stronger than China, because China is somewhere at the limits of its development. It’s said that India could, in 20-30 years, if it fulfills all the prerequisites, economically surpass China.

In the military field, I see it, I indicate it in the latest article coming out this week, that for example in the area of drones and unmanned fighters, India has progressed a lot and is trying to be independent, so it doesn’t have to buy either Russian, Chinese, or American ones.

Moderator: You often return to Taiwan. Why?

Pavel Macko: It’s an absolutely key neuralgic point. I indicated how Taiwan originated – by separation from China. China is trying to get it back, holds the so-called one-China policy. It’s very aggressive towards Czech politicians as well – if they negotiate with the Taiwanese, it immediately attacks them. Just as it’s sensitive about the Dalai Lama, it’s sensitive about Taiwan.

Now in Taiwan there’s of course an independent government, but I would like to return to how it would look if China attacked Taiwan. I was intrigued by publicist J.P. Linsley, a journalist who was, by the way, in Ukraine and survived the initial invasion there. He looked in more detail at how it would be if China attacked Taiwan.

Last week we saw an exercise where the Chinese again practiced landing on Taiwan and blockade. Many were afraid that when Putin attacked Ukraine, China would immediately attack Taiwan as well. They’re not ready for that yet, but they’re trying to build amphibious landing capabilities.

Many evaluated it that China „shifted from fifth to second gear“ when they saw how the Russians hit a wall in Ukraine, and slowed down their ambitions and pressure on Taiwan. That’s not entirely the case.

The problem is that if China attacked Taiwan, they wouldn’t be as unprepared as Russia was in Ukraine. Every month we see evidence that Chinese-Russian cooperation is very intensive. Behind the scenes, China supports the Russians. The Geran drones they produce, the Russians couldn’t produce without 80% Chinese components critical for these drones.

China is also taking military knowledge. There is a very intensive exchange of experiences in drone operations and all activities going on quietly. Everything negative that the Russians experienced in Ukraine, China is thoroughly analyzing. It’s getting direct data from the Russians.

There is intensive communication in the technological area. Intensive correspondence was detected between Rosoboronexport (Russian arms monopoly), a Russian research institute for control communication systems and Chinese components.

So in Russia there may be „chaos,“ but the Chinese are learning from it and trying to be prepared so they don’t surprise Taiwan (as Russia was surprised in Ukraine).

Moderator: And we’re at the end. Pali, a quote?

Pavel Macko: We may have already given it, I’m not sure, because 129 parts is a long time to remember each and every quote. Moderator: But you should remember them.

Moderator: It’s not about remembering the quote, but whether I’ve already used it. I have them archived, because I archive those numbers. Maybe we’ll publish them in a book now. Well, I have to react to how Robert Fico is acting uncollegially and against his „herd.“ So I’ll take the liberty of a quote from Benjamin Franklin.

Pavel Macko: But say it in English first, I’ll like that.

Pavel Macko: Yes, because there’s a good play on words in English – the same word is used in both the first part and the second part of that quote. Benjamin Franklin was supposed to say it when signing the Declaration of Independence of the USA. The quote goes in the original language: „We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.“ And in translation: „We must all hold together, or certainly we will all hang individually.“

Moderator. Thank you.

The post General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar 129 appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

The possible warming of relations and ending of the war from the Trump-Putin summit in cold Alaska quickly cooled down. Allies are discussing security guarantees, which however will not be according to NATO’s Article 5. Hamas would now agree to a temporary ceasefire, but Israel already has a military operation plan.

#France #Macko #Peace negotiations #Putin #Russia #security guarantees #security radar #Trump #UK #Ukraine #USA #War in Ukraine #Zelensky

Transcript of a popular podcast prepader together with the weekly .týždeň.

Moderator: Welcome to listening to the 127th edition of General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar. Welcome, General.

General Macko: Thank you very much, pleasant listening.

Fog of War: Developments in Ukraine

Moderator: What is the development on the two main battlefields? Let’s start with Ukraine.

General Macko: I’ll start traditionally, let’s go to the strategic bombing. Despite intensive negotiations taking place at all possible levels and diplomatic messages, the clearest message of how the Russians mean it was precisely by sending missiles and drones to Ukraine. This makes it clear to everyone what they are after – to drag out time.

The most massive attack was on the night of August 20, where they hit Lviv, Mukachevo, Lutsk, attacking mainly western Ukraine. In Mukachevo, just a few kilometers from the Slovak and Hungarian borders, they attacked an American factory. This is also an answer to those who say that when the United States will mine minerals there, it will be a sufficient security guarantee. This resonated sometime after February, but it’s not like that.

They also attacked the Pavlohrad Mechanical Plant. The Russians still declare that they destroyed stocks of Sapsan missiles. I don’t know that, Ukraine of course doesn’t confirm it anywhere.

Similar to how Ukrainians recently showed the Flamingo missile… In this case, it’s better to stick to the principle „don’t shout hop until you’ve jumped“. Why? It’s clear that Zelensky needs to say such things to boost the morale of his own population and soldiers. But here it’s better to maintain operational security. Russian intelligence services have indications, but they never have precise information, we shouldn’t give it to them.

It’s not good to hint at what I have and what I can do with it. If the Ukrainians wanted to create a real psychological shock, they should have fired that Flamingo at a proper Russian base. It is said that they have already done so, but probably not yet.

The point is that the first moment of surprise is key. Flamingo is a large missile with a large radar signature. It’s a subsonic missile that flies like a cruise missile. This means it will be detectable by Russian systems. The Ukrainians should have done exactly what the Russians do – release a large swarm of drones, confuse Russian systems, and in between send them one proper hit.

We’ll see if the Ukrainians will use those Sapsan or Grim-2 ballistic missiles. Russian claims about their destruction are probably a hoax, just like claims that they destroyed twice as many HIMARS as were ever delivered to Ukraine. And despite that, HIMARS are still firing.

Ukrainian Counterattacks

When we look at the Ukrainian side, of course Ukraine also tried to return these attacks and was relatively successful. They had a massive drone attack from the night of August 19 to 20. The Russians claimed they didn’t cause damage, but independent sources report infrastructure damage in several places.

The Volgograd oil refinery and the railway station in Voronezh were attacked again. Something exploded in the Ivanovo region. Ukrainian intelligence claims that Konstantin Nagayko, the Russian commander responsible for the attack on Kharkiv, was injured in an explosion. It was probably an action by Ukrainian intelligence services.

Summary of the Situation

To summarize, my comment would be that the Russians are dragging out peace negotiations (they claim they no longer want a ceasefire, only peace) and currently, from a strategic bombing perspective, they are concentrating on Ukraine’s industrial base. They are trying to undermine it to the maximum extent possible and intersperse it with attacks on the civilian population. Of course, as winter approaches, they will again concentrate on energy infrastructure to take away their breath.

Developments on the Battlefields

Moderator: How are the Ukrainians doing? Did they manage to stop the breakthrough at Dobropillya?

General Macko: It looks like yes. That initial hit was very successful. This means that Ukrainian forces brought in reinforcements, divided the Russian formation into several parts, but couldn’t completely finish it off. The Russians are of course reinforcing it, but the Ukrainians…

We don’t have a visual aid, of course, we’re in the radio version, but imagine something like an oval with an arm coming out of it – like when you inflate a glove and a thumb sticks out. That was the protrusion at Dobropillya. The Ukrainians blocked it, divided it into several parts, but now they are trying to further attack the base from which that protrusion came, to release the „steam“ from this area.

The Ukrainians are relatively successful at this. It is true that the Russians have the 8th Combined Arms Army there, they have the 51st Combined Arms Army, they attacked there with elements of at least three brigades. Of course, the forces are thin on both sides. If we’re talking about a brigade, it’s certainly not 3,500-7,000 soldiers, because Ukrainians had even larger brigades than the Russians. But the Russians are pushing reinforcements there because they know exactly that if they lose momentum there, they won’t be able to threaten the rest of Donbas.

So now it has stabilized a bit, but it’s basically a success for the Ukrainians – they contained it, pushed back. They also had a small success around Pokrovsk, where for the first time they cleared the interior of Pokrovsk from sabotage reconnaissance groups and slightly its surroundings as well.

On the other hand, the Russians slightly advanced in the vicinity of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk. Not that they would control those cities, but they got a bit further beyond them. They slightly advanced by one settlement in the Dnipropetrovsk region, but from the Russians‘ perspective, this is probably propaganda, suggesting that they could attack in that direction as well.

The last thing I would like to mention – there are signals emerging that the Russians could shift pressure, since they’re not succeeding directly in Donbas, more to the Zaporizhzhia region, to the southern front.

Addition to Dobropillya

General Macko: I have just one note about that. I caught quite a good analysis from the Czech profile Perun. They are guys who have been working with drones for a longer time. They talked about why the breakthrough at Dobropillya happened – the Ukrainians thinned out the defensive lines there. We discussed this a few episodes back, we said that instead of a continuous line, they created „strongholds“ or support points with drone operators.

But of course, the other side also reacts. The Russians have a unit and system called Rubikon, which we also discussed. They use Rubikon in such a way that they don’t attack directly just the first line, but mainly the supply routes, convoys, and destroy the troops‘ supplies. This proved successful for them in the Kursk region, and that’s why the Ukrainians eventually withdrew. They had good terrain there, but it also had a disadvantage – it was channelized, they had only a few valleys and roads through which supplies could be delivered.

Now it’s interesting that NATO has also started building a drone wall or drone barrier in the Baltics. The wall alone is not enough. It needs to be said that you always need a combination of means. In the end, war is always about will, and there must also be a soldier with will.

Moderator: When you mention drones, everyone imagines only those that fly, but now I notice that Ukrainians use many ground drones. Is that real?

General Macko: It is real. I’ll also do a bit of advertising for the weekly, because I started writing a series about drones. This issue contains the history of drones, which might surprise many – drones go back to the First World War. So it’s nothing new.

I recommend getting the latest issue of the weekly. But to return to the question – yes, Ukrainians are significantly progressing with ground drones. They were successful with naval ones, they cleared the Black Sea Fleet from Crimea, and now they are more significantly deploying ground drones.

My conclusion from this is that it’s important. The battlefield is becoming more technological, nobody can stop that, but in the end, every war is a battle of wills. Where there is will, those defend themselves. When we don’t have will, no technology will help us.

Middle East

Moderator: Let’s move to the Middle East. How is the situation developing there? Hamas allegedly already agrees with a 60-day ceasefire. I’ll allow myself an assessment – it’s certainly the result of Israeli pressure that they agree.

General Macko: Definitely, because Israel announced that it’s no longer going to negotiate. They approved the decision to go and occupy the rest of Gaza. We discussed those goals and stages in detail last time. Last week, Israel started planning a detailed military plan. They had a strategic plan, which we discussed, and the detailed military plan, which I hinted at last time, Israel has now announced that they have completed it.

The Americans pressed Hamas or the Palestinians to engage in negotiations. Hamas announced that it is ready to negotiate. Because they said they are ready for another 60-day ceasefire.

Netanyahu, of course, said: „You know what, we’ve already decided and we’re going to strike you, we have a military plan.“ Netanyahu has now suspended those operations, but again, it’s more of a negotiating strategy, a communication strategy, because militarily he already has things prepared. After all, we all know that those measures were set up so that only preparatory military activities are to take place now. The main task is only from October 7, because they said they would start at the earliest on October 7, and they would also symbolically start the sharp combat phase on the anniversary of Hamas‘ attack from October 7, 2023.

So now these are the so-called „shaping operations“ or „forming operations“, where they are building conditions… On August 8, they already issued an evacuation order for people to leave Jabalia and Gaza City. Now logistical infrastructure is being built in the south. So regardless of what Netanyahu said, the main combat operations would not have started anyway. But he created space and pressure on Hamas by that: „You know what, this is the last chance, we’ll suspend it, and this is the last chance for you to come to an agreement. We won’t go and kill all of you, but you won’t be in power anymore, you must leave the Gaza Strip, there will be some other authority instead of you, and you must demilitarize.“

And they don’t want that. They don’t want it because again the trick with the two-month ceasefire is: „Okay, so out of those 50 hostages, we might return 30 dead ones and 10 live ones, and we’ll keep those 10 again and we’ll drag out time again.“

Despite all the criticism of Israel at this moment, it’s good that Israel is pretending to be more restrained and wants to wait and see what Hamas actually agrees to. And if it doesn’t meet its parameters, it will pressure them: „Okay, I’ll pull out not from the drawer, but from those topographic pouches, the battle plans, and we’ll go and finish it.“ Or we’ll agree in such a way that we won’t have to negotiate on another ceasefire, that this will already be a permanent ceasefire.

We’ll see how it develops, but in the meantime, during that week, exactly what happened was that they completed that military plan. Operational and tactical planning has some time sequence. I’ve been dealing with this for years, also at allied levels. Those large contours of the plan were clear, different alternatives, so-called „branch plans“ – branching of plans, what will be if… – to calculate all possible reactions. And Israel has now completed this.

Meanwhile, some security operations continued. There was bombing again in southern Lebanon. Here I just remind that Lebanon is disarming Hezbollah. The Lebanese government has issued clear instructions to disarm Hezbollah.

Netanyahu appears a bit controversial, with his tough talk and speaking about Greater Israel. That’s fine to some extent, but what disturbs me, and maybe it’s counterproductive, is the further expansion of settlements in the West Bank, because it will provoke further reactions that divert attention from the core of the problem, which is now in Gaza.

Moderator: I would like to ask about those settlements, because to laypeople like me, it sounds like: „Well, they’ll build a few houses there, so what? What could bother anyone about that?“ What is the principle issue with building those settlements?

General Macko: The principle is that the West Bank, according to the original UN resolutions when the state of Israel was created, was assigned to the Arabs. After the Arabs expelled… we were saying here that Israel, when it was established, had about 750,000 inhabitants. And the Arabs in that first Arab-Israeli war, when Czechoslovakia was still supplying weapons and aircraft to Israel for it to survive at all, in response to their being unsuccessful in that war and not destroying the state of Israel, expelled 850,000 Jews from their countries where Jews had lived for centuries. That’s more than the population of Israel itself.

So the Israelis placed them on their territory, but it was dense there and there isn’t water everywhere. In the desert, it’s not easy. So these Israelis, for at least 20 years, or Jews, were in refugee camps. Many established settlements, they said: „Okay, when you expelled them from your countries and we no longer have space in what was allocated to us,“ so they established settlements and settled those Jews also in territories originally assigned to Arabs and built some settlements there.

Now it’s controversial because if some two-state solution is to be made in the future, then Israeli settlers, when there is suitable land, want to go there and they go into the risk that they will be in that hot cauldron with a population that doesn’t want them there, and they still build settlements there.

It’s exactly like when the Russians bring their own people everywhere… That’s why it’s controversial, because it disrupts the compactness of the territory, and the Arabs fear that in the future, when there is some arrangement, Israel will also claim that part of the territory because it already has settlements there.

Strategic Backstage: Trump-Putin Negotiations

Moderator: Since the last radar, the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska took place, followed by Zelensky’s negotiations with Western leaders in Washington. It even looked like a trilateral Putin-Trump-Zelensky meeting could take place this week. But I didn’t believe it at all. But it’s starting to get complicated again. How do you personally evaluate that development? You certainly see it through slightly different eyes than we laypeople.

General Macko: What we more or less agreed on with Martin Swarovsky, when we were last at your place in a joint video before the negotiations, is being fulfilled – that we don’t have great expectations from these negotiations.

Why? Because I also have to look at the symptoms that accompany it. If you give an ultimatum to someone like Putin, and then you yourself send your emissaries, that was Witkoff, who went to Moscow two days before the ultimatum expired, and that meeting in Alaska was arranged, which is fine…

I also supported it, because the United States, unlike our Minister of Foreign Affairs or Prime Minister, have that displacement and are the player that can contribute to ending the conflict. They have all the tools for which the Russians would have to think whether they want to go into confrontation with the United States, or they realize that they cannot win that war anyway, so it’s better to end it.

The problem is that when you send negotiators and then the ultimatum expires and despite that, the Russians don’t agree to a ceasefire, you’re sending a signal that you don’t have the will to continue and bring things to an end. It could have been done like this: „Okay, we’ll negotiate in Alaska, but a ceasefire must occur by August 8, and when it doesn’t… then we won’t negotiate.“ Or: „We’ll negotiate, but when a ceasefire doesn’t happen, I’ll impose sanctions in the meantime, and when we agree in the negotiations, I can suspend or cancel them, but since I’ve given an ultimatum once, I must keep it.“

Otherwise, we teach the opponent that we are not so determined, we are not so decided, and therefore they will drag out time with us. And that’s exactly what happened.

I laconically noted on social network X that the problem today is that the Russians have nothing, but they have a lot of vodka and will. And we have almost everything, but we don’t have that will. And therefore, in the end, not our economic strength, not the military strength of the collective West, not Ukrainian determination, but Russian will to continue in that war will prevail, and the Russians will drag out time.

So very briefly: In Alaska, there were indications that the negotiations could lead to a result, but neither side said the complete details. The good news was that Trump, after Merz and company intensively negotiated with him before, and Zelensky too, doesn’t dare to accept something right away, but he didn’t want to appear as the bad one who would a priori accept Russian demands. That’s why he adjourned it and said that we’re almost close to an agreement, but… this is a quote: „Until everything is agreed, nothing is agreed.“ That’s what President Trump said at that press conference, where he gave the first word to Putin.

Then he said he would consult with allies. He consulted with allies, the allies even with Zelensky traveled to the White House. Those negotiations were constructive, but with two major strategic conclusions:

1) The first was that the US will not provide troops for potential security guarantees. What is leaking, although no one will confirm it to you, is that more or less internally, the United States is reconciled with the fact that Ukraine will have to cede territory – but not just any territory for any territory, but Donbas, that it will have to cede. And that is the „Fortress Donbass“ or „Donbass fortress“, which has been fought over not for 3.5 years, but for 11 years.

I’ll remind you that when that Russian war started, the Russians occupied, with those so-called rebels, who were actually members of the Russian intelligence service, or Wagner Group members, or „soldiers on vacation“ (Russian soldiers on vacation), also Sloviansk. Ukrainian forces conquered it and pushed them out, and that’s when they built that strong defense in Donbas. And that was also Lysychansk, that was also Severodonetsk, which later fell. Then Bakhmut also fell, but they still have that rampart, fortification, and those economically important cities.

So the Ukrainians cannot surrender this, because firstly, the Russians were not able to conquer it militarily. Maybe they will gain it in 10 years, but until then, if the West did exactly what it should, Russia would collapse and economically would have to accept other conditions.

So it was said that the United States does not support Ukraine in NATO. Well, strategically, they probably agreed with Putin: „We won’t provoke you, you need guarantees.“ Putin himself said in Alaska that Ukraine also needs guarantees. So it was agreed that they would agree. And that’s always such… I say that what happens behind the scenes is important.

Western allies, since they knew that the United States would not go into direct confrontation, that they don’t have too much will to push for sanctions, and that at the same time Trump is impatient and wants to have it over with as quickly as possible, so they said they would give security guarantees. And those were then negotiated during the week.

So if it won’t be Article 5, we all knew that Ukraine cannot be admitted to NATO now during the war, but until the last moment, not only Jens Stoltenberg, but also the new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, assured that it’s only a matter of time before Ukraine will be in NATO. And now we’re deviating and saying that we’ll give it other security guarantees.

I don’t want to say I don’t believe them, but it’s important for Putin to believe it. Because if something is to deter you, you must be convinced that the other side will do it. I’ll translate it for laypeople: If we say that we’ll give security guarantees such that peace will be agreed and we’ll put troops there to supervise the implementation of the agreement and the Russians will also know about it, then the Russians would have to agree with it, because otherwise they won’t sign the peace or it will be a pretext for them to continue the war.

Theoretically, we wouldn’t have to ask the Russians. But it would have to be credible, because all those security guarantees lie in the fact that it doesn’t matter whether you put 5,000 or 500,000 soldiers there. In the end, it must be that if after the conclusion of peace, Russia attacks Ukraine again, those who provide security guarantees go to war with Russia. I don’t mean by that that they go to destroy Moscow, but at minimum they will go into a sharp war with it to kick it out of Ukraine. And until Putin has the feeling that this is absolutely guaranteed, he won’t believe it.

2) The second thing is the United States, and here I will be positive towards the United States. The United States said they won’t put troops on the ground. It’s quite logical, because it’s really the case that we, Europe, have the primary interest in security in Ukraine. And therefore quite logically, J.D. Vance, with whom I don’t have to agree on everything, says: „So put your own troops then.“

But the United States must have a firm commitment, even if they won’t have a commitment in Article 5 to Ukraine, they must have a firm commitment to their allies. And they also said that they will support us from the air. And that air support can be logistical. They have a huge transport fleet, so they can quickly bring in supplies and reinforcements for allied troops.

It can also be combat. They have combat aircraft, we’ve seen that they can, with those aircraft carriers and aircraft they have in Europe today, and with tankers they can bring in, get to that area very quickly. They can maintain what they maintained over Iran – continuity of combat operations. Not that we fly for 3 minutes, fire a missile, and have to land. They can keep aircraft in the air, they can create continuous pressure, they have means like long-range missiles and the like. So theoretically, they could do it.

And now we see Russia’s reaction – at this moment, Russia is starting to speculate. They say that China should also be in those security guarantees. Logically, it seems fine. On the other hand, we in Europe can probably say that we don’t need it. The Russians are creating an axis with China and North Korea. And besides North Korean soldiers, we don’t need Chinese soldiers in Europe either. Let China guard its space in Asia nicely and not stick its horns into Taiwan, the Philippines, and beyond, where it’s pushing. Certainly not into Europe. Because that wouldn’t be a true guarantee.

And the Russians want such a guarantee… I can imagine, for example, Turkish troops as separation troops. Because the Turks have relatively good relations with both sides. We’ll see how it develops. But I’m starting to suspect that the meeting, as you suggested, won’t happen. Already now, the Russians are saying that they first need to negotiate things at the working level. Trump has actually already said that the Russians and Ukrainians should go to negotiations themselves.

And here I’ll give a final anecdote. President Trump boasted. First, he said that he had already closed or ended 5 wars. Then 7. Now he said 7. I’ll leave it for another podcast, but I want to say that, for example, between Serbia and Kosovo, there was no imminent war threat. That was virtual from Trump.

Where credit can be given to him is certainly in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, because those parties also negotiated with the White House. And they also humiliated Putin because they went to close it in Washington with the assistance of the United States. And the United States is also involved there in the corridor between Karabakh and Armenia.

When we look at India and Pakistan, Pakistan nominated Trump for the Nobel Prize and India says you had no hand in it at all, you weren’t involved. And finally in Cambodia and Thailand, yes, China and the United States assisted with that, pushed, but the mediator was ASEAN. The Prime Minister of one of the ASEAN countries was the main sponsor who secured that agreement. But of course, these two big ones, the USA and China, gave that political-strategic signal that they are behind that agreement, they are pushing for it, and so it happened.

Weapons Deliveries for Ukraine

Moderator: How will it be with weapons deliveries for Ukraine?

General Macko: These weapons deliveries continue, various formats are being negotiated. What was said holds true, that the United States will sell those weapons to NATO and NATO will pass them on to Ukraine. Financial mechanisms are being sought for how to finance it. I think this will continue.

Several initiatives have been announced, because here we need to have a clear scenario: As long as Russia keeps dragging out the war, Ukraine needs that support and help. We’ve seen that Trump is even using his so-called „presidential drawdown authority“. This means that without Congressional approval, he can reduce part of the army’s supplies. Here we’ve returned to the regime that was roughly under President Biden.

But for domestic politics, President Trump now has an excuse, because he’ll say: „I did everything for there to be peace, but the Russians won’t listen, so I have to help the Ukrainians.“

Moderator: Yesterday he even said that Biden forced the Ukrainians only to defend themselves, that war cannot be won by defending and that the Ukrainians should attack. Did I explain it correctly?

General Macko: Bingo! That’s exactly what I said back in April of last year, when I said that everyone says Trump is unpredictable. We knew that. I said, prepare for a roller coaster.

But what was essential was that I said that Trump, if he gets angry, can go into it radically. And those are the remarks about whether Zelensky is willing to attack Moscow and so on. Because it’s like this: Even if Ukraine doesn’t want to defeat Russia on Russian territory, in defense you can avoid losing. But you can never win. No war was ever won by defense.

Anniversary of August 21, 1968

Moderator: Yesterday we commemorated that sad anniversary of August 21, when the Russians invaded us. You, from what I know, were also at some memorial events. But I would first ask you if you could comment on such a simple fact that Prime Minister Fico didn’t say a word about it.

General Macko: I think it’s completely clear. In ’68, the world was divided into two camps. And our ancestors had no choice. And despite that, they had collaborators here who legitimized the entry of Soviet troops.

As Juraj Mesík wrote yesterday in a commentary for one newspaper – let’s tell the truth, that people didn’t write about Soviets anywhere when those Russians came here. They wrote „Russians go home!“ And by Russians, they meant that empire. Now we’re not talking about nationalities that they drove into it from their country and those partner states.

But when they came here, we still had collaborators who sanctified it. But back then our ancestors couldn’t help themselves against that enormous superiority that rushed in here during the night. But today we can choose. And today we have collaborators here who are again speculating to go this same path, and it’s outrageous that the Prime Minister did not comment on this.

But something else is also outrageous. Foreign Minister Blanár did comment. And purely technically, if I didn’t know what he said before and who he is, what he said was correct.

Even the President expressed himself. I allowed myself to needle him and troll him yesterday, because the President said that we must be in the European Union and NATO to not experience something like this, for it not to be repeated. So I’ll remind everyone, and I’ll be bad and biased, that the President began his presidential campaign by taking a photo with the Russian Federation’s Ambassador Bratchikov. And that testifies to his sincere interests in Russia, where he still hasn’t understood that Russia is an aggressor, that Russia has been conducting this imperial policy for the last 300 years, and that we should be on guard against Russia, and not collaborate with them or collect points from misguided citizens who would even today welcome these occupation troops on our territory.

Moderator: And where did you spend yesterday?

General Macko: I spent it in Trnava. It’s true that Patrik Lenghart, a university teacher, an activist, convinced me to also join a civic association, an activity called „Wednesday,“ where we are trying to limit the influence of foreign powers, in this case Russia, here, because the Russians are trying to create again an atmosphere in Slovakia like the one that preceded the invasion in ’68.

So I was with Michal Kocáb in Trnava, there were also artists who supported it. It was a more than two-hour event, we were reminiscing about the symbolism of these events, but also those threats and what is happening in Ukraine, what is the connection between what is happening in Ukraine, the year ’68, and what can happen to us if we’re not careful.

This same thing was expected from our government. It didn’t have to explicitly attack Russia, but it should have given a clear signal to citizens: „This is happening in Ukraine and that’s why we’re going to support Ukraine and our common interests within Europe.“

And do you know what the Prime Minister did? It’s not that he didn’t express himself. The Prime Minister also made the headlines of Indian newspapers. I follow those English-language and Indian ones, where he made headlines. And for what does our Prime Minister make world headlines? He didn’t get there with any reform, he didn’t get there with anything extraordinary that would be in Slovakia. Slovakia got to the headlines of world media the most during his governments when they killed Kuciak, when he attacked Macron and called everyone in the West warmongers. And now again, because he said that Slovakia will block all European support activities towards Ukraine.

History of the Second World War

Moderator: Let’s go to history, the cycle from the Second World War. Last time we discussed the Balkans, if I remember correctly. What was happening to the east of us?

General Macko: This worked out for us and factually it’s not a plan, I can tell the listeners. Because the original plan was that we would get to the Slovak National Uprising, but that can’t be realized, that war was longer, more complex.

We’re missing from that picture, when we take from the year ’40 to ’41, the Soviet Union and what was happening in its surroundings. And a lot was happening there. Outwardly, the Russians or Soviets pretended to be a neutral power, but in reality, they were very active.

I’ll remind that we discussed the Winter War, and it ended in March 1940 with some peace agreement. The Winter War with Finland. The Russians understood that they wanted to have that Karelia to secure the defense of Leningrad then, but they knew that they couldn’t turn Finns into Russians, so they left the rest alone, because they got a beating right in that first phase anyway. In the second phase of the Winter War, they were a bit more successful.

But what continued? The Soviets continued to cooperate very intensively with Nazi Germany. They were allies. When we look at spring-summer 1940, they expanded and occupied – they did an Anschluss – the Baltic states: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia under the pretext of protecting their western border. They called it „securing the western border“. And as if they were protecting these nations. So in June they occupied them. And in July they immediately annexed them. They created Soviet republics in these three countries and annexed them.

In June 1940, the Soviet Union also forced the cession of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia from Romania. That’s today’s Moldova. In the fall, the Soviets under Stalin tried to conduct diplomacy. They plotted even more with the Nazis.

I remind that the Soviet Union on September 17, 1939, attacked Poland, 17 days later than Slovakia and Nazi Germany. And they divided Poland between them. So Stalin, based on those Molotov-Ribbentrop pacts, tried to get closer to Hitler and Nazi Germany. They wanted to divide Europe and the world.

So Molotov in November 1940 visited Berlin, where he negotiated about the possible entry of the Soviet Union into the pact of three powers, which was Germany, Italy, and Japan. In short, the Soviet Union still in November 1940, for its dirty imperial interests, after it stole the Baltics, after it stole Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, wanted to become part of the fascist axis of Germany, Italy, and Japan. I’m just reminding all those Russophiles.

On June 22, 1941, a breach was made to that, when the Germans attacked the Soviet Union. That’s why the Soviets say, because you have to translate those words, „treacherous attack“, because even under communist propaganda, you’re older, Jeno, you remember it, that they always said „treacherous attack on the Soviet Union“. That was in those Czech documentary films. Treacherous in that they were the closest allies of Nazi Germany and it betrayed them when it already saw that they weren’t sufficiently prepared, and implemented Operation Barbarossa.

Moderator: What military operations did the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, so this word I’ve already removed from my vocabulary, undertake in this period, besides that Winter War?

General Macko: Let’s say directly Bolshevik Russia – the Bolshevik Communist Party was then called the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). Literally.

Well, that occupation of the Baltics, that was a lightning military operation without a declaration of war, where they actually sent units, occupied strategic points, and forced governments to resign. Now, that’s why I’m reminding of this, this is exactly like through carbon paper, this is what the Russians do systematically. They did it in ’68 here, they landed at Ruzyně, stole, took our political leadership to Moscow, and subsequently established their regime here, installed their people here, with whom they then ruled.

They even forced on us a treaty, which our Prosecutor General Maroš Žilinka, an associate of this Petrushev, where he goes to the Hermitage and walked with him a few years ago, talked about, and that’s such a shame. He said that it was an excellent treaty, that it was far better than the defense cooperation agreement with the United States.

And this is Slovakia, and this is what we don’t realize – those threats, that the Russians are coming, and it doesn’t matter whether it was Tsarist Russia, whether it’s Bolshevik Russia, whether it’s now post-imperial Russia. The Russians have always done this – they occupied key squares on the chessboard, replaced the pieces, took control, when they couldn’t control, they destroyed everything with bombs, missiles, tanks.

Moderator: How did the neighbors react to everything that those Russians got up to?

General Macko: Well of course, and that’s another explanation of why history sometimes happens as it happens. Because besides this, they also conducted covert operations and repressions in those occupied territories.

Just as here after 1945, even before the communists took power here, they exported people illegally to gulags, they did this in these countries too. The NKVD, which was the predecessor of the KGB, the Soviet secret police, carried out extensive purges, deportations, arrests in newly occupied territories, to destroy potential resistance and ensure Sovietization. This is what would await Ukrainians if Ukraine fell, this is what would await all of us if they fell.

So the reaction of those countries was quite clear. Poland was dismantled. There was only domestic underground resistance there, but it was dismantled. Finland, since it lost territory in that war, after the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union, quite understandably joined the German side, because they hoped to at least recapture lost Karelia.

Romania also had to cede that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in 1940, so later it joined the German invasion against the Soviet Union. Hungary was watching very carefully, because when they occupied that Bessarabia and Bukovina, the Russians came closer to the borders of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, which was then in Czechoslovakia, but the more southern part was Hungarian-speaking, and the Soviets pushed in there. So Hungary also joined the war against the Soviet Union alongside Germany.

I mentioned Poland, and the Slovak state – we had relatively normal relations with the Soviet Union and under the influence of those events, we also joined and sent the Rapid Brigade on June 22, 1941.

In other words, with its disgusting imperialist policy, Russia pushed those countries, which could have been either neutral or perhaps even allies with them, into Hitler’s fold, because in the end, those countries had no other choice if they wanted to survive. They had to join where they thought they would be better off.

360°: Africa

Moderator: What’s on your radar, Pali?

General Macko: I have several things there, but it’s Africa again. That’s a beautiful area. The main thing that caught my interest from those agency reports is that the Nigerian army reported on a significant operation in the Lake Chad basin, where they eliminated the highest leader of Boko Haram.

This drew attention also because of the importance of that region, because we’re talking about Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. The operation is considered quite a big blow to the jihadist group, which has been plaguing that region with violence for more than 10 years. These are just hard-core jihadists.

Besides that, there was an interesting incident that a bomb exploded near a military air base in Colombia, as if violence was returning there. There was a fight there also with Maoists who were hiding in the mountains. Tension in Syria, intra-Syrian tension, was renewed in connection with the 12th anniversary of the deadly chemical attack near Damascus. These are such unresolved problems.

But what stood out to me the most was that Boko Haram.

Moderator: And what actually is Boko Haram?

General Macko: Boko Haram was founded in Nigeria, in the northeast, by some Muhammad Yusuf in 2002. By the way, it’s similar to how Hamas was formed. There was also a Yusuf there who founded Hamas.

It started as a religious movement that opposed Western-style education. Actually that „Boko Haram“, „haram“ means forbidden, and that „Boko Haram“ was like „we don’t want this Western education“. Just as the Taliban started in Madrasas somewhere in Pakistan, and also tried to return to Islamic conservatism, Sharia law.

But of course, subsequently it began to radicalize there. Yusuf was killed outside of court during skirmishes, they had a new leader, and he was no longer concerned with education or culture, but with a hard jihadist uprising. First they focused on Nigeria, then they went to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger and exploited the permeability of borders and those various ethnic ties. And they started to stick their necks out.

I remember that they kidnapped schoolgirls, raped them, but that’s less known now. In 2015, they then pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. The Islamic State was supposed to be a worldwide caliphate, Islamic, that would control the whole world. And they declared themselves as the West African province of the Islamic State.

And just a statistic: That uprising caused 350,000 deaths, 3.2 million displaced people in that area, in the Lake Chad basin. Of course, agriculture, trade, access to health services were significantly disrupted.

So a multinational joint operational group was then formed there, composed of units from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, who tried to fight against them. Then we had units in Mali, even international ones, and a European mission, which also tried to help locals in Mali against these Islamists.

But in Mali, what then happened was that a military junta seized power and kicked out these units as well.

Moderator: And what do the Americans, French, and Russians do with these juntas, with those local ones, in this area?

General Macko: And this is interesting, because we discussed within the Security Radar that a belt of those West African juntas was created. ECOWAS was 15 countries that were in that sub-Saharan area and West Africa, which cooperated as an economic association like the European Union or something similar. And they broke away, because there is a junta in Mali, in Burkina Faso, and also in Niger. We discussed this recently.

And now what happened? The United States, along with the French, had a base in Niger, from where, in cooperation with those local governments, they helped fight against these Islamists, jihadists. After the junta took power in Niger, they kicked them out, so the United States and France withdrew their troops and left that area.

Moderator: And imagine who is there…? Can I guess? Russians.

General Macko: Exactly. The Russians wormed their way in there, the Wagner Group came there first, and now the Russians have done it in such a way that they created the Africa Corps. By the way, the Africa Corps is a Nazi legacy from the past, Erwin Rommel commanded it. So the Russians have now built, following the model of those Nazis, the Africa Corps. These are basically successors to the Wagner Group, but the Russians now openly admit that they are supported, financed, and sponsored by the Russian Ministry of Defense.

These are trying to do several things there. First, to keep those juntas in power, to help them against the Islamists, because they disrupt order there, and mainly to mine diamonds and other minerals. To earn money.

Russia is strategically focused on this – they are trying to monopolize. This is also in Ukraine. There are large gas deposits around Crimea and in some parts of Ukraine. When the Russians take it, Europe will still be dependent only on Russian gas or from the rest of the world.

This is something that happened – after the collapse of the colonial empire, the Western world seemed to be less interested in Africa, abandoned it. 65% of natural resources today are controlled by China, and Russia is trying to grab the rest as quickly as possible.

Moderator: And what about the French?

General Macko: The French, unfortunately, are gradually leaving from there. They are losing influence there, even though they were former French colonies.

And the Russians, exactly as always. Let’s take it. In Europe, the Russians say that they still celebrate victory over fascism, even though they brought the second totalitarianism. And a moment ago we said that they were close allies – the Soviets and the Nazis. So although the Russians say, they maintain that tradition that they fight against fascism, at the same time they are the biggest sponsor and supporter of these extreme right-wing movements throughout Europe.

And in Africa, they do the same – they say that they help countries against former colonialists and the like. And gradually, in silence, they build their Russian colonies there. I just remind that in reality, Russia, where its territory is today, never built colonies and went straight to annexation. As Putin said, where the foot of a Russian soldier steps, it is ours. „This is ours.“

And this is a message probably also in connection with the anniversary of August 21, 1968, and the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Russian troops have already entered here twice. And that’s why Putin still thinks he has a claim to this whole Central and Eastern Europe. And it would be ideal for him if there were puppet governments here, like in Belarus. Because Lavrov also said this week that it’s not just about some territories in Ukraine. That they want to have such a political regime in Ukraine that they need and want.

And this is actually a warning and the main message of this week. Beware, these are permanent Russian imperial interests, here and in Africa. They will have cutthroats, killers there just to keep those countries under their influence.

Quote at the End

Moderator: What could perhaps be a quote for this difficult week?

General Macko: I’ve been saying for a long time that Russian imperial policy has not changed from Tsarist Russia through Bolshevik Russia to the present day. It’s just called differently. And that Putin dreamed of re-establishing Greater Russia. He’s a man from the KGB, raised on one teat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other from the KGB, and that stayed with him.

And that these people, supporters of Russia, like our red revolutionary Blaha and similar ones, actually still preach some Red Revolution, which, regardless of the victims, is supposedly the best for society.

So I’ll remind what none other than Sir Winston Churchill said about this regime: „Everyone sees how communism decomposes the soul of a nation, makes it miserable in peace and vile in war.“

Read also:

https://pavelmacko.sk/2025/08/14/general-pavel-mackos-security-radar-episode-125/

Analysis of the Situation on the Ukrainian Front with General Pavel Macko – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

The post General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar 127 appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#360 #Alaska Summit #Fog of War #Macko #peace talks #Putin #Russia #stategic bombing #strategic backgroung #Trump #USA #War in Ukraine #Zelensky

Full transcript of the popular podcast in weekly .týždeň . Originally released Aug 15, 2025 (in Slovak).

Welcome to listening to the 126th edition of General Pavel Macko’s security radar, whom I welcome here.

Pavel Macko: Thank you, have a nice day.

Fog of War

Moderator: Trump and Putin’s meeting will begin literally in a few hours. We’ll return to the preparation and expectations in the background. On the battlefield, or even in the rear, nothing indicates that the war should end. So, Pali, what’s the development?

Pavel Macko: Exactly. We see that both sides are trying to achieve the maximum until the last moment. That means, no slackening of troop activity, that they are preparing to take some advantageous defensive positions, but intense fighting is taking place.

Moderator: I’ll start with strategic bombing. I just read that Ukrainians attacked some cargo ship with weapons.

Pavel Macko: I just caught this from you, that it’s an Iranian cargo ship in a port in the Caspian Sea, where they were transporting Shahed drones. This is a sign that both sides are going all out until the last moment. When we look at Russian strategic attacks, it has quieted down a bit in terms of cities. Nevertheless, the Russians attacked Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro on the 8th. On 10.08, they attacked in the Dnipropetrovsk region and claim to have destroyed 4 Patriot launchers and a radar, which should probably affect air defense. On the 14th, they attacked in Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk.

Russian intelligence says they focused on Sapsan or Grim-2 missile systems. They claim to have eliminated Ukraine’s capability in the area of these deep strikes.

I’ll comment on this a bit. The destruction of Patriots wouldn’t be something exceptional; we’ve seen it before. 4 launchers, that’s about half of a fire battery. It’s a serious loss because they’re looking for every single launcher. Here’s just my note, because even before, when they destroyed some part of a Patriot near Kyiv more than a year ago, it turned out that it had been sitting in one place for too long.

This is a mobile device. It is, of course, used for strategic defense in the case of Ukraine, but it needs to be moved. That means moving and implementing measures that the Iranians experienced – that we must have these devices protected. Not only against those large missiles that shoot it down but also against drones and other devices that its radar doesn’t normally see. That means, multi-layered defense must be done.

We’ll see if this is confirmed or not. Of course, it would be unpleasant, but again, this is a big war where neither side can remain without losses.

As for the destruction of Sapsan, I’m not sure if they really managed to liquidate these factories. Whether they tried to do it, whether it wasn’t just about the launchers somewhere in Sumy, but that there are those military armories in Dnipropetrovsk.

Here, I would say that sometimes silence is golden. I understand that President Zelensky needs to boost morale and that he talks about „we have already tested those rockets, we are ready,“ but when he presents it too publicly, he draws a lot of attention, because the other side will evaluate it as a real threat and will do everything to destroy it. It would be more sensible to produce a few hundred and then announce it and the next day make a flurry. But whether they really destroyed it or not, we will see by whether the Ukrainians will use them.

Moderator: Well, and what about the Ukrainians then, how are they doing?

Pavel Macko: The Ukrainians were also extremely active. You already mentioned that last event now, which I haven’t studied in depth yet, but when we look, they attacked virtually every day:

▪️August 9 in the Volgograd region – a refinery in Volgograd, by the way, the smoke can still be seen even now

▪️August 10 in the Belgorod region – ammunition depot

▪️August 11 in the Bryansk region – a railway junction used for military logistics (by the way, this was also part of that Kursk operation, that there was a possibility to eliminate several of those directions)

▪️August 12 in the Krasnodar Territory – they attack there often, but now they attacked fuel storage tanks, and not with air drones, but with naval drones

That means, they actually sailed across the entire Black Sea and hit with naval drones, which are in the Sea of Azov and hit coastal storage tanks. So it wasn’t quite the eastern Black Sea coast, but it was in the Sea of Azov. That means, they had to get to it or pass by Kerch unobserved under the Kerch Bridge.

Moderator: So that definitely caught my interest. I’m just waiting for when that Kerch Bridge will come up.

Pavel Macko: I think that at the moment it’s not such a priority that they would invest too much in it. The Russians are guarding it, and it wouldn’t give any operational advantage to the Ukrainians at the moment.

Moderator: And what about Pokrovsk? Is it really such a serious breakthrough as they say?

Pavel Macko: Well, now let’s look at those battlefields. The situation on that Donetsk front is, of course, tense. It’s like a tightly stretched string, where you just wait for it to snap.

I’ve been saying for a long time that the Russians are increasing that pressure, they have numerical superiority, they’re trying different tactics. And they managed a breakthrough with smaller units, they seeped through inconspicuously. And actually, under normal circumstances, if I looked at a 10-kilometer shift – well, that’s not like from Lužná to Bratislava. And I’ll say that in such a big war, it’s nothing.

Of course, but given that despite that enormous effort, enormous losses, we see those Russian advances – step by step, house by house, trench by trench, and it took them a year and a half – they actually made about a 10-kilometer advance over the course of this week.

Towards Dobropilia. I’ll just explain it, we don’t have a map, so it’s like:

▪️They’re fighting at Kupiansk. The fighting still persists there, nothing fundamental is changing. They’re trying to capture Kupiansk through that bridgehead, across the Oskil River.

▪️They’re fighting at Chasiv Yar, where they’ve already gotten behind that area, behind Chasiv Yar, but the Ukrainians are still holding in the northwestern part of Chasiv Yar.

▪️Kostiantynivka is free, but they’re kind of bypassing it.

▪️Battles similar to those in Chasiv Yar are also in Toretsk.

And to that, there’s also the area that is Pokrovsk. At Pokrovsk, they got from the south to Dachne, that’s southwest, that they bypassed Pokrovsk. But to Dobropilia, when they got further, there’s actually that road that goes from Pokrovsk and then goes north between Dobropilia and Kramatorsk. It’s such an important road that the Russians are trying to reach, because that would significantly affect logistics.

Despite the fact that terrain vehicles and the like are also used – the Russians at the beginning of the invasion, and the Ukrainians now need paved communications for large logistics. So it’s serious, mainly because they caught the Ukrainians being careless. Despite knowing that there’s huge pressure there, they allowed the Russians to make such a wedge with which they penetrated 10 kilometers. In this case, it’s quite a lot.

Because it allows, if it were to fall, for example, that Kostiantynivka, it would allow the Russians to open a gate for a larger attack or for the siege of Pokrovsk. But it’s not something that would mean that everything will collapse now and they’ll start advancing tens of kilometers. But the Russians will increase that pressure there.

We’re still talking about them looking for a place to push. Of course, the Russians don’t control 30% of the Donetsk region. And even if they didn’t encompass it, they want to have the most advantageous position, so that if by chance in the future, even after some ceasefire, the fighting is renewed, they would get as far as possible.

Moderator: We might talk about this tomorrow morning together, after the Trump-Putin meeting. You’ll be wiser, I probably won’t be, but you will be. Alright, let’s go to the criticism of Syrskyi.

Criticism of Syrskyi

Pavel Macko: Well, and this is related to precisely these battles. When we were talking here about him replacing Zaluzhnyi, we said, well, it’s a legitimate thing for President Zelensky, but by doing so, he’s also putting his hands more into those operations.

Syrskyi is exactly the person who has that long screwdriver and actually tries to manage, even micromanage, every unit. And here I would say that the criticism is partly justified, partly not.

Simply, no one changes. Zelensky took Syrskyi because he was the less rebellious one and asked less than Zaluzhnyi. On the other hand, it was known about Syrskyi that he’s that Soviet soldier. That he’s simply that unyielding one, that he commands. When he defended Bakhmut, he held Soledar for a long time, I criticized it, because they sacrificed three brigades in Soledar.

So the criticism is partly justified, but of course, you have to fight with what you have. You won’t have better ones. Here’s a different trend. When I was doing that study with those German colleagues from that first phase of the war, Ukraine still had those experienced soldiers from Donbas. And they really used mission command, or command through objective, they were independent.

But many of them also fell, many of them were rotated. And actually what happened is that we’ve now reached the stage that they had to mobilize and they’re using those officers who have those old Soviet habits. And really it’s as the Wall Street Journal wrote, that „a big Soviet army is destroying a small one.“

But that’s the worst thing the Ukrainians could have done. I’ve been criticizing it for at least a year and a half, that they must not adapt to Russian tactics, because Russian tactics are based on massive artillery strikes, aviation, and quantity.

It’s not true, as Tomáš Forró was writing now, that the Ukrainians are also lacking personnel, which is true, but that therefore they have no chance of winning and will lose sooner or later. That’s not true, because in history, rarely has pure quantity alone won. But of course, it’s a complex situation, the Ukrainians have to deal with it.

Middle East

Moderator: So, the Middle East. What’s new there? How is it developing?

Pavel Macko: The situation is influenced by the Israeli cabinet’s decision to occupy and clear Gaza. Currently, it’s such that preparatory work is underway. The General Staff is still planning the parameters of that operation. As we said in the introduction, a massive heat wave has hit not only Slovakia but also Israel. There, of course, it means something completely different.

At the moment, the order has already been issued for the evacuation of those people from the Gaza Strip. But the conditions or camp in the southern part of the Gaza Strip are not yet prepared.

Intense military operations were taking place. Israel again bombed several Hamas positions. There were also higher casualties. Thus, the humanitarian crisis is deepening. Although in one day, the Israelis released more, but significantly more trucks are prepared than they can let through continuously into that area.

What definitely caught the attention of all media were the protests and the killing of journalists. Up to six of them. Of course, Israel immediately said that the journalist, one from Al Jazeera, is or was… I saw photographs where he was photographed with those terrorists. That he was the head of a Hamas cell. That means, at that moment, he became a legitimate target, because that’s exactly the controversy, like when an unnamed „woodpecker“ in Slovakia infiltrated the media as a member of SIS [Slovak Intelligence Service].
Well, Peter Tóth.

Moderator: I was thinking, who is the woodpecker. Peter Tóth.

Pavel Macko: Well, that’s exactly where the boundaries end in a democratic society. Here we’re talking about when someone cooperates with terrorists, they can’t hide behind a microphone.

Of course, controversy was also caused by the statement of Bezalel Smotrich, a minister from those radicals, who again is considering expanding settlements in the West Bank. That’s not really the best time and the best topic to be opening now.

Moderator: Last time, last week, you mentioned that Israel wants to evacuate as many Palestinians as possible from Gaza City down south, by October 7 at the latest. And yesterday I read that they are also negotiating with some African country.

Pavel Macko: Well, and that’s interesting, because Sudan was divided, there’s also South Sudan, and actually Israel is also negotiating with South Sudan about potentially relocating parts of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to South Sudan.

Moderator: Permanently?

Pavel Macko: As soon as they come there temporarily and stay there for more than a year, it will be permanent, because these conditions are worsening in the Gaza Strip.

The city if it will be… because there was a conflict between Israeli forces, the Chief of General Staff says let’s besiege, they’re going to combine siege tactics directly through entry into the city or so-called „clearing operations.“ That’s why the evacuation orders were issued.

The problem is that conditions in the southern part of the Gaza Strip, in that open space where some tent city for 600,000 and more people is supposed to arise, don’t exist yet. I can’t imagine it, it’s also humanitarianly complex.

But on the other hand, these people will be pushed out of that area because of those operations, because otherwise there are huge losses threatened on both sides. And there’s also another risk, exactly the opposite, that Hamas, on the contrary, will try to forcibly keep those people in the Gaza Strip and in Gaza City. They will persuade some to stay, and some will be held there by force.

Moderator: I was completely shocked by the air supply and the fact that one of those packages hit a young Palestinian and killed him. How is it with that supply?

Pavel Macko: Overall, there have already been 23 such incidents. What’s the context? Gaza would need about 600 trucks daily to have such a smooth flow. There are several thousand trucks that are de facto already on the way, and now there are several problems.

The Israelis don’t recognize some unknown NGOs that help, because they don’t consider them partners. Part is stuck on some security checks and suspiciousness, so Israel wants to control each cargo, which delays it, but technically they could probably do it by putting more personnel there, making several control checkpoints, and getting a larger number of trucks into circulation.

To this comes an airlift, in which countries participate. Canada is extremely active, but also Spain and other European countries, which actually drop this aid. But that pallet has about one ton, that’s really the most crisis aid. There I would rather understand if some medical aid, medicines, and such things were dropped to get them as quickly as possible.

Israel allowed it because it trusts those partners that they won’t be dropping weapons and explosives there. But of course, those people are desperate. We’ve experienced this in Africa, we experience it in various conflict zones, that those people desperately lunge for that aid until the last moment. But that pallet is not a parachute with a person, it falls relatively quickly, which means, unfortunately, that accident happened, and there are several problems.

Strategic Background

Moderator: Strategic background. So in a few hours, what will happen?

Pavel Macko: Well, a meeting between Donald Trump and President Putin.

Moderator: And what do you expect from it? Are you optimistic?

Pavel Macko: Well, I have mixed feelings, to be honest. But Trump in his recent statements sounded quite reasonable, he was sending indirect signals to Putin, in my opinion.

But the risk is that he wants to meet one-on-one. This last happened, I think, in Helsinki in 2018, and nobody was enthusiastic about it, because he actually came with such very accommodating steps in favor of Putin.

Moderator: So one former colleague wrote that she wanted to faint to interrupt that negotiation.

Pavel Macko: Yes, I read that somewhere too. Well, what’s the risk? It needs to be said that Trump is not a professional diplomat and he’s up against a KGB agent, who has actually led the state all his life, has these Machiavellian methods under his skin, commands the world map, commands all these nooks and crannies.

It turned out that even with Kim Jong-un, that Trump is… I don’t want to disparage, he’s a president elected by 77 million Americans, so I’d prefer not to comment on him, but simply, he’s a person who is naive in this. Simply, he doesn’t have it studied, that’s the difference compared to Biden, because Biden was a long-time diplomat, a long-time politician. Trump was a real estate agent.

Well, and the problem is that he sometimes nods to something in good faith. It’s not that he’s bad, or too accommodating to Putin, but he simply nods in good faith to something that he thinks is fine, and then finds out that it’s completely different or off, because he sometimes has such childish…

Moderator: Maybe he doesn’t even realize.

Pavel Macko: Well, take for example, he was signing after being elected and after inauguration, he was signing some decrees and some orders, even with Spain, and he asked if it’s a country in BRICS. So Spain, that’s one of the bigger partners in NATO. A schoolboy here would probably know that, but again I say, this is the risk that simply the charm of personality, and we don’t know yet, of course, I wouldn’t go into these conspiracies, what all they have prepared for Trump.

From his statements, I saw a sincere effort that he won’t give it so easily to Putin. But Putin will try to use this situation, because he delayed everything, fulfilled nothing, and still demanded a meeting. Trump said he would mainly listen to him. Let’s hope it will be so.

But actually, it will all be about Putin wanting to open several questions and give that lollipop on which he wants to lure him, because we know that Trump, even in the election campaign, said that he would like to reduce armaments, that he would like simply… Because the INF treaty on those short and medium-range missiles. This strategic agreement fell. The last START is falling. And thereby there’s no replacement for those disarmament treaties from the times of the deep Cold War, and there’s a threat that a new round of the arms race will really be unleashed. Well, and the Russians are offering him that they could negotiate about this.

Moderator: Exactly. And that’s why the signaling needs to be seen in this context as well, because this is called diplomatic signaling. There will be the Zapad [West] exercise, and among other things, the Russians are communicating that in mid-September, they will practice with the Belarusians the use of tactical nuclear weapons, the use of „oreshniki“ [nut-crackers].

Pavel Macko: All this is supposed to make a bait and atmosphere. This is reflexive control. That’s exactly what influences the actions of the other side.

So let’s wait for the results. It’s a few hours. I’m curious myself, because it can go awry in all directions, but one thing is certain. We also discussed this with Martin Svárovský, that in the end, it won’t work without Ukraine. Ukraine has been at war for too long, has been defending itself for too long, and is too big to just accept a new Munich Dictate with the blink of an eye.

Moderator: In connection with tomorrow’s meeting, Chancellor Merz initiated a whole series of meetings of European leaders. How do you evaluate those activities?

Pavel Macko: I think it was necessary. I actually spoke on this topic, I think, on Czech Television last week, that this is exactly what they should be doing, that diplomacy should now be taking place behind the scenes.

Of course, there was something for the cameras, some of it was signals towards Putin, some towards Trump, so that it was also said publicly where some „red lines“ are in quotation marks, so that Trump would also be in the situation that he has to perceive it and can’t then subsequently say that he didn’t know about it.

But I would just pick out two aspects from it. First, what is actually like a prerequisite, on which the partners agreed. Because the atmosphere was good, everyone evaluated it positively. We know that behind the scenes it was probably ugly, as they say in English, so it’s less nice, but there was no discord in advance.

That means, what they at least agreed on was that the format of the negotiations should be such that any final agreement must be with the participation of Ukraine, perhaps other partners as well. Trump also promised that if they agree now, they could quickly proceed next week to trilateral negotiations, and perhaps there would be other partners there as well.

The second thing is that a ceasefire is an absolutely basic condition, that there must be some security guarantees, and the United States indicated that they could be engaged in this, we don’t know yet how, well, and that Russia will not have a veto, even though Trump said that he won’t let Ukraine into NATO anyway.

Moderator: Alright, and what if Putin doesn’t back down?

Pavel Macko: Well, if he doesn’t back down, then we’re in a situation where Trump has lost his pants and image, because in that case, he will look like a very weak negotiator, because he gave an ultimatum, which he even shortened. The ultimatum expired, but he didn’t actually implement anything. Meanwhile, of course, to avoid this stress, he sent Witkoff to persuade Putin. I think it’s on a good path, but I don’t trust Putin too much.

So I caught such a statement, from Trump’s first administration was Marshall Billingslea. He’s such an expert, a plenipotentiary precisely for sanctions, and he’s actually saying what would need to be done. Complete blocking, that simply those sanctions must come. And that would mean complete blocking against all financial institutions, completely cutting off the Russians from the SWIFT system, but also sanctioning secondarily all foreign banks that would try to produce some secondary, some parallel settlement system that the Russians could use.

Furthermore, immediately impose sanctions on several Chinese banks that have, for example, financed exports to Russia and to the aviation and defense sector. Because that machinery for the aviation defense sector went there.

Another thing is to announce sectoral sanctions on all Russian energy transactions, including secondary sanctions, that means, for the time being, there could also be those 25% sanctions that were announced, or tariffs on India, on China. This could be done immediately, and then that law could also come, which is actually in the American Congress. That’s Senator Graham and also Blumenthal. They have 84 co-submitters, so there’s strong pressure there.

And one important thing is that they could also add and expand sanctions on the Russian grey fleet. The United Kingdom did something, the European Union did. In total, there are more than 500 ships that are leased in Russia in all sorts of ways. They would be able to block them in some way.

Of course, if these measures were done, they would be able to throttle Putin by 600 million dollars a day and at the same time, those interests from these frozen parts or from those frozen assets that are there could be given to buy American weapons for Ukraine for the time being. So this would certainly help.

But these are things that we’ve known for, let’s say, three years. And with those sanctions, progress is so terribly slow that the Russians always manage to avoid parts of those sanctions in some way.

VAT on Arms Production

Moderator: Alright, let’s go to Slovakia. Some government politicians, and even the Slovakia movement, have an idea that they want to increase VAT on arms production and maximize the tax and license fees on arms companies, because they allegedly make extreme profits. That seems fine at first glance, you’re making money on weapons. What do you think about it?

Pavel Macko: Well, it has several problems. I would say it bluntly, that it’s dangerous stupid populism and in the end, it would harm Slovakia. Also our defense capability and it would prolong the modernization of the army. And it could drive those manufacturers out of Slovakia.

I’ll try to break it down a bit in two minutes.

First, increasing VAT doesn’t make sense. Those weapons and ammunition are sold primarily abroad, and VAT is applied at the final consumption in our territory. That means, when we increase VAT, on one hand, we’ve increased the defense budget, and right away we take it, because actually, the state pays that VAT to itself. That means, you just recycle your money, which would mean a significant increase in the cost of modernizing our army, which is probably not the best thing we could do in this situation.

As for those licenses and tax increases, well, we have some tax laws, as generally from the point of view of the rule of law. Making up special taxes, that’s like when they invented a special pension for Prime Minister FICO and wanted a special pension for the Attorney General, but not every one, but precisely that Žilinka. This is simply nonsense. This simply isn’t done, because it’s legally non-standard. There should be clear rules.

But quite essential is that good arms factories have always been a lucrative business. But this would actually make the sale of these weapons and ammunition to Ukraine even more expensive. That means, I’m surprised at the Slovakia movement, that apart from that lack of knowledge of economic principles, that we’re actually increasing VAT at home for our own army and making our modernization more expensive, that we’re going to penalize even the Ukrainians, because we’ve caught on to some statement by Robert Fico that „not even a bullet to Ukraine.“ Now we criticize him that he exports more there, that’s okay that we criticize him, but we don’t criticize him for the fact that those arms factories, those weapons are exported there. We criticize him for the hypocrisy that Robert Fico is actually presenting with this.

But now imagine, it’s supposed to be up to 5% of defense expenditure. And so, do we want to buy everything from abroad? Or will we sink our arms factories, or create an environment for them. I would, on the contrary, reduce income taxes precisely to motivate increased production and development of the sector and reduce taxes, or for example, give some state support.

Let’s take, in Vlkanová we have a Slovak arms factory, which grew on a green meadow, which built a quad – a combat vehicle, but the main thing is what’s on it. It’s actually one of the main tools for example for fighting against drones, which are becoming dominant on that battlefield, and they can export it, and we’re actually going to burden them with taxes now and punish them for success.

Simply, this is exactly wrong, when we look at the economy having just 0.2% growth now, one of the smallest in the entire European Union and in the eurozone. That curve of growth decline is horrible when we look at the last year and a half, and that’s not even fully reflecting all those consolidation measures, which are literally suffocating the economy. Let’s not rake and poke into what works.

World War II – Balkans

Moderator: So let’s go to the continuation of the cycle about World War II. Last time we analyzed the Battle of Britain here, and today we’re moving to the Balkans. What was happening there?

Pavel Macko: So briefly, there was the battle for the Balkans, for Greece. Albania was annexed by Italy already in 1939, but Mussolini was looking at Greece. Now he was frustrated by how the Germans were advancing everywhere with blitzkrieg. So he decided without coordination with the Germans to attack Greece. And it didn’t end well. It ended well for the Greeks, but only temporarily, unfortunately.

When we talk, these are battles in the Balkans, which eventually includes the occupation of Yugoslavia and ended with the battle for Crete. So I’ll briefly just first say those events:

On October 28, 1940, Italy attacked Greece from Albania with about 70,000 soldiers. It started with the Italians giving an ultimatum to the Greeks to allow them to advance at sea and to essentially surrender, submit, and subordinate themselves to Italian interests. But the war didn’t develop according to Italian expectations. The Greeks, first of all, stood their ground and said they wouldn’t back down and started fighting.

And subsequently, they even pushed those Italians back into Albania in early November. In December to January, in winter, Greek units advanced deep into southern Albania, to key cities, key mountain passes.

And in February, Britain got involved in it. I remind you that at that time, Cyprus was part of the British Empire. The British had interests in the eastern Mediterranean, and of course, Italian expansion into the Aegean Sea would have threatened their interests. So the British began helping the Greeks with the help of the Royal Air Force and their commando soldiers.

And the Italians got a thrashing. Then the Germans launched Operation Marita in April 1941, and on April 27, the Germans finally conquered Athens. Greece came under Axis occupation. And finally, on June 1, 1941, the resistance on Crete also ended.

Moderator: Well, you already mentioned at the beginning that the main cause of the Italian-Greek war was Mussolini’s imperial megalomania. And what was going on in Yugoslavia?

Pavel Macko: Well, I would still go back a bit to that Mussolini and maybe to those parameters, that when we look, Italy deployed 6 divisions and later increased it to 29 divisions and 400,000 soldiers. But they were poorly equipped, had very low morale, simply it wasn’t going well for them.

Greece started with 4 divisions and 50,000 soldiers, expanded it to 13, but they had strong defensive tactics, high morale, it was in the mountains. The United Kingdom then got involved, and finally Germany attacked in April with 24 divisions, led by Field Marshal List.

When I return to those causes, Mussolini imagined a new Roman Empire. He wanted to achieve all this in the Mediterranean, he wanted to expand Italy’s influence to Greece, to Yugoslavia, to the Balkans. And it was also such frustration, he was jealous of the Germans, that in that Axis, where he was together with Germany and Japan, he played second fiddle.

With Greece, there was of course long-term tension. By the way, October 28 is a very significant, memorial day in Greece. It’s called „Oxi“ day. Oxi was „no,“ because the Italians gave an ultimatum to the Greeks, and the Greek prime minister said that they shouldn’t submit, that simply they would defend themselves. Literally, that was the statement, „so there will be war then.“

And actually, when I now return to Yugoslavia, that’s an interesting development. Because Yugoslavia at the beginning was forced by the Axis countries to sign an agreement with these Axis countries and was like an ally, but that lasted only a few days. In March 1941, it reluctantly signed that tripartite pact under pressure from Germany and Italy.

Two days later, on March 27, there was a coup d’état in Yugoslavia led by pro-British officers. Yugoslavia became a monarchy, they installed King Peter II as the ruling monarch. This angered Hitler, because he counted on using Yugoslavia for his goals. Suddenly it was unreliable for him and a threat to his Balkan strategy.

The Italians also disappointed him, so he decided to solve things himself and directly. On April 6, 1941, Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria launched a coordinated invasion of Yugoslavia. It fell in 11 days, Belgrade was heavily bombed. They divided that Yugoslavia. Germany occupied Central Serbia, Italy annexed parts of Slovenia, Kosovo, and Dalmatia. Hungary and Bulgaria also took a part, the Hungarians the north. And the Independent State of Croatia was established in that territory.

But a resistance movement emerged in Yugoslavia, and the country became a focal point of partisan warfare. This then had an impact on the entire course of World War II and further courses of battles in the Balkans, but even on the Cold War.

If we look at it, that resistance had two parts. One were the Chetniks. That was led by General Draža Mihailović. Later, however, those Western allies opposed him, because they suspected him of helping the Nazis in the fight against partisans. And the partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito, they fought in the mountains. They then received great support from the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the USA, and eventually gradually liberated that Yugoslavia.

The significance was that the March coup (1941) in Yugoslavia diverted German troops. They had to delay the operation for the invasion of Greece. Thereby, however, the Barbarossa plan was also delayed. The Germans didn’t manage to get to Moscow after the invasion of the Soviet Union before winter, and actually, it all broke for them. So that was probably the most important thing. And of course, Mussolini’s collapse.

360°

Moderator: 360° Pali, what’s on your radar?

Pavel Macko: Well, again, the situation in Congo, in western Africa, and in the Sahel region is becoming more complicated. The UN is paying increased attention to this. And the problem is that the Security Council holds such regular briefings. So they did such a briefing. It actually got like to the top. It also lit up red on my radar, because the Security Council was discussing it.

There’s a quite difficult humanitarian situation there. There are large such inter-tribal attacks. Well, and actually this something, if you remember that conflict between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda, that was a very bloody conflict, so this is actually still about the same thing. That this area is such a hot cauldron, where it boils and at the moment it’s bubbling and boiling over again.

Moderator: Alright, and what kind of conflict is it? Where does it have its roots?

Pavel Macko: Well, that conflict, it’s a long-term conflict. It goes actually back to the colonial era, because there are several groups there, actually large numbers of inhabitants were relocated there.

And when I look, there was always some war there. Actually, this current situation is that in the Kivu area, there’s such an M23 movement – rebels, who have actually been fighting for a long time for some self-determination. There’s a big escalation of violence, they’re dragging Rwanda, Uganda into it.

But when I take it that those roots go really back to the fact that actually during Belgian colonial rule, large numbers of those Hutus and Tutsis were forcibly relocated from Rwanda to eastern Congo. And that of course caused long-term ethnic tension. Those ethnicities compete or vie for survival, for their living space, for access to food, to resources.

And there was a whole series of wars there. The Masisi War in 1993, then there was an uprising in 1996, which was led by Tutsis in Kivu and it grew into further regional wars, which drew in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi. There was the so-called Second Congo War. And that is sometimes called the African World War. It was in the years 1998 to 2003.

Europe tried to intervene there, as did the UN. And actually, what happened then was that 9 countries and dozens of armed groups actually fought each other, everyone against everyone. So it’s very complex there, it will continue to be complex, there are those cycles of violence and various militias, and there are of course also geopolitical factors. Simply, there are long-term fights and unrest in the Congo area. It’s actually a country rich in gold, tin. But also other minerals that are mined there, some, for example, important for the electronics industry. There’s 80% of the world’s reserves of coltan, where there are two types of such elements, which are actually used in the electronics industry.

Moderator: You mentioned regional influences. How does it affect neighboring countries?

Pavel Macko: At the moment, it’s such that the whole surroundings are destabilized, and we have just in North Kivu 2.5 million people who have been displaced. And thousands more people are hiding in individual areas. There’s a total collapse of healthcare. Well, and there’s a lack of access to basic food.

This potentially threatens that if it doesn’t manage to be dampened, and the world’s largest UN mission is operating there between them, then we have a huge conflict, which can again change to the fact that more of these countries will actually get involved with each other. And that will also mean huge pressure on already broken countries, like Mali, Niger, and those others. And those refugees will simply move somewhere, presumably only northward.

Moderator: Last week we were talking here about Cambodia and Thailand. Those two countries were also filling world media. It’s somehow quieted down. Is there anything new there?

Pavel Macko: Positive, because so far the ceasefire is being observed. There was also some diplomatic development. Cambodia and Thailand held a meeting of that General Border Committee, or what we would call, that demarcation commission, in Kuala Lumpur on August 7. They agreed in detail on a 13-point ceasefire plan. The movement of troops was frozen. There’s a ban on attacks on civilians. ASEAN observer teams are being deployed there. So it’s a fortunately good development so far.

But even that short conflict has its humanitarian and economic impact. When I look at my notes, 130,000 evacuated in Cambodia, they report injured children. GDP in Cambodia will decrease by 3% this year and as a result of a 20% decline in tourism. And there’s a problem that they have rotating, migrating workers there. That movement will also be restricted. So here you can see that even such a very short conflict can have quite strong consequences.

Final Quote

Moderator: So let’s go to the quote.

Pavel Macko: This week I was thinking that we all have such great expectations. In the end, we’ll probably be disappointed. I would give one from Samuel Huntington, the author of the book about the clash of civilizations, very famous, popular, which came out in the 90s. And he says that „expectations should not be taken for granted, because you never know when you will be disappointed.“

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#Attack on Kyiv #Kyiv #Putin #Russain war of agression #Russia #Trump #Trump’s ultimate #USA #War in Ukraine

We are discussing the military and political consequences of the current situation in Ukraine with General Pavel Macko.

Interview with General Pavel Macko

Host: Welcome to JOJ24 broadcast. Good evening. General, why did the Russians decide to launch such a massive attack at this particular time?

General Macko: The Russians are now cyclically conducting at least one major attack on Kyiv every week. This is happening in the middle of the summer fighting season, while there’s also some ultimatum running which they are downplaying, and despite this, they want to damage Ukrainian infrastructure to the maximum extent possible. They want to hit as many targets as possible and use such massive combined attacks for this purpose.

Today’s attack wasn’t exceptional in this regard, since it’s cyclical as I said – these records are being broken all the time. What could be emphasized, however, is that for the first time, the attack began with a massive drone assault from all directions on Kyiv. This was meant to saturate the air defense system, followed by the launching of cruise missiles Iskander-K.

These are similar to Iskander ballistic missiles, except these fly at a low altitude above the ground. They are very precise missiles with a standard accuracy of less than 5 meters. And since we see what they hit, it’s clear that this was a completely deliberate Russian strike on a civilian area, because apart from the apartment building that was destroyed, there were only other civilian objects all around. So any error or accident is ruled out. Simply put, they did it deliberately.

Russian military doctrine and destruction of civilian infrastructure

The reason is that while the Russians don’t formally have in their doctrines that they can violate the Geneva Conventions and attack civilian targets, they do have in their military doctrine the destruction of civilian infrastructure – whether transportation or energy. They use it as a tool to undermine will, as part of psychological warfare and also as a tool of political pressure.

The fact that it doesn’t work is another matter, but simply in that portfolio of options they have available, the Russians have used this too. This is also the case with the „Oreshnik“ on Dnipro, where it has a large dispersion – on the contrary, it cannot hit precisely – and is also meant to cause as much damage, chaos, and panic as possible in the middle of the city.

They are trying to indicate that they will continue the attacks, that they will escalate, and that Ukrainians should not rely on sanctions or secondary sanctions or international pressure. The only chance – this is Russia’s message – is for Ukrainians to surrender, comply with Russian terms, and maybe then the Russians will change their approach.

Host: In recent months, Russia has also been escalating attacks on Ukrainian cities and towns far behind the front line. Is this a Russian tactic and what is it aimed at?

General Macko: This is what I’ve already indicated. They’ve been doing this since the beginning of the conflict, but of course as Ukrainian air defense gradually weakens and as the Russians gradually find tactical approaches to make attacks more effective, they are precisely aiming to create panic and chaos throughout the country and, of course, weaken infrastructure.

Attempt to weaken the Ukrainian economy and defense industry

This is also an important aspect. Ukraine is increasingly producing defense equipment on its own. For this, of course, it needs energy, it needs factories. The military ones are mostly underground and are well protected from the Soviet era – Ukraine was like an armory of the Soviet Union. But of course there are supply chains, there are also regular factories.

As a result, the Russians are trying to disrupt this Ukrainian economy as much as possible, to „cut its veins“ so that the economy cannot generate as many defensive resources. This makes Ukraine less dependent on external supplies and less dependent on political decisions and cycles within those external supplies, as we have seen that supplies were repeatedly interrupted.

So this is also a key objective of Russia – if they attack somewhere in central or western Ukraine, they attack precisely with the aim of disrupting the functioning of the Ukrainian economy and especially the military-industrial complex to the maximum extent possible.

Host: Could Trump’s shortened ultimatum also have been a catalyst for the Russian attack? The Russians firmly rejected it. What do you think will be the reaction of the American administration?

Trump, sanctions and the US response

General Macko: I’ll start with a reflection on whether it was a reaction. The Russians have been systematically escalating these attacks, so it’s hard to say. It would be speculation if I said that now they are actually sending signals to Trump as well. They have been doing this systematically since the beginning of the year and have been doing it since Trump took power.

After rejecting a possible ceasefire and ceasefire offers in April, the Russians began to escalate the pressure. Thus, they are trying to do something about the conflict. They probably also have their own economic problems.

When it comes to President Trump’s ultimatum, he has to some extent fallen into the trap of his own statements. This means he will have to do something. He has now threatened secondary sanctions – that means sanctions on all countries that will buy from the Russians certain products that will be subject to sanctions, as the United States itself does not buy many of them.

Here’s the problem where, at least with China, it could end up that Trump will not be able to enforce this and China will continue to buy oil from Russia as well as gas. And if the Americans came with those sanctions, the chapter of tariff and trade war would open again.

Trump has also indicated a very tough stance toward India, where it at least appears that he could really impose secondary tariffs and that those negotiations could be very tough. India, despite having built better relations with the United States in recent years, trades very intensively not only in arms products but also in oil products with Russia. This, of course, undermines Donald Trump’s effort to force Russia to end the fighting and sit at the peace table.

Planned American support for Ukraine

But there is also another aspect – Donald Trump is apparently preparing the ground for a more radical announcement of further deliveries of weapons systems to Ukraine, including offensive weapons systems. There is currently a bill in Congress in the Senate that should allow a regular model of financing and supplying Ukrainian forces with American weapons through NATO allies, where at least $8 billion a year should go to this type of support.

Host: As you mentioned yourself, Ukraine is facing a summer offensive, during which Russian forces are making advances in areas that have been relatively spared since the beginning of the war. Moscow has announced that its troops have captured the city of Chasiv Yar, which was an important stronghold of the Ukrainian army in the east of the country. What might this mean for Ukraine’s negotiating positions and for the further development of the conflict?

The significance of the capture of Chasiv Yar and the situation at the front

General Macko: It doesn’t fundamentally change the situation yet, because the fighting for Chasiv Yar has been going on for 16 months, so the city is totally destroyed. We’re talking about a town the size of Holíč or Šamorín – a 12,000-person city that the Russians have been conquering for 16 months. The actual fighting for Chasiv Yar has been going on since the fall of Bakhmut in May 2023, which means more than two years, because the first phase was to get to the Donbas water canal, which was a kind of natural barrier on the border of Chasiv Yar. When the Russians overcame it, they spent another 16 months conquering the city.

The situation is similar in Kupiansk, where for more than a year the Russians have been trying to capture the city. It’s the same with Pokrovsk, in Toretsk – they are in the city, but the fighting for the city has also been going on for over a year.

This means that even if the Russians captured these cities, even if the capture of Chasiv Yar was confirmed, it would tactically give them an advantageous position. There is higher terrain there that provides a good view of the surrounding area. They could further attack Konstantinovka, and if they gained that too, they would open a gateway for a larger grouping of troops, which we don’t see anywhere yet. They would have to move it from somewhere, and then they could start attacking in the direction of Kramatorsk and Slavyansk.

Limits of Russian advance and negotiating positions

But even if they were successful in this, Russia’s negotiating position is that they still demand that Ukraine cede parts that have not been occupied so far, which they either never occupied at all, such as Slavyansk, Kramatorsk or Zaporizhzhia, or which they occupied temporarily, such as Kherson, from where they were pushed out.

This means that the negotiating position will not change in any fundamental way. The Russians would need a bigger breakthrough to occupy the rest of Donbas, but so far it doesn’t look like they have the capacity for that – unless the Ukrainians make some huge mistake. We don’t see any operational reserves, any larger grouping of troops that would be somewhere close to the front line and waiting to be deployed where the front line is broken through.

This means that even if the Russians break through the front line, they will more or less prioritize and take troops from some other parts of the front section and quickly strengthen the breakthrough area. But of course, this takes some time and also gives the Ukrainians time to regroup their forces.

Russian tactics and slow progress

The Russians are simply taking advantage of the fact that they have numerical superiority and that Ukrainians have a problem with personnel, which they compensate for with greater use of drones. The Russians are throwing all forces into battles, but progress is relatively slow. For larger cities, they are creating conditions for their encirclement and then gradual capture, but so far there is no sign of any dramatic speed in terms of advancing tens of kilometers a day.

Host: That was General Pavel Macko. Thank you for the interview and your time. Goodbye.

General Macko: Thank you for the invitation, have a pleasant evening.

Host: I will add to the viewers that you can also watch the entire interview on our website joj24.sk in the Studio JOJ24 section.

Videorecording of the interview you can see here:

https://youtu.be/r8Tzk3clOzg?si=lwRL_7fzxM-6AErE

See also:

Ukrainians and Russians are Learning. What About Us?

Ukrainian War for Existence – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

Analysis: Is a lasting and just peace within reach? – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

Trump sends nuclear submarines near Russia after Putin aide’s ‘dead hand‘ threat

The post Is Russia provoking President Trump? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#NATO #Putin #Rusko #Trump #Trumpove ultimátum #Ukrajina #USA #Vojna na Ukrajine

O vojenských a politických dôsledkoch súčasnej situácie na Ukrajine sa rozprávame s generálom Pavlom Mackom.

Rozhovor s generálom Pavlom Mackom

Moderátor: Vítajte vo vysielaní JOJ24. Dobrý večer prajem. Pán generál, prečo sa Rusi odhodlali na takýto mohutný útok práve v tomto čase?

Generál Macko: Rusi cyklicky teraz každý týždeň vykonávajú minimálne jeden veľký útok na Kyjev. Teraz je to aj v situácii, že je uprostred letnej bojovej sezóny, zároveň beží nejaké ultimátum, ktoré si oni zľahčujú, a napriek tomu chcú v maximálnej možnej miere poškodiť ukrajinskú infraštruktúru. Chcú zasiahnuť čo najviac cieľov a využívajú na to aj takéto mohutné kombinované útoky.

Ten dnešný útok nebol v tomto výnimočný, keďže je to cyklické, ako som povedal – tie rekordy sú lámané každú chvíľu. Čo by sa ale dalo zdôrazniť je, že po prvýkrát útok začal masívnym náletom dronov zo všetkých smerov na Kyjev. To malo zasýtiť systém protivzdušnej obrany a následne nasledovalo odpaľovanie rakiet z plochého letu Iskander-K.

Tie sú podobné ako balistické rakety Iskander, len tieto letia v nízkej letovej hladine nad zemou. Sú to veľmi presné rakety, ktoré majú štandardne presnosť menej ako 5 metrov. A keďže vidíme, čo zasiahli, tak je jasné, že toto bol úplne vedomý zásah Ruska do civilnej oblasti, pretože okrem toho paneláku, ktorý bol zničený, všade okolo boli len ďalšie civilné objekty. Takže akýkoľvek omyl alebo náhoda je vylúčená. Skrátka, urobili to zámerne.

Ruská vojenská doktrína a ničenie civilnej infraštruktúry

Dôvod je taký, že Rusi síce nemajú formálne v doktrínach to, že by mohli porušovať Ženevské konvencie a útočiť na civilné ciele, ale majú vo vojenskej doktrínе ničenie civilnej infraštruktúry – či už dopravnej alebo energetickej. Používajú to ako nástroj na podlomenie vôle, ako súčasť psychologickej vojny a zároveň nástroj politického nátlaku.

To, že to nefunguje, je druhá vec, ale jednoducho v tom portfóliu možností, ktoré majú k dispozícii, Rusi aj toto použili. Takto aj ten „Orešnik“ na Dnipro, kde je to s veľkým rozptylom – naopak, nevie presne trafiť – a takisto má spôsobiť čo najväčšie škody, chaos a paniku uprostred mesta.

Snažia sa naznačiť, že budú pokračovať v útokoch, že tie sa budú stupňovať a že sa Ukrajinci nemajú spoliehať na nejaké sankcie alebo sekundárne sankcie či medzinárodný tlak. Jediná šanca – to je taký odkaz Ruska – je, aby sa Ukrajinci vzdali, vyhoveli ruským podmienkam, a možno potom Rusi zmenia prístup.

Moderátor: V ostatných mesiacoch Rusko stupňuje útoky aj na ukrajinské mestá a obce ležiace ďaleko za frontovou líniou. Ide o taktiku Ruska a k čomu smeruje?

Generál Macko: Toto je to, čo som už naznačil. Oni to robia od začiatku konfliktu, ale samozrejme tým, ako postupne ukrajinská protivzdušná obrana slabne a ako Rusi postupne nachádzajú taktické postupy, ako urobiť útoky účinnejšie, sledujú tým presne vyvolanie paniky a chaosu v celej krajine a samozrejme oslabovanie infraštruktúry.

Snaha oslabiť ukrajinskú ekonomiku a zbrojný priemysel

To je aj jeden dôležitý aspekt. Ukrajina čoraz viac vyrába prostriedky na obranu vo vlastnej réžii. Na to samozrejme potrebuje energiu, na to potrebuje továrne. Tie vojenské sú väčšinou podzemné a sú dobre chránené ešte zo sovietskej éry – Ukrajina bola takou zbrojovkou Sovietskeho zväzu. Ale samozrejme existujú dodávateľské reťazce, existujú aj bežné fabriky.

Tým pádom sa Rusi snažia v maximálnej možnej miere narušovať práve túto ukrajinskú ekonomiku, „podrezať jej žily“, aby ekonomika nedokázala generovať toľko obranných prostriedkov. To robí Ukrajinu menej závislú na vonkajších dodávkach a menej závislú na politických rozhodovaniach a cykloch v rámci tých vonkajších dodávok, keďže sme videli, že opakovane boli dodávky prerušované.

Takže toto je takisto kľúčový cieľ Ruska – ak útočia niekde do strednej alebo západnej Ukrajiny, útočia práve s cieľom narušiť v maximálnej možnej miere chod ukrajinskej ekonomiky a predovšetkým toho vojensko-priemyselného komplexu.

Moderátor: Mohlo byť katalyzátorom ruského útoku aj Trumpovo skrátené ultimátum? Rusi ho razantne odmietli. Aká bude podľa vás reakcia americkej administratívy?

Trump, sankcie a reakcia USA

Generál Macko: Začnem úvahou o tom, či to bola reakcia. Rusi systematicky stupňovali tieto útoky, takže ťažko povedať. Bola by to špekulácia, keby som povedal, že teraz vlastne vyslali signály aj Trumpovi. Oni to robia systematicky od začiatku roka a robia to aj od nástupu Trumpa k moci.

Po tom, čo odmietli v apríli možné prímerie a ponuky na prímerie, Rusi začali stupňovať tlak. Tým pádom sa snažia niečo urobiť s konfliktom. Zrejme majú tiež svoje vlastné ekonomické problémy.

Pokiaľ sa bavíme o ultimáte prezidenta Trumpa, on sa do určitej miery dostal do pasce svojich vyhlásení. To znamená, že bude musieť niečo urobiť. Teraz pohrozil sekundárnymi sankciami – to znamená sankciami na všetky krajiny, ktoré budú kupovať od Rusov určené výrobky, ktoré budú predmetom sankcií, keďže samotné Spojené štáty ich veľa neodoberajú.

Tu je problém, kde minimálne s Čínou to môže skončiť tak, že Trump nedokáže toto presadiť a Čína bude aj naďalej kupovať ropu z Ruska aj plyn. A pokiaľ by Američania prišli s tými sankciami, znovu sa otvorí kapitola tarifnej a obchodnej vojny.

Trump naznačil aj veľmi tvrdý postoj voči Indii, kde to minimálne vyzerá tak, že by mohol naozaj zaviesť sekundárne tarify a že tie vyjednávania môžu byť veľmi tvrdé. India, napriek tomu, že v posledných rokoch si budovala lepšie vzťahy so Spojenými štátmi, veľmi intenzívne obchoduje nielen so zbrojárskymi produktmi, ale aj s ropnými produktmi s Ruskom. To samozrejme podkopáva túto snahu Donalda Trumpa donútiť Rusko k ukončeniu bojov a zasadnutiu za mierový stôl.

Pripravovaná americká podpora Ukrajine

Je tu ale aj ďalší aspekt – Donald Trump si zrejme pripravuje pôdu aj na radikálnejšie oznámenie ďalších dodávok zbrojných systémov pre Ukrajinu, a to aj ofenzívnych zbrojných systémov. Momentálne je v Kongrese návrh zákona v Senáte, ktorý by mal umožniť pravidelný model financovania a zásobovania ukrajinských síl americkými zbraňami cez spojencov v NATO, kde ročne by na tento typ podpory malo ísť minimálne 8 miliárd dolárov.

Moderátor: Ako ste už sami spomenuli, Ukrajina čelí letnej ofenzíve, počas ktorej ruské sily dosahujú postupy v oblastiach, ktoré boli od začiatku vojny relatívne ušetrené. Moskva oznámila, že jej jednotky dobyli mesto Časivjar, ktoré bolo dôležitým oporným bodom ukrajinskej armády na východe krajiny. Čo to možno znamená pre vyjednávacie pozície Ukrajiny a pre ďalší vývoj konfliktu?

Význam dobytia Časiv Jaru a situácia na fronte

Generál Macko: Zásadným spôsobom to zatiaľ nemení situáciu, pretože o Časiv Jar prebiehali boje už 16 mesiacov, takže mesto je totálne zničené. Bavíme sa o mestečku veľkosti Holíča alebo Šamorína – 12-tisícové mesto, ktoré vlastne Rusi dobýjali 16 mesiacov. Reálne boje o Časiv Jar prebiehali už od pádu Bachmutu v máji 2023, čo znamená viac než dva roky, pretože prvá fáza bola dostať sa na Donbasský vodný kanál, ktorý bol akousi prirodzenou bariérou na hranici Časiv Jaru. Keď ho Rusi prekonali, tak ďalších 16 mesiacov dobýjali mesto.

Podobná je situácia v Kupiansku, kde viac ako rok sa Rusi snažia dobiť mesto. Rovnako je to pri Pokrovsku, v Torecku – tam sú v meste, ale bojuje sa o mesto tiež už vyše roka.

To znamená, aj keby Rusi tieto mestá dobyli, aj keby sa dobytie Časiv Jaru potvrdilo, tak by im to takticky dalo výhodnú pozíciu. Je tam vyšší terén, ktorý poskytuje dobrý výhľad na okolie. Mohli by ďalej útočiť na Konstantinivku, a keby aj tú získali, otvorili by si vstupnú bránu pre väčšie zoskupenie vojsk, ktoré ale zatiaľ nikde nevidíme. Museli by ho odniekiaľ presunúť, a potom by mohli začať útočiť v smere na Kramatorsk a Slaviansk.

Limity ruského postupu a vyjednávacie pozície

Ale aj keby sa im toto darilo, tak vyjednávacia pozícia Ruska je v tom, že oni stále žiadajú, aby Ukrajina odstúpila aj doteraz neokupované časti, ktoré buď vôbec nikdy neokupovali, ako Slaviansk, Kramatorsk alebo Záporožie, alebo ktoré okupovali dočasne, ako Cherson, odkiaľ boli vytlačení.

To znamená, že vyjednávacia pozícia sa nejakým zásadným spôsobom nezmení. Rusi by potrebovali väčší prielom, aby obsadili zvyšok Donbasu, ale zatiaľ to nevyzerá, že by na to mali kapacitu – pokiaľ Ukrajinci neurobia nejakú obrovskú chybu. Žiadne operačné rezervy, nejaké väčšie zoskupenie vojsk, ktoré by bolo niekde blízko frontovej línie a vyčkávalo na nasadenie tam, kde sa podarí prelomiť frontovú líniu, také nevidíme.

To znamená, že aj keby Rusi prelomili frontovú líniu, budú viac-menej prioritizovať a zoberú z niektorých iných častí frontového úseku vojská a rýchlo posilnia oblasť prielomu. To ale samozrejme trvá nejaký čas a dáva to čas aj Ukrajincom na preskupenie síl.

Ruská taktika a pomalý postup

Rusi skrátka využívajú to, že majú početnú prevahu a že Ukrajinci majú problém s personálom, ktorý kompenzujú väčším nasadením dronov. Rusi vrhajú všetky sily do bojov, ale postup je relatívne pomalý. Pri väčších mestách si vytvárajú podmienky na ich obkľúčenie a potom postupné dobíjanie, ale zatiaľ to nie je náznak nejakej dramatickej rýchlosti v zmysle postupu desiatok kilometrov denne.

Moderátor: Hovoril generál Pavel Macko. Ďakujem za rozhovor a váš čas. Dovidenia.

Generál Macko: Ďakujem za pozvanie, príjemný večer.

Moderátor: Divákom ešte dodám, že celý rozhovor si môžete pozrieť aj na našej stránke joj24.sk v sekcii Studio JOJ24.

Videozáznam rozhovoru si môžete pozrieť aj tu:

https://youtu.be/r8Tzk3clOzg?si=o_MQftNYt1d7hfG9

Čítajte aj:

https://pavelmacko.sk/2025/08/01/kyjev-celil-jednemu-z-najvacsich-utokov-za-posledne-tyzdne/

https://pavelmacko.sk/2025/07/30/prelomia-rusi-ukrajinsku-obranu-alebo-ustupia-ultimatu/

https://pavelmacko.sk/2025/04/27/analyza-je-na-dosah-trvaly-a-spravodlivy-mier/

The post Provokuje Rusko prezidenta Trumpa? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#Iskander-K #Kyjev #Rusko #Trump #Trumpove ultimátum

Najmenej 7 ľudí vrátane jedného dieťaťa zahynulo, ďalší zostávajú v sutinách, uvádza vojenská správa.

Ruská armáda na druhej strane oznámila, že obsadila strategicky dôležité mesto Časiv Jar v Doneckej oblasti na východe krajiny. Ukrajinská armáda to však popiera.

Rozhovor s generálporučíkom Pavlom Mackom

Moderátor: Naším hosťom je bývalý najvyšší zástupca Slovenska v štruktúrach Severoatlantickej aliancie, generálporučík v zálohe Pavel Macko. Dobrý deň, vitajte.

Pavel Macko: Dobrý deň.

Moderátor: Čo spôsobí ruská raketa Iskander, keď zasiahne obytný dom?

Pavel Macko: Či už je to balistická raketa Iskander alebo je to tá krídlatá verzia, je to mohutná taktická raketa, ktorá má niekoľkostokilogramovú nálož. Tá môže byť od 380 až do 700 kíl a spôsobí mohutný výbuch bez ohľadu na to, aký je typ nálože. Znamená to totálnu devastáciu takého nezodolneného objektu, ako je civilný objekt, ako je panelák alebo proste nejaká budova.

Skrátka, je to zbraň, ktorá je účinná na zodolnené vojenské objekty a nie na takýto cieľ.

Moderátor: Čomu ostatne nasvedčujú tie fotografie z miesta úderu, ktoré máme k dispozícii?

Pavel Macko: Nasvedčujú tomu, že skutočne to bolo použité na zničenie takého civilného cieľa. Tu je treba povedať, že tento typ rakiet má kruhovú presnosť 5 až 40 metrov, čo znamená, že je absolútne vylúčené, aby tá raketa len takto zblúdila, pretože v širokom okolí sú len ďalšie civilné objekty, materské školy a tak ďalej.

To jednoznačne znamená, že Rusi použili raketu s takýmto masívnym účinkom cielene a zámerne udrieť do takéhoto objektu. Bez ohľadu na to, že Rusi formálne ani nemôžu mať vzhľadom na medzinárodné konvencie zničenie takýchto civilných cieľov priamo v doktríne, majú vo svojej vojenskej doktríne útoky na civilnú infraštruktúru, čiže dopravnú, energetickú.

Cieľom takéhoto pôsobenia je:

▪️psychologická vojna, ktorá má zlomiť vôľu obrancov,

▪️podlomiť ich zastrašovaním,

▪️politický nátlak, ktorý má donútiť protistranu k nejakým ústupkom.

Toto Rusi používali dokonca aj na vlastnom území v Groznom.

Moderátor: Kyjev uvádza, že väčšinu ruských dronov a aj časť rakiet sa podarilo zneškodniť. Ako účinná je teda z vášho pohľadu protivzdušná obrana proti takto rozsiahlym, koncentrovaným útokom?

Pavel Macko: Je to veľmi zložité. Ešte vlani dosahovali 95% účinnosť proti dronom a 74% proti raketám. Tento rok to kleslo na zhruba 79% pri dronoch a na polovicu pri raketách.

Je to spôsobené tým, že:

1) Ukrajincom dochádzajú prostriedky proti raketám. Majú menej striel zem-vzduch.

2) Zároveň je to dané aj zlepšovaním dronov zo strany Ruska, ktoré taktikou útočia aj na Kyjev zo všetkých možných smerov, to znamená aj zo západu.

3) Snažia sa v maximálnej možnej miere presýtiť ten systém, čo zvyšuje účinnosť takého útoku.

Strategický význam mesta Časiv Jar

Moderátor: Posuňme sa k ďalšej dôležitej správe z Ukrajiny. Z týchto hodín Rusi tvrdia, že obsadili mesto Časiv Jar. Ukrajinská armáda to popiera. Aký strategický význam má toto mesto na samom východe krajiny?

Pavel Macko: Ja by som to nenazval strategickým, ale je to dôležitý taktický oporný bod. Časiv Jar je zhruba 12-13 tisícové mesto na takom vyvýšenom teréne. Je to vlastne vstupná brána do tej pámy, ktorá za ním nasleduje smerom na Kramatorsk a Slaviansk.

To znamená, že Rusi sa snažili od dobytia Bachmutu v máji 2023 dobyť aj Časiv Jar. Priame boje o toto 12-tisícové mestečko prebiehali 16 mesiacov.

A zatiaľ nevieme, pokiaľ by Rusi získali toto mesto, tak ten, kto ho má, pokiaľ sa bráni, je na vyvýšenom teréne a má dobrý pohľad na ustupujúce vojská aj palebné krytie týchto priestorov okolo. A pokiaľ to má útočník, v tomto prípade Rusko, tak samozrejme mu to dáva taktickú výhodu, ale nemusí to znamenať vôbec nič, lebo sú tam ďalšie obranné línie.

Strata tohto miesta komplikuje situáciu Ukrajincom. Rusom to umožní zvýšiť tlak na Kostiantynivku. A pokiaľ by aj tá padla, tak tým by si otvorili väčší vstupný priestor do oblasti severozápadnej Doneckej oblasti – Kramatorsk, Slaviansk.

Moderátor: Dá sa povedať, že Rusi v uplynulých týždňoch a dňoch pomaly, ale iste postupujú?

Pavel Macko: Rusi postupujú, ale skôr práve v posledných týždňoch by sa dalo povedať, že ten postup sa spomalil. Pokiaľ by padol Časiv Jar, bol by to prvý výraznejší úspech tento rok.

Inak Rusi postupujú, dostali sa už až západne od Pokrovska, ale používajú takúto taktiku, že vlastne obchádzajú jednotlivé dôležité miesta, lebo nedokázali dobiť ani Toreck, ani Kupiansk, ani Pokrovsk. Teraz možno dostanú ten Časiv Jar.

Takže ten postup je minimálny, ale samozrejme, už strata týchto miest by bola takým výraznejším taktickým úspechom, že by mohli naozaj deklarovať, že postupujú. Zatiaľ postupujú skôr v takých riedko obývaných oblastiach tým, že sa snažia obísť populačné centrá.

Ukrajinské údery na ruskom území

Moderátor: Ako na druhej strane hodnotíte najnovšie ukrajinské údery na ruskom území? Podľa ukrajinskej tajnej služby SBU zasiahli drony znovu ciele hlboko na ruskom území. Okrem iného, podnik na výrobu elektroniky asi 700 km od Moskvy.

Pavel Macko: Tu sú dôležité dva faktory:

1) Asymetrická reakcia – Ukrajinci musia pôsobiť asymetricky, musia ničiť tie zdroje, ktoré umožňujú Rusom stupňovať túto agresiu a viesť inváziu do Ukrajiny s masívnym bombardovaním.

2) Prenos vojny na ruské územie – Musia prenášať vojnu na ruské vojenské ciele na ruskom území a tým pádom aj naznačiť Rusom, že sú rovnako zraniteľní.

Preto takéto aktivity sa budú stupňovať a majú svoj efekt aj priamo v tom, že odoberajú silu alebo schopnosť Rusov na operačnej úrovni generovať ďalšie sily a prostriedky pre rozširovanie svojich útokov na Ukrajine.

Moderátor: Toľko bývalý najvyšší zástupca Slovenska v štruktúrach Severoatlantickej aliancie generálporučík v zálohe Pavel Macko. Ďakujeme, že ste si na nás urobili čas.

Pavel Macko: Ďakujem za pozvanie. Krásny deň.

Súvisiace články:

Prelomia Rusi ukrajinskú obranu alebo ustúpia ultimátu? – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

The post Kyjev čelil jednému z najväčších útokov za posledné týždne appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Ruský útok na ukrajinské výcvikové stredisko si vyžiadal obete.
Ruské rakety zabili troch vojakov a ďalších osemnásť zranili pri útoku na ukrajinské výcvikové stredisko, uviedol Kyjev. Moskva tvrdí, že zasiahla areál v Černihivskej oblasti na severe napadnutej krajiny. Predchádzajúci deň Ukrajinci informovali o tridsiatich obetiach ruského ostreľovania rôznych miest brániaceho sa štátu.

#armádne zbory #drony #Putin #reorganizácia ukrajinskej armády #Rusko #Trump #Trumpove ultimátum #Ukrajina

Rozhovor s generálporučíkom Pavlom Mackom

Moderátor: Podrobnejšie s ďalším hosťom štúdia ČLT24, Pavlom Mackom, generálporučíkom vo výslužbe, bývalým veliteľom výcvikového centra spojeneckých síl NATO, ktorý je s nami v spojení. Dobré dopoludnie.

Pavel Macko: Dobrý deň.

Moderátor: Americký prezident Trump skrátil ultimátum, počas ktorého má Rusko uzavrieť prímerie s Ukrajinou, a to na desať dní. Ako sa americké ultimáta odrážajú do situácie na bojisku, do postupu Ruska voči Ukrajine?

Pavel Macko: Rusko jasne deklarovalo pri tom prvom oznámení ultimáta na 50 dní, aj teraz, že ono mieni pokračovať naďalej vo vojne a stupňuje svoj tlak. Jednak zvyšuje útoky do vnútrozemia Ukrajiny – to sú presne tie civilné straty, o ktorých ste pred chvíľkou hovorili. Ale zároveň stupňuje tlak aj na bojisku.

Je uprostred letnej bojovej sezóny. Zostáva mu niekoľko týždňov, maximálne dva mesiace optimálnych bojových podmienok. Potom bude také prechodné obdobie. Takže to nemá priamy vplyv. Rusi jednoducho ignorujú toto ultimátum a snažia sa získať maximálne možné zisky. A už teraz robia Ukrajincom maximálne škody počas toho behu ultimáta.

Moderátor: Pokiaľ ultimáta nefungujú, čo by mohlo Vladimíra Putina primäť k tomu, aby si sadol za rokovací stôl?

Pavel Macko: Tak úplne zásadné by bolo, keby to ultimátum vypršalo – ono ešte nevypršalo, takže nevieme posúdiť, či funguje alebo nie. Takže by došlo k nejakej akcii. A tá akcia by bola, že by Spojené štáty naozaj pristúpili k výraznejším ekonomickým sankciám, ale samozrejme v tomto prípade aj sekundárnym.

K tomu sa prípadne môžeme vrátiť, lebo je to komplikované – znamenalo by to narušenie vzťahov s Indiou, s Čínou, kde medzitým bežia rokovania o iných tarifných urovnaniach medzi Spojenými štátmi a týmito krajinami. Ale je to jedna možnosť.

A druhá možnosť je, že Spojené štáty zrejme majú pripravený nejaký plán. A v prípade vypršania ultimáta naozaj príde zvýšenie dodávok zbraňových systémov pre Ukrajinu a zvýšenie podpory celkovej pre Ukrajinu tak, aby nebola s jednou rukou zviazaná za chrbtom pri vedení tohto konfliktu.

Inými slovami, prezident Trump sa snažil prezentovať od samého začiatku, už počas kampane, ako mierotvorec, ktorý zabezpečí mier. Teraz si zbiera dostatok argumentov na to, aby mohol komfortne vycúvať z tohto postoja, a to, čo všetci považujú za neúspech jeho diplomacie a stratégie, aby mohol predať tak, že to je vlastne vina na strane Ruska. A tým pádom sa mohol vrátiť k tej politike jasnej jednoznačnej podpory Ukrajiny, samozrejme za iných ekonomických podmienok, ako tomu bolo za Bidenovej administratívy.

Situácia na bojisku

Moderátor: Dostávame sa k tomu, ako sa darí jednej či druhej strane na bojisku. Ten ruský postup je aktuálne aký? Pred niekoľkými týždňami sa zdalo, že pomerne akceleroval. Platí to stále?

Pavel Macko: Nemyslím si. Rusi samozrejme mierne postupujú, ale skúsim to dať do perspektívy. Najkritickejšia situácia je v oblasti Pokrovska, kde Rusi, či už smerom juhozápadne od Pokrovska, akoby obchádzajú ten Pokrovsk. Mali v predchádzajúcich dňoch aj čiastočné úspechy na tom severnom smere. Potom ich zase Ukrajinci na chvíľu zatlačili, ale pravda je tá, že prieskumno-diverzné oddiely alebo malé prieskumno-diverzné jednotky ruských vojsk prenikli priamo do Pokrovska. No ale o ten Pokrovsk sa bojuje už rok, aj keď sa tá situácia zhoršuje.

Ale dám to ešte do väčšej perspektívy, lebo sa veľa bojuje aj pri Limane, v tom smere na Siversk, Torecka vlastne ešte bližšie pri Kupiansku. Keď si pozrieme Kupiansk, tak Rusi sa snažia dostať Kupiansk naspäť do svojich rúk od novembra 2023. Zintenzívnili v lete tú ofenzívu proti Kupiansku. Na jeseň minulý rok bola evakuácia, vlastne máme koniec júla 2025.

A Rusi síce rozširovali to predmestie, tá situácia v Kupiansku je zložitejšia, lebo sa dostali na druhú stranu rieky a postupujú akoby od severu a snažia sa podobne ako v tých ostatných prípadoch obísť Kupiansk zo všetkých smerov a tak ho dostať. No ale nedobíjajú ho.

Keď sa pozrieme na Toreck, bojuje sa viac ako rok, od mája minulého roku. Keď sa pozrieme na Časivjar, tak to je od pádu Bachmutu, to už je viac ako dva roky. To znamená, je to relatívne. Samozrejme, že Rusi za cenu nesmiernych strát získavajú postupne také predmestia a posúvajú sa mierne, ale ten postup nenaznačuje niečo, že by dochádzalo k nejakému dramatickému zvratu.

Ten prišiel napríklad minulý rok tým vpádom Ukrajincov do Kurskej oblasti. To znamená, aj teraz je to tak, že jedna aj druhá strana sa snaží udržať svoje pozície. Rusi mierne postupujú, ale môže sa stať, že pokiaľ by koncentrovali všetky sily do svojho útoku, buď budú úspešní a prekročia vlastne… ale môže sa stať opačne, že napríklad prepadnú, a vtedy by sa vyskytla príležitosť pre ukrajinský rýchly protiútok.

Moderátor: V tomto smere, teda v tom smere, kto by do budúcna mohol mať iniciatívu – predstavuje niečo zásadného to znovudobytie malej obce v Sumskej oblasti Ukrajinou? Alebo je to proste epizóda sama osebe, ktorá nenaznačuje nič smerom do budúcna?

Pavel Macko: Ja to vidím skôr ako epizódu, ale ona má svoj význam, pretože Rusi sa v tomto momente snažili otvoriť akoby ďalší úsek frontu, a tým pádom vedia, že Ukrajinci majú pomerne málo síl proti Rusom a že vlastne by roztiahli akoby tú ukrajinskú zostavu. A tým pádom by ju viac napli, ako keď naťahujete pružinu, a vlastne snažili by sa ju niekde pretrhnúť.

Tým, že toto Ukrajinci viac-menej vyriešili alebo vyriešili, naznačili, že nie sú tak slabí v tejto oblasti. Tak to odobralo Rusom túto možnosť a uvidí sa, či Rusi sa budú snažiť znovu ďalej tam pokúšať preraziť, alebo skonsolidovať tú líniu pri Charkove. Lebo na sever od Charkova majú tiež také dve oblasti a minimálne Rusi by sa snažili ich spojiť dokopy, aby to skonsolidovali, vytvorili si konsolidované predmostie alebo také nárazníkovú zónu. A z nej by potom mohli sa pokúsiť opäť na odlákanie pozornosti alebo na prekvapenie Ukrajincov pokúsiť zaútočiť v smere na Charkov.

Samozrejme, dobyť Charkov je úplne… Cieľ v tomto okamihu z ríše snov. Neprerusom nevedia dobyť ani ten Časiv jar.

Reorganizácia ukrajinskej armády

Moderátor: Ukrajina sa tiež snaží znižovať svoje straty. Ako zásadná v tomto smere je reorganizácia ukrajinskej armády, budovanie nových zborov, zložených z niekoľkých brigád a ďalších formácií? Ako kľúčové to je?

Pavel Macko: Je tu viacero aspektov:

▪️Sú tu technologické aspekty

▪️Sú tu organizačné aspekty

▪️Sú tu aj doktrinálno-taktické aspekty

Organizácia na brigádny systém a zborový systém znamená, že tieto brigády sú koncentrované pod jednotné velenie jedného armádneho zboru, čo umožňuje tie špecializované podporné prvky, ako palebnú podporu, delostrelectvo brigádu alebo dronové jednotky koncentrovať. Tým pádom ich aj flexibilnejšie realokovať, presmerovávať na jednotlivé smery tam, kde je treba.

Lebo pokiaľ to máte v inej štruktúre a máte to viacero rozdelené medzi taktické manévrové jednotky, tak je to fajn, majú to okamžite k dispozícii, ale nemôžete to potom presmerovať niekam inam, trvá to proste dlhšie.

Druhá vec je, že výrazne sa posilňuje úloha dronov na jednej aj na druhej strane. Napriek tomu, že už boli dominantné, sú stále dominantnejšie, a hľadá sa efektívna organizačná štruktúra aj pre tieto dronové jednotky. Skrátka, tie sa stávajú hlavnou palebnou alebo bojovou silou. Takže to je tento aspekt.

No a samozrejme, Ukrajina sa snaží nájsť aj optimálny pomer medzi tým, ako skoncentrovať tie kapacity vzhľadom na meniacu sa taktiku – že útočí sa v menších jednotkách, ale zároveň potrebujete kryť väčší priestor na tie možné náhle prieniky. No a výsledkom je vlastne táto reorganizácia.

Ja som presvedčený, že je to krok správnym smerom, ale samozrejme ten diabol je v detaile – ako sa im podarí to reálne realizovať a či si to osvoja aj tí velitelia.

Moderátor: Pavel Macko, veľmi vám ďakujem. Pekný deň.

The post Prelomia Rusi ukrajinskú obranu alebo ustúpia ultimátu? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

But fighting without vision and strategy is not enough. It’s important to know why we fight and what we fight for.

#EU #NATO #Putin #Russia #Trump #Ukraine #USA #War in Ukraine #Zelensky

Pavel Macko reporting for Týždeň magazine. Full transcript of the podcast https://youtu.be/GmSQTqTEAQA?si=QePWcXi8HiZLAVVC

Eve of War

In Europe, at the beginning of 2022, we sensed that something terrible was brewing, but most of us didn’t want to admit it. Neither citizens nor politicians. We were still enjoying the euphoria of three-quarters of a century of peace and over three decades of general freedom.

The public and politicians not only in the Baltic states but throughout Europe anxiously watched Russian maneuvers around Ukraine’s borders. They also perceived the continuing diversionary actions of Russian intelligence services and „vacationing“ soldiers in eastern Ukraine. These were accompanied by artificial hysteria about an impending Ukrainian attack on two separatist republics.

Russia had more than 100,000 armed soldiers on the borders, bringing in blood supplies, field hospitals, and additional troops. Meanwhile, pro-Russian collaborators there were already talking about a Ukrainian invasion in autumn 2021 and organizing forced evacuation of the population. Ukrainians showed not even a hint of any troop regrouping. President Zelensky even downplayed warnings from Western intelligence services.

After Russian ultimatums in December 2021, when they demanded Ukraine’s disarmament and its reintegration into the „Russian world,“ as well as the annulment of NATO expansion after 1997, the tension was palpable. But few could imagine a major war. It made sense to no one except Putin.

Slovak Anomaly

Slovakia was already an anomaly on a global scale at that time. Politicians of today’s ruling coalition organized protests and, under the pretext of peace, openly supported Russian aggression and demands. They even accused the West, especially the USA, of trying to provoke aggression against Russia. They organized a hunt against our MPs for supporting the defense agreement with the USA and threatened, together with today’s department head, a general strike. All in support of Russian interests, not Slovak ones.

Whether they did so out of complete confusion or were coordinated from the Russian embassy may one day be discovered by historians and investigators. Today, these are under the thumb of Maroš Žilinka, who as late as February 8, 2022, threatened parliamentarians with „the judgment of history“ for not wanting to hear his desperate fight against the agreement with the USA. Just before that, he praised the benefits of Soviet occupation.

Fight for Independence and Freedom

In July, we commemorate the anniversary of the American Revolution – the war for independence that culminated in the declaration of independence of American colonies. Since then, July 4 has been Independence Day in the USA. The French Revolution began with an attack on the Bastille and was a war for freedom. The French commemorate July 14 as Bastille Day.

Ukrainians today are fighting a combined war – for the bare existence of their own nation and their own free state. How this war turns out will determine our future history. In Slovakia’s case, probably also the existence of our state in its current form and borders.

Let’s analyze in two parts what happened, what is still happening, and what it means for Europe and Slovakia. What we have believed in so far is gradually disappearing, fears are being fulfilled.

Historical Parallels and Putin’s Strategy

To many people, President Putin’s approach just before the invasion of Ukraine resembled Hitler’s strategy during the Munich Dictate. Historical parallels are always somewhat flawed, but there might be something to it.

Russia had been conducting hybrid operations for a long time to prepare the international audience for a new reality. After the West’s strategic blunder of ending operations in Afghanistan and the massive disruption of normal life during COVID, Russia gained the impression that the West was tired. They thought it was self-absorbed and people were frightened of losing comfort.

Political leaders were at odds and trying to solve one cascading crisis after another, as well as strategic adaptation to rapid climate change. For Russia, like all autocratic regimes, this was a secondary matter. The primary concern is maintaining and strengthening power.

Ukraine and the entire West were strategically disturbed, unable to concentrate on the existential threat. The Russians evaluated this as an opportunity to capitalize on long-term disruptive activities in the world, into which they had invested billions of dollars for years.

Putin’s Ultimatum

But Putin’s ultimatum failed. Not so much because the West felt strong and united. Rather, they underestimated Putin and his determination.

The nearly 200,000 troops around Ukraine in late January 2022 looked threatening but not convincing enough that Russia could really engage in a major war. So the US rejected Putin’s ultimatum.

He maneuvered himself into a situation where he didn’t have many options left:

◾️Either admit he was bluffing and his costly show of force didn’t work

◾️Or attempt a lightning action, this time with the risk of high losses compared to the occupation of Crimea without a shot

But if he quickly achieved strategic goals, he would be able to politically sell it to his domestic and international audience. The West and the rest of the world would, according to Putin’s reasoning, come to terms with the new reality.

Beginning of the Invasion

The order to start the invasion came. In the early morning hours, around 5 AM on February 24, 2022, a large-scale invasion of Ukraine began.

Similar to Hitler, who attacked Poland early in the morning at 4:45 AM on September 1, 1939, Putin counted on a Blitzkrieg – a rapid advance into Ukraine’s interior and its rapid collapse.

Like the Nazis in Poland, the Russians quickly attacked Ukraine from three strategic directions:

◾️From the north toward Kyiv

◾️From the east toward Kharkiv and Donbas

◾️ In the south to Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and further along the Mykolaiv-Odesa axis

The entire maneuver was supported from the first minutes by strategic bombing of key defensive points and critical infrastructure. The cherry on top was to be a strategic airborne operation in Hostomel and the rapid occupation of Kyiv’s center and key political-administrative facilities.

Stalled Blitzkrieg

An exemplary lightning chess game, which the Russians had doctrinally and practically rehearsed and tested multiple times in the post-World War II period. It always went smoothly. Now the Russians suddenly got stuck.

Although the media still talks about a „three-day war,“ according to available information, the Russians had planned the entire operation for 10 days. In 10 days, they wanted to control not only Kyiv but the entire Ukraine, break its armed resistance, install a puppet government, suppress resistance hotspots, and stabilize the situation. This is what empires have been doing for centuries in rebellious provinces or with disobedient small neighbors. They know that any long conflict is exhausting and a strategic risk.

All of this failed for the Russians. The world was shocked not only that the Russians engaged in a war we haven’t seen since 1945 – that is, a war where a strong opponent attacks a relatively large neighbor with all means, who effectively defends itself.

Strategic Shocks for Russia

The Russians experienced several strategic shocks and couldn’t withdraw from the conflict in time. Regardless of the current state on the battlefield after more than three years, they strategically lost at the beginning. But they can still gain operational and tactical victory at an enormous cost.

First Strategic Shock

The biggest strategic shock for the Russians was that Ukrainians began to spontaneously defend themselves – ordinary citizens with Molotov cocktails. What was an advantage for the Russians – an attack on a more than 2,200-kilometer-long front, which was to ensure the overloading of Ukrainian defense and rapid collapse – turned into a Russian nightmare.

Their own troops became overloaded, their logistics failed, they couldn’t generate what everyone expected from a military superpower: massive dynamic combined arms maneuvers of large military formations with full support from the air, artillery, and mobility.

Second Strategic Shock

The second strategic shock for the Russians was the rejection of the invasion by Russian-speaking Ukrainians. The entire „liberating“ myth about the invasion fell.

Third Strategic Shock

The third strategic shock for the Russians was the vigorous and unified approach of the EU and NATO, which managed to respond within 24 hours with a clear political message. This then gradually transformed into breaking the barrier of fear of Russia and gradual aid to bleeding Ukraine.

Long Exhausting War

Instead of a lightning conquest of Ukraine, the Russians ended up in a long exhausting war. Ukrainians are fighting for bare survival.

Meanwhile, this war, with more than a million human casualties on the Russian side alone, has turned into a war of survival for the Russians as well. First and foremost, it’s about the survival of Putin’s regime and Putin personally. In the long term, it’s also about the survival of Russia as a strong and respected empire.

Russia is being exhausted, internal tension is growing, and on its borders, it has not only increasingly sovereign former colonies but also a numerically superior and economically stronger China.

Despite the failure of the lightning war, the Russians managed to destroy hope for a peaceful life in Europe. The Russians totally destroyed the post-war model of peaceful coexistence of countries and the OSCE security mechanism. There is a deep furrow not only between Russia and Ukraine but also between Russia and the West. Unfortunately, this is also within our societies. It is a consequence of the long-term hybrid war that the Russians are waging against us.

Life in a Different World

On February 24, 2022, in my very first media commentary on the beginning war, I expressed the opinion that regardless of whether the Russian invasion ends the next day or lasts for years, from 2/24/2022, we live in a different world, and our children will probably never experience the era of relaxation like all of us after November 1989. War is returning as a common political-historical phenomenon into our lives.

That’s why it’s important to analyze what happened, what is happening, and where it might lead. The Russian war in Ukraine has and will have a transformative effect on warfare and socio-political conditions for the next generations.

From Blitzkrieg to Gradual Dying Out

The war still continues. But it already is and will be a source of numerous studies and analyses. It will shape an entire generation of politicians, soldiers, and experts. I myself had the opportunity to participate in one of the first extensive studies. Our international three-member team attempted to generalize the lessons from the first ten months of the war. We provocatively named the report „How to Defeat Russia.“

Another two years have passed since then, and dozens of similar analyses have appeared. The situation on the battlefield has also changed and continues to evolve.

Distorted Intelligence Information

The Russian invasion was based on distorted intelligence information and poor strategic assessment. Putin was hungry for war, and no one had the courage to tell him that Russia, despite the relative weakness of Ukraine, was not prepared for a major war.

The Russians calculated that the population would quickly reconcile with the fall of Zelensky and Russian power. The Russians had practiced combat operations for several months, but they were not prepared for real combat.

Logistics Failure

The structure of Russian logistics was not adapted to conducting intensive combat operations for a longer period on foreign territory. The Russians had their so-called operational logistics outsourced to a state civilian company at that time.

At the tactical level, Russian troops carried with them only two calculation days of supplies at the battalion and at the brigade or regiment level. This was far from enough for the tens to hundreds of kilometers of advances in the first days. NATO has up to seven days of supplies at the same level.

Ukrainian tactics and weather also played their part. The Russian war machine got stuck. The rapid conquest of Ukraine turned into long-term battles in multiple dimensions.

Moreover, despite strategic bombing, the Russians failed to suppress Ukrainian air defense and gain air superiority. This has marked the entire course of the war so far.

Three Phases of the War

If we take into account the key factors and the prevailing character of activities, we can talk about three phases of the war.

First Phase (2022)

The first phase of the war took place in 2022. Briefly, it can be said that the Russians suffered a Ukrainian defensive shock, and Ukraine’s counteroffensive repelled the Russian advance at Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson.

Ukrainians even rapidly liberated a large part of the occupied territories, pushing the Russians into heavy defense. They had to resort to partial mobilization to prevent the collapse of front lines in southern Ukraine.

Western aid increased sharply, allowing precise strikes and recapturing territory. But Ukrainians partly became victims of their own success, and by the end of 2022, aid slowed down.

Second Phase (2023)

The second phase took place in 2023. Ukraine maintained tactical initiative almost the entire year but failed to turn it into operationally significant success. A stalemate ensued.

Russia strategically adapted, abandoned ideas of a quick victory, and dug in in eastern and southern Ukraine. Surovikin’s multi-layered line was too tough a nut to crack for Ukraine’s limited offensive formation.

Ukraine’s summer offensive stalled amid fortified lines saturated with a new generation of Russian drones. Ukraine shifted toward attrition warfare. What normally serves to shape the operational environment became the main content of combat activities aimed at logistics, command centers, and the enemy’s rear infrastructure.

It was confirmed that recapturing one’s own occupied territory, if the aggressor shifts to strategic defense, is extremely difficult.

Third Phase (2024 – Present)

The third phase of the war has been ongoing from the beginning of 2024 until now. It could be called hybrid escalation and technological transformation.

Although the Russians have operational initiative all the time, they cannot perform a fundamental rapid operation that would move the battlefield. Attempts at modern combined arms maneuvers of large formations have failed; instead, tactics have shifted toward constant small tactical attacks.

The battlefield is fully transparent, nothing can be hidden, soldiers often have only 10 minutes for combat maneuver and taking a new position. Moreover, it is saturated with all-seeing and all-destroying drones.

Ukraine has expanded drone and missile attacks deep into Russian territory, for example, in the case of Kursk. Russia has intensified aerial bombing and pressure on the Donetsk and Kharkiv fronts. The battlefield is becoming increasingly fragmented, decentralized, and technologically driven.

Main Factors for Ukraine’s Survival

When the invasion began, many experts believed we were seeing an atypical war, a clash of two post-Soviet armies irrelevant to Western armies.

The truth is that in the first months of the war, Ukrainians had the tactical and doctrinal upper hand. Especially that part of the Ukrainian army that had experience with operations in Donbas and had undergone Westernization. Commanders were independent, able to make decisions flexibly according to the situation, and mastered the principles of so-called mission command, where you only assign a goal to the unit, not a rigid procedure.

Russians were the exact opposite at the beginning – rigid, unable to make independent decisions, always looking at their superior and his detailed instructions. This has changed in the meantime. Russians are learning too.

Despite this, Ukrainians have so far managed to resist regardless of Russian numerical superiority and Russian superiority in strategic weapons.

Hybrid Model of the Ukrainian Army

The Ukrainian army has evolved from post-Soviet forces into a hybrid model that combines NATO-style mission command, asymmetric tactics, and targeting with AI support.

Russia, despite failures, has also adapted its Soviet-era doctrine and strengthened it with multi-layered defense, electronic warfare, mass artillery, and finally strong air support at the line of contact.

The course of the war so far shows that if Ukraine wants to survive, it must prioritize the strategic neutralization of the stronger Russia over a decisive victory on the battlefield. Ukraine’s victory may not come in the form of a signed treaty or complete restoration of territory. Instead, it may depend on the strategic neutralization of Russia and its aggression, making Russian aggression futile, even if the war persists.

Five Key Factors for Survival and Success

From this perspective, these 5 key factors for survival and success can be identified:

1) Disabling and Denying Russian Operations

◾️Ukraine must continue to paralyze Russian offensive capacity through drone warfare, remote mining, and attacks into the strategic operational depth of the adversary

◾️Functional defeats of enemy capabilities, such as disabling a bomber base or oil infrastructure, can shift the war from attrition to operational insignificance of that Russian capability

2) Sovereignty of the Defense Industry

◾️Ukraine started in a very difficult situation. It could rely only on limited supplies from the Soviet era, a weakened defense industry, and foreign aid

◾️Today, it can produce up to 52% of its needs itself, and this share is rising despite Russian bombing

◾️Domestic production of drones, artillery, and air defense systems is essential

◾️European partners are financing Ukrainian weapons production to reduce dependence

3) Civil-Military Integration

◾️In war, not only the armed forces but the entire country is involved. Not only because rockets and drones fall everywhere, but mainly because Ukraine correctly introduced the concept of total defense and resilience

◾️Territorial defense forces, volunteer battalions, and civilian mobilization form the backbone of Ukraine’s resilience

◾️Protection of critical infrastructure and maintaining societal continuity are as important as success on the battlefield

◾️For example, the ability to quickly repair damaged railways and the inability of Russians to hit moving targets deep in Ukrainian territory were the main reasons why the Russians failed to stop growing foreign aid

4) Strategic Deterrence

◾️Ukraine’s victory plan has partly fallen by the wayside, especially after the advent of the Trump administration in the US

◾️But it correctly proposes a package of non-nuclear deterrence including capabilities for long-distance strikes and joint defense operations with future partners

◾️Deterrence must be credible, sustainable, and anchored in Ukraine’s post-war security architecture

5) International Support and Political Unity

◾️Continued Western assistance – financial, military, and diplomatic – is essential

◾️Ukraine’s survival depends on maintaining global attention and fighting war fatigue, especially amid changing US politics

This applies not only within Ukraine but also in Slovakia and the West. In Ukraine, our security and free existence are being fought for. If Russia succeeds, the chance that we will find ourselves under Russian control again or live in constant fear of what the Russians will do will dramatically increase. Such a state would not only have political and psychological impacts but would mainly significantly cut into our resources. It would be the end of our security and relative prosperity.

Peace is Still Not in Sight and Democracy in Crisis

„It was supposed to be resolved within 24 hours.“ It’s hard to estimate whether Donald Trump’s pre-election statements were just conscious populist lies or the self-indulgent naivety of a politician whom the Russians bailed out of problems several times as a businessman.

No one expected President Trump to actually end the war in one day, but the US administration’s approach so far has been a huge disappointment and hasn’t brought the end of the war closer. It’s nowhere in sight.

Ukrainians so far cannot push the Russians out, and they cannot defeat Ukraine. But they can cause increasing suffering to civilians. This is due to the increasingly exhausted Ukrainian air defense, periodic blocking of American aid, and the inability of Americans and the West to produce more means to combat Russian missiles, drones, and heavy bombs.

Bad American Strategy

The Americans chose a very bad strategy. Despite knowing for decades that only a tough stance works against the Russians and their expansionism, they tried to buy the Russians at the cost of unilateral pressure on Ukraine.

If it had worked, Ukrainians might not have liked it, but at least it could be said that the end justifies the means. But the exact opposite happened. Putin stopped taking the Americans and their president seriously. Behind polite diplomatic phrases is mockery and even greater arrogance and brutality from the Russians. They rejected all of Ukraine’s offers for a ceasefire and negotiation and indicate that they only accept complete capitulation of Ukraine and humiliated forgiveness from the West.

Instead of stopping the war, long-time allies quarreled because of it. Europe is putting together a coalition of the willing in case it’s no longer possible to count on the Americans. But without American capabilities, Europeans will still be players in a supporting role for a long time if it comes to direct confrontation with Russia.

NATO in Crisis

Meanwhile, the Americans are giving them (Russians) too much space. It’s not just about American pragmatism and focusing more on China as the main competitor, but also about the inability, even after more than three years, to increase production of critical systems and missiles for air defense.

The recent NATO summit thus threatened a major dispute or even catastrophe. Some European politicians like Fico and Orbán were even prematurely celebrating Russian victory and new orders in Europe.

President Trump eventually had his way. NATO countries committed to increasing defense spending up to 5% of GDP. The crisis was temporarily averted. But the commitment to increase defense spending has no clear timeline and also includes a lot of room for creative accounting. So real strengthening of defense may not come quickly enough.

Moreover, Russia’s 5th column in NATO, led by Fico, has already made it known that they won’t give an extra cent for their defense. On the contrary, even from the current 2% of GDP for defense, they will significantly cut for explicitly civilian projects and openly talk about leaving NATO.

This was founded not only for defense against the aggressive Soviet Union and today’s Russia, but was also built on common values. How long this alliance will last in times of business politics and permanent trade and tariff war between the US and the rest of the allies is unclear.

Ukraine Must Help Itself

Ukraine, fighting for its survival, will primarily have to help itself. Just as it spontaneously did from the first day and hope that then others will help it too.

Battle to the End?

Under the given circumstances, it’s important for Ukrainians and for all of us not to lose attention and not to get tired. If a solution to the conflict doesn’t come on the diplomatic field, Ukraine must endure it militarily as well.

The current situation is extremely complex. The Russians cannot significantly advance on land, but they attack all the more from the air. The intensity of Russian attacks on civilian targets and critical infrastructure is constantly rising.

Ukrainians have eliminated part of the strategic bombers, and then they have many long-range missiles from flat flight paths, but the Russians can compensate with ballistic missiles and especially long-range drones. They modernized originally Iranian drones and today can produce hundreds of them daily. In June alone, Russians launched more than 5,400 drones at Ukraine.

At the same time, the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defense is gradually declining. In 2022, they could eliminate 95% of drones and 74% of missiles. Today it’s only 79% and 50%.

Situation at the Front

The Russians still have tactical and operational initiative and are pushing practically across the entire front. Fortunately, they have so far failed to capture any major city except Vuhledar. The second year, there is fighting for Kupiansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk. The Russians have also approached Kostiantynivka and penetrated the edge of the Dnipropetrovsk region.

The question arises whether Ukrainians still have a chance to endure. According to my estimate and the estimate of colleague experts, they still have a chance, and mainly they have no other option.

Transformation of Warfare

Ukrainians, aware of this, are not resting on their laurels. Both sides are coming up with innovations. The character of combat has fundamentally changed. It’s not just a solution out of necessity. It’s rather a fundamental transformation of warfare.

What otherwise takes years has been shortened to months. The innovation cycle, for example, in the field of drones, lasts only 3 months. Today’s tactical advantage may be marginal or completely irrelevant by the end of the year.

Although the Russians have an apparent advantage in the amount of personnel, they are not without problems either. They cannot just deploy conscripts in operations on Ukrainian territory. Training new contracted or called-up soldiers is complicated on both sides, and neither side has enough instructors.

Ukraine is more vulnerable in that training takes place in a war zone, but it can compensate for this with training from its allies and supporters.

Ukrainian Capabilities

Ukraine still has approximately 1 million men and women in arms, who are tired from long-term deployment but also have greater motivation.

Ukraine can produce more and more weapons systems by itself. For example, they can produce up to 250 self-propelled howitzers annually, which is more than all of NATO combined. Despite the massive use of drones, heavy equipment and artillery are still needed. Only the way they are used is changing.

Ukraine is gradually increasing the capacity of its air force with donated F-16 fighters and French Mirage 2000-5F fighters. The fact that they have already lost three of them is not a catastrophe but proof that they are using them more frequently and riskily.

Technological Edge

Despite significant Russian numerical, economic, raw material, and technological superiority, Ukrainians manage to keep pace with them and achieve technological excellence.

Ukraine is today a global leader in the production and use of drones. They have achieved absolute excellence with the help of Western companies in the field of artificial intelligence utilization.

An innovative way of processing data in the cloud and digitalizing the use of relatively outdated technology has brought a dramatic change in the field of target determination, targeting, and their destruction. Even with a smaller number of weapons systems of varying quality, they can achieve extremely effective fire destruction.

Strategic Asymmetry

The greatest advantage of Ukrainians lies in their strategic approach to changing doctrine. Aware of Russian numerical superiority and the unavailability of some strategic weapons and means with operational reach, Ukrainians focused on strategic asymmetry in their military operations.

They focus on mobility, deep precise strikes, and increasingly use guerrilla warfare and special forces operations deep in Russian territory. They have made the protection of air and sea routes and the long-term building of their own capabilities and capacities a strategic priority.

Despite long-term political fatigue from the war and the unpredictability of Americans, they can still rely on their allies. Support from countries of the Ramstein format continues to function, and partners help finance Ukrainian armament programs or technology transfer.

Self-Preservation Instinct and Will of the Nation

The instinct of self-preservation can mobilize and stimulate heroic performances. This applies equally to nations as to individuals.

Ukrainians are fighting an existential struggle. Every single Russian drone strike, every single rocket in the city center brings destruction. But instead of the depression and defeatism expected by the Russians, these motivate Ukrainians and mobilize the civilian population.

If before the invasion Putin dared to claim that Ukrainians don’t even exist and everyone has always belonged to the „Russian world,“ today he has a consolidated and confident nation before him.

The will of a nation to fight has been one of the main sources of strength of nations and the key to success in all long and great wars so far.

All these are factors that don’t make Ukrainians doomed to defeat by any means. The Russians experienced three strategic surprises right at the beginning. If Putin today relies on lasting longer in this war, he may experience a fourth and final strategic surprise.

Ukrainians can still withstand Russian aggression, but meanwhile, it may happen that we won’t withstand it, here in Slovakia.

Lessons from the War for Us in the West

Regardless of how Russian aggression and Ukraine’s fight for survival eventually end, we must learn from this war. It revealed the fragility of European security assumptions, the urgency of civil defense, and the need for strategic clarity and mobilization.

Slovakia and Europe as a whole – this conflict is not a distant crisis but a mirror reflecting our own vulnerability and choices.

Hundreds of treatises have already been written about this war today, although not all are fully understood and especially accepted by politicians who decide and citizens whom it concerns. Many assumptions will change, as will their final evaluations. But the main trends are clear today.

This war is already fundamentally changing views on warfare and military-political competition, as well as concepts of state survival. The long-term consequences of the Ukrainian conflict are extensive and deeply transformative – regionally and globally. Together they create a whole series of domino effects.

Main Consequences of the War

Let’s mention at least some:

Geopolitical Realignment

◾️Geopolitical realignment is occurring, and a new cold war dynamic is emerging

◾️The war has cemented the gulf between Russia and Western democracies

◾️NATO and the EU are strengthening ties and expanding military capabilities

◾️Russia is increasingly aligning with China and other non-Western powers, potentially reshaping global alliances and trade routes

◾️Countries that were traditionally non-aligned are reassessing their positions and balancing economic interests with security concerns

Security and Military Changes

◾️European countries are increasing defense budgets and weapons production. This applies not only to the Baltic states and Poland but also to Germany or Sweden

◾️NATO has rapidly expanded as a result of the war. Finland and Sweden’s entry into NATO represents a significant strategic shift in Northern Europe

◾️The conflict has accelerated the use of artificial intelligence, drones, and cyber tools in modern warfare, creating new precedents for future conflicts

Economic and Energy Disruption

◾️Sanctions, disrupted supply chains, and energy shortages have triggered inflation and economic instability worldwide

◾️Europe is rapidly diversifying away from Russian oil and gas, investing in renewable energy sources and alternative suppliers

◾️Even after the conflict ends, many sanctions against Russia will likely persist, changing global trade and investment flows

Human Rights and Social Consequences

◾️Massive casualties, emigration, and declining birth rates are accelerating Russia’s demographic crisis

◾️Widespread human rights violations, including torture and forced deportations, will leave lasting scars and complicate future reconciliation

◾️With millions of displaced Ukrainians, rebuilding communities and infrastructure will likely take decades

Strategic Uncertainty

◾️Frozen conflicts will continue to haunt the world. Even if active fighting ceases, unresolved territorial disputes and political enmity can persist for years

◾️New arms races are coming, and the importance of deterrence is growing. The war has renewed interest in hypersonic weapons, cyber capabilities, and nuclear deterrence strategies

◾️Global governance and cooperation are failing

The war in Ukraine is also bringing a completely new revolution in warfare. Doctrine and tactics are completely changing. The view of the right mix of military capabilities, strategic deterrence, defense, civil defense, and country resilience is fundamentally changing.

Views on the professional army and compulsory service are changing. Concepts of comprehensive mobilization of society await a fundamental revision.

These issues and their impact on Europe and Slovakia will be addressed in the second part of the podcast.

And that’s all for today. I look forward to listening to the second part of the podcast. Thank you for your attention.

The post Ukrainian War for Existence appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

While the Americans talk about peace within reach, the Russians are escalating attacks on civilians. Analysis of proposals for peace in Ukraine.

The American Dictate as an Innovation of the Munich Dictate?

U.S. negotiators have unveiled Trump’s alleged seven-point peace plan to halt the fighting in Ukraine. At the same time, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio could not hide his frustration. Just before Easter, he indicated that if the warring parties do not accept Trump’s peace at any cost, which is to be paid mainly by the Ukrainians, the Americans may as well end their mediation mission and devote themselves to something else.

From what has been communicated in public, this would be a humiliating surrender of Ukraine. In fact, even worse than the Munich Dictate to Czechoslovakia under Hitler’s arrangement. During the Munich Dictate, at least Neville Chamberlain and Édouard Daladier naively and cowardly hoped that by curtailing the territory of Czechoslovakia, they would satisfy the aggressive Hitler and prevent war. President Putin uses the same rhetoric as Hitler, only translated from German into Russian and with modified geographical names.

But in the case of Ukraine, Russian aggression has already begun, and we have had a war here for the twelfth year, including a full-fledged war waged for the fourth year. We have not seen a war of this magnitude here in eighty years since the last world war. Ukrainians resisted Russian pressure. Putin did not wait for negotiations, lied to President Macron and Chancellor Scholz until the last moment, and unscrupulously attacked Ukraine. Ukrainians defended themselves spontaneously, even civilians with Molotov cocktails. They proved to the whole world that the Russians do not have what it takes to defeat them in more than three years.

Ukrainians have paid a huge price for this in lives, health, millions of refugees, enormous material and moral damage. And now they are supposed to succumb to some ultimatum, desecrate all those victims and submit without a fight to an external dictate contrary to international law, the UN Charter and morality? Chamberlain and Daladier may have underestimated Hitler and believed his propaganda.

But in the case of Putin, Trump has repeatedly seen the perfidy of his promises and his brutal acts of aggression. If he transformed his self-centeredness and effort to throw everything at his predecessor President Biden into an effort to pander to Russia and humiliate Ukraine, then the consequences will be borne by Ukraine, Europe, but also the United States. President Trump will not be able to make excuses for not being able to count on how Putin will behave.

After two rounds of negotiations, in Paris (April 17) and then in London (April 23), it looked like we had a difficult diplomatic rift ahead of us. Bigger than the one between Trump and Zelensky in the Oval Office of the White House. The Americans presented their „ultimate“ proposal.

The Ukrainians, together with their supporters, especially the United Kingdom and France, later put forward their counter-proposal. We did not know the details, we only had incomplete information from the negotiators mediated through the media. Reuters eventually managed to obtain the texts of both proposals.

On the eve of the funeral of Pope Francis, the American negotiator Witkoff met with President Putin. At the funeral of the pope, President Zelensky met with President Trump, as well as the quartet of Trump, Zelensky, Macron and Starmer met together.

Everyone briefly says that the talks were positive. But we don’t know the details yet. So, let’s discuss in more detail how these proposals for achieving peace differ.

Differences between the American and European-Ukrainian proposals

On April 17, the Americans presented both Russia and Ukraine with what they described as a final proposal to both sides. Although the media referred to Trump’s proposal as a seven-point plan, according to Reuters,  it  is concentrated in four areas – ceasefire, security guarantees, agreements on territories and economic development.

Ukraine had serious reservations about this proposal, which is why Marco Rubio canceled his participation in the negotiations in London on April 23. Ukraine and its allies have put forward a counterproposal. So, let’s compare these two proposals.

Truce

The American proposal envisages a permanent ceasefire. Both sides would immediately start negotiations on technical details and conditions. Translated into plain language, the U.S. envisages a permanent ceasefire. Therefore, both sides are to start negotiations on the technical conditions for the implementation and verification of the ceasefire. And this is where the risk lies. In recent days, we have seen that a ceasefire without clear rules and verification is very difficult to implement.

Ukraine and its partners are putting more emphasis on this area. An immediate and unconditional ceasefire on land, in the air and at sea is considered by Ukraine and its allies to be the very first and conditional step. That is, an unconditional ceasefire should come first and only then talks about territories and other issues. That is why they are proposing immediate negotiations on technical conditions with participation of the US and European countries.

Compliance with the ceasefire would be monitored from the beginning by the Americans with the support of third countries. The Russians have so far rejected this and then violated all agreements. Ukraine wants transparency. In addition, Ukraine and its European allies demand that part of the ceasefire is that  the Russians unconditionally allow the return of all deportees and illegally displaced children. Both sides would exchange all prisoners of war. Russia must release all civilian prisoners.

Security guarantees for Ukraine

The Americans suggest that Ukraine will receive robust security guarantees. The guarantor states will be an ad hoc grouping of European states plus willing non-European states. Ukraine will not seek to join NATO. Ukraine may pursue EU membership.

Learning from the failure of formal declarations and guarantees, as in the case of the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine is demanding stronger, in their opinion, real security guarantees against the resumption of Russian aggression. They want Ukraine to receive robust security guarantees, including from the US (an agreement similar to Article 5 of NATO), while there is no consensus among the allies on NATO membership. No restrictions on the Ukrainian Defense forces.

The Ukrainian proposal also envisages an ad hoc grouping of military forces of European and willing non-European countries. Ukraine proposes that there should be no restrictions on the presence, weapons and operations of foreign forces on the territory of Ukraine. There is no contradiction regarding EU membership.

Territory

In this area, there are the most fundamental and so far, irreparable contradictions and incompatible overall philosophies of approach. The U.S. formally (de jure) recognizes the Russian control of Crimea. The US will de facto recognize Russian control over the Luhansk region. The US will de facto recognize Russian-controlled of the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. The territories in the Kharkiv region will be returned to Ukraine. Ukraine will regain control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant through US control and administration, with electricity distributed to both countries. Ukraine will have free passage of the Dnipro River and control of the Kinburn Spit.

This American proposal caused a great wave of resentment not only in Ukraine, but definitely pleased President Putin. This proposal is the destruction of a decade of international order in force and unilaterally rewards the aggressor and potentially incentivizes aggression around the world to acquire territories.

According to the Ukrainian proposal, territorial issues will be discussed and fully decided only after a full and unconditional ceasefire. That is, a ceasefire should be reached first, and only then should these issues be resolved. Negotiations on territories will begin on the basis of the line of control.

Thus, Ukraine is aware that it is not currently able to push the Russians out of the occupied territories. But it is interested in resolving the fates of abused and imprisoned people, it wants the return of kidnapped children. But most importantly, it cannot formally recognize the permanent loss of territory. President Zelensky and the parliament do not even have the right to do so according to the constitution. In addition, it would be a guide to further aggression a few years later.

Economy

Under Trump’s proposal, the U.S. and Ukraine will implement economic cooperation in the field of minerals. Ukraine is to be fully reconstructed and financially compensated. Sanctions against Russia resulting from this conflict since 2014 will be removed. U.S.-Russian cooperation in the field of energy and other industries.

The Ukrainian counterproposal is not fundamentally contradictory but rather specifies some details. In the case of reconstruction and financial compensation, it proposes that they will also include Russian sovereign assets will remain frozen until Russia compensates damage to Ukraine.

The view on the timing and pace of lifting US sanctions against Russia is also different. These are to be gradually released once sustainable peace is achieved and can be restored in the event of a breach of the peace agreements.

Conclusion: It is quite certain that these differences were the subject of conversation between Presidents Zelensky and Trump, as well as in other conversations. But how much these positions have converged and whether they are relevant to Russia at all remains to be seen.

The post Analysis: Is a lasting and just peace within reach? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#Macron #NATO #Putin #Rusko #Starmer #Trump #Ukrajina #USA #Vojna na Ukrajine #Zelenský

Americký diktát ako inovácia Mníchovského diktátu?

Americkí vyjednávači predstavili údajný Trumpov sedembodový mierový plán na zastavenie bojov na Ukrajine. Americký minister zahraničia Marco Rubio zároveň nedokázal skryť svoju frustráciu. Tesne pred Veľkou nocou naznačil, že pokiaľ bojujúce strany neprijmú Trumpov mier za každú cenu, ktorú majú zaplatiť hlavne Ukrajinci, môžu Američania aj ukončiť svoju sprostredkovateľskú misiu a venovať sa niečomu inému.

Z toho, čo bolo komunikované na verejnosti, je zrejmé, že by išlo o ponižujúcu kapituláciu Ukrajiny. De facto ešte horšiu ako Mníchovský diktát Československu pod taktovkou Hitlera. Pri Mníchovskom diktáte totiž aspoň Neville Chamberlain a Édouard Daladier naivne a zbabelo dúfali, že oklieštením územia Českoslovenka uspokoja agresívneho Hitlera a zabránia vojne. Prezident Putin používa rovnakú rétoriku ako Hitler, iba preloženú z nemčiny do ruštiny a s upravenými geografickými názvami.

Lenže v prípade Ukrajiny ruská agresia už začala a máme tu už dvanásty rok vojnu, z toho štvrtý rok plnohodnotnú vojnu vedenú všetkými prostriedkami. Vojnu takéhoto rozsahu sme tu nevideli osemdesiat rokov od poslednej svetovej vojny.

Ukrajinci odolali ruskému nátlaku. Putin nečakal na vyjednávania, do poslednej chvíle klamal prezidentovi Macronovi a kancelárovi Scholzovi a bez škrupulí zaútočil na Ukrajinu. Ukrajinci sa spontánne bránili, dokonca aj civilisti s Molotovovými koktejlmi. Celému svetu dokázali, že Rusi nemajú na to, aby ich za viac ako tri roky porazili.

Ukrajinci zaplatili za to obrovskú cenu na životoch, zdraví, miliónoch utečencov, obrovských materiálnych a morálnych škodách. A teraz majú podľahnúť nejakému ultimátu, znesvätiť všetky tie obete a bez boja sa podriadiť vonkajšiemu diktátu v rozpore s medzinárodným právom, Chartou OSN a morálkou?

Chamberlain a Daladier mohli podceniť Hitlera a uveriť jeho propagande. Ale Trump v prípade Putina už predsa opakovane videl vierolomnosť jeho sľubov a jeho brutálne agresívne skutky. Ak svoju sebastrednosť a snahu hodiť všetko na svojho predchodcu prezidenta Bidena pretavil do snahy podliezať sa Rusku a ponížiť Ukrajinu, tak následky ponesie Ukrajina, Európa, ale aj Spojené štáty. Prezident Trump sa nebude môcť vyhovárať na to, že nemohol počítať s tým, ako sa Putin zachová.

Po dvoch kolách rokovaní, v Paríži (17.4.) a následne v Londýne (23.4), to vyzeralo, že máme pred sebou ťažkú diplomatickú roztržku. Väčšiu, ako tú medzi Trumpom a Zelenským v oválnej pracovni Bieleho domu. Američania predstavili svoj ultimatívny „konečný“ návrh.

Ukrajinci spolu so svojimi podporovateľmi, najmä Spojeným kráľovstvom a Francúzskom neskôr predložili svoj protinávrh. Podrobnosti sme nepoznali, mali sme len neúplné informácie od vyjednávačov sprostredkované cez médiá. Agentúre Reuters sa nakoniec podarilo získať texty obidvoch návrhov.

V podvečer pohrebu Pápeža Františka sa stretol americký vyjednávač Witkoff s prezidentom Putinom. Na pohrebe pápeža sa stretli prezident Zelenský s prezidentom Trumpom, aj štvorica Trump, Zelenský, Macron a Starmer.

Všetci stručne hovoria, že rozhovory boli pozitívne. Ale detaily zatiaľ nepoznáme. Rozoberme si teda podrobnejšie v čom sa tieto návrhy na dosiahnutie mieru líšia.

Rozdiely medzi americkým a európsko-ukrajinským návrhom

Američania 17. apríla predložili Rusku aj Ukrajine to, čo sami označili za konečný návrh obidvom stranám. Aj keď médiá označovali tento Trumpov návrh ako sedem bodový plán, podľa informácií Reuters sa koncentruje do štyroch okruhov – prímerie, bezpečnostné garancie, dohody o územiach a rozvoj ekonomiky.

Ukrajina mala k tomuto návrhu vážne výhrady a preto Marco Rubio zrušil svoju účasť na rokovaniach v Londýne 23. apríla. Ukrajina a jej spojenci predložili protinávrh. Porovnajme si teda tieto dva návrhy.

Prímerie

Americký návrh predpokladá trvalé zastavenie paľby. Obidve strany by sa okamžite dali do rokovaní o technických detailoch a podmienkach. Preložené do jednoduchého jazyka, USA predpokladajú trvalé zastavenie paľby. Obidve strany majú preto začať rokovania o technických podmienkach pre realizáciu a verifikáciu prímeria. A práve v tomto je riziko. V uplynulých dňoch sme videli, že prímerie bez jasných pravidiel a overovania sa len veľmi ťažko realizuje.

Ukrajina a jej partneri kladú na túto oblasť väčší dôraz. Okamžité a bezpodmienečné prímerie na zemi, vo vzduchu a na mori považuje Ukrajina a jej spojenci za úplne prvý a podmieňujúci krok. Teda najprv má prísť bezpodmienečné prímerie a až potom sa môžu baviť o územiach a ďalších otázkach. Preto navrhujú okamžité rokovania o technických podmienkach za prítomnosti USA a európskych krajín.

Dodržiavanie prímeria by bolo od začiatku monitorované Američanmi s podporou tretích krajín. Toto Rusi doteraz odmietali a potom porušovali všetky dohody. Ukrajina chce transparentnosť. Ukrajina a jej európski spojenci naviac požadujú, aby súčasťou prímeria bolo to, že Rusi bezpodmienečne umožnia návrat všetkých deportovaných osôb a unesených detí. Obidve strany by si vymenili všetkých vojnových zajatcov. Rusko musí prepustiť všetkých civilných väzňov.

Bezpečnostné záruky pre Ukrajinu

Američania navrhujú, že Ukrajina dostane robustné bezpečnostné záruky. Garantujúcimi štátmi bude ad hoc zoskupenie európskych štátov plus ochotné mimoeurópske krajiny. Ukrajina nebude usilovať o vstup do NATO. Ukrajina môže pokračovať v úsilí o členstvo v EÚ.

Ukrajina poučená zlyhaním formálnych deklarácií a garancií ako v prípade Budapeštianskeho memoranda žiada silnejšie, podľa nich skutočné bezpečnostné garancie pred obnovením ruskej agresie. Chcú, aby Ukrajina obdržala robustné bezpečnostné garancie a to aj od USA (dohody podobnej článku 5 NATO), pokiaľ nie je zhoda medzi spojencami na členstve v NATO. Žiadne obmedzenia pre obranné sily Ukrajiny.

Aj ukrajinský návrh predpokladá ad hoc zoskupenie vojenských síl európskych a ochotných mimoeurópskych krajín. Ukrajina navrhuje, aby neboli žiadne obmedzenia prítomnosti, zbraní a operácií pre zahraničné sily na území Ukrajiny. Ohľadom členstva v EÚ nie je rozpor.

Územia

V tejto oblasti sú najzásadnejšie a zatiaľ neodstrániteľné rozpory a nezlučiteľné celkové filozofie prístupu. USA formálne (de jure) uznajú anexiu Krymu. USA de facto uznajú ruskú moc nad Luhanskou oblasťou. USA de facto uznajú ruskú moc nad obsadenými časťami Doneckej, Záporožskej a Chersonskej oblasti. Ukrajine sa vrátia územia v Charkivskej oblasti. Ukrajina znovuzíska kontrolu nad Záporožskou jadrovou elektrárňou cez americkú kontrolu a administráciu, pričom elektrina bude distribuovaná obidvom krajinám. Ukrajina bude mať slobodný prechod rieky Dnipro a kontrolu nad Kinburnskou kosou.

Tento americký návrh vyvolal veľkú vlnu nevôle nielen na Ukrajine, ale rozhodne potešil prezidenta Putina. Takýto návrh je likvidáciou desaťročia platného medzinárodného poriadku a jednostranne odmeňuje agresora a potenciálne môže stimulovať agresie po celom svete s cieľom získavania území.

Podľa ukrajinského návrhu , teritoriálne otázky budú diskutované a plne rozhodnuté až po plnom a bezpodmienečnom prímerí. Teda, najprv má byť dosiahnuté prímerie a až potom sa majú riešiť tieto otázky. Negociácie o územiach začnú na báse aktuálnej línie kontroly (dotyku).

Teda, Ukrajina si je vedomá, že nie je momentálne schopná vytlačiť Rusov z okupovaných území. Ale má záujem o vyriešenie osudov týraných a väznených ľudí, chce návrat unesených detí. Ale hlavne, nemôže formálne uznať trvalú stratu územia. Prezident Zelenský ani parlament na to podľa ústavy ani nemajú právo. Naviac, bol by to návod na ďalšiu agresiu o pár rokov neskôr.

Ekonomika

Podľa Trumpovho návrhu, USA a Ukrajina budú implementovať ekonomickú spoluprácu v oblasti minerálov. Ukrajina má byť plne zrekonštruovaná a finančne kompenzovaná. Sankcie voči Rusku v dôsledku tohto konfliktu od roku 2014 budú odstránené. Bude sa rozvíjať americko-ruská spolupráca v oblasti energetiky a ostatných odvetviach.

Ukrajinský protinávrh nie je v zásadnom rozpore, skôr upresňuje niektoré detaily. V prípade rekonštrukcie a finančných kompenzácií navrhuje, že budú zahŕňaťaj ruské suverénne finančné zdroje, ktoré zostanú zmrazené až kým Rusko kompenzuje škody Ukrajine.

Odlišný je aj pohľad na načasovanie a tempo rušenia amerických sankcií voči Rusku. Tieto majú byť postupne uvoľňované po dosiahnutí udržateľného mieru a môžu byť predmetom znovuobnovenia v prípade, že by došlo k porušeniu mierových dohôd.

Záver: Je celkom isté, že tieto rozdiely bolôi predmetom rozhovoru medzi prezidentmi Zelenským a Trumpom., ako aj v ďalších rozhovoroch. Nakoľko sa ale tieto stanoviská zblížili a či sú vôbec relevantné pre Rusko sa ešte len ukáže.

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#Kyjev #Putin #Rusko #Trump #Ukrajina #USA #Vojna na Ukrajine

Ide o Ukrajinu, nie o Trumpa, Putina či Zelenského

Donaldovi Trumpovi ide len o vlastné ego a „ocenenie“. Milióny trpiacich a obetí vojny ho až tak nezaujímajú. Naopak, jeho postup vyzerá tak, že si asi chce pomocou precedensu s anexiou Krymu nechať zadné vrátka na vlastné vojnové dobrodružstvá a anexie v budúcnosti. To, že Ukrajina nemá také karty ako Rusko, bolo zrejmé od začiatku. Inak by si Rusko nikdy netrúflo na vojenskú agresiu a celoplošnú inváziu. Rusko sa ale prepočítalo. Ani po viac ako troch rokoch totálnej vojny a brutálneho násilia voči civilom nedokáže Ukrajinu poraziť a obsadiť.

Ale to nijako neberie zodpovednosť z pliec USA a Spojeného kráľovstva. Spolu s Ruskom v roku 1994 tlačili na Ukrajinu, aby 5. decembra 1994 podpísala Budapeštianske memorandum. To, že Ukrajina dnes „nemá karty“ a čelí existenčnej hrozbe ako štát aj národ, je v prvom rade zlyhanie tých, ktorí mali garantovať Ukrajine existenciu a bezpečnosť po tom, čo sa pod ich tlakom vzdala možnosti vôbec mať „nejaké karty“.

Vo svete aj doma musia platiť základné pravidlá

Agresor a vrah v podobe Putinovho Ruska sa ohradzuje, že obeť vraždenia je málo kooperatívna a nechce robiť ústupky? TO FAKT? Takže zmierenie sa Ukrajincov s tým, že nik nehodlá vytlačiť Rusko z okupovaných území a Ukrajina a pozostalí obetí mučenia, vraždenia a vojnového násilia majú zabudnúť na stíhanie zodpovedných za vojnové zločiny aj náhradu vojnových škôd stále jastrabom v Moskve a Trumpovi nestačia? Zelenský nie je vlastníkom Ukrajiny a ani keby chcel, nemôže len tak rozdávať územia agresorom. Ukrajina je domokracia a ústava mu to ani nedovoľuje.

To, čo platí v zahraničnej politike je vždy previazané aj s domácou politikou. Ak dovolíme medzinárodným agresorom beztrestne zabíjať a nárokovať si na vojnový lup, tak potom prečo aj doma nezrušíme políciu a justíciu a jednoducho nenecháme vládnuť LYNČ, či právo silnejšieho? Prečo máme stíhať zlodejov a vrahov, ak chceme zohľadňovať ich „nároky“ voči obetiach ich zločinov? Prečo máme stíhať teroristov, ak chceme legitimizovať ich skutky, hľadať pre ne ospravedlnenie a nútiť obete terorimu, aby akceptovali „nároky“ teroristov?

Vraždenie a násilie sa nielen morálne, ale aj právne odsudzuje všade na svete bez ohľadu kultúru, vieru a politický systém s výnimkou fašizmu, komunizmu a diktátorských režimov. Ide o základné ľudské hodnoty, ktoré nás majú odlišovať od ríše zvierat či strojov. Ak ľudstvo abdikuje na základné ľudské hodnoty a princípy, či vo vnútri spoločnosti alebo na medzinárodnom poli, aký zmysel by mala existencia ľudskej civilizácie? Veď to nemôže byť len medzistav pred vyvraždením na základe práva silnejšieho.

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#Eurofighter Typhoon #Musk #Nemecko #Španielsko #Spojené kráľovstvo #Tesla #Trump #Turecko #USA

Tesla padá voľným pádom

Robiť biznis a politiku súčasne, najmä keď verejne napádate svojich partnerov, či sa spájate s extrémistami, sa môže vypomstiť aj najbohatším ľuďom ako Elon Musk. Ten nielenže kontroverzným spôsobom a bez serióznej analýzy opravuje americký štát a spôsobuje masívne prepúšťanie a fatálne omyly. Následne po ňom súdy či iní členovia administratívy opravujú škody, ktoré napácha. Jeho spoločnosť Tesla vyrástla aj vďaka umelého ošiaľu z elektrických vozidiel, ktoré si kupovali fajnšmekri a hlavne progresívna a liberálnejšia časť populácie, citlivo vnímajúca pokračujúce globálne klimatické zmeny.

Lenže súčasná vláda USA, v ktorej má výrazný vplyv práve majiteľ Tesly, nielenže spochybňuje klimatickú krízu. Vo veľkom ruší ekologické opatrenia, odstupuje od Kjótskeho protolu, podporuje masívnu ťažbu a spotrebu fosílnych palív. Hlavným heslom sa stalo „Drill, Baby, Drill!“, voľne preložené „Ťaž koľko sa len dá!“. Ak do toho prídu Elonove arogantné vyjadrenia, neonacistické pózy, miešanie sa do vnútornej politiky a volieb iných štátov a priama podpora ultrapravicových síl, vyvoláva to pochopiteľne negatívnu spätnú reakciu.

Začína sa bojkot výrobkov Tesly v Amerike, Kanade, škandinávskych krajinách, Nemecku, ale aj vo vzdialenej Austrálii. Prepad predajov za posledné dva mesiace je ohromujúci. V niektorých krajinách poklesol predaj vozidiel Tesla aj o viac ako 70 %, v Nemecku to bolo 46 %. Poškodenie reputácie v takomto rozsahu bude dlhodobé. Naviac, Tesla už nemá exkluzivitu, na trhu je množstvo lacnejších a lepších elektromobilov.

Spoločnosť Tesla bola extrémne nadhodnotená na burze. Napríklad skutočná automobilka General Motors, mnohonásobne väčšia ako Tesla, má kapitalizáciu 48 mld. USD (14.3.), zatiaľ čo nepomerne menšia Tesla aj po prepade 30 % za posledný mesiac má trhovú kapitalizáciu (hodnotu na burze) 804 mld. USD (14.3.). Teraz táto bublina praská ako svojho času digitálna bublina dot.com. Tesla padá voľným pádom a hlavnou príčinou je strata dôvery vo firmu vlastnenú a riadenú Elonom Muskom. Celkovo od svcjho vrcholu zo 17. decembra 2024 Tesla za posledné tri mesiace padla už o 48 %.

Strata dôvery v USA môže znamenať stratu zákazníkov a novú konkurenciu

Po posledných opatreniach americkej vlády voči Ukrajine a v dôsledku neustále sa meniacej rétoriky vo vzťahu ku svojim spojencom, sa niečo podobné môže stať aj s dôverou spojencov a americkým exportom zbraní. Ten je prísne regulovaný ministerstvom zahraničných vecí a Kongresom USA, ale je to aj mimoriadny zdroj príjmov amerických zbrojoviek.

Tie síce už dávno nie sú chrbticou americkej ekonomiky a tvoria len jej veľmi malú časť. Ale profitabilita a dobrá kondícia amerických zbrojoviek sa priamo odzrkadľuje v americkej národnej bezpečnosti aj v schopnosti rozumne financovať rozvoj zbrojárenských technológií a udržať si technologickú špičku. To všetko v čoraz nebezpečnejšom svete, v ktorom čoraz väčšiu úlohu hrá Čína. Tá už aj v oblasti zbrojných technologií už dávno nie je len najvýkonnejšou kopírkou už známych riešení na svete.

Spojené štáty po predstavení v Oválnej pracovni pri návšteve prezidenta Zelenského zastavili materiálnu vojenskú pomoc pre Ukrajinu. To ale mnohí z nás čakali, obávali sa toho aj Ukrajinci. Na druhej strane, Trumpova administratíva zatiaľ žiadnu pomoc pre Ukrajinu ani nemala v pláne. Došlo k zastaveniu dobiehajúcej pomoci z predchádzajúceho balíčka celkovej pomoci vo výške 60 mld. USD. Ten bol schválený po dlhých obštrukciách Republikánov minulý rok v apríli. Veľká časť z toho bola vojenská pomoc, pričom zostávalo dodať zbrane a muníciu za cca 3 a pol miliardy. Ak by Biden neváhal, tak táto pomoc by bola už dávno vyskladnená a dodaná na Ukrajinu.

No skutočný šok nastal po tom, čo USA nielen obmedzili, či dokonca zastavili výmenu spravodajských informácií a prístup k satelitným snímkam, ale zablokovali aj efektívne používanie už viacerých dodaných zbraní. Nejde len o zablokovanie prístupu k presnejšej vojenskej GPS navigácii. Veľa zariadení má v sebe kryptozariadenia na utajovanú komunikáciu a riadenie operácií.

Na spojenie sa používajú v 27 krajinách NATO rádiostanice Harris, spojenie medzi stíhačkami vo vzduchu, prostriedkami včasnej výstrahy, PVO a pozemnými riadicimi centrami ide cez dátový protokol Link-16. Tieto systémy sú bez tzv. kľúčového hospodárstva nepoužiteľné, alebo nedokážu meniť šifrovanie a stávajú sa zraniteľnými.

Podobne je tomu so stíhačkami a ich systémami rádioelektronického boja, kde sa frekvencie a charakteristiky prostriedkov protivníka často menia. K tomu sa musí prispôsobovať softvér a charakteristiky aktívnych prvkov. V prípade lietadiel F-35 Lightning II sa špekuľuje, že Američania by v nich mohli mať zabudované aj tzv. kill switche. Teda, že by Američania vedeli diaľkovo v prípade potreby vypnúť kritické systémy. Po tom, čo USA predviedli smerom k Ukrajine, ale aj po čoraz agresívnejšej rétorike, v mnohých hlavných mestách zavládlo zdesenie. Nik si síce nepripúšťa nejaký rýchly rozpad vzťahov s USA, ale 100 % dôveru už asi nemá nik.

Spojené štáty dlhú dobu tlačili na svojich spojencov a to celkom oprávnene, aby výrazne zvýšili v rámci NATO podiel na svojej bezpečnosti. Transakčne orientovaný Donald Trump tlačil na výrazné zvýšenie výdavkov európskych partnerov na zbrojenie a v zápätí hovoril, že spojenci by mali nakupovať americké zbrane a znížiť tak obchodný deficit USA. Niektoré systémy aj dlho ešte budeme musieť nakupovať od Američanov, lebo iné nie sú k dispozícii. Ale zostať silne závislí na čoraz nepredvídateľnejšom a cynickom partnerovi začínajú európski spojenci vnímať ako bezpečnostné riziko.

Poliaci masovo zbroja, v najbližších rokoch ich to bude stáť 400 miliárd eur. Veľkú časť berú od USA, zvyšok z vlastnej výroby alebo z kapacitných dôvodov aj od ostatných partnerov vrátane Južnej Kórei. Ani Američania neboli schopní rýchlo dodať požadované objemy. Predstava, že dávate 5 % HDP na obranu, vynaložíte stovky miliárd na nové Patrioty, THAAD, desiatky stíhačiek F-35 a 470 súprav HIMARS a nemáte istotu, či Vám ich niekto v kritickej situácii nevypne musí byť desivá. Aj keď sa Poliaci spoliehajú na to, že majú kontrakty priamo s výrobcom a nič im nehrozí, vedia, že to nemusí byť tak.

Poliaci zrejme už príliš veľa možností na zmenu nemajú a vzťahy s USA dlhodobo posilňujú. Preto aj nedávna účasť prezidenta Dudu na kontroverznej konferencii konzervatívcov dáva zmysel. Ostatné krajiny majú ešte čas a hlavné obranné nákupy pred sebou. Začínajú váhať a na verejnosti sa ozývajú prvé kuvičie hlasy západných politikov. Prezidentovi Trumpovi sa tak môže podariť dosiahnuť cieľ zvýšenia výdavkov a prebudiť spojencov. Avšak budíček šokom môže podobne ako Muskove výkriky na X a pred kamerami viesť k odklonu od nákupu amerických zbraní.

Nejde len o nemeckých, francúzskych a britských politikov. Nedávno sa nechal počuť portugalský minister obrany, že Portugalsko nenakúpi zamýšľané americké stíhačky F-35. Následne prišla zo strany vlády korekcia, že minister sa unáhlil a že Portugalsko len zvažuje aj iné alternatívy, ale nevylučuje nákup F-35. Podobné fámy sa začínajú šíriť aj o Fínsku. Ale zatiaľ ide skôr o fámy alebo spravodajské hry na rozhádanie spojencov. V každom prípade, pokiaľ sa bude americká administratíva správať ako slon v porceláne, tak síce popichne Európu na vyššie zbrojenie, ale americké zbrojovky až taký osoh z toho mať nebudú.

Turecko potrebuje a chce nové stíhačky

Turecko sa ocitlo v trochu odlišnej situácii. Na nákup najmodernejších amerických zbraní mohlo zabudnúť už po predchádzajúcej roztržke, aj kvôli svojej nekoordinovanej intervencii v Sýrii, či po nákupe ruského systému PVO S-400 Triumf. Turecko bolo zo strany USA vyradené z programu F-35 a dokonca aj z podpory F-16. Erdoganovi sa obštrukciami rozšírenia NATO o Fínsko a Švédsko a blokovaním vstupu Švédska do NATO podarilo odblokovať podporu a dodávky F-16. Ale to bolo maximum, čo mohlo dosiahnuť.

Aj preto malo Turecko už dlhšiu dobu záujem o stíhačky Eurofighter Typhoon, ktoré boli vyvinuté a sú vyrábané európským konzorciom firiem zo Spojeného Kráľovstva, Nemecka, Španielska a Talianska. Aj tento obchod bol dlhšie blokovaný, najmä kvôli jasnému odmietavému postoju Nemecka. Teraz by sa mohla situácia zmeniť. S exportom do krajín mimo konzorcia musia súhlasiť všetci štyria partneri v konzorciu. Spojené kráľovstvo, Taliansko a Španielsko nemajú s predajom stíhačiek Turecku žiadny problém.

Teraz prichádzajú signály, že aj postoj Nemecka by sa mohol zmeniť. Nie je to síce garantované, ale veci sa dali do pohybu a spojené kráľovstvo sa bude veľmi o to snažiť. Nemecko blokovalo predaj okrem iného aj kvôli tureckým protiizraelským postojom a pozíciou ku konfliktu Hamasu s Izraelom.

Turecko má záujem o kúpu 40 ks Eurofighter Typhoon 4. emisie (iterácie) a ich integráciu do tureckých vzdušných síl. Táto verzia je vybavená najmodernejším a špičkovým radarovým systémom AESA CAPTOR-E. Štvrtá generácia (emisia) Eurofighterov by mala byť podľa odhadov prevádzkovateľná minimálne do roku 2060. Dodávateľom pre Turecko by malo byť Spojené kráľovstvo. Podľa najnovších informácií, britské ministerstvo obrany už aj predložilo svojmu tureckému náprotivku podrobný návrh kontraktu. Turci ho teraz detailne posudzujú. Samotní Nemci chcú v najbližšej dobe nakúpiť 38 kusov týchto stíhačiek, čo podčiarkuje dlhodobú strategickú prespektívu a udržateľnosť tohto typu stíhacích strojov.

V súvislosti s rastúcou vojenskou spoluprácou medzi Spojeným kráľovstvom a Tureckom, v decembri minulého roku na leteckej základni Murted pri Ankare pristáli aj dve stíhačky Eurofighter Typhoon britského Kráľovského letectva. Tureckí predtavitelia si tak mohli ohmatať a pozrieť lietadlo priamo na mieste. Spojené kráľovstvo, ktoré už nie je v EÚ, môže zohrať kľúčovú úlohu spojky pri udržaní transatlantického partnerstva. Súčasne je lídrom koalície ochotných nielen pre podporu Ukrajiny, ale aj pre výrazné posilnenie európskej obrany schopnosti.

Turecké letectvo tak nakoniec môže dostať zelenú na posilnenie o namodernejšie európske stíhačky a samotné Turecko na posilnenie svojich väzieb s Európou. Prípadný obchod v tomto prípade prospeje aj európskemu obrannému priemyslu.

//Edit (17.3.2025).

Podľa vyjadrenia The defence news (Canada Reconsiders F-35 Fighter Jet Deal, Explores European Alternatives ) a The Aviationist (Canada Reconsidering $13.2 Billion F-35 Purchase Amid Growing Tensions With The U.S. – The Aviationist), Kanada zvažuje prehodnotenie svojho zámeru na obstaranie stíhačiek F-35 Lightning II a hľadá čiastočnú náhradu v podobe strojov z Európy. Namiesto pôvodných 88 ks F-35 v objeme 13,2 mld USD teraz Kanaďania uvažujú o nákupe maximálne 32 kusov a namiesto zvyšných F-35 zvažuje nákup minimálne 60 ks stíhačiek JAS 39 Gripen verzia E/F od švédskej spoločnosti SAAB. Švédsko v tejto súvislosti ponúklo aj možnosť kompletácie JAS 39 Gripen priamo v Kanade, čo v prípade F-35 Lightning II nie je na základe amerických postupov možné.

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#Červené more #EÚ #EUNAVFOR ASPIDES #Húsiovia #Jemen #Trump #USA

USA a ich spojenci si dlhodobo nevedia rady s Húsiami a ich útokmi na lode v Červenom mori. Skončenie útokov nepriniesla ani európska misia EUNAVFOR ASPIDES. Jedným z problémov je, že reštriktívne pravidlá nasadenia neumožňujú potlačiť aktivity Húsiov, ktorí kontrolujú veľkú časť územia Jemenu a majú rozsiahly vojenský arzenál.

Na Húsiov opakovane udreli USA so Spojeným kráľovstvom, jeden prístav bombardovalo aj izraelské letectvo. Napriek tomu si Húsiovia trúfajú napádať nielen obchodné lode, ale aj americké vojenské lode v Červenom mori, Adenskom zálive aj v úžine Bab-el-Mandab.

Pred niekoľkými týždňami Trump podpísal výnos, ktorým zaradil Húsiov na zoznam zahraničných teroristických skupín. Aj napriek vojenským opatreniam USA a ich spojencov, EÚ a Izraelu, Húsiovia od útoku Hamasu na Izrael už napadli viac ako 100 lodí a plavidiel dronmi, raketami a malými člnmi.

Dnešným dňom prezident Trump ohlásil rozhodnú vojenskú akciu, ktorá podľa neho bude trvať tak dlho, kým neprestanú tieto útoky. Donald Trump zdôraznil, že húsijské útoky spôsobujú miliardové straty a žiadni teroristi nebudú ohrozovať USA a medzinárodný obchod. Prezident Trump nezabudol skritizovať administratívu svojho predchodcu a prisľúbil rozsiahle letecké údery, ktoré môžu trvať aj celé týždne. Súčasne zatiaľ vylúčil akékoľvek pozemné vojenské operácie priamo v Jemene. Húsiovia zatiaľ hlásia 9 mŕtvych v dôsledku dnešných útokov (15.3.2025).

Drsný odkaz poslal Trump aj Iránu, ktorý dlhodobo podporuje aj Húsiov. „Pre Irán: Podpora húsijským teroristom musí okamžite prestať! Nehrozujte americký ľud, jeho prezidenta, ktorý získal jeden z najväčších mandátov v prezidentskej histórii alebo celosvetové dopravné trasy. Ak budete v podpore pokračovať, majte sa na pozore, lebo Amerika Vás zoberie na zodpovednosť a nebudeme pri tom milí.“ napísal Trump na sociálnej sieti.

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#mier na Ukrajine #Peskov #Putin #Rusko #Trump #Ukrajina #USA #Vojna na Ukrajine

Donald Trump je biznisman divokého strihu, ale aj oficiálne zvolený a aktuálny prezident USA, ktorého treba rešpektovať. Vabank môže hrať so svojou firmou. Zjavne mu to ale nevychádza s USA ani so svetom.

Keby vo vzťahu k Ukrajine nerobil nič, len zastavil pomoc a neútočil na Ukrajinu a nekolaboroval s Ruskom, bola tu ešte pomerne vysoká nádej na to, že Rusku by došiel dych.

Aj keď sa zatiaľ USA a Rusko len oťukávajú a ešte sa nedá hovoriť o rokovaniach, americká rezolúcia BR OSN do istej miery aj právne legitimizovala ruskú agresiu. Bohužiaľ, FRA ani UK v záujme udržania NATO nenašli dosť odvahy túto rezolúciu vetovať. Nechceli tak potenciálne popudiť veľmi impulzívneho prezidenta USA.

Slabá východisková pozícia USA

Výsledkom je takmer nulová východisková vyjednávacia pozícia USA pri prípadných rokovaniach a zrada Ukrajiny. Ak sa doteraz neuskutočnili mierové rokovania, tak nie preto, že by Ukrajina a Európa nechceli mier, ako to tvrdia ruskí kolaboranti Fico a Orbán či prezident Trump. Neuskotočnili sa preto, lebo Rusko malo neakceptovateľné požiadavky na kapituláciu Ukrajiny.

Americká stratégia, ak vôbec môžeme o nejakej stratégii hovoriť, zatiaľ nie je založená na sile, ako to sľubovali ešte pred pár dňami, ale na slabosti, ústupkoch Rusku a zrade.

To povedie k tomu, že Rusi budú svoje agresívne požiadavky ešte stupňovať. Doteraz chceli, aby Ukrajinci odovzdali aj to, čo Rusi ani za 11 rokov vojny nedokázali dosiahnuť vojensky. Teda odovzdanie aj neokupovaných častí 4 nelegálne anektovaných oblastí, Luhanskej, Doneckej, Záporožskej a Chersonskej.

Vôbec by ma neprekvapilo, ak by Rusi, povzbudení americkou (ne)stratégiou, teraz prišli s požiadavkou na úplné odovzdanie celej ľavobrežnej Ukrajiny. Teda všetkého územia na východ od Dnipra, ktoré ani v najväčšom sne nemajú šancu dostať vojensky.

Ako som už naznačil, toto ešte nie sú rokovania a Američania zatiaľ nemajú žiadnu zmysluplnú stratégiu okrem veľkých vyhlásení, dobrých iba tak pre sociálne siete. Má to ale aj svoje výhody. Čokoľvek, čo doteraz USA povedali, môžu kedykoľvek zmeniť.

A na šťastie pre Ukrajinu aj pre nás, Putin by si mal dávať veľký pozor na to, čo chce a nepremeškať poslednú šancu, ako rozumne z tejto nezmyselnej vojny rýchlo vycúvať. Lebo ak svojou nenažratosťou popudí prezidenta Trumpa, môže dosiahnuť zásadnú zmenu jeho postoja. POtom sa nebude stíhať diviť ani stiahnuť z okupovaných území.

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FAKTY vs PROPAGANDISTICKÉ FIKCIE (26.02.2025) – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

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