▪️a reason that cannot be resolved otherwise

▪️clear objective, strategy and realistic plan

▪️forces and resources in place for their implementation

▪️and a realistic chance that at the end of the war you will have better peace than before its beginning.

2⃣ In addition to the absence of international legal legitimacy, none of the above conditions were met, and yet an order was issued to begin operations without a comprehensive plan, let alone any alternative (branch) plan.

3⃣ Even worse is when you have as defense minister a reservist who, although he served on two short missions, does not understand the state’s security and strategic issues. If he simultaneously has despotic tendencies, and believes that war has no laws and rules, you have guaranteed unsolvable problems.

4⃣ Alliances are not built by humiliating partners, behaving arrogantly, not counting on them in your plans, making decisions without them, and when everything goes wrong, attacking them.

5⃣ Sun Tzu already said: „When you surround an army, leave it a way to escape. Do not press too hard on a desperate enemy.“ The Iranian regime is fighting for survival and has chosen such a strategy. Its leaders and IRGC commanders know very well that if they fall, bloody revenge may come for years of terror against their own population. They also know they have allies in the world who could help them when the time comes.

6⃣ No reasonable person can have interest in a long-term extensive conflict with an open end, nor in internal collapse and long-term civil war in a 90-million country sitting literally on a global nerve center.

7⃣ Israeli and American strategic interests coincide only partially. Israel benefits from degradation of Iran’s ability and its proxy groups to threaten its existence and security. The USA benefits from long-term stability in the region and preventing an uncontrollable and confrontational hegemon from emerging there.

▶️ Without some loss of Trump’s and USA’s credibility, this probably won’t work. It’s better to admit the mistake and record small gains immediately than to hope for total victory without a plan. Usually, instead of that, big losses come. The USA should sit down with their regional partners and NATO allies, succeed, say sorry and try to convince Iran that enough is enough. There’s time for bad solutions, including major escalation, only when everything else fails.

****

Suplementary explanation to my point 3

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has made several controversial statements regarding military operations in the Caribbean and during the conflict with Iran (codenamed Operation Epic Fury). His rhetoric often prioritizes „lethality“ and „warrior ethos“ over traditional diplomatic or humanitarian constraints.

Operations in the Caribbean (Operation Southern Spear)

Controversy in the Caribbean centers on aggressive tactics against suspected drug trafficking vessels, which critics allege have led to potential war crimes.

„Kill Everybody“ Allegation: Hegseth allegedly issued a verbal order to special operations forces in September 2025 to „kill everybody“ aboard a suspected smuggling boat.

Controversy: A second strike reportedly killed two survivors clinging to wreckage, leading to accusations that Hegseth ordered the execution of people who were hors de combat (out of the fight), a violation of international law.

Hegseth’s Response: He labeled these reports „fake news“ and „fabricated,“ insisting all strikes were „lawful“ and targeted „narco-terrorists“.

„Sink You“ Policy: Hegseth publicly stated that anyone working for designated terrorist organizations bringing drugs by boat would be „found and sunk“.

Internal Pushback: He called a video by Democratic veteran lawmakers—reminding troops of their duty to refuse illegal orders—“treasonous“ and attempted to demote Senator Mark Kelly for his involvement.

Conflict with Iran (Operation Epic Fury)

During the 2026 conflict with Iran, Hegseth has used aggressive and religious language that critics say disregards the laws of war.

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s remarks in Puerto Rico come …

9 Sept 2025 — It’s all about the OIL. … Pieter Germishuys  makes you feel like a big strong respected manly man right? … Oh, go to Fox New…

Lawmakers warn Hegseth may have committed war crimes …

30 Nov 2025 — POLITICO has not independently verified the Post’s reporting. Sens. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) and Tim Kaine (D-Va.) — both of whom …

Pete Hegseth brings combative style as face of Trump’s war in Iran

11 Mar 2026 — He speaks of how Operation Epic Fury is „crushing the enemy“, whom he labels „terrorist cowards“. „We have only just begun to hunt…

„No Quarter, No Mercy“: In mid-March 2026, Hegseth declared there would be „no quarter, no mercy for our enemies“ in Iran.

Controversy: Under the Geneva Conventions, declaring „no quarter“—refusing to spare those who surrender—is explicitly prohibited.

„Stupid Rules of Engagement“: He has repeatedly criticized established rules of engagement as „stupid“ and „politically correct,“ arguing they „handcuff“ American soldiers.

Religious Rhetoric: Hegseth has framed the war in a religious context, stating that the „providence of our almighty God“ is protecting U.S. troops and that the mission is „righteous“.

Civilian Casualties & Media: Hegseth drew sharp criticism for appearing to minimize U.S. casualties and for „bulldozing“ questions regarding civilian deaths, such as a strike on an Iranian primary school that reportedly killed over 100 children. He accused the press of only reporting casualties to „make the president look bad“.

„Punching Them While They’re Down“: He described strikes against Iranian leaders as „punching them while they’re down,“ adding that it is „exactly how it should be“.

The post How to get out of this? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Note: Shortened transcript of original slovak podcast as from Feb 20. 2026.

Fog of War

Situation in Ukraine

Moderator: What is the overall situation in Ukraine?

General Macko: For the first time in a long time, after 2.5 years, we saw that not only were Russians biting off pieces of Ukrainian territory, but we also saw that Ukraine executed local counterattacks and even regained more than 200 square kilometers of territory.

This is not yet some strategic turnaround, but we see that Ukrainians still have the capability for local counterattacks on land, where they are outnumbered against the Russians.

Strategic campaign continues

Regarding the strategic campaign, it naturally continued. The Russians again generated large packages of massive attacks. They do this cyclically – they did it before the Geneva talks.

🔹Russians rely on quantity

🔹Ukraine demonstrates deep strikes and is capable of hitting very deep into Russian territory

Overall strategic picture: we are in a war of attrition. The talks didn’t move significantly anywhere, despite it being important that they took place.

Zelensky said at the Munich conference that de facto there is no power plant in Ukraine that has not been hit and somehow damaged by Russian forces.

News from the front line

When we look at the front line overall, there are no fundamental changes:

🔹Near Sumy, Russians advanced in one village, but it’s not a breakthrough

🔹No substantial change in Kharkiv region

🔹Relatively quiet around Kupyansk as well

🔹The biggest battles are traditionally in the arc from Lyman through Kostiantynivka, Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk (Donbas)

🔹More pronounced activity in eastern Zaporizhzhia region, where Ukrainians gained the mentioned 200 km²

Deep strikes from both sides

Air warfare continues. Russians had two massive strikes – before the Munich Conference and just before the peace talks in Geneva. They do this cyclically – we saw it before Abu Dhabi, before Alaska.

This is apparently an attempt by Russians as part of large-scale psychological and hybrid warfare against the West, where they try to demonstrate their capabilities.

Key Russian production numbers:

🔹They produce around 130-150 missiles monthly

🔹Thousands of drones monthly

🔹At least 130 drones daily (modernized Gerans)

New Russian capability

Importantly, Russians can now also use Gerans in combination with other reconnaissance drones to hit relatively mobile targets. This was something they couldn’t do at the start of the war – that’s why they bombed railways, because they couldn’t hit trains.

State of war after four years

It’s incredible, but next week it will be 4 years since this war began and the fifth year is starting.

When we look overall, we are absolutely clearly in a state of war of attrition – this is war until total exhaustion.

Personnel problems on both sides

🔹Russians have around 700,000 soldiers in Ukraine

🔹Casualties are high on both sides

🔹Ukraine depends on external sources

Explanation of fallen exchanges: When Russians advance and Ukrainians withdraw, they sometimes don’t have time to take their fallen with them. When Russians move forward, they can collect their fallen, while Ukrainians don’t have this opportunity.

Territorial gains over two years

Over two years, since Russians gained initiative, they gained only 1.5% of Ukrainian territory:

🔹They had 29% in summer 2022

🔹It dropped to 17% in autumn 2022

🔹Over years 2023-2025, they reached nearly 20%

🔹They still control 9% less than at the start of the war

For comparison: In the same time, the Soviet army would have marched through and conquered half of Europe.

Technological innovations

Ukrainians led in technologization:

🔹Focus on drones (aerial, ground, naval)

🔹Have drone forces as independent units

🔹Drone units integrated in combat formations

Russians respond:

🔹Centralized it through the Rubikon system

🔹Modernized electronic warfare

🔹All possible jammers to protect their own forces

Middle East – Gaza and Israel

Moderator: What’s new in Gaza and Israel?

General Macko: Nothing substantial over the past week. Besides Trump’s non-functioning plan, low-intensity, continuous Israeli campaign continues:

🔹Destroying infrastructure

🔹Poor humanitarian situation

🔹Hamas has sporadic activity

No fundamental changes in southern Lebanon or the West Bank.

Important change: The United States announced they want to completely withdraw from Syria in the coming weeks and months. This relates to the new government getting the situation under control.

Strategic Background

Geneva Negotiations

Moderator: How do you evaluate the trilateral talks between the US, Ukraine, and Russia?

General Macko: They fulfilled my expectations – I had no great expectations. Russian communication before the talks already indicated it would be even worse than in Abu Dhabi.

Why did the negotiations fail?

Russians changed the negotiator – they put Medinsky in charge again. He’s a cold, very uncompromising hawk. Statements from February 9th and 10th showed that:

🔹They want major geopolitical concession from the West

🔹They want protectorate over Ukraine

🔹Regardless of territorial agreements, they want to control all of Ukraine

🔹It should be disarmed and without guarantees

Negotiation participants

For the US: Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner (Trump’s personal envoys)

For Ukraine:

🔹Rustam Umerov

🔹Kyryl Budanov

🔹Andriy Hnatov (Chief of General Staff)

🔹David Arachmia

For Russia:

🔹Medinsky

🔹Mikhail Galuzin

🔹Igor Kostyukov (GRU chief – Russian military intelligence service)

Negotiation results

No progress – key issues couldn’t be resolved:

🔹Territorial arrangement

🔹Security guarantees

🔹Ukraine’s future status

First day: 6 hours of negotiations
Second day: Only 2 hours

Zelensky was dissatisfied that sensitive issues weren’t discussed. Ukraine’s position: territorial integrity is non-negotiable.

Trump’s deadlines

Trump set a deadline that has no connection to battlefields, but only to American supplementary congressional elections, where Republicans are doing very poorly.

Zaluzhny’s Presidential Ambitions

Moderator: Zaluzhny indirectly hinted in an interview that he could run for Ukrainian president. How do you see this?

General Macko: It’s an interesting matter. He didn’t formally express it, but the tone of the interview suggested it. He gave an interview to Associated Press.

Controversial claims

Zaluzhny claims that in 2023, just before the Zaporizhzhia offensive, half his forces and ammunition were taken away – a decision by the president and General Syrsky.

Commanders‘ reactions didn’t please Zaluzhny:

🔹They criticize him for bringing this up now

🔹They claim he’s not entirely right

🔹They see the situation differently than he communicates

Historical context of the 2023 offensive

After rapid counteroffensives in autumn 2022, expectations arose for a major Ukrainian counteroffensive. Zaluzhny focused on Zaporizhzhia region, but meanwhile Russians built strong Surovikin line.

Problem: If the direction of attack is expected, it’s no longer the main direction or doesn’t have such a chance to succeed.

The situation in 2023 was different:

🔹The West gave almost no support

🔹Support started coming only in March-April

🔹Troops weren’t trained on Bradley, Leopards

🔹There were information leaks about brigade movements

Criticism of Zaluzhny

Soldiers criticize: He’s trying to retroactively absolve himself of responsibility and shift it to others. Now is wartime – it’s not the most fortunate timing.

Zaluzhny no longer has the popularity he had when he was at home. Instead of talking about what he would do differently, he talks about who’s to blame for what.

Munich Security Conference

Moderator: You write in detail about the Munich Security Conference in our weekly. How do you evaluate it?

General Macko: It was one of the most tense conferences. The greatest expectations were about how the American delegation would react.

Shocking report on the state of the world

The report had an image of an elephant and the headline „Under Destruction“ (instead of the usual „Under Construction“). 120-page report spoke of demolition of international order.

Main demolisher: The United States, which after 1945 de facto built it, protected it all along and guaranteed it.

Conference atmosphere development

Last three years:

🔹2024: Erosion, losing benefits from international arrangement

🔹2025: Already decay

🔹2026: Conscious destruction

Key presentations

Rubio: Had a soaring speech, but then it was totally erased by the visit to Slovakia and especially Hungary, where he showed they don’t care about unity with Europe.

Merz: Said the international order is gone, rejected nuclear armament of Germany.

Macron: Classically – Europe must be self-confident, sovereign and must build its own capabilities.

Chinese paradox

Interesting paradox: The Chinese, who according to Trump benefited from the international system, now act as the biggest protectors of that system.

China tries to benefit as much as possible from the internal contradiction between the West and gain attention not only from third world countries, but also Europe.

Slovak non-participation

The fact that Slovakia wasn’t there is a catastrophe. Either they weren’t there because:

1) We don’t have people capable of such communication (like Blanár)

2) They can only manage departments, not discuss at this level

It’s a great shame for Slovakia – our voice is not heard.

Comparison with Finland

Our president had a program: halusky, Italian cuisine at the Olympic house – that was all. The Finnish president had a 19-point program. Finland is similarly sized, has similar capabilities, but is more advanced.

The difference in presidential output is the difference in country output and citizen success.

Slovak armament

Moderator: In connection with the American Secretary of State’s visit, the Ministry of Defense announced it wants to buy another 4 F-16 fighters and HIMARS rocket launchers. Is this good?

HIMARS – yes

General Macko: I’ll start with HIMARS – as the war in Ukraine shows, there’s a renaissance of artillery, but it’s better to have precise artillery and deeper strikes.

Ours are requesting HIMARS with extended range:

🔹150 kilometers or

🔹PRECISION STRIKE MUNITION up to 500 kilometers (PrSM, original ATACMS)

Missiles are fired from the same system, only the container changes.

We have similar equipment: We had older HIMARS missiles for our rocket launcher, which was combined – it could fire Soviet standard 122mm and NATO MLRS standard from containers.

Advantages:

🔹Rocket launchers we have are on old Tatra 813 chassis

🔹We could manufacture this in cooperation and participate in production for other countries, if put on new chassis

🔹Could cooperate on manufacturing rocket pods or containers

F-16 – not a priority

We have 14 fighters on order (12 combat + 2 training, but really combat two-seaters).

Arguments for additional purchases:

🔹You need 2 minimum in sharp readiness

🔹Another 2 in reserve

🔹Needed for training

🔹Part always in inoperable condition

My opinion: I would be against those fighters. Not because it’s illogical, but it’s not a well-set priority.

After 20 years we’re still behind with one brigade – they’ve wanted a mechanized brigade from us since 2004, so we’d have at least one that can defend us.

Let’s finally complete that brigade and then dream about castles in the air.

Energy security – dispute with Croatians

Moderator: How do you see the dispute with Croatians over the Adria pipeline?

General Macko: I look at it from security perspectives:

Paradox of Slovak approach

On one hand:

🔹We contracted 60 billion euros for defense in 3-4 months (framework agreements)

🔹We consolidate, but arm competitively

On the other hand:

🔹We are totally vulnerable in energy security

🔹We committed to still take Russian oil

What Fico forgot to mention

When attacking Ukraine together with Orbán, he forgot to mention:

🔹Russians bombed Ukraine

🔹Russians bombed a reservoir, thereby also affecting the pipeline

🔹If Ukrainians were repairing, why wouldn’t they solve freezing people in Kyiv first?

Problem of dependence on one source

Instead of source diversification we’re still dependent on one source, where:

🔹Russians use it as a weapon

🔹They use their weapons on the pipeline too

🔹We endanger Slovakia’s stability and security

Croatian position

Croatians speak clearly:

🔹Adria’s capacity is sufficiently large

🔹You can import any oil, but not Russian

🔹EU didn’t give exemption for Russian oil through pipelines

🔹„We won’t burn our fingers“

Real reason for dispute

Fico tries to save the Hungarian model:

🔹They used dumping prices due to Russian embargo

🔹They bought substantially cheaper

🔹But gasoline and diesel are more expensive than in countries with „expensive“ non-Russian oil

🔹Hungarian company takes huge margins

Slovak citizens get nothing from this.

Security risks

Endangered is the entire operation of:

🔹Economy

🔹Health systems

🔹Security systems

🔹Transport systems

The question is appropriate: Should prosecutors look at this? What are the property relationships here?

Security Council

Security council is called regarding ex-minister Tomanová, but not called regarding energy security after 15 years of inability to diversify oil supplies.

360°

American-Iranian negotiations

Moderator: How do you evaluate American-Iranian negotiations in Geneva?

General Macko: Great progress was not achieved. They were open, both sides said so.

Primary problem

Iran says: There’s no force in the world to deprive it completely of nuclear program. It needs uranium enrichment for its own nuclear power plants – otherwise it would be strategically dependent like Slovakia on Russian oil.

USA insists on: They want absolute certainty – 100% guarantee that they won’t have any nuclear program at all.

Escalation instead of agreement

It was clear this would be the stumbling block. That’s why we see escalation:

🔹Poland calling citizens to immediately leave Iran

🔹Trump said he’ll decide „within hours“

🔹He has a secret security meeting

🔹Estimates speak of possible attack over the weekend

Trump’s maximum pressure strategy

Trump needs to make the threat of immediate attack credible:

🔹Recalling citizens

🔹Warnings

🔹Media leaks

🔹Creating psychotic atmosphere

Compared to last week: I don’t think Trump will attack, but the probability of strike has significantly increased.

Cuba

Moderator: It seems the communist regime in Cuba will end. How?

General Macko: So far it looks like similar scenario as in Venezuela. Marco Rubio (his family comes from Cuba) hinted at this during Maduro’s arrest.

American strategy

They’re pushing it to the maximum – applying maximum pressure:

🔹They know Russians won’t be able to help them

🔹They blocked oil deliveries from Venezuela too

🔹Mexico also said they won’t supply oil

Cuba’s state

Cuba was left bare:

🔹Problems since the 90s

🔹Garbage accumulating

🔹Energy outages becoming dramatic

US goal

So they don’t have to invade, they try to achieve that the regime collapses itself. Maximum „tap on the leaning structure“.

Problem: It doesn’t guarantee stable conditions, just a more favorable regime for Americans.

Trump’s Peace Council

Moderator: Is Trump’s peace council an attempt to create a new UN or just entertainment?

General Macko: Everything points to it. He had big ambitions – not just for Gaza, but for the whole world. Eventually he reduced it.

Problems with conception

Reason for reduction:

🔹Invitation was sent to 60 countries

🔹Few of them responded to real membership

🔹Not one paid 1 billion for permanent membership

🔹Russians are still evaluating the possibility

The whole thing is built on „lifetime president Donald Trump“ – one person out of 8 billion people decided to lead such a council.

First session in Washington

At least 40 countries participated (majority observers):

Members: UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Bahrain, Pakistan, Turkey, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Kosovo, Albania, Argentina, Paraguay.

It’s not a balanced organ representing the world.

Gaza program

Financial commitments:

🔹9 countries pledged 7 billion USD for reconstruction

🔹Americans 10 billion (didn’t say from where)

🔹Minimum 70 billion needed

Military mission:

🔹20,000 soldiers + 12,000 police

🔹Soldiers provided by: Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Albania

🔹Commander: Major General Jeffers (former special forces member)

🔹Won’t have UN mandate – only this council’s

Implementation problems

Gaza is unstable, Hamas not disarmed – basic prerequisites for mission functioning are missing.

Western allies are skeptical – they perceive it as an attempt to replace UN and create order dominated by Trump.

Controversial invitations: Netanyahu, Putin (Putin conditioned participation on unfreezing Russian assets).

Closing Quote

„Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man’s character – give him power!“

Abraham Lincoln, US President who died in 1865 by an assassin’s hand.

The post General Pavel Macko’s Security Radar – 152nd Edition appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

And we are joined by retired Lieutenant General Pavel Macko. Welcome. Good evening.

Good evening, I wish you.

So let’s discuss both meetings in Geneva together. First, let’s go to those two-day trilateral negotiations on ending the war in Ukraine. Do you expect any fundamental breakthrough from them, which simply hasn’t happened in those previous negotiations so far? Will it happen now in Geneva?

Trilateral negotiations USA-Ukraine-Russia

Quite honestly, I don’t expect any fundamental breakthrough. Nevertheless, those negotiations are important. But it must be said that we had two rounds of negotiations in Abu Dhabi, where they made progress, where it was also good that those negotiations got some format and some structure, where there are actually several working groups for different areas. It’s good that in both delegations there are people who have a military background, whether it was – I don’t mean Kyrylo Budanov there as the former head of that intelligence GUR, but I mean including the chief of staff from Ukraine and the head of GRU from the Russian Federation. There was an economic component and generally a political component in these negotiations. However, what’s essential is that the key issues that prevent any conclusion of agreements are: first, Russia doesn’t accept any security guarantees from the West and any Western influence or Western assistance to Ukraine after a possible conclusion of peace agreements. Second, Russia has large territorial demands, and third, Russia also has demands for changing the political regime in Ukraine and even demands for further fundamental geopolitical concessions from the West, in Europe and generally in relation to Russia. This is further underlined by those current statements of Russian representation, when already on January 14th at a public assembly, regime representatives and Putin indicated that they have more than those territorial demands, than formal recognition of those four illegally annexed regions, but that they would actually be interested in additional regions as well. Subsequently, Lavrov clarified that they would be interested in Kharkiv region, Dnipropetrovsk region, Odesa region and thus also Mykolaiv and Kherson, and this is something that is completely outside the framework. And moreover, Russians are increasing additional demands. The latest statements from February 9th and 10th and from February 14th even go further, where Russia clearly basically signals that it’s interested in such a solution that would mean de facto absolute capitulation of Ukraine. That pattern can perhaps be found in history only in connection with the approach of Nazi Germany, when actually today’s Russian rhetoric speaks about wanting a pro-Russian and friendly Ukraine, de facto some Russian protectorate, where Russians would decide what will be in that truncated remainder of Ukraine. And these are likewise problems and likewise insurmountable contradictions in that vision of future possible arrangements. These, in my opinion, will lead to the fact that although they will negotiate about some minor details and those peripheral matters of peace agreements, it will get stuck precisely on these hard demands. And the change in the very head of the delegation by Medinsky coming again indicates this hawkish position of Russia, which will probably predetermine the results of these negotiations as well.

Russian play

So what does this mean, that Russia is playing for time, that it’s delaying?

Unambiguously, Russia still feels in the position that it still has trump cards in its hands. It’s raising its stakes and actually any concession or attempt at an accommodating step, whether from Ukraine or the United States as a sponsor of these negotiations and simultaneously a supporter of Ukraine, it interprets as disunity and weakness and thereby raises its stakes and systematically attacks Ukraine. It tries to use maximum economic, military and psychological pressure. After all, winter is still peaking in Ukraine and massive energy attacks on energy facilities have an effect. Zelensky confirmed over the weekend during the Munich Security Conference that practically every single power plant in Ukraine is affected in some way and damaged. Russians continue in this and will continue on the front as well. Even though we see there that Ukrainians have some partial tactical successes on the border of Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions, Russians still have the feeling that by this postponement of a possible solution to that conflict they can gain more and that militarily, even if very slowly and at the cost of high casualties they are advancing, so currently Russians will still push to gain as much as possible from a possible agreement. Moreover, rejecting security guarantees gives the possibility to repeat such aggression in the near future and try to bring it to the end. That means, all this is the result of Russian ambitions that perhaps exceed their real possibilities and capabilities, but so far they see that it allows maintaining a certain disunity in support of Ukraine. We see that Europe doesn’t have sufficient capacity – it’s hesitant – and the United States also changes actually those its approaches to supporting Ukraine and to pressure on Russia all the time. Russia senses some chance in this, that by such stretching and partial concessions and then again raising stakes, it can actually stretch time and undermine that unity or that position of Ukraine and its allies and supporters.

End of war in June 2026?

Washington wants to end the war by June according to Volodymyr Zelensky. We’ve heard similar deadlines in various statements, as you’ve already indicated, but without results. Can the American administration succeed this time and also, above all, how? Because Zelensky talked about Americans wanting to exert pressure on both Ukrainian and Russian sides. So what could this be about? What kind of pressure has the White House not yet resorted to?

Here we need to start perhaps from the end, that this deadline is given by the internal politics of the United States, because they have midterm elections or those partial elections to the American Congress. And so far it looks like the support for the Republican Party is quite small and that therefore the Donald Trump administration could lose the majority not only in the Senate, but even in the lower chamber, that means in the House of Representatives. Thereby that possibility of such sovereign rule of the current administration would be significantly limited. Congress could start blocking many steps of President Trump. That means, if he talks about this deadline, it’s not at all some effort to end the conflict at any cost in favor of Ukrainians or Russians. Simply, Donald Trump wants to present some result. As for those possibilities of pressure and tools, well, we’ve already seen the entire spectrum. First, after the American administration took office, he tried it on Ukraine in that famous discussion in the Oval Office, which was even before the actual negotiation and de facto ended the negotiation. Trump pressured Ukraine and said it has no cards, he wanted to achieve a quick result, it didn’t work. Then we saw a series of various concessions, pressures, ultimatums. We saw that in Alaska Trump thought he had achieved some agreement with Russia, but de facto he only gave Putin legitimacy and gave him a podium and red carpet. He abused that. Then came harsh or demands for harsh oil sanctions. Finally, a law is passed in the American Congress. We see that the United States started seizing tankers of that shadow fleet. That means, this is probably the path by which if the United States wanted, they could pressure Russia. But honestly, I think that if such a settlement comes or at least a cessation of fighting by June, it won’t be exclusively the result of American pressure, but rather it will be a combination of several factors, where also that American pressure, but also continuing sanctions and worsening conditions for the Russian economy and for oil export could lead to such a situation that Russia would get to a point where it would already see that it has no possibility to gain more and with a certain degree of frustration would agree to some negotiations. It’s less than 50 percent probability that such a thing will happen. Of course, some sudden break, reversal, something like a collapse on one side or the other can also come, because we really don’t know in depth even that Russia, which still pretends to have the upper hand and wants to gain more, how it really is. Those strongman speeches and this raising of stakes can also be a negotiating tactic that’s supposed to cover up that Russia is not doing as well as it tries to present outwardly.

Iran nuclear program

Let’s go to those second negotiations in Geneva. The second round of indirect nuclear talks between Iran and the USA will also begin. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in this regard announced to Donald Trump that a potential nuclear agreement must include stopping the uranium enrichment process by Iran and also dismantling the entire Iranian nuclear infrastructure. Is this something that Tehran will agree to, in your opinion?

Hard to say, but probably not. We see that the previous nuclear agreement, from which the United States withdrew, had some gaps even in the vision of Donald Trump and his administration. Currently it’s such that Donald Trump is pushing that vision of absolute prohibition of any uranium enrichment. This is something that will be rejected, because Iran will object that it’s prepared to give up the military program, but that it cannot give up that civilian program, which is vitally important for its energy system. Iran faces many problems. It has oil, which is under embargo and practically only China buys it, but on the other hand it has huge problems with water resources, it has large economic problems. We saw a massive wave of unrest that was originally caused rather by economic problems and subsequently came even that political frustration. Iran is currently conducting military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz and indicates that in case of escalation it could put up armed resistance or try to expand or provoke conflict in the wider Persian Gulf region. This would of course complicate global trade in oil products and liquefied gas. So these negotiations will involve complex bargaining. Currently, however, it doesn’t look like the negotiation should reach some quick agreement. It will probably get stuck precisely on the fact that Iran won’t be willing to agree to such ultimatum demands that would completely deprive it of any control over its nuclear program, including that energy nuclear program. The United States will increase that pressure, because Trump also cannot actually accept just some partial agreement. Moreover, in the US Congress in connection with the previous agreement, a law is also passed. And thereby such a nuclear agreement would have to be submitted by Trump to Congress for approval and there are also various opinions and rather opinions on a hard policy toward Iran prevail, regarding control of its nuclear facilities.

Retired Lieutenant General Pavel Macko was speaking. Thank you very much for your time and for your commentary and I wish you a peaceful night if possible.

Thank you for the invitation and likewise a pleasant evening.

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Note: This article is based on english trascription of the original podcast by .tyzden in slovak language. You can listen to it in a form fo podcast here:

Security radar of General Pavel Macko – 151st edition – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

Moderator: Welcome, Pavel.

General Pavel Macko: Thank you very much, warm greetings to the listeners. We also have the Munich Security Conference in the headlines, unfortunately I’m not there this year, but we’ll bring its conclusions on the pages of Týždeň magazine and evaluate it next time.

Fog of War

Moderator (Eugen Korda): As always, what is the security situation in Ukraine?

General Pavel Macko: Very bad. We see the continuation of that tragedy, as we announced – intense fighting is ongoing, intense bombardment. The Russians are trying to keep the Ukrainians in winter and darkness. We see that infrastructure in Kyiv is seriously damaged, but this is happening across the entire country. When I evaluate it overall, the front has hardly moved. The fighting was extremely intense, especially in Donbas. The Russians carried out the largest drone attack last weekend and then we saw yesterday again a large drone and missile attack. They are concentrating on destroying Ukrainian infrastructure. Ukraine also struck energy facilities in Belgorod and Ukrainian command is dealing with air defense problems. Russia is trying to gain and improve its tactical position before the spring season. We see the same from Ukraine’s side.

Moderator: And what’s happening on the front?

General Pavel Macko: When I take it, let’s do a quick overview. In the east, the biggest fighting concerns Bakhmut, Chasiv Yar, Kramatorsk – there the Russians continued pressure west of Bakhmut. Near Chasiv Yar, they are trying to push toward Slovyansk. The most intense fighting was near Klishchiivka, Ivanivske and Kalynivka. When we look at Kharkiv region, the Russians slightly advanced in this Kharkiv region.

Going back to this Donbas, there was also intense fighting on the Avdiivka, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove direction – on this section. There the Russians tried to expand control southwest of Avdiivka. Ukrainian command states that the attacks are massive but ineffective. The reality is that we really haven’t seen any major movement of that line.

If we look further south, there is also intense fighting. We saw such tactical counterattacks by Ukrainians, especially after Starlink went down, so the Russians lost contact. It’s not something significant, it’s more about equalizing positions and showing the reality on the battlefield, because the Russians were using tactics where they infiltrated, settled somewhere and then it looked like they controlled the area. Now this actually allowed them to say that they really no longer control it.

There’s a nice tidbit for listeners – when they lost those Starlink connections, the Russians tried to find Ukrainians who would give them access codes. It’s like with us – these are our satellites, they blackmailed them. But they didn’t know this was tapped, that actually a Ukrainian division created fake accounts and a call and lured about 2,500 Russian accounts, from which they discovered their location and coordinates. And this is probably also visible in that tactical success.

Moderator: Overall picture?

General Pavel Macko: The overall picture, as I already indicated, is not moving in any fundamental way. The situation is stable, but the number of clashes is enormous. Of course, these are smaller units, but the number of clashes is enormous. When I evaluate it overall, the Russians are still slowly advancing. Over the past month they had about 150 to 300 square kilometers of territorial gains, but nothing suggests that one side or the other would have any major fundamental breakthrough.

Moderator: How do you assess Russian missile and drone attacks deep into Ukraine?

General Pavel Macko: It’s an outrage, it continues and here it must be said that whether in the attack of February 7th or now in the latest one – the Russians combine, they learned this over those four years. They combine hypersonic missiles, cruise missiles and drones are added to that, using the fact that they modernized those drones and today they can attack even moving targets. This means, if they have sufficient information from some collaborators on the Ukrainian side or their agents, they can attack moving targets. It’s something Ukraine must deal with. Ukrainian air defense was engaging, destroyed a large number of drones, but still the strikes were strong, cyclically plunging Ukraine into darkness, also damaging Ukrainian production, because obviously for large military production you need a lot of energy.

Moderator: Good, and what about the Ukrainians?

General Pavel Macko: So the Ukrainians also attacked. They attacked Belgorod and Bryansk, there they also attacked those energy facilities. We witnessed an attack with five Flamingos, those are their large missiles. It looks like they’re good. Russia claimed it shot down all five, but despite that we saw secondary explosions in the area. This was attacking a facility of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate, or glavnoe raketno-artilleriyskoe upravlenie (GRAU). These are also large warehouses. It’s in Volgograd region about 350 kilometers, 320 kilometers from the battle line and state border in Russian depth. Overall, Ukrainian strikes are aimed mainly at energy, logistics and ammunition depots. Their goal is to weaken the Russian rear before the spring combat season, similar to what the Russians are trying to do.

Moderator: But I read that Zelensky quite criticized that defense.

General Pavel Macko: Yes, because obviously Ukrainian air defense hasn’t undergone any fundamental changes since 2022. It was successful, but it’s being exhausted. Now I read that Germans will provide 35 Patriot missiles. So for yesterday’s attack they would need about 80. And on top of that they would need to operate against drones. So it’s clear there’s a disproportion. This confirms that, if we look at it in a broader context, the West hesitated for a long time and actually blocked Ukraine and didn’t want to supply them with those longer-range weapons, when that was the only thing that could be done. Not catching every missile, every drone, but destroying those sources from where they come.

But of course, air defense also needs to be improved and there were failures, mainly in those multiple regions. Zelensky criticized this leadership and ordered immediate changes. In some regions, air defense is being rebuilt practically from scratch. We’re talking about those small observer teams, those small strike units up to that large air defense – they had to be restructured, the layers are changing, tactics and command methods are to be changed. And at the same time Zelensky ordered to accelerate drone and weapons supply, supplement personnel and made some personnel changes toward those regional leaders, because this also belongs to territorial defense. And mainly there, where reaction to attacks failed – basically it’s the largest reorganization of Ukrainian air defense since 2022.

However, we won’t analyze this in detail, nor are the information available, because obviously even the Ukrainians won’t reveal everything to open media and won’t give Russians instructions on how to overcome it again.

Moderator: And Zelensky sent a message to the world that for me was almost incredible, that there could be elections and a referendum there.

General Pavel Macko: I take it as part of negotiating tactics. The United States is brutally pressuring Zelensky, they jumped on that Russian propaganda and question Zelensky’s legitimacy. Not all of them, but there are those American hawks, mainly from that MAGA movement. So Zelensky made a clear tactical move, where he said fine, so potentially there could be elections in April, and a referendum on peace agreement and territorial changes, which would create conditions for concluding that peace. And of course the next day came the correction after this caused a wave of displeasure in Ukraine, where he said clearly – provided we reach a ceasefire, because it’s clear that under those bombs and missiles you see day and night, we won’t and cannot hold elections. But we have good will, we’re ready for it. But it’s in the hands of the Ukrainian people to decide, but when you shoot at them and drop bombs, they can’t decide about anything.

Moderator: Gaza and Israel, are there any changes?

General Pavel Macko: Not any major ones. I must say that over the past week tension continued directly in Gaza, it’s still a fragile ceasefire, regularly disrupted by Hamas activities and then retaliatory Israeli strikes and raids. In that past week, no major ground operations were reported, but those air and drone strikes against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) infrastructure continued. This is actually a continuation of those tensions that are there. Simply put, Hamas is still quite strong.

Moderator: Good, what about the rest of Israel? West Bank? By the way, Jews no longer want to call the West Bank the West Bank, but I think Samaria, according to the historical name.

General Pavel Macko: Yes, it’s historical. After all, those who go to church sometimes hear in those biblical texts some references to this territory. But there’s that trend, it’s also subject to criticism. So first, operation Iron Wall continues there, which are actually raids and elimination of those various terrorist cells and groups. But second, there is quite – and this is due to the composition of Netanyahu’s government, where there are also representatives of those more radical streams in Israeli society – and actually expansion of settlements is taking place there. This of course meets with displeasure of that Palestinian population. They are also targets of criticism from outside, even the United States said they should restrain this activity.

Of course, we don’t know now to what extent the real situation is such that it looks like they’re preparing new annexation of the West Bank, because this is what mainly Arab sources suggest, and what is only consolidation of that situation and an attempt to ensure security and at the same time moderate even those most radical voices in Israel.

I also looked at how Israeli media see this. A broader spectrum starting with Haaretz ending with Jerusalem Post and there the summary is that they report on Gaza as precise strikes by Israeli security forces. The topic of hostages still dominates and those echoes on the West Bank. There’s emphasis on Israeli security forces‘ raids and political tension. Internal political crisis is still being communicated and if we look at southern Lebanon, there’s such dry technocratic stating that there’s occasional exchange of fire, but it’s controlled escalation.

Moderator: And how did the creation of technocratic administration in Gaza progress?

General Pavel Macko: Laconically, if I had to say it, I would say that the technocratic government for Gaza exists only on paper, in the field there’s really a vacuum. And now actually – there exists that international plan. We mentioned it here, including that former minister who is supposed to be the head there, he’s ready, but Hamas doesn’t want to disarm. Based on that, Israel then blocks actually this activity and the result is that it’s all on paper. But really nothing fundamental is succeeding. This means we’re still in that position where it’s a good plan, super plan that looks like something worthy of Nobel Prize, but really it can’t be set in motion.

The United States is therefore already pushing a more moderate model, talking about something like demilitarization under supervision, but Israel considers this too soft. Hamas is weakened but not defeated. It still has tunnels, has weapons, has support from part of the population. As we said last time – those who were killed are being replaced by new recruits. And real disarmament is so far only a political declaration, but we don’t see any process heading toward that.

Strategic Background

Moderator: Last week there was a meeting of NATO defense ministers. What did they agree on?

General Pavel Macko: It’s a regular meeting, so-called ministerial. Two weeks ago there was a ministerial of foreign ministers, now defense ministers and next will follow a summit on July 7th and 8th, if I remember correctly, in Ankara. This is such a regular cycle, these ministerials happen at least twice a year and always one is such big, working one, one is more social also with those social activities and team building. In this case it was a working meeting.

At such a ministerial, the agenda for the upcoming summit is also communicated. This means, that level of foreign ministry gives such political guidance, those big political agreements and at such defense ministerial it’s already transformed or translated into the language of numbers, into the language of concrete measures. So at this summit there were several main points.

Monitoring or reporting of progress in fulfilling the two percent GDP for defense commitment was done. Then they talked about building those capabilities, so-called national goals, which are determined within those puzzle pieces or that mosaic that NATO must assemble to be able to defend itself. These are those goals we also have – mechanized brigade and similar. So this was discussed. They talked about strengthening deterrence and defense. They also talked about international projects and some agreements were signed between groups of these members. For example, on joint procurement and technology development, including deep precision strikes, those are mainly long-range missile fires, ballistic protection, protection of underwater infrastructure, so-called Task Force Baltic. And the NATO-Ukraine council also convened. A separate meeting took place with Ukraine’s defense minister.

If we look at it, there was agreement on some issues. Potential disagreement is maybe more in the area of pace of increasing weapons production. Some allies object that we still focus on increasing that GDP percentage, but the increase is not followed by sufficient production, meaning production needs to be accelerated. Rutte openly said that NATO needs more production, faster and in larger quantities. There are also differences in the pace of fulfilling two percent, some countries are already significantly ahead, but for example Germany announced that while it won’t reach those percentages, but actually compared to previous years it’s already going to double its defense budget. This means that real, physical increase is one hundred percent.

Moderator: I heard about operation Arctic Sentry, which translates as Arctic Guard. What is this supposed to be and has it been approved somehow?

General Pavel Macko: It hasn’t been approved yet. I’ll remind listeners that after there were those incidents in the Baltic Sea and cables were cut, so we have Baltic Sentry or Baltic Guard or Baltic Watch, maybe I would translate it that way. The same happened then after those attacks or incursions into Polish and Estonian airspace, where so-called Eastern Sentry was created, that’s increased air space patrolling, air space monitoring on the eastern flank. And now Arctic Watch is being considered.

It relates to the discussion about Greenland, relates to the discussion about increased movement and influence of Russians and China in this space, relates to how northern sea routes are gradually opening up. This means that allies, to satisfy Trump, to also ensure their security, are considering operation Arctic Watch. So far it’s in that position where there were such two exercises – Cold Response and another name that escapes me now, which are to be consolidated. And now it’s being considered in various forms how those increased operations would actually be carried out.

Basically it’s about monitoring the entire Arctic space, more detailed monitoring of that strait or that open maritime space that connects actually the Arctic space, where Russians are very strong and built massive infrastructure in recent decades, where China is also starting to assert itself, occupying or creating its Arctic fleet, even though it’s not directly an Arctic country. And this is actually the space between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom. Otherwise this was space that was always monitored. During World War II it was key space for supporting Europe.

In case of any larger conflict, it’s space that is absolutely critical for the alliance, so that Americans and Canadians can approach Europe. It’s space where when patrolling increases, it will be possible to monitor more, and this happened during the Cold War too, e.g. Russian nuclear submarines sailing from Kola Peninsula, where Russians have their main base.

I’ll say it’s not yet an approved operation, but planning instructions have been issued at the level of Supreme Allied Commander, SACEUR, or SHAPE, that allied command in Mons. And at the same time it’s said that there should be countries there, that those forces would be diverse, there would be naval groups – United Kingdom, United States, Norway, Canada, air capabilities, ground units, mainly from Finland and Norway, and intelligence assets.

Moderator: I heard that Americans released some command positions in NATO to Europeans. What’s happening? Are they leaving, or how should I explain this?

General Pavel Macko: Those are two things, several people asked me about this, and it needs to be explained. Those are two things. The first one is such superficial, that the United States actually said they’re handing over command of JFC in Norfolk, Joint Force Command Norfolk, that they’ll hand it over to a European general and also command in Naples, where traditionally since NATO’s creation and since that command’s creation the United States commanded. And as if they’re withdrawing. On the other hand, we see that the United States still retains command of that SHAPE, that Supreme Commander in Europe – SACEUR and has control over that Mons (SHAPE). And conversely, they take over command for transformation – ACT in Norfolk, which also sits in the same region. And at the same time Europeans would take over those other commands.

Here I’ll say just one thing – no need to worry, because these are multinational integrated commands. Only the flag of the officer from the country that commands that command changes, but these commanders are under international jurisdiction. And when I was in those structures, when I was commander in Bydgoszcz, I answered directly to superior commander in Norfolk, that ACT. And I reported to NATO Military Committee, meaning all our activities were always directed by North Atlantic Council. It doesn’t fall under national rules.

Moderator: And you weren’t accounting three times?

General Pavel Macko: I didn’t account three times. And the truth was that the only thing countries have in this is that salaries and personnel orders are issued nationally, all other activities are performed under international jurisdiction. But the second thing is, and this is true, NATO announced basically the largest reform of command structure of the North Atlantic Alliance, meaning those commands themselves, since 2011.

I’ll just remind listeners that there were three such changes. The biggest was in 2004, when I was starting in Heidelberg, where there was significant reduction of commands down to one third. Those were peace dividends. In 2011 this was somewhat corrected and there was further relocation of these NATO commands. And now we see opposite trend. New challenges came, new security environment. Quietly in between, in 2020 a third joint forces command was created in Norfolk, because before there were two in Brunssum and Naples.

Those formerly had geographically divided north and south. Then after that reform in 2004 they were interchangeable and alternated to those commands those NATO rapid reaction forces across regions. And now, to summarize what should happen. First – there should be higher agility, meaning ability of these commands to intervene faster. The Norfolk command is being strengthened, which gets more tasks in protecting precisely that Arctic space we mentioned in connection with that Arctic Sentry. The Brunssum command also changes those flags, where it will have more geographical responsibility for that entire northern part, basically above the Alps northward.

Moderator: And will there also be an eastern flank HQ?

General Pavel Macko: There will be, there will be. And I’ll finish that Brunssum, that it also geographically integrates Sweden and Finland. Then a new regional command east should be created, probably in Poland, command for the eastern flank. I don’t want to reveal, it’s not officially approved, where it could be. But the point is that already the commander of Multinational Corps in Szczecin, of which there are ten altogether by the way, has been saying for longer that such geographical competence should be given. Because if it’s on the eastern flank, we need quick reaction, so we can’t wait for that traditional process where forces start being assigned to commands later.

Interestingly, maybe for others, an allied command for cyber defense and hybrid threats is also being created, about which it’s also not known, which should bring NATO into the 21st century. All this serves the fact that after a period of slowing down these structures, as if slowing their reaction, now the opposite process is happening. We have regional defense plans, forces are created for them and now this should also complete the command structure. Greater weight should be on Europeans, but as we said a moment ago, it doesn’t mean Americans leaving these structures.

Moderator: Slovakia and Hungary will be visited this Sunday by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. What can be expected from this visit?

General Pavel Macko: Rubio is coming to Bratislava according to me not only because of nuclear energy and NATO, but also to have Washington verify where Slovakia belongs. Whether it’s closer to Warsaw or to Budapest.

Moderator: And what will he find out?

General Pavel Macko: Well, I’ll comment on that next week. But when I look at that official program that was there, when I look at that broader security, energy and political context, several things emerge for me. Rubio is now at the Security Conference in Munich and then immediately, if it ends 15th-16th he goes to Bratislava and Budapest. I think the primary goal of this trip is supporting Viktor Orbán. Despite Rubio being perceived as more moderate, he is a faithful cheerleader of President Trump. We saw this in that joint US Congress session, that with Vance and Hegseth these are big cheerleaders and unconditional supporters of President Trump. He is very loyal to Trump as well, but is more digestible for European partners.

So primarily it’s really to give support in Hungary before elections to Orbán. This will also be communicated by Fidesz and Viktor Orbán as great American support for his policy. It’s also a signal toward Central European allies and allied populists. And we actually now find ourselves having to decide where we’ll be more. Whether with that Viktor, or with Poland, which is becoming a significant player.

And when we talked about that command structure, for example one change in Brunssum is that long-term there was British-German command, that Germans always commanded and British were deputy. Then it was German-Italian, where commanders alternated like this and now it’s newest – and Poles already officially announced this – it will be Polish-German command. Thus we see how Poland’s reach is growing. Because in between, that responsibility of that Brunssum also significantly increased. It’s actually responsibility for half the Alliance, operational command. And a significant four-star Polish general will be stationed there as commander.

When I quickly look at Slovakia, security and NATO will probably also be a topic. There will be discussion about harmonizing those security interests. There will definitely be pressure for a clearer line from Slovakia in NATO and toward Ukraine. And confirmation whether we’re a reliable ally, Rubio will definitely ask about our NATO commitments. Short-term we’ll tell him everything is fine and long-term he won’t be able to check. And of course they’ll continue that communication and cooperation in nuclear energy.

360 Degrees

Moderator: How does tension between USA and Iran continue? This morning I caught news that the largest American aircraft carrier is heading to the Persian Gulf.

General Pavel Macko: The crisis between USA and Iran is deepening. Those negotiations and communication exchanges failed and thus Donald Trump as president tightened sanctions and rhetoric and talks about something very hard. The United States are thus considering and now it already looks like they decided to deploy another carrier strike group, because it’s not just an aircraft carrier. Those are cruisers, those are other platforms, submarines, mine sweepers. It’s always such purpose-built strike group. It’s not just protective wall around that aircraft carrier, but it’s also additional strike force. So they’re apparently setting this in motion.

Iran meanwhile brutally suppresses its protests. Both sides are in stalemate where the biggest risk is excessive escalation. The United States are escalating pressure but don’t want a big war. Because this is still not preferred in that Trump strategy – he would most like to have that big hammer, like in that movie with Thor, that I bang there, it shakes and everyone lines up. But President Trump definitely doesn’t want to go into any ground operations. We see those risks and tensions for those their forces that are in the region.

Moderator: And what are those risks?

General Pavel Macko: Well, an incident in Persian Gulf could be such trigger, whether attack on tanker, drone attack. It could close actually that Strait of Hormuz. And we know that large amount of hydrocarbons goes from there, that surroundings and Europe depend on it… It’s like when you have cardiovascular system, you have important artery, you squeeze it and you have problem. And it doesn’t have to be just that carotid or directly pulmonary, but it can be also somewhere, for example that femoral. It always makes big imbalance or disrupts that organism. This means this would be very dangerous.

An attack on American forces in Iraq or Syria could also happen, which are not invulnerable and Iran has these capabilities. Or Iran could proceed to that escalation in the region. Or that high concentration of forces could occur and unintentional escalation could happen. So we’ll watch this carefully. Trump bet on increasing economic and military pressure. Iran on the other hand shows hard line outwardly, but mainly does repressions at home. But those diplomatic channels are weak.

Closing Quote

General Pavel Macko: So last time we talked about negotiations and now we see also security conference, allied negotiations, we see Marco Rubio’s visit. So if you allow, I’ll give another quote also about negotiations.

„European negotiations are like making love to elephants. Everything happens at high level, a lot of dust is stirred up and it takes very long before anything comes of it.“

Said Willy Brandt, German politician and German chancellor from 1969 to 1974.

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Marco Rubio represents the highest-ranking American representative at this year’s conference. His speech was intended to serve as a tone correction after last year’s chaotic performance by J.D. Vance. Rubio finds himself in a challenging position where he must appease Europe while simultaneously maintaining the hard line of Donald Trump’s administration.

What did he say?

The civilized tone compared to Vance represented the first key element of his appearance. Recent disputes with allies, the fiasco of aggressive policy toward Greenland, criticism for dismantling the international system and demolishing transatlantic relations, together with the shocking report published by MSC about the demolition of the international system by the US administration, literally demanded a significant correction of approach.

Rubio devoted the largest part of his speech to returning to shared history and emphasizing the common civilizational path and shared values. In this way, he tried to refute partners‘ feeling that the USA is destroying rules and burning bridges behind them. He paraphrased it with the words: „The USA may dominate the western hemisphere, but we are still children of Europe.“

The second significant element was the rejection of the narrative that the USA is destroying international order. According to Rubio’s argumentation, the rules-based world system, free movement of people, liberalism, and climate agenda were incorrectly set up, are now broken, and our enemies have exploited them for their growth. They used them unfairly while we deindustrialized. According to him, the USA is not destroying the system but wants to build a new system that corresponds to the new geopolitical reality. Europe should join this process. He paraphrased it as: „We must build our own Western raw material supply chain independent from other centers of power.“

The third point was justification of steps toward Iran and Venezuela as necessary. The USA had to act because the world is failing. The UN and world community did not prevent the tragedy in Gaza or Ukraine, they didn’t even stop attempts to acquire nuclear weapons by the ayatollahs. Other powers outside the West are abusing the poorly set international system. The global world order needs to be redefined anew and fairly – competition of powers is reality and has replaced the system based on „poorly set“ rules.

The fourth element was emphasis on Christian heritage, character of civilization, and conservative values as defense of the ideology of the current American administration. According to Rubio, the USA is not a disruptor but a consistent defender of these fundamental values.

The fifth point concerned the complete failure of the UN, due to which the USA must act and invites partners to do so. It is necessary to reevaluate international formats and alliances. The USA wants a strong alliance with European allies, but not at any cost. It is desirable for Europe to be strong and thus strengthen our common Western civilization alongside the USA. He paraphrased it with the words: „The purpose of our alliance is to defend citizens, our countries and our interests, the meaning of the Alliance’s existence is not protection of the welfare state.“

It should be noted that pressure on increasing defense spending and fairer distribution of the burden of common defense was not so strong and straightforward, but rather implied.

The sixth point was assurance of US commitment to NATO, but with conditions. Europe must add more effort. The goal of the USA is not the end of the Transatlantic era. Europe must have means to be able to defend itself.

Conclusions and assessment

Regarding conclusions and assessment, the performance was good to listen to, but reality is far harsher. Messages about alliance with Europe were strong and clearly articulated. However, unpredictable steps by President Trump and his administration, absence of any transparent discussion with partners, and even threats of using military force against an ally relativize this and return us to harsh reality.

About Marco Rubio’s real priorities, which are in conflict with his speech, the cancellation of participation in the meeting with Zelensky and his allies testifies. Diplomatic talk about a packed schedule is a poor excuse. What had higher priority than this meeting with allies and Zelensky?

Europe must stand on its own feet. This will not spoil anything, it will be a better and more balanced partner to the USA. If American real politics would tear to pieces soaring speeches like Rubio’s, at least we won’t be left empty-handed.

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Note: This is a transcript of the original broadcast at .týžden in Slovak language

Moderator: Welcome to listening, and I can hardly believe it, to the 150th edition of the Security Radar of my friend General Pavel Macko. Welcome, Pavel.

Pavel Macko: Thank you very much, pleasant listening.

FOG OF WAR

Putin’s „Ceasefire“ on Ukrainian Infrastructure

Moderator: How did Putin’s ceasefire on attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure turn out?

Pavel Macko: It turned out like all the ceasefires that Putin declared – simply big talk. He actually used the time when he didn’t attack for those few days – he didn’t even keep to those 7 days. He used the fact that he accumulated missiles and drones and made an even more intensive attack, which was even harder for the Ukrainians to stop.

This means that his effect was far higher than if he had attacked every day. And that’s actually the result of Putin’s „ceasefire“.

But it’s essential that none of us normal people, who know this, expected Putin to make any fundamental turn. But the falseness, even complete monstrosity of these peace activists was confirmed, who are actually making a defense of such aggression and claim they are trying to achieve peace. In reality, they are trying to achieve Russian victory.

Overall Picture of the Week

When I look at this overall, the overall picture of the week on several levels is as follows:

▪️First: Russia is intensifying pressure on multiple front sections, but any advances are not large

▪️Ukraine is achieving local counter-attacks, especially near Kupiansk and Kostiantynivka

▪️This winter campaign is extraordinarily exhausting – after several years, actually for the first time during these 4 years of war, when it’s truly the toughest winter

▪️The impacts are enormous and meanwhile the Russians have also gained some additional resources

▪️Ukrainian air defense after 4 years is exhausted

▪️Russian losses are however record-breaking – in January they again lost 30 thousand soldiers

▪️On the other hand, they are massively replenishing equipment and continuing that long-term war economy

Diplomatically: Russia is again stalling for time, not retreating from its demands and actually negotiating only to prevent greater pressure, greater sanctions and a tougher stance from those countries and Ukraine that want to achieve that ceasefire and ensure that this war finally ends.

Situation on the Front Lines

Moderator: So let’s go to the front line and I suggest we go to Kharkiv and Kupiansk.

Pavel Macko: Good. When we look at Kharkiv and Kupiansk, there were partial counter-attacks by Ukrainian forces. Near Kupiansk, they managed to regain some positions again.

When we look, I have notes here that Russia has been pushing for a long time from the north and east. They also had such a bridgehead on the other side of the Oskil river and the Ukrainians managed to push back in these areas.

Other Front Sectors

Lyman, Siversk, Sloviansk: There we know that fighting is already taking place in Siversk. Russian units continued attacks toward Novoselivka, Vykhivka, Serednie, Drobysheve and Dybrova, but there was no fundamental advance there.

Near Kostiantynivka, Druzhivka: Ukraine conversely achieved significant successes.

Near Yablunivka: The Russians advanced slightly east of the city.

Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad: There the Russians were slightly successful. Reconnaissance-sabotage units penetrated directly into Myrnohrad and increased pressure along one of the main transport routes. Ukraine however repelled dozens of attacks around Rodynske.

Zaporizhzhia Oblast: The biggest battles around Hulyaipole have been continuing for a long time. West of Dobropillia. But it’s extreme there – the Russians attack 32 times daily on just this one small front section.

In Kherson: There the classic shelling continues. The Russians still claim in those negotiations that they want Kherson back, but de facto they want to completely destroy it just like the destroyed Vovchansk and all those cities on the contact line.

Middle East – Gaza and Israel

Moderator: Let’s go to the Middle East. Are there any changes in Gaza and Israel?

Pavel Macko: That overall picture is… The ceasefire formally continues, we were supposed to move to the second phase. But it’s actually eroding:

▪️Israeli activities continue

▪️Hamas reacts similarly or provokes clashes

▪️International mechanisms are not yet functioning

▪️Humanitarian crisis (the situation is difficult)

Indeed, now the crossing at Rafah has also been opened, but it’s insufficient, the UN components are not functioning there either.

Problems with Humanitarian Organizations

Israel called on Doctors Without Borders to leave the Gaza Strip because they again suspect them of collaborating with Palestinians – not the citizens they should serve, but collaborating with Hamas.

Moderator: I read such a report in the Israeli press – there was their own reporter who showed one Palestinian doctor who during the war appeared as a doctor, showed victims, everything. And in the end it turned out he was a Hamas officer. Good, let’s continue.

Pavel Macko: Exactly, there are also honest ones there, but by providing legitimacy or legend for that cover, it naturally irritates the other side.

Administrative Arrangement of Gaza

When we look further, the administrative arrangement of Gaza is unclear. The United States – we talked about Al-Shat here, who is supposed to be there, that former Palestinian Authority minister, could be the administrator, temporary head of that administration, some bureaucratic government. However, it’s not yet in the situation where it would really function.

Reconstruction is at a dead end, because as long as there’s no stable and secure environment, the donors don’t have confidence, don’t give money there and there are no mechanisms that would implement it.

Security Situation

As I indicated, there was a series of clashes and attacks. Hamas and its security components conducted operations against groups they designate as Israeli-supported gangs.

In other words, other Palestinians, who don’t identify with Hamas, who maybe have a different view on how things should function in Gaza, are already also targets, so Hamas is already attacking its own.

The Israelis consolidated somehow, adjusted that yellow line. Of course, this immediately caused Arab outcry that they want to reduce even more or reduce Gaza’s territory.

Creation of New Administration

Moderator: How is the creation of new administration in Gaza progressing? Because without that we won’t move forward.

Pavel Macko: Definitely. This is what I already indicated in that overview. The border crossing at Rafah opened. There’s a limited number of patients who can cross from one side to the other.

The US is pushing for that multi-phase plan– meaning a full transition to phase 2, including an international security mission and gradual reconstruction.

But since there’s no agreement on disarming Hamas, they haven’t moved anywhere, therefore territorial administration hasn’t moved either, because one is subordinated to or conditional on the other.

Therefore those players like the United Arab Emirates prepared a project of some Emirati complex in southern Gaza, where they want to actually house thousands of displaced Palestinians.

But the project is politically controversial, because again Palestinians reject relocation to zones controlled by Israel, because that’s in the part that’s behind that yellow line on the other side.

So nothing has been achieved there yet and these new institutions can’t establish themselves.

Fundamental Problem

Moderator: When I look at this as a layperson – because I am a layperson – it seems to me that without Hamas being dispersed, things won’t move forward there.

Pavel Macko: We’ve been saying this since the beginning, since October 7, 2023. Why don’t they disperse it? Because we’ve seen that it causes large collateral losses. Therefore everyone turned against Israel.

On the other hand, we see that President Trump already asked for a Nobel Peace Prize for this, but he didn’t get it. Good anyway, because that would be unfair. And now we see that even he can’t push this through.

This means that this conflict will continue as we’ve been saying for a long time. It can be stabilized only when there’s willingness from the Arab side, first directly from the ranks of Palestinians, whom Hamas has been indoctrinating for a quarter century, because it completely controlled there.

And precisely these clashes – this is exactly about the fact that as soon as there’s a slightly different opinion, people from Hamas immediately liquidate them there, murder and shoot their own.

Second: Arabs never gave up – and I mean Hamas and these radical components – they never gave up the goal of complete liquidation of Israel.

And as long as they don’t give this up and as long as international security forces don’t come there, who will run into the same thing Israel runs into – that they will have to do the so-called dirty work, that they will also have to militarily strike those unfortunates who won’t want to cooperate in that ceasefire – this will continue.

Situation in Syria

Moderator: What’s happening around Syria? We said that the biggest tension…

Pavel Macko: First, there are conflicts of interest between Lebanon and Syria, because there’s a part of those fled officers hiding in Lebanon.

There’s Hezbollah, which is no longer a political favorite in Syria after the replacement of Bashar al-Assad, because they fought against this al-Shar. So that’s one part.

It calmed down there, but recent weeks saw strong conflict between the new governmental power and SDF forces including Kurdish units.

Ceasefire and Integration

From January 20 a de facto ceasefire has been in place there. It looks like the situation is stabilizing.

Kurds are really in the weakest position in the last 10 years. They had to leave the western bank of the Euphrates river, had to move to the eastern side, but ended the fighting. They also ended in other areas.

What was originally promised when Bashar al-Assad fell is happening – that integration will occur. Only that integration is not now that the entire SDF would integrate at once, it’s integrating by individual regions, by individual cities and communities.

What is negative on one hand for those Kurds, because therefore they don’t create some compact whole.

From the governmental power’s perspective it’s advantageous in that no parallel command is created – because we see this in Bosnia and Herzegovina, how it looks: there’s that federation, but actually Republika Srpska does whatever it wants anyway.

This political-administrative arrangement of Syria still awaits its solution and the military one is such that the government is trying to integrate those armed components into a unified army.

Lebanon

In Lebanon the situation is still tense and there are some pockets of resistance, Israel had to react again.

And mainly it shows also there that similarly as in Syria, the political situation is very unstable. They had an interim government basically since that explosion – if listeners remember, since that huge explosion in the port in Beirut – there was such a provisional governmental regime.

And this continues. The only thing that changed is that Hezbollah’s role and position is weaker.

STRATEGIC BACKGROUND

Three-Party Negotiations on Ukraine

Moderator: Main attention focused on three-party negotiations on Ukraine. So can you somehow briefly evaluate them? But it seems to me that nothing is moving anywhere.

Pavel Macko: Basically you’re right. We’re already done with this conclusion. But I’ll still explain it a bit.

We had two rounds. The first round was January 23 and 24. We already partially discussed it. Then came the second round.

First Round of Negotiations

I’ll first recap that first round, because it’s important for understanding where we’ve moved.

In that first round there was actually direct contact between Ukrainians and Russians through – with the presence of the US as mediator after almost 4 years.

And it was the first round. No one had great expectations that peace would suddenly emerge there. It was at such a higher working level.

Ukrainian delegation:

▪️Rustam Umerov

▪️former defense minister, today head of security council

▪️Kirill Budanov

▪️former head of HUR and now head of presidential office

▪️Chief of General Staff

Here I need to explain – Syrsky is the main commander of Ukrainian forces. That means he is the commander. And what we have as chief of staff, they have as chief of general staff. And that general was also there.

Russian side had Dmitriev there – economic-political negotiator and had the head of Russian GRU there.

Results of First Round

That means, that format– first, what happened was that a framework and format for negotiations was established. Professional working groups were established in which details will be discussed.

Main topics were addressed:

▪️Territorial issues

▪️they didn’t agree on anything, there’s a key dispute

▪️Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

▪️also a problem

▪️Security guarantees for Ukraine

These are actually two such dealbreakers or showstoppers, as it’s said in English. These are the brakes, obstacles so far insurmountable. That means security guarantees and territory.

Because Russia still claims that Ukraine should give up territory that Russians haven’t been able to somehow encompass even after 4 years of war.

Atmosphere of Negotiations

Moderator: What’s the dynamic of those negotiations, what’s the atmosphere? That’s also important there.

Pavel Macko: Both sides claimed it was productive and substantive, meaning they had content. When I already hear the word „productive“…

Ukraine said that yes, these were substantial negotiations, that concrete steps and practical solutions were addressed, which set aside those two most important issues I mentioned.

The US also designated them as productive and appreciated what I also appreciated, that those technical military teams negotiated together, because the ceasefire also needs to be agreed upon military-technically, so that the first shot from one drunk soldier doesn’t restart the war. Because that can also happen.

Russians proved that they don’t have willingness for peace, but meanwhile intensively attacked and said that military operations will continue until Kyiv accepts their demands.

In other words, Russians probably both for domestic audience and for their audience in the third world, are playing such a game – this is called hardball in English, such a tough game.

Basically they want, even if they’ll have to concede from those demands of theirs, they want to sell it as their clear victory. Of course, everyone sees that’s not true.

And if Russians don’t catch the right moment that they won’t gain more, the exact opposite can happen, that they can also collapse. Ukraine can of course also collapse – it’s closer to it than Russia, but it’s a very complex situation.

Summary of First Round

So it was something new after 4 years. They didn’t insult each other after these negotiations, so it’s already important that the negotiation was substantive. I would summarize it that way.

Key conclusions:

▪️Created a framework but didn’t bring results

▪️Territories and security guarantees (this is simply the stumbling block)

▪️Russia uses parallel attacks as a pressure tool

▪️Therefore reducing trust from Ukraine and its supporters that those negotiations are sincere

▪️USA, to not lose face, is trying to keep these negotiations alive

It’s noteworthy that the State Department, foreign ministry, is not represented there, meaning those who are there are not classic diplomats.

Second Round of Negotiations

Moderator: How do you evaluate that second round?

Pavel Macko: That second round progressed, because quite logically, from what I explained in that first round, it was more about procedural issues, formats, who with whom, when, in which groups.

Now it was more about real negotiations, within individual groups they negotiated in more detail.

From what we have – of course, detailed record of these negotiations is not publicly available – so:

▪️That long-term dispute continues

▪️Security guarantees are still without concrete progress

▪️USA acts as mediator

▪️both sides remain relatively firm

Russian Provocations

Russians escalated energy attacks, and this even during the announced ceasefire, which of course Kyiv designated as violation of agreement. It was visible when they bombed a classic conventional power plant and then also a heating plant near Kyiv.

Russians thought that by this they would scare the rest, that if you don’t yield to us and won’t negotiate with us, or accept conditions, we’ll attack. They don’t want to negotiate, they just want Ukrainians to accept conditions – so somehow we’ll continue and you’ll be even worse off.

Of course, they’re abusing this time when there are extreme frosts there.

Positive Progress

But they moved forward in what Zelensky also expected and wanted. They moved forward in the expected prisoner exchange– 314 or 324, I’m not sure now what that number was. The first 150 were already exchanged.

It’s good that also on that Russian side, besides those nationalists, extremists and such clowns like Medvedev, who shouted that all those prisoners of war should be killed – for example from Mariupol, those who were now almost 4 years in captivity – so they returned from that captivity.

Because war also has its rules, we have Geneva Conventions for that and this is something that Russians should also observe.

Further Development

The rest is that they’ll continue, they’ll probably meet next in the United States.

But that Russian strong pressure rather causes greater support for Ukraine from its supporters.

NATO Reactions

Moderator: I noticed that when the NATO Secretary General was in Ukraine a few days ago, he got to taste how a massive Russian attack tastes. Can this somehow change NATO’s approach?

Pavel Macko:It’s already changing, because if I listened carefully to Rutte’s statements, for example his predecessor talked about Ukraine’s integration into NATO and so on, but that language was diplomatic.

Now Rutte had relatively harsh language toward these Russians, said unambiguously that this is proof that Moscow doesn’t want peace. And it’s not some pretext.

Russians thought that hard attacks would help– and otherwise they miscalculated strategically in this, just as they miscalculated on February 24, 2022, because they quickly jumped away from that negotiation. They were persuaded by Macron, by Joe Biden. Scholz called Putin several times, Macron called even a few hours before that invasion. Putin saying that invasion wouldn’t happen, but he wanted to play that tough game, attacked, knocked out his front teeth and still can’t get out of it.

And now it’s the same, that Rutte gave very sharp statements. I put it in a table because we prepared that scenario together.

He said – this is a quote: „This peace will be lasting not because papers are signed, but because it will be backed by hard power.“

Change in NATO Position

This means, if Russians now refused that no foreign soldiers would be there, no support for Ukraine, because Russia wanted a weakened Ukraine that would be a puppet in Russia’s hands, this is changing.

And when they decide in the future to take control of Ukraine, they can do it politically through their extensive agent network and install a new Yanukovych there, or they can do it again militarily, that they would complete what they haven’t managed so far.

After they gather strength – like now with those recent attacks – let’s imagine that we give Russians a year or two pause to re-arm, re-equip and then strike Ukraine again.

This is now changing, NATO’s position as a whole is also changing, where it says it will continue this support and interprets this Russian attack as an attempt at terror and pressure. And therefore arguments for those robust security guarantees are strengthened.

End of New START Treaty

Moderator: The last treaty on control of strategic nuclear weapons, New START, ended. So explain what that agreement was and why it ended?

Pavel Macko: I would probably also like us to make this today’s main topic, to get a broader perspective for our listeners.

What the New START Treaty Was

So first that New START– this was the last functioning agreement, signed by Barack Obama and the Russian president, which actually limited strategic nuclear weapons.

But I’ll say what the development was here.

Historical Development of Nuclear Agreements

During the Cold War, in the late 60s, these powers got into a situation where they achieved huge numbers of nuclear weapons, because that paranoia and mutual suspicion, where we found ourselves in arms races, ended in:

▪️Russians eventually had more than 40,000 nuclear warheads (today they have 5,400)

▪️United States at that peak had more than 32,000 nuclear warheads

A large part of this was also tactical. We had large-caliber artillery shells and such short-range missiles there.

This means that even for regular battlefield combat it was calculated that these nuclear weapons would be used in clashes between these states, while hydrogen bombs were rather mounted on those long-range means, whether intercontinental missiles.

First Negotiations

Those negotiations ran already 1968-1969, but somehow they didn’t manage to conclude. Of course, Nixon’s pressure and move also with China eventually convinced the Soviets.

I’ll just enumerate them. There was a whole series of agreements:

SALT– this was that first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1969-1979.

Very quickly then came SALT 1, where strategic carriers were also limited, meaning the number of missiles and those other means.

A second treaty SALT 2 was also negotiated in 1979, but it wasn’t ratified. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan then and they didn’t ratify it, but both sides more or less adhered to it.

ABM and INF Treaties

In 1972 the ABM treaty was also concluded – this was limitation of anti-missile defense, where the number was set at maximum 200, later adjusted to 100 anti-missile systems.

The problem is that when one side starts building too strong anti-missile defense, it forces the other to increase the number of those offensive means.

I forgot one important one – this was the INF treaty – it was called about banning medium and short-range missiles between Gorbachev and Reagan in 1987.

This was absolutely crucial for Europe. In Europe we were in the range of 3 to 8 minutes response time, meaning the risk of accidental nuclear conflict was enormous.

By completely eliminating these missiles, that space was cleared, and therefore only space for those intercontinental missiles was left. There’s at least half an hour for reaction there.

This means that even in case of some stupid escalation, the red phone could still be used, and those missiles could be sent to self-destruct and stop a potential attack. This couldn’t be done with these medium-range missiles.

START Treaties

Then after the end of the Cold War came the START agreement in 1991. From huge numbers, those numbers were reduced even more significantly and we actually got to today’s numbers.

There was START II, which also banned those multiple warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles, on those heavy ones. Because you can cheat there. You say you’ll have only 100 intercontinental missiles, but put ten of these warheads in each.

Russians have Avangard prepared this way. In the final flight stage it’s as if you again had ten missiles. Suddenly you have thousands instead of hundreds. So this treaty was important because of that.

New START

Then this agreement, when it ended, actually that new START was negotiated, where limits on warheads and carriers were set. And it was extended a few years ago for 5 years, but this extension expired, a new agreement wasn’t concluded.

New START parameters:

▪️1,500 deployed strategic warheads

▪️meaning those they can have in operational regime

▪️700 deployed carriers

▪️800 total carriers

▪️this includes strategic bombers

Control Mechanisms

So there were mainly detailed inspection mechanisms. Both sides announced where they have those forces, where the US has problems with those Russian mobile ones, but they always had to notify major movements.

And both sides could visit those places. Of course they didn’t go into the guts of these systems, but they could verify whether those measures are being observed, whether they secretly haven’t built additional forces, whether they secretly don’t have some additional missiles there. All this has now ended.

Why the Treaty Ended

When I say it formally, Russia suspended participation in 2023 and subsequently the United States also reacted, but formally the treaty was valid, no one violated it.

This happened mainly because when the war in Ukraine started, Russians supposedly for technical reasons started blocking these verifications, these on-site inspections.

The reason– on one hand I understand them, it was paranoid, because they were at war with Ukraine and feared that during those inspections Americans would learn something they could then pass to Ukrainians.

On the other hand Americans said– there’s no point going into such an agreement that can’t be verified, as we also said before with the Budapest Memorandum and so on…

So this was absolutely crucial. They considered the US as a hostile side. This was part of that Russian rhetoric, that Putin constantly says, because when he’s not succeeding, he says that first he wanted to denazify and demilitarize everything. And when he’s not succeeding, he says he’s actually fighting the entire West. And this is that propaganda that goes around.

Chinese Factor

Another thing was that there were also those negotiations and considerations that China announced a large nuclear program, even to triple the number of its warheads by the decade, it already has 600 warheads now.

China has such an ambition that by 2035 to have parity with the United States in some components and in its region or catch up with Russia and the United States.

And after 2040 China wants to already be an equal partner also in strategic nuclear weapons to the United States.

Chinese Triad

This means that China started building the so-called triad. The triad is that you have:

1 ) Those ground intercontinental ballistic missiles

2) You have them then on submarines

▪️these are well protected because they’re hard to detect, meaning it’s a second strike weapon or last judgment, that when everything fails, even if that country was destroyed, it has the ability either semi-automatically or even automatically to respond to that strike and destroy the other side

3) And there are then aviation means – strategic aviation.

Russians invested more in those aviation means in those cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, which they now use only with conventional warheads directly on Ukraine.

Why New START Finally Fell?

I said that it fell actually because:

▪️United States wanted a broader agreement

▪️Russia wanted a different agreement, because it conditioned it, wanted to balance and offset other things on it

▪️China didn’t want any agreement yet, said it’s not yet that player that should be regulated

Russian and Chinese Armament

Moderator: I notice that Russia demonstrated new weapons and of course we’ve seen it also with the Chinese. And those Russian conventional ones aren’t very trustworthy. But should we fear those Russian nuclear weapons? And what about the USA? Are they falling behind or not?

Pavel Macko: Several aspects. It’s true that Russia modernized and quite massively. I wouldn’t underestimate their nuclear arsenal.

Russian Nuclear Forces

First, insiders know that there are really elite troops there. These aren’t those bums called ground troops that they showed at the beginning of the war. It’s more professional there.

But we’ve seen accidents there too, but that was mostly during tests. This means we can’t say in what technical state those missiles that are in operational service are.

But we know that Russians demonstrated in 2018 a series of those displays – Avangard, Zircon, which can also have nuclear warheads.

Hypersonic Systems

Sub-warhead is a small missile inside that big missile. There are several of them. These are so-called hypersonic gliders, which can still maneuver.

They have their own engine, can change flight path and fly at that hypersonic speed, which by the way all ballistic missiles fly.

But the difference is that the glider can still maneuver and fundamentally change direction and can go hundreds of kilometers elsewhere than where the original missile would fall.

Russian Modernization

So Russians modernized. They have:

▪️New Yars and Sarmat missiles

▪️New submarine-launched ballistic missiles (which are launched Bulava)

▪️New submarines of Borei class

▪️New cruise missiles Kh-102 (Kh-101, which they used, this is some derivative)

▪️They have those Avangardes, Poseidon, Burevestnik

Principally Russians modernized, because the Soviet Union left them old junk. And they were aware that conventionally – and then they also introduced professional army – conventionally Russia didn’t have a chance not only against NATO, but also potentially against other rivals. And therefore invested asymmetrically in nuclear arsenal.

Chinese Expansion

What about China? China is expanding. But of course from that low base. China was that below-average student, below-average player, even lower than United Kingdom and France.

France has 290 and United Kingdom some roughly 250-245 of these warheads.

China started building its potential. Just as it builds its conventional army – visible that it has 5th generation fighters, stealth fighters already better than Russians, that it invests in other means.

It started investing in this too, but started from that low number:

▪️Had in 2010: 200 warheads

▪️Today has: 600

▪️Heading toward at least a thousand by the end of this decade

Chinese Triad

But it’s also building a triad. As it starts expanding in that Pacific and sees that the United States has dominance there, it’s building nuclear triad. That means new nuclear submarines and also hypersonic systems.

We’ve seen several of them now on parade and this is precisely because of that rivalry in Indo-Pacific and also fear of American anti-missile defense, which is strengthening. Now we’ve heard about Golden Dome.

American Nuclear Forces

Moderator: And are the USA falling behind or not?

This is interesting, because a lot in professional journals and so on was criticism when Russians introduced these hypersonic systems, then Chinese also conventional and potentially also nuclear systems, which are for example designed to destroy those aircraft carrier battle groups.

When you have a hypersonic missile, the opponent can’t stop it anymore, you put a nuclear payload there, so you can actually erase that American advantage – aircraft carriers, Americans are rulers of the seas with them. What the British Empire used to be.

They have 9 battle carrier groups– those are aircraft carrier battle groups, several fleets, they have large Pacific, Atlantic fleet.

Criticism of American Lag

When China developed this, many evil tongues say that the US fell asleep, don’t have hypersonic systems, didn’t pay much attention to it. But I’ll mention several aspects.

It’s really true that Minuteman III are missiles from the 70s, but technologically they were much more advanced than those Russian missiles that were in forces. But the US didn’t modernize them.

They have only one warhead, can’t even add others, while Russians meanwhile made an upgrade where they don’t have multiple warheads mounted, but can and know how to do it relatively quickly.

So in this segment the US seemed to lag behind.

New American Programs

Currently running is a program for Sentinel upgrade or replacement of Minuteman III. Otherwise Sentinel is also that invisible reconnaissance drone RQ-171, but these should be Sentinel missiles, which should be ready by 2030. That’s still 5 years, but it’s an extremely expensive project, so the question is whether it will be successful or not.

But the US has strategic aviation, where unlike Russian aircraft they have absolutely top-notch stealth bombers. B-2 were already excellent and now B-21 Raider are absolute world top.

China and Russia don’t have even a chance yet to catch up to them in this in the next decade.

American Strength in Submarines

Main US strength lies and there they modernized, or had highly advanced technologies – and those are missiles launched from submarines.

In this they are absolute top. Still their Trident 2 D5LE missiles are unmatched, so they don’t even need to modernize them.

Golden Dome

Currently, I won’t discuss this today, we’ll discuss it another time. Golden Dome is not only protection from space against missile attacks – those are just sensors, but Golden Dome is supposed to also ensure maintaining connection, that all those submarines and fleets in stealth mode, even after nuclear explosions, should function and should be able to communicate with each other.

Should We Fear Nuclear Arms Race?

Moderator: So tell me this one thing – should we fear that nuclear arms race or not?

Pavel Macko:There are several scenarios. It started when there were 30-40 thousand warheads on both sides. We’re far from that happening, it would cost enormous expenses and I believe it won’t go to this limit.

The truth is that absence of all agreements can cause distrust on both sides and we see that even Trump indicated they might resume nuclear tests. These by the way are also agreed to be banned, but that comprehensive ban treaty wasn’t ratified.

This means it’s not legally binding. Only so far it was quietly observed.

Possible Scenarios

So there are several scenarios:

1) Quiet voluntary continuity and waiting for a suitable time when they sit down for negotiations. This would probably capture what Trump said.

When Trump said that when New START expires, it expires, that we’re simply not under such pressure that we must accept any pressure from Russia and we want to have China in it too. So that’s the first scenario.

2) New arms race– that’s the worst, that new arms race comes, meaning Trump will invest money and launch it.

3) Trilateral negotiations– that all three nuclear players and basically also militarily biggest powers USA, Russia and China sit down and try to agree.

4) Fragmentation, regionalization of that nuclear deterrence – meaning Europe including France, United Kingdom and others. That it fragments and we already have 9 nuclear countries and more can be added.

5) Crisis escalation– absolutely worst scenario, unlikely but very dangerous, is crisis escalation, that simply at some moment these conventional conflicts get out of control and one side will demonstrate use of nuclear forces.

I think that currently we are in scenario A– meaning quiet voluntary continuity and attempt at negotiation.

Slovakia in Security Context

Moderator: And where do we find ourselves in this, Slovakia?

Pavel Macko: I’m looking for a decent word. We are disoriented, trampled in the ground. We buried ourselves there like moles, only we didn’t choose good terrain, because we buried ourselves in some swamp and it’s leaking into our mole hole from all sides.

Slovakia is being left out of all these security discussions. As I indicated those scenarios, we actually don’t know where security will move and how it will transform.

Problems of Fico’s Government

Into this comes hysteria of this Smer government, which does knee-jerk politics in four world directions and breaks its allied relations to the core.

We saw Epstein, that actually our top representatives get caught in traps… Even if it’s not confirmed that our prime minister met with Bannon or not, by the way Fico was at that same CPAC forum last year, where Bannon was hailing and after him Robert Fico… not right after him, but later Robert Fico spoke, while even such a leader of extremists from French National Front left after this hailing. Even for him it was too much. Our prime minister stayed there. And that’s a problem.

Lies About MiG-29

The last cherry on top is that the prime minister shouted at the previous government that they are traitors, that they disarmed Slovakia. Now the prosecutor, who was pro-Smer, and I dare say this, let them be angry at me or not, if needed, I would give dozens of arguments…

Moderator: Pro-Smer is not a good expression, she just helped Smer.

Pavel Macko: Yes, to be correct.

Even she found that the law regarding donation of MiGs and S-300 was not violated and prosecutor Remeta explained it in detail, how it really was. Fico lied yesterday at the press conference when he again said that S-300 was modernized.

And yet I know he has many generals, even loyal to him, who could have advised him and said it’s nonsense. But apparently he doesn’t ask anyone, because Fico doesn’t ask anyone about anything today.

From Fico’s foreign trips we have no outputs and conclusions. Not even the confidential ones. Simply there are no records from those negotiations, which is complete nonsense. This never was in Slovakia.

Tunneling of Slovak Army

Actually I’ll now remind you of one thing. And that’s something I probably also announce that I’ll likely file a criminal complaint, because if this government went to prosecute the previous one for that donation, then the prosecutor now confirmed what that government claimed, what I claim, that here enormous damage was arising during MiG maintenance.

When through the company of Fico’s friend Výboh subscription contract was made, where Russians committed that for that money they will maintain the number… I know that number, but I can’t say it because Minister Gajdoš refused to give it to me officially on my request, so I could publish it, how many of those 12 fighters we originally had should be permanently combat-ready, but it was roughly two thirds.

And we sometimes achieved only one tenth. And the prosecutor also said that at the end we had one fighter that was combat-capable and flight-capable, but we paid money for that full contract.

This means that not the previous government, but Fico’s governments tunneled Slovak armed forces and endangered the security of the Slovak Republic.

360°

Iran and Negotiations with USA

Moderator: Let’s look at developments around Iran. Will a new agreement be negotiated and the situation calmed, or will America have to strike there?

Pavel Macko: The question is whether America dares to strike there, because that’s actually why it didn’t strike during those protests.

They could actually provide an argument to that extreme Iranian government that it would unleash a kind of side conflict, that it would actually start some conflict in the Persian Gulf and therefore escalate the situation.

This would of course allow that government to make extreme measures at home, to suppress any opposition and could endanger American interests in that space, also American forces that are there.

American Military Preparation

Therefore Americans moved those aircraft carriers there, they have mighty force there now that could really strike.

I don’t think and Americans never indicate that they would want some ground invasion or landing, as we saw also in Venezuela, but they can very drastically strike those key targets in Iran.

But they also don’t want to do it, because it can be just a spark for a bigger conflict. Therefore there’s that offer for negotiation.

Today they should meet also with help of intermediary countries that try to give some negotiation format.

So that tension is very high, but it must be said that these negotiations today (February 6, 2026) are a real attempt at de-escalation.

Content of Negotiations

But chances for some fundamental breakthrough are small, we already have a long podcast, so I’ll just briefly say what those negotiations should be about.

First that dynamic or tension is illustrated by the fact that United States called on its citizens to immediately leave Iran.

Khamenei again said that if the US attacks, that conflict will change into regional war. That’s what I indicated.

Demands of Sides

When I return to those negotiations:

USA demands:

▪️Complete removal of enriched uranium stocks – Iran is willing to negotiate about this

▪️They want to also limit the ballistic program

▪️meaning those carriers

▪️And end support for regional militias like Hezbollah, Houthis and so on

Iran still insists that it’s prepared to negotiate only about that nuclear program, but ballistic missiles and those revolutionary guards and those various clones of revolutionary guards they bred throughout that region – those proxy groups – it doesn’t want to discuss this.

Qatar, Turkey and Egypt try to somehow act as intermediaries, but we’ll see.

Development Assessment

Simply, it will be first contact, that risk is high.

My assessment is that the US will balance between what I said, that risk of large escalation, but at some moment at least some limited strike may come.

I can even imagine they would strike directly at Khamenei.

Final Quote About Negotiation

Moderator: You spoke here today twice, or several times about negotiations and I know you prepared such a negotiation quote. So tell us and say who created that quote.

Pavel Macko: So: „If you approach negotiation with the assumption that the other person thinks the same way as you, you’re wrong. It’s not about empathy, but about projection.“

And it was said by Chris Voss– he’s a popular author of several books, former chief FBI negotiator.

The post Security Radar of General Pavel Macko – 150th Edition appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

Trump’s ultimatum has expired. The end of the war, however, is nowhere in sight, but everyone is already looking forward to a possible meeting between Putin and Trump. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is considering occupying the entire territory of the Gaza Strip.

Welcome to listening to the 125th edition of General Pavel Macko’s security radar.

Moderator: Paľo, welcome.

Pavel Macko: Good day.

Fog of War

Moderator: We’ve already discussed possible Trump negotiations, negotiations in Moscow on our website and in the video I recorded with you, Paľo. Let’s go straight to the situation on the battlefields.

Strategic Bombing in Ukraine

Paľo Macko: I’ll start by saying that strategic bombing continues from both sides. Incidentally, this was also one of the rumors that the Russians might want to offer a suspension of these strategic attacks. But that would be unilaterally advantageous for the Russians, despite them increasing the production of drones and missiles.

Ukrainians, by counter-attacking deep into Russian territory and destroying their factories and bases, are weakening the Russians‘ capacity that could be thrown onto the battlefield itself.

Record Russian Drone Attacks

Russians are breaking records again. I have statistics here for the last month:

▪️In June, Russians launched approximately 5,400 Shahed drones at Ukraine

▪️Last month it was already 6,443 drones

▪️That averages over 200 drones per day

The attacks are massive. We’ve seen multiple records broken in July, and attacks in the last week that were very massive. They are based on Shahed technology.

Ukrainians destroyed one storage facility, but according to Ukrainian intelligence, Russians are now capable of producing around 170 drones per day. Compared to May, they’ve increased it by another 70; at that time, they were producing about 100. The formal goal is 300 drones per day by the end of the year, but realistically it’s about 190-200 drones.

What does this mean? Russians are able to accumulate these drones. When we saw 700 drones in one day, these attacks could be even stronger. They also use rocket attacks, and this could lead to such a volume that we might experience up to 2,000 drones in a day.

Ukrainian Attacks on Russian Positions

Ukrainians are also trying to attack. This week there were again attacks by Ukrainians on Russian positions. I’ll look at the list; there were many targets hit:

▪️Oil refinery in Novokuibyshevsk in the Samara region

▪️Storage and launch site for Shahid drones in the Primorsko-Akhtiarsk region

▪️Elektropribor plant

What’s important is that there’s quite successful coordination of Ukrainian forces – the SBU security service, HUR military intelligence, and unmanned systems forces can coordinate and comprehensively plan such operations.

Situation on the Battlefields

Kursk and Sumy Regions

Fighting continues in the Kursk and Sumy regions. In the Kursk region, Russians tried to renew their offensive, but it was extinguished.

Looking at the Sumy region, more complex reports emerged about how Ukrainian commandos got into the rear of Russian units and eliminated several companies. A small diversionary group managed to cause casualties of around 330 dead and several hundred wounded. They had it prepared. When they made contact, Ukrainians were able to support the attack with drones and other means, and the losses on the Russian side were large.

Russians still hold a smaller buffer zone in the Sumy region. I’d pause here. They say it’s a buffer zone, but in reality, it looks different. Sumy is a city of 250,000. It’s a big city and relatively close to the borders. Here the Russians could try to take the city or make a gray zone out of it, because then they would keep Ukrainians in check and have another area. And if not capture it, then destroy it.

We see that Russians are now pushing in negotiations for recognition of control over the Kherson region. But Ukrainians drove them out of Kherson. Zaporizhzhia region – Russians don’t control Zaporizhzhia as a large city of a million people, nor do they currently have a chance to control it.

It cannot be ruled out that Russians might try to make a larger offensive in this direction and then pressure Ukrainians: „Okay, we’ll leave Sumy alone, but you have to give us Zaporizhzhia…“ That’s a rogue tactic.

Kharkiv Region and Kupiansk

Fighting is taking place in the Kharkiv region. So far, Russians have failed to consolidate the two protrusions – Lyptsi and Vovchansk, which form Russian force protrusions in Ukrainian territory.

The situation is most complicated near Pokrovsk, where they’re advancing from both the southwest and northwest. Pokrovsk is not surrounded, but the main supply route between Pokrovsk and Dnipro is gradually coming into the firing range of Russian forces.

Moderator: You mentioned Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. I don’t know if you want to add anything to that.

Paľo Macko: No, I would perhaps return to Kupiansk, because this is the second hot spot. Russians declared that they’ve moved further, but it appears that in villages west of the Oskil River, where they have a bridgehead, Russians don’t have complete control. It’s more like the operation of diversionary reconnaissance groups that show some presence there, do something. Optically it looks like they already have it under control, but Kupiansk is holding.

All these cities are in a difficult situation – whether Toretsk, Kupiansk, or Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk – but all have been holding for more than a year, some for more than two years. Russians are advancing, but there’s no sign of any great force that could break it quickly. But they will try to do so.

Middle East

Moderator: Alright, let’s go to the Middle East. Yesterday, overnight from Thursday to Friday, Israel’s war cabinet met and decided, simply put, to occupy the Gaza Strip.

Paľo Macko: Well, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip until 2005, or had full security control there, then handed it over to the Palestinian authorities. Hamas took power in Gaza in 2005, and since then the entire coastal strip, which we call the Gaza Strip, has been isolated. Israel built a protective fence there, and on October 7, 2023, we saw how that ended. Terrorists from Hamas and Islamic Jihad came out through the protective barrier around the Gaza Strip.

I wouldn’t talk about occupation, but there is pressure that they want to get the entire Gaza Strip under security control. This has, of course, sparked controversy in Israel, but I’ll focus more on what the plan would mean.

It should be a 4-5 month ground operation that would begin with the occupation and control of the entire Gaza Strip. One thing is to break military resistance and get in, but another is to maintain control. In this case, it would mean establishing security forces at least temporarily throughout Gaza, with the need to fight among the population. At the same time, after the fighting ends, they would have to maintain control, patrol the streets, and maintain order. It’s a risky operation, but it should be for about 4-5 months.

Moderator: Okay, wait, I’ll interrupt you. Do they have any other option? If they can’t agree with Hamas, and Hamas doesn’t want to agree, they don’t have many options.

Paľo Macko: It carries risk because there’s quite a lot of resistance even in Israeli security forces. They look at it in terms of what risks it carries.

The goals are:

▪️Remove Hamas – clear, legitimate

▪️Ensure the release of hostages – a completely great goal, because it’s been going on for almost two years. Hostages are in a miserable state, and Hamas uses this for blackmail, trying to divide Israeli society. Those who have relatives as hostages have been protesting from the beginning, which is natural. They’re demanding major concessions to Hamas, just to get their people home. To this, another part of the population says: „Fine, but that puts everyone else at risk.“

▪️Ensuring that Gaza does not pose a threat to Israel

All these goals are quite legitimate, but it means fighting in densely populated parts of the city. Therefore, not all foreign partners support it. There are security risks and the possibility of higher casualties on the side of Israeli forces and the population. And that’s what they objected to in the security forces – whether it’s worth it to them.

There are two philosophies:

1) Take control of the territory and clean it up

2) Isolate it and let it do what it wants inside

These are the plans and possible consequences of those plans.

Current Situation in Gaza and Surrounding Areas

Moderator: What major battles and events have occurred in Gaza, Israel, and Syria in the past week?

Paľo Macko: Fighting still continues. There were some airstrikes, strikes. There were allegedly also collateral casualties, Palestinian civilians killed. The profile of the fighting is difficult. Hamas knows it needs to hide among the population, provokes some action, then a strike follows. And usually, the strike unfortunately also carries casualties of innocent civilians who happen to be there at that moment.

We’ve already talked about the security cabinet meeting, but unfortunately the hostage crisis continues. We’ve seen footage of miserable hostages, and they’re still not liberated.

On the West Bank, Operation Iron Wall continues, which has been ongoing since January 2024. Again, it’s an effort to keep the security situation under control.

Moderator: I want to ask, is it true that the Lebanese government called on Hezbollah to hand over weapons?

Paľo Macko: Yes, this is true. This has been being addressed for several days and weeks. Now the pressure is escalating. The Lebanese government sees:

1) That Hezbollah is weakened

2) That it no longer has support in Syria and Iran is far away and also has its problems

3) That it constantly provokes pressure from Israel – whenever Hezbollah does something, a counter-strike follows

Lebanon wants Hezbollah to abide by the agreement with Israel, where it promised to leave the buffer zone, that there would be no weapon and no fighter there. This is an agreement from the previous conflict in 2006, which was violated, and now the new ceasefire is supposed to renew this agreement. So it’s completely logical that the Lebanese government is putting pressure on Hezbollah.

Moderator: And what’s new in Syria?

Paľo Macko: In Syria, the ceasefire is fortunately holding. It continues even after those intense momentary clashes where there were quite large casualties. Tension is still there. There are more than 192 thousand civilians who have been displaced – these are so-called internally displaced persons. They had to move and are temporarily bivouacking somewhere in other parts. It will be a problem to get them back.

There were large casualties – more than 500 dead on the side of fighters, but also more than 400 Syrian soldiers. And one more piece of information – Israeli Druze don’t perceive borders as a barrier. They simply migrate back and forth because they try to help their communities.

Strategic Background

Moderator: Paľo, today we’ll skip the history of World War II, but this week we commemorated another anniversary – 80 years since the dropping of atomic bombs. What do you have prepared in the background today?

Paľo Macko: I have several topics here; it was really a rich week. Everything we’ve seen, including those Moscow negotiations. But I would go to other things that are more in the background.

Interview with Kyrylo Budanov

First, I would mention an interesting interview with the head of Ukrainian intelligence defense service, Kyrylo Budanov. He had a philosophical moment, a reflection, where he discussed how Ukraine should continue its resistance against Russians and that national unity needs to be maintained.

It needs to be put in context that these were his subjective expressions, but he was quite on point in saying that if the country internally starts to fall apart or fragment into various interest groups, there will also be an erosion of independence and risks. If those in power break away too much from the chain, there’s a risk they’ll break away from the people. And that was in Ukraine – after the Orange Revolution, Tymoshenko ultimately failed, then we saw Poroshenko’s government, which was also kind of „neither here nor there.“

Into this come these negotiations, where there might be some ceasefire, but not everyone will be satisfied with it. As long as you’re under pressure, you stick together like a flock. But when that pressure eases, differences can surface.

Moderator: I’ve heard that Ukrainians got access to data from a Russian submarine that’s part of the nuclear triad. Is that true?

Paľo Macko: Yes, that’s right. It’s a shock. For Russians, it’s a serious matter. Ukrainian intelligence gained access to classified specifications. We’re talking about a Russian nuclear submarine, not some older one, but one of those modern Borei-class that carries 16 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each with multiple warheads.

It’s a means of retaliation. Countries keep these submarines precisely because they’re always in an unknown location and are a guarantee that even if they were attacked with nuclear weapons, they wouldn’t be disarmed, because they can counter-strike from submarines.

It’s a fiasco if Ukrainian intelligence service got access to:

▪️Security measures on the submarine

▪️Procedures and protocols

▪️Even the crew list

This doesn’t speak well of the protection of Russian strategic capabilities. Of course, this could cause escalation. Maybe it wasn’t even good that they published it, that they know it. We don’t know what all they know, but the fact that they published it is already on the edge, when even Russians have in their doctrine an attack on their nuclear facility as one of the triggers. But they’re not affecting or attacking the submarine so far.

The problem is that Russians already had a mishap a few years ago when they lost control of the so-called nuclear briefcase. It was when they had their Russian „Air Force One“ parked at the Moscow airport, and some thief broke into it. They claim it was a thief, but someone got in there and had access to electronic systems and everything related to it. So for a nuclear superpower, this is quite irresponsible.

Joint Weapons Purchase for Ukraine

Moderator: What about the joint weapons purchase for Ukraine that was talked about so much?

Paľo Macko: A lot was talked about it, but the process in dozens of Ramstein formats was always chaotic. Only now is it starting to come together, coordination is taking place.

At this moment, the European Public Procurement Agreement for Ukraine has been created. The Czech Republic, Denmark, and the Netherlands have launched a joint program worth $1 billion for the delivery of American weapons to Ukraine. This is already about planning, coordinating with a clear time horizon and a clear order. It should be for air defense systems and artillery.

The impact is that it’s moving from donations to structured procurement, when there’s not much left to donate. Thus, it can be put into some consolidation, and arms factories can better plan their capacities.

The important thing is to maintain strategic unity. If we know we need to help Ukraine, not primarily for them, but also for ourselves, then it needs to be done – and it needs to be done sensibly, in a consolidated manner, and not chaotically, where there’s a different idea every week.

Call from Israeli Security Leaders

Moderator: In Israel, there’s an interesting call from the security elite, who are calling for a stop to the fighting in Gaza. What’s that about?

Paľo Macko: In August, about 600 former Israeli security leaders, including former heads of Mossad, Shin Bet (their counterintelligence), and the General Staff, signed a call for an immediate end to the war in Gaza.

They claim that the main military objectives have already been met, Hamas has lost key capabilities, it doesn’t represent a great real force. There are its remnants, but it’s more a political matter from their perspective than a military one. Therefore, they say they wouldn’t need to engage further.

We don’t have to agree with them, but it’s a signal from people who stood at the head of the General Staff and these components, have insight into these things, and are weighing on the scales: what they can achieve and what it will cost them. And on the other side of the scales is: what all it can cause and what risks it carries. They’re trying to balance those risks.

This call resonated in the media as well. Of course, it’s just a call from a „council of elders“ that has no formal position. Netanyahu is the one who, in the end, whether we like him or not, is the prime minister who bears the immediate responsibility, is responsible for the functioning of the state, the security of citizens, and security forces. He has the mandate to decide as he sees fit.

It’s an indication that Israeli society is still free; it’s not like Russia. In Russia, not only Putin decides, but also the „top.“ War hawks may not only be in the Kremlin but also in the Duma and other components, where they still dream of a great victory and the destruction of the entire West. And that’s dangerous. That’s why we listen to those programs on Russian state television, where they want to bomb us with nuclear weapons, kill us, destroy our cities, and rename Paris to Vladimir and the like. This is dangerous – the fascization of Russian society continues.

View of the World – 360°

Moderator: So what does your radar show?

Paľo Macko: The ceasefire between Cambodia and Thailand is holding so far. We saw the delimitation commission working for the first time on Monday. This week I would like to return to Iran.

Moderator: And what’s there? Is the ceasefire working, not working? Or is there currently some silence around Iran?

Paľo Macko: The ceasefire is working, but I was doing a comprehensive monitoring of crisis areas in the world, and I must say that over the past week, apart from the Russian-Ukrainian war and the conflict in the Middle East, Iran resonated the most. But a little differently than we might expect.

Iranian Covert Operations

Iran came to the forefront in connection with the increase in Iranian covert operations, especially assassinations and kidnappings targeting individuals in Europe and throughout North America. It’s a big problem; even a coordinated report came out where 11 intelligence services drew attention to this.

When we consider that we saw a 12-day war between Israel and Iran, which ended with US intervention, subsequently a ceasefire was concluded at US pressure, but they were threatening even then. Many took it as if the regime is already weak, that it will collapse any moment, but it has, like in Romania, when securitate fought even when it was clear that the regime had fallen, an extensive network and is doing hybrid activities.

It’s not just Russians, it’s not just North Koreans, but Iran is extremely active, has its diasporas all over the world. I’ve already mentioned the warning issued by the USA, UK, France, and 11 other countries.

Iranian agents have narrowly focused on:

▪️Dissidents

▪️Journalists

▪️Their former officials living in Western countries

They’re after them, trying to attack them, and using classic methods of hybrid threats:

▪️Surveillance

▪️Cyber intrusions

▪️Kidnapping attempts

Many of which were thwarted or foiled at the last minute by counterintelligence in these countries.

The global impact is that it has diplomatic consequences. They summoned Iranian ambassadors and said: „Wait, these are already hostile activities, what are you allowing yourselves on our territory?“ They had to increase protection for multiple individuals, and joint investigations of Iranian networks are being conducted.

It’s like with Russians here – they’re spread through various agents, secondary collaborators, poor fellows who work in alternative media and for 500 euros will sell their own country and endanger the lives of their fellow citizens. Unfortunately, this is also happening from Iran.

Moderator: Let’s go to those activities. Can you name some?

Paľo Macko: I would divide them into blocks:

1) Expanded activity of foreign intelligence service – Iranian operatives were tracking journalists and officials

2) Espionage techniques and cyber attacks – Iranians were always good at hacking. Not only did they become victims of their centrifuges being hacked, but they themselves are very good.

3) Hezbollah – looks like half-dead, but there’s still space. People were partially disarmed, but Iran can still eventually use it to destabilize Lebanon.

If I were to follow up on the previous question – Lebanon realizes that people do desperate acts, and this Hezbollah, which has lost significance, may lose interest in being a major political force in Lebanon. They participate in power, have deputies there, but when they lost their influence, they can degenerate into destabilization – they’ll start causing harm.

Of course, there’s also nuclear tension, because we still don’t know how much nuclear material remained and where. And if Iran has embarked on such diversionary, espionage, cyber, and terrorist activities, it can use that material for purposes other than we originally thought.

Quote for the End

Moderator: Let’s go to my favorite section, and that’s the quote.

Paľo Macko: The times are hectic. We’ve been discussing the biggest military security crises. But at the beginning of July, exactly a month and two days ago, the Dalai Lama, who is a symbol of resistance against Chinese rule in Tibet, a moral authority and spiritual leader of Lamaist faith, turned 90. Amazing age.

For someone who has lived almost his entire life in exile, he has had a disproportionately large positive influence in the world, including through his spiritual message. So in honor of his 90 years (and we wish him, of course, the longest and most fruitful life), I would like to offer a thought from him:

„Live a good and honest life. When you get older and look back, you will be able to rejoice a second time.“ – Dalai Lama

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