In the first decade of the third millennium, the American drone RQ-170 Sentinel allegedly flew deep into Chinese airspace on a secret surveillance mission. What’s shocking is that it returned unnoticed. This stealth drone, nicknamed the Beast of Kandahar, was designed to avoid radars. It gathered intelligence information including about nuclear facilities. The mission was classified for years and no one officially confirmed it. It showed how invisible drones can be – even to a superpower.

Rarely do you have the luck in life to not only observe but also be part of a great change. Drones were known in armies for a relatively long time. A narrow group of intelligence and reconnaissance specialists or experts in fire destruction worked with them. When I took office as chief of operations staff of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2007, such a change occurred.

We began to use drones more intensively not only for reconnaissance, but also directly for conducting combat from the air. The complex mountainous terrain of vast Afghanistan directly demanded such innovations. We began to use the already known MQ-1 Predator more massively. The drone was already modified – capable of carrying two Hellfire missiles or other ammunition. Suddenly we had a multifunctional tool at our disposal. While one drone maintained situational overview over the battlefield, with the second we could execute a quiet and effective air strike. We could immediately evaluate live the effectiveness of the executed strike – so-called battle damage assessment.

Such missions are classified to this day. But much has changed. During the mission in Afghanistan, I began exceptionally allowing the display of live footage from drones monitoring ongoing operations on one of the large screens at the operations center. Some soldiers were scandalized. They were bothered by the live display of combat. Today on social networks and the internet you can find plenty of footage from drones or FPV drone strikes from Ukraine.

In autumn 2007 we received significant reinforcement – the MQ-9 Reaper drone. It was larger than the Predator, lasted longer in the air and could carry more than ten times the combat payload. It could monitor the situation on the ground for entire hours from great height, transmit data to intelligence officers and then strike massively.

In civilian life few people suspected it, but soldiers from ISAF command knew about the use of Predators and Reapers. Besides that, another story was also unfolding out of sight of most ISAF members. At the end of 2007, grainy photographs began spreading on the internet showing a mysterious aircraft with bat wings parked at Kandahar airport in Afghanistan. Aviation enthusiasts were confused. The US Air Force remained silent. Only in December 2009 did it officially acknowledge the existence of the RQ-170 Sentinel, a stealth reconnaissance drone developed by Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works division.

One of its most dramatic roles? The RQ-170 allegedly flew over Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistani Abbottabad during Operation Neptune’s Spear in 2011. It transmitted live video to American commanders and to the White House. It provided oversight over how Navy SEALs executed the raid in which the world’s most wanted terrorist died.

The mystique around the drone deepened later that same year. Iran claimed it captured the RQ-170 intact. According to the Iranians, the drone was flying 140 miles inside their airspace. It was probably monitoring nuclear facilities. They claimed they hacked into its control systems and forced it to land. The US rejected this claim, but footage of a seemingly undamaged drone appeared on Iranian state television.

Pentagon Shaken by $26 Hack

At the end of 2008, American soldiers in Iraq arrested a Shiite militant. In his laptop they discovered something unexpected – hours of live video recordings from American Predator drones. The footage was captured using SkyGrabber software for $26. It was developed by a Russian company for downloading satellite television and media streams. One teenager came up with this trick.

The insurgents didn’t hack into the drone’s control systems. They simply intercepted unencrypted video channels. Information from these channels was transmitted from drones to ground stations and command centers. Because they weren’t encrypted, anyone with the right satellite antenna and software could tune into them.

The breach was first reported by The Wall Street Journal in December 2009 and later confirmed by CNN and other media. It turned out that the military had known about the vulnerability since the 1990s, already during operations in Bosnia. Encryption had been removed from many channels at that time to prevent latency problems with real-time monitoring.

The Pentagon reacted quickly after the hack information was published. Encryption protocols on UAV platforms were updated. The military began modernizing the ROVER system – Remote Operated Video Enhanced Receiver, which was used to share footage from drones with soldiers on the ground. Officials acknowledged that solving the problem was not trivial, because almost every drone in the fleet used similar connection for downloading information.

Although no missions were compromised, the incident was a wake-up call. It showed how low-tech solutions can exploit high-tech systems and how even the most advanced military tools can be vulnerable to digital espionage. This story shows that drone development is not just about engineering, but also about playing cat and mouse in cybersecurity and electronic warfare.

Aerial Torpedoes

According to Cambridge Dictionary, a drone is an aircraft or small flying device that has no pilot but is remotely controlled by someone on the ground. It is used for monitoring, filming or dropping payload. Key characteristics include the absence of an onboard pilot. It can have various propulsion systems such as battery, combustion engine and similar.

A drone is often part of unmanned aerial systems – UAS or Unmanned Aerial System, which include the drone itself, ground control station and communication equipment. Today the designation drone is no longer tied only to flying devices, but also to remotely controlled ground, surface and underwater devices.

Most people associate drones with the advent of digital technologies that enabled more precise remote control as well as live image transmission. But the history of drones begins much earlier, already during World War I.

The stalemate in trench warfare forced armies to look for innovative ways to attack enemy positions without risking pilots‘ lives. One idea was to develop aerial torpedoes – essentially flying bombs that could autonomously deliver explosives across enemy lines. These early concepts were predecessors of glide bombs, guided missiles and modern UAVs.

Several key initial projects got underway. One of the first was Britain’s Aerial Target project from 1917. It was a radio-controlled aircraft designed by A. M. Low, intended for intercepting German airships. Although the machine never entered combat, it represented pioneering effort in remote-controlled aviation. Low is often called the father of radio guidance systems.

Americans came up with the Kettering Bug in 1918. It was developed by Charles Kettering and the US Signal Corps. It was a small biplane powered by a four-cylinder engine. It used gyroscopes and a mechanical timer for flight guidance and payload dropping. It had a range of up to 120 kilometers and was supposed to be a disposable flying bomb.

At that time, digital technologies or devices for image capture and transmission were not available. Using such flying devices to destroy targets meant great technological challenges. Navigation was the biggest one. It was based on gyroscopes, barometers and mechanical counters. Remote control was in its infancy and reliability was low. Most prototypes were experimental and were never deployed in combat operations.

They left behind a legacy that paid off later. These initial efforts laid the foundation for future development of guided missiles, kamikaze drones and eventually reconnaissance UAVs. They proved the feasibility of pilotless flight, even though technology was not sufficiently advanced at that time for wide use. The idea of a pilotless aircraft for dangerous missions was revolutionary in World War I and remains central to UAV philosophy today.

Military strategy also began to change. These first attempts proved that risk-free reconnaissance and attacks were possible, which influenced the development of unmanned aircraft during the Cold War and modern doctrines such as persistent surveillance and targeted strikes. Every military conflict brings a revolutionary leap to the evolution of technologies. During World War II and the Cold War, these ideas matured into combat drones, spy aircraft and eventually combat UAVs like the Predator and Reaper.

Today’s UAVs use artificial intelligence, GPS and real-time data connections. But the main mission – performing tasks too risky or tedious for humans – remains unchanged. The connection between the Kettering Bug and the Tomahawk cruise missile is direct. Both are unmanned long-range weapons, precisely guided.

Secret Cold War Missions

After the end of World War II, the Cold War began between East and West. The competition moved from land, seas and air also to space. It continued intensively also in the field of unmanned vehicle development. The competing sides suspected each other and wanted to know what secrets the other side was hiding. Espionage and deep reconnaissance over enemy territory became a strategic task. The Ryan Firebee and Lockheed D-21 were two of the most important early American drones. Each represented a different philosophy of unmanned aircraft development during the Cold War.

The Ryan Firebee became a versatile workhorse. The first flight took place in 1952, a year later it was introduced into service. It was a response to the US Air Force’s request to develop a jet-powered target. Originally it was thus a target drone for fighter pilot training and testing missile anti-aircraft systems. Later it was modified into reconnaissance variants – the Model 147 series – during the Vietnam War and Cold War. It was used for electronic warfare, surveillance and even decoy missions.

It was equipped with jet propulsion, capable of reaching speeds close to Mach 0.96 and altitude over 18,000 meters. It could be launched from aircraft like the B-26 Invader, or from the ground with RATO – Rocket-Assisted Take-Off boosters. The RATO booster provided short-term but powerful thrust that allowed the drone to quickly leave the launch ramp. After fuel exhaustion, the RATO booster detached and the drone continued flight using its own turbojet engine. It was controlled by radio connection and equipped with parachutes.

Modified Firebees flew over China and North Vietnam and collected intelligence without risking pilots‘ lives. Some were destroyed by enemy defenses, but many missions were successful and helped shape UAV doctrine.

After the shooting down of the American U-2 spy plane over the USSR came the Lockheed D-21 spy drone. Its development began in 1962, the first flight took place in 1964. It was in active military service only briefly, from 1969 to 1971. It was intended for deep reconnaissance over enemy territory, mainly China and the USSR. It could fly at Mach 3.3 speed at altitude of approximately 27,400 meters.

It had a high-resolution camera and inertial navigation system. The drone was launched from M-21 Blackbird aircraft and later from B-52 bombers. After completing the reconnaissance mission, the machine could drop a film capsule and then proceed to self-destruct so enemies couldn’t capture it. Its use was accompanied by problems. One M-21 launch aircraft crashed during drone startup, killing a crew member. Operational missions over China were unsuccessful, leading to program cancellation in 1971.

During the Cold War, the US and Western countries developed and used several other types of unmanned aircraft, such as the Ryan Model 147 Lightning Bug, Lockheed Q-Star, and at the end of the Cold War, the Teledyne Ryan RQ-2 Pioneer.

The Ryan Model 147 was a reconnaissance drone derived from the Firebee. They used it for flights over North Vietnam, China and North Korea. It was equipped with cameras and radar sensors. Interestingly, it was launched from a DC-130 aircraft and after the mission recovered in the air using a C-130 with a hook.

The Lockheed Q-Star or Compass Cope was an experimental UAV for long-term reconnaissance. They developed it in the 1970s as an autonomous reconnaissance system with the ability to return to the launch site. The Teledyne Ryan RQ-2 Pioneer served for tactical reconnaissance. It was used by the US Navy and Marine Corps during Operation Desert Storm. It was one of the first UAVs used in combat conditions.

Soviets Respond

Countermeasures to American development also came from the Soviet bloc. After the U-2 incident in 1960, when pilot Gary Powers was shot down over Soviet airspace, the USSR realized the threat posed by high-altitude reconnaissance. The Soviets began developing unmanned systems that would match US capabilities and reduce dependence on vulnerable manned aircraft.

The key Soviet UAV was the Tupolev Tu-123 Yastreb. It was introduced in 1964 and intended for strategic reconnaissance over NATO territory. The drone was equipped with supersonic jet propulsion and had a preprogrammed flight path. It carried cameras and electronic reconnaissance equipment on board. It was a one-time mission, after which the machine dropped a film capsule and then self-destructed.

Later the Soviets introduced the Tupolev Tu-143 Reis for tactical battlefield reconnaissance. It was introduced into armament in the early 1970s. It was a subsonic machine with short range, a parachute was to serve for its rescue and recovery. It was used in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. In the former Czechoslovak Socialist Republic it was introduced under the designation VR-3 Reis. Its use was more similar to the Firebee and was used to obtain real-time battlefield information. It was introduced to Czechoslovakia in 1985 and used until 1995. Its role was photographic and television reconnaissance, radiation situation assessment, target tracking at depths of 60 to 70 kilometers.

During a 1988 incident, one of these drones fell by parachute into a kindergarten area in Prague, causing a stir. Officially it was then covered up by designating the VR-3 as meteorological apparatus. The drone was launched from a mobile launcher and could be used up to five times. One VR-3 specimen is now displayed at the Aviation Museum in Kbely and another in Lešany.

The Tu-143 drone went through several modifications and renewals. The M-143 was a target drone version introduced in the mid-1980s. The Tu-243 Reis-D was an improved version with longer range and improved engine. The Tu-300 Korshun was a further refined model with modern sensors and optional ammunition – development renewed in 2007. The Tu-143 system was deployed in Afghanistan by Soviet forces. Syria used it during the 1982 Lebanon War for reconnaissance of Israel. Ukraine during the 2022 war converted it into substitute cruise missiles or for revealing air defense.

Like the Americans, the Soviets also needed target drones for training their pilots and testing missile anti-aircraft systems. The solution was the Lavochkin La-17. They introduced it in 1950. It had a jet engine and was radio-controlled. Later the Soviets developed it into reconnaissance variants.

However, the Soviets faced several technological challenges. Their drones often relied on film cameras, which limited real-time intelligence. Navigation systems were less advanced than American ones and relied on inertial guidance. Recovery or extraction after mission was difficult, especially for dynamic missions or missions with deep penetration over enemy territory.

Soviet unmanned aircraft enabled surveillance over NATO forces and border areas. They were extensively used in Warsaw Pact exercises and some were exported to allies like Syria and Iraq. These programs laid the foundation for modern Russian UAVs including the Orlan-10 and Forpost.

Conclusion

After the end of the Cold War, few suspected what would come. With digitalization came enormous drone development and it continues to accelerate. In the next part we will look at four generations of modern drones, activities of key countries and drone diplomacy.

The post Evolution of Military Drones – Part One appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

„It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent, but the one that is most adaptable to change.“ – a paraphrase of Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory. It’s not enough to just understand the war in our neighborhood and recognize who is in the right. It’s important to learn from it and adapt.

#civil defense #civil-military cooperation #cyber warfare tools #ethics of autonomous weapons #fifth generation warfare #information warfare #innovations in military technologies #lessons from the war in Ukraine #military communication #military tactics drones #modern warfare

Note: Originally published at weekly .tyždeň. Illustrations by Pavel Macko, with support of AI moduls Flux Utra Pro and Copilot.

In Ukraine, we can observe in real-time how doctrines, tactics, and technology are changing. Some changes are the result of limited pre-war resources and losses during the exhausting war. The rest is innovation.

The West is helping Ukraine. But significant assistance is also coming to the huge and supposedly invincible Russia. According to the latest estimates, Russians have received more than 12 million 152mm artillery shells from North Korea. Russians are getting drones, weapons, and missiles from North Koreans and Iran, and industrial support from China.

A Battle of Will, Determination, and Innovation

The real struggle is taking place at the front and in the rear on both sides. From my visit to Kyiv as part of Globsec’s VIP group, I remember an image that characterizes this war. After a night attack, in the morning we met young CEO Tatiana at Brave 1. She had spent the night in a shelter with her children, took them to school in the morning, and came to work to welcome a group of guests – generals, MPs, diplomats, former intelligence chiefs, and an ex-president.

We found ourselves in an environment among people who looked like a group of hipsters and computer geeks. Brave1 was a newly established coordination agency. A cluster for defense innovations bringing together ministries, startups, and financiers to support the development of defense technologies. The organization is formed and managed by young women whose husbands are fighting at the front, and young men without mobilization obligations. Their mission is to ensure the modernization and development of new technologies for people on the zero line.

Do you have a good idea but don’t know how to implement it? Need money to produce a prototype? Want to test your product with soldiers? Go to Brave 1. The agency helps individuals, small companies, and technology giants. Brave 1 is far from being the only organization with such a mission. There are a whole range of arms and innovation associations operating there. The innovation cycle has shortened from decades to years and months. In the field of drones, generational change occurs every 3 to 6 months.

NATO has established the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analytical, Training and Education Center (JATEC). It wants to learn from Ukrainian insights on modern warfare. JATEC also coordinates the training of Ukrainian soldiers and analyzes new threats such as cyber warfare, drones, glide bombs, and AI technologies.

While Ukraine demonstrates enormous will and nationwide efforts for survival, we have the opportunity to observe in peace and safety how warfare is changing. Will we be able to analyze rapid changes? Can we not only identify lessons but also adopt them, learn them? Can we make the right strategic and investment decisions so that we don’t have to face aggression and learn everything only during defense like the Ukrainians?

Most Important: Defense is a National Matter

Even during Russian maneuvers before the invasion, it was clear that unequal opponents were facing each other. Ukraine was expected to hold out for a few days, at most weeks. But Ukrainian citizens overturned Putin’s chessboard with all its pieces. Russia hit hard. The main reason was that they weren’t just facing a less equipped but otherwise battle-experienced 200,000-strong army. They faced a nation that came together, had the determination to survive, and learned quickly.

From the first hours, not only the armed forces and central state bodies responded, but the entire country. Regional and local governments and territorial defense forces played a key role. Most governors and mayors knew what to do. They felt responsibility and had authority. Despite the advancing front, they organized local defense, ensured public services, and quickly removed the consequences of attacks.

Ukrainians quickly switched to total defense. The integration of civil-administrative components, rescue and security forces, territorial troops, and the regular army is unprecedented by our Western standards. There were also outages, but leaders knew what to do.

Despite Russian propaganda about a totalitarian regime, Ukraine is a democratic and decentralized country. Thanks to decentralization, independence, and initiative, they were able to quickly fill gaps. Including those in the logistical support of fighting troops. What centrally managed army logistics couldn’t provide was replaced by local civil-military cooperation and support.

For a country’s survival in an exhausting war, overall resilience is important, the ability to quickly remove the consequences of attacks, quickly restore public services, functions of energy and critical transport infrastructure. This was one of the key factors why Russians failed to stop and destroy military aid deliveries from the West. Ukrainians could repair railways faster than Russians could destroy them.

Ukrainians mobilized the military and all other human and material resources. They could only do this because they had supplies and prepared people. According to Ukrainian experiences, we in NATO and Slovakia must reconsider the concept of mobilization, the system of state crisis management, and the preparation of professional components and the population.

If we want to deter aggressors and resist, we must quickly adopt a whole range of measures, implement them, and demonstrate our capabilities to deter an aggressor and successfully repel aggression if deterrence fails. Providing basic military training to large groups of the population must be part of the measures. The professional army cannot handle everything alone nor last long; we need robust reserves. Those that maximize the civilian capabilities of reservists.

The best preparation is regular simulations and exercises at the local and regional level. We need to:

▪️Strengthen the defense awareness of the population

▪️Improve knowledge of civil protection principles

▪️Build communities for homeland defense

▪️Ensure professional preparation and training of mayors and local governments

This will be useful not only in a major crisis but also in dealing with extraordinary events. Our civil protection and infrastructure are neglected. We must invest in infrastructure so that it allows us to withstand in case of attack and improves the quality of life and comfort in peace.

Smart People and Technologies

While the strong fighter from the arena is training somewhere in Záhorie together with the president and the minister of defense, the muscular Rambo is no longer the archetype of a soldier. We still need skilled, physically fit, and mentally resilient soldiers. But today we need more smart and educated soldiers, flexible engineers, and operators who can fully utilize new technologies that looked like sci-fi just ten years ago and are increasingly penetrating the military.

Artificial Intelligence (AI). It powers autonomous systems, predictive analysis, and real-time decision-making. It is used for target recognition, logistics optimization, and battlefield simulation. It enables faster threat assessment and adaptive combat strategies.

Autonomous and Unmanned Systems. These include drones, robotic ground vehicles, and unmanned vessels. They are used for surveillance, precision strikes, and supply deliveries in hostile zones. Swarming technology enables coordinated attacks by multiple drones.

Cyber Warfare and Digital Defense focuses on enemy infrastructure, communication, and data systems. It includes disinformation campaigns and psychological operations. Countries are significantly investing in cyber resilience and offensive capabilities.

Quantum Technologies. Quantum encryption promises ultra-secure communication. Quantum sensors could revolutionize navigation and surveillance. They are still in the initial stage but are considered a strategic game-changer. Whoever masters them earlier will jump to a higher league.

Hypersonic Weapons. They reach over 5 Mach, making them extremely difficult to intercept. Russia’s Kinzhal missile has already been used in Ukraine, and hypersonic weapons have also been tested in combat by Iran. They force us to reconsider missile defense systems and deterrence strategies.

Space Capabilities. Satellites provide real-time intelligence, navigation, and communication. Space is becoming an arena for military superiority. Anti-satellite weapons and orbital surveillance are on the rise.

Advanced Manufacturing and Materials. 3D printing allows rapid production of parts and weapons in the field. New materials improve armor, „invisibility,“ and energy efficiency. They reduce logistical burden and increase battlefield adaptability.

Next-Generation Communications. 5G and secure networks enable faster and more reliable coordination. Stable and secure communication is crucial for operations across multiple domains, cyber security, and in space.

These technologies are changing the way wars are conducted and redefining what „war“ even means. On the other hand, technologies such as AI, autonomous weapons, and cyber warfare bring not only tactical advantages but also a number of ethical dilemmas. Among the most pressing dilemmas we can include:

▪️Addressable responsibility for decisions leading to death

▪️Human judgment vs. machine decisions

▪️Loss of moral will in autonomous systems

▪️Protection of civilians and collateral damage

▪️Permanent cyber warfare and information integrity

▪️Arms races due to a lower threshold for war

▪️Regulation of space activities and AI

Modern Combat Tactics

New technologies are revolutionizing war tactics by shifting the focus from brute force to precision, speed, and adaptability.

Precision and Targeting. Ukrainians started with an amateur fire control system called Kropyva (nettle) during the Russian aggression in Donbas. They ended up with an AI-powered system in a cloud environment. This allowed them to turn ordinary citizens into the equivalent of military reconnaissance and fire guidance. All they had to do was upload images and videos from their smartphones to the cloud via an application with geolocation enabled. Suddenly, they had thousands of scouts without more than a year of training and a lot of data.

AI helped them process this data and determine target coordinates and fire destruction priority. Even with a small number of older guns and a small amount of ammunition, Ukrainians could compete with massive Russian artillery. Smart weapons, such as guided missiles and loitering munitions, allow hitting high-value targets from a safe distance. Drones provide constant surveillance, improving target identification and strike accuracy.

Command and Control. Autonomous systems speed up decision-making by executing pre-programmed responses in dynamic conditions. Automated battlefield analysis helps commanders anticipate enemy movements and adjust tactics during combat. AI simulations train soldiers and test strategies in realistic conditions without risk.

Mobility and Deployment. Unmanned assets (air, ground, and naval) work in dangerous zones, reducing the threat to humans. Swarm tactics use coordinated groups of drones to overcome defenses or carry out attacks from multiple sides.

Cyber and Information Warfare. Cyber attacks today can deactivate enemy infrastructure, communication, and logistics without physical attack. Disinformation campaigns shape public perception and morale and become a tactical tool of hybrid warfare. Electronic warfare disrupts GPS, radar, and communication, forcing opponents to return to manual systems.

Multi-domain Operations. We are moving from joint operations to integrated operations across domains. Space assets, such as satellites, provide real-time intelligence and secure communication. Remember the problems Ukrainians had when access to satellite intelligence support was turned off? Next-generation networks such as 5G enable seamless coordination across land, sea, air, cyber, and space domains.

Tactical Changes. Smaller forces using asymmetric warfare can face larger ones using technologies such as drones and cyber tools. Precision weapons allow attack without direct confrontation. Combat is decentralized, units can operate independently with real-time data, reducing dependence on central command.

Fifth Generation Warfare?

To laypeople watching the news, it seems that the war in Ukraine has returned to the trench warfare period of World War I. Experts agree that the current conflict in Ukraine is a so-called fourth-generation war with elements of the emerging new, fifth-generation warfare. Let’s look at how modern warfare has evolved. Each generation reflects a shift in technology, doctrine, and social structure.

First Generation Warfare – line and column tactics were applied from the 17th to roughly the mid-19th century. Typical was mass manpower in fixed combat formations. Uniformed soldiers fought under state authority. Combat took place on limited battlefields with clear front lines. Examples include the Napoleonic Wars and the American War of Independence.

Second Generation Warfare – industrial firepower. This was conducted in the period from the late 19th century and World War I. Emphasis was placed on indirect fire using artillery and machine guns. It was trench warfare and static defense with a centralized command and attrition strategy. These include the Russo-Japanese War and World War I.

Third Generation Warfare – maneuver warfare – took place in World War II and during the Cold War. Typical were speed, secrecy, and surprise to bypass enemy lines, blitzkrieg tactics were introduced, and deep penetrations (tank wedges, attack helicopters). Command was decentralized and the principle of mission command was introduced. Typical examples are the German invasion of France (1940) and the Gulf War (1990-91).

Fourth Generation Warfare – asymmetric and decentralized conflict prevailed from the end of the 20th century to the present. Non-state actors (partisans, terrorists, militias) enter the game, blurring the lines between civilians and fighters. War is complex, has a political, psychological, and cultural dimension. Examples include the Iraqi insurgency, the war against the Taliban, Ukraine’s hybrid defense.

Fifth Generation Warfare – war of information, perception, and influence. Unlike previous generations, the emphasis is on non-kinetic capabilities. Tanks or units are not needed – conflict takes place through cyber attacks, disinformation, and economic pressure. It is significantly asymmetric; small actors (even individuals) can rock powerful states. The battlefield is everywhere – online, in the media, in financial systems.

Fifth generation warfare challenges traditional military doctrines. It forces nations to think about national security beyond borders and battlefields. The state must invest in:

▪️Cyber resilience

▪️Digital literacy

▪️Information integrity

It is necessary to develop multi-domain strategies that include diplomacy, technology, and civil society.

In reality, conflicts will be hybrid, meaning they will include multiple capabilities and technologies. They will take place in all mutually integrated domains, and there will be no front and rear. There will only be local differences in tools and intensity of action. One asymmetry will balance another. If we don’t have artillery and tanks, expect that’s where our adversary will surprise us. If we don’t digitally deter and are not cyber resilient, the adversary will defeat us without firing a shot.

The biggest mistake we could make in the feverish effort to increase defense spending would be to focus only on quickly available weapon systems and filling long-term holes in the system that arose during budget droughts. Preparing for the past war is a waste of effort and resources. We must prepare for a future war whose contours we are only beginning to sense.

The only chance to succeed and purposefully invest in our defense and security is to build versatile armed forces and a resilient society that will be sufficiently flexible, adaptive, and agile. Such that they can quickly adapt and respond to changing threats and conditions. Armed forces must have iron and reason, society must have prudence and cohesion.

Read also:

1) Ukrainian War for Existence – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

2) Analysis: Is a lasting and just peace within reach? – Pavel Macko – Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie

The post Ukrainians and Russians are Learning. What About Us? appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

But fighting without vision and strategy is not enough. It’s important to know why we fight and what we fight for.

#EU #NATO #Putin #Russia #Trump #Ukraine #USA #War in Ukraine #Zelensky

Pavel Macko reporting for Týždeň magazine. Full transcript of the podcast https://youtu.be/GmSQTqTEAQA?si=QePWcXi8HiZLAVVC

Eve of War

In Europe, at the beginning of 2022, we sensed that something terrible was brewing, but most of us didn’t want to admit it. Neither citizens nor politicians. We were still enjoying the euphoria of three-quarters of a century of peace and over three decades of general freedom.

The public and politicians not only in the Baltic states but throughout Europe anxiously watched Russian maneuvers around Ukraine’s borders. They also perceived the continuing diversionary actions of Russian intelligence services and „vacationing“ soldiers in eastern Ukraine. These were accompanied by artificial hysteria about an impending Ukrainian attack on two separatist republics.

Russia had more than 100,000 armed soldiers on the borders, bringing in blood supplies, field hospitals, and additional troops. Meanwhile, pro-Russian collaborators there were already talking about a Ukrainian invasion in autumn 2021 and organizing forced evacuation of the population. Ukrainians showed not even a hint of any troop regrouping. President Zelensky even downplayed warnings from Western intelligence services.

After Russian ultimatums in December 2021, when they demanded Ukraine’s disarmament and its reintegration into the „Russian world,“ as well as the annulment of NATO expansion after 1997, the tension was palpable. But few could imagine a major war. It made sense to no one except Putin.

Slovak Anomaly

Slovakia was already an anomaly on a global scale at that time. Politicians of today’s ruling coalition organized protests and, under the pretext of peace, openly supported Russian aggression and demands. They even accused the West, especially the USA, of trying to provoke aggression against Russia. They organized a hunt against our MPs for supporting the defense agreement with the USA and threatened, together with today’s department head, a general strike. All in support of Russian interests, not Slovak ones.

Whether they did so out of complete confusion or were coordinated from the Russian embassy may one day be discovered by historians and investigators. Today, these are under the thumb of Maroš Žilinka, who as late as February 8, 2022, threatened parliamentarians with „the judgment of history“ for not wanting to hear his desperate fight against the agreement with the USA. Just before that, he praised the benefits of Soviet occupation.

Fight for Independence and Freedom

In July, we commemorate the anniversary of the American Revolution – the war for independence that culminated in the declaration of independence of American colonies. Since then, July 4 has been Independence Day in the USA. The French Revolution began with an attack on the Bastille and was a war for freedom. The French commemorate July 14 as Bastille Day.

Ukrainians today are fighting a combined war – for the bare existence of their own nation and their own free state. How this war turns out will determine our future history. In Slovakia’s case, probably also the existence of our state in its current form and borders.

Let’s analyze in two parts what happened, what is still happening, and what it means for Europe and Slovakia. What we have believed in so far is gradually disappearing, fears are being fulfilled.

Historical Parallels and Putin’s Strategy

To many people, President Putin’s approach just before the invasion of Ukraine resembled Hitler’s strategy during the Munich Dictate. Historical parallels are always somewhat flawed, but there might be something to it.

Russia had been conducting hybrid operations for a long time to prepare the international audience for a new reality. After the West’s strategic blunder of ending operations in Afghanistan and the massive disruption of normal life during COVID, Russia gained the impression that the West was tired. They thought it was self-absorbed and people were frightened of losing comfort.

Political leaders were at odds and trying to solve one cascading crisis after another, as well as strategic adaptation to rapid climate change. For Russia, like all autocratic regimes, this was a secondary matter. The primary concern is maintaining and strengthening power.

Ukraine and the entire West were strategically disturbed, unable to concentrate on the existential threat. The Russians evaluated this as an opportunity to capitalize on long-term disruptive activities in the world, into which they had invested billions of dollars for years.

Putin’s Ultimatum

But Putin’s ultimatum failed. Not so much because the West felt strong and united. Rather, they underestimated Putin and his determination.

The nearly 200,000 troops around Ukraine in late January 2022 looked threatening but not convincing enough that Russia could really engage in a major war. So the US rejected Putin’s ultimatum.

He maneuvered himself into a situation where he didn’t have many options left:

◾️Either admit he was bluffing and his costly show of force didn’t work

◾️Or attempt a lightning action, this time with the risk of high losses compared to the occupation of Crimea without a shot

But if he quickly achieved strategic goals, he would be able to politically sell it to his domestic and international audience. The West and the rest of the world would, according to Putin’s reasoning, come to terms with the new reality.

Beginning of the Invasion

The order to start the invasion came. In the early morning hours, around 5 AM on February 24, 2022, a large-scale invasion of Ukraine began.

Similar to Hitler, who attacked Poland early in the morning at 4:45 AM on September 1, 1939, Putin counted on a Blitzkrieg – a rapid advance into Ukraine’s interior and its rapid collapse.

Like the Nazis in Poland, the Russians quickly attacked Ukraine from three strategic directions:

◾️From the north toward Kyiv

◾️From the east toward Kharkiv and Donbas

◾️ In the south to Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and further along the Mykolaiv-Odesa axis

The entire maneuver was supported from the first minutes by strategic bombing of key defensive points and critical infrastructure. The cherry on top was to be a strategic airborne operation in Hostomel and the rapid occupation of Kyiv’s center and key political-administrative facilities.

Stalled Blitzkrieg

An exemplary lightning chess game, which the Russians had doctrinally and practically rehearsed and tested multiple times in the post-World War II period. It always went smoothly. Now the Russians suddenly got stuck.

Although the media still talks about a „three-day war,“ according to available information, the Russians had planned the entire operation for 10 days. In 10 days, they wanted to control not only Kyiv but the entire Ukraine, break its armed resistance, install a puppet government, suppress resistance hotspots, and stabilize the situation. This is what empires have been doing for centuries in rebellious provinces or with disobedient small neighbors. They know that any long conflict is exhausting and a strategic risk.

All of this failed for the Russians. The world was shocked not only that the Russians engaged in a war we haven’t seen since 1945 – that is, a war where a strong opponent attacks a relatively large neighbor with all means, who effectively defends itself.

Strategic Shocks for Russia

The Russians experienced several strategic shocks and couldn’t withdraw from the conflict in time. Regardless of the current state on the battlefield after more than three years, they strategically lost at the beginning. But they can still gain operational and tactical victory at an enormous cost.

First Strategic Shock

The biggest strategic shock for the Russians was that Ukrainians began to spontaneously defend themselves – ordinary citizens with Molotov cocktails. What was an advantage for the Russians – an attack on a more than 2,200-kilometer-long front, which was to ensure the overloading of Ukrainian defense and rapid collapse – turned into a Russian nightmare.

Their own troops became overloaded, their logistics failed, they couldn’t generate what everyone expected from a military superpower: massive dynamic combined arms maneuvers of large military formations with full support from the air, artillery, and mobility.

Second Strategic Shock

The second strategic shock for the Russians was the rejection of the invasion by Russian-speaking Ukrainians. The entire „liberating“ myth about the invasion fell.

Third Strategic Shock

The third strategic shock for the Russians was the vigorous and unified approach of the EU and NATO, which managed to respond within 24 hours with a clear political message. This then gradually transformed into breaking the barrier of fear of Russia and gradual aid to bleeding Ukraine.

Long Exhausting War

Instead of a lightning conquest of Ukraine, the Russians ended up in a long exhausting war. Ukrainians are fighting for bare survival.

Meanwhile, this war, with more than a million human casualties on the Russian side alone, has turned into a war of survival for the Russians as well. First and foremost, it’s about the survival of Putin’s regime and Putin personally. In the long term, it’s also about the survival of Russia as a strong and respected empire.

Russia is being exhausted, internal tension is growing, and on its borders, it has not only increasingly sovereign former colonies but also a numerically superior and economically stronger China.

Despite the failure of the lightning war, the Russians managed to destroy hope for a peaceful life in Europe. The Russians totally destroyed the post-war model of peaceful coexistence of countries and the OSCE security mechanism. There is a deep furrow not only between Russia and Ukraine but also between Russia and the West. Unfortunately, this is also within our societies. It is a consequence of the long-term hybrid war that the Russians are waging against us.

Life in a Different World

On February 24, 2022, in my very first media commentary on the beginning war, I expressed the opinion that regardless of whether the Russian invasion ends the next day or lasts for years, from 2/24/2022, we live in a different world, and our children will probably never experience the era of relaxation like all of us after November 1989. War is returning as a common political-historical phenomenon into our lives.

That’s why it’s important to analyze what happened, what is happening, and where it might lead. The Russian war in Ukraine has and will have a transformative effect on warfare and socio-political conditions for the next generations.

From Blitzkrieg to Gradual Dying Out

The war still continues. But it already is and will be a source of numerous studies and analyses. It will shape an entire generation of politicians, soldiers, and experts. I myself had the opportunity to participate in one of the first extensive studies. Our international three-member team attempted to generalize the lessons from the first ten months of the war. We provocatively named the report „How to Defeat Russia.“

Another two years have passed since then, and dozens of similar analyses have appeared. The situation on the battlefield has also changed and continues to evolve.

Distorted Intelligence Information

The Russian invasion was based on distorted intelligence information and poor strategic assessment. Putin was hungry for war, and no one had the courage to tell him that Russia, despite the relative weakness of Ukraine, was not prepared for a major war.

The Russians calculated that the population would quickly reconcile with the fall of Zelensky and Russian power. The Russians had practiced combat operations for several months, but they were not prepared for real combat.

Logistics Failure

The structure of Russian logistics was not adapted to conducting intensive combat operations for a longer period on foreign territory. The Russians had their so-called operational logistics outsourced to a state civilian company at that time.

At the tactical level, Russian troops carried with them only two calculation days of supplies at the battalion and at the brigade or regiment level. This was far from enough for the tens to hundreds of kilometers of advances in the first days. NATO has up to seven days of supplies at the same level.

Ukrainian tactics and weather also played their part. The Russian war machine got stuck. The rapid conquest of Ukraine turned into long-term battles in multiple dimensions.

Moreover, despite strategic bombing, the Russians failed to suppress Ukrainian air defense and gain air superiority. This has marked the entire course of the war so far.

Three Phases of the War

If we take into account the key factors and the prevailing character of activities, we can talk about three phases of the war.

First Phase (2022)

The first phase of the war took place in 2022. Briefly, it can be said that the Russians suffered a Ukrainian defensive shock, and Ukraine’s counteroffensive repelled the Russian advance at Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson.

Ukrainians even rapidly liberated a large part of the occupied territories, pushing the Russians into heavy defense. They had to resort to partial mobilization to prevent the collapse of front lines in southern Ukraine.

Western aid increased sharply, allowing precise strikes and recapturing territory. But Ukrainians partly became victims of their own success, and by the end of 2022, aid slowed down.

Second Phase (2023)

The second phase took place in 2023. Ukraine maintained tactical initiative almost the entire year but failed to turn it into operationally significant success. A stalemate ensued.

Russia strategically adapted, abandoned ideas of a quick victory, and dug in in eastern and southern Ukraine. Surovikin’s multi-layered line was too tough a nut to crack for Ukraine’s limited offensive formation.

Ukraine’s summer offensive stalled amid fortified lines saturated with a new generation of Russian drones. Ukraine shifted toward attrition warfare. What normally serves to shape the operational environment became the main content of combat activities aimed at logistics, command centers, and the enemy’s rear infrastructure.

It was confirmed that recapturing one’s own occupied territory, if the aggressor shifts to strategic defense, is extremely difficult.

Third Phase (2024 – Present)

The third phase of the war has been ongoing from the beginning of 2024 until now. It could be called hybrid escalation and technological transformation.

Although the Russians have operational initiative all the time, they cannot perform a fundamental rapid operation that would move the battlefield. Attempts at modern combined arms maneuvers of large formations have failed; instead, tactics have shifted toward constant small tactical attacks.

The battlefield is fully transparent, nothing can be hidden, soldiers often have only 10 minutes for combat maneuver and taking a new position. Moreover, it is saturated with all-seeing and all-destroying drones.

Ukraine has expanded drone and missile attacks deep into Russian territory, for example, in the case of Kursk. Russia has intensified aerial bombing and pressure on the Donetsk and Kharkiv fronts. The battlefield is becoming increasingly fragmented, decentralized, and technologically driven.

Main Factors for Ukraine’s Survival

When the invasion began, many experts believed we were seeing an atypical war, a clash of two post-Soviet armies irrelevant to Western armies.

The truth is that in the first months of the war, Ukrainians had the tactical and doctrinal upper hand. Especially that part of the Ukrainian army that had experience with operations in Donbas and had undergone Westernization. Commanders were independent, able to make decisions flexibly according to the situation, and mastered the principles of so-called mission command, where you only assign a goal to the unit, not a rigid procedure.

Russians were the exact opposite at the beginning – rigid, unable to make independent decisions, always looking at their superior and his detailed instructions. This has changed in the meantime. Russians are learning too.

Despite this, Ukrainians have so far managed to resist regardless of Russian numerical superiority and Russian superiority in strategic weapons.

Hybrid Model of the Ukrainian Army

The Ukrainian army has evolved from post-Soviet forces into a hybrid model that combines NATO-style mission command, asymmetric tactics, and targeting with AI support.

Russia, despite failures, has also adapted its Soviet-era doctrine and strengthened it with multi-layered defense, electronic warfare, mass artillery, and finally strong air support at the line of contact.

The course of the war so far shows that if Ukraine wants to survive, it must prioritize the strategic neutralization of the stronger Russia over a decisive victory on the battlefield. Ukraine’s victory may not come in the form of a signed treaty or complete restoration of territory. Instead, it may depend on the strategic neutralization of Russia and its aggression, making Russian aggression futile, even if the war persists.

Five Key Factors for Survival and Success

From this perspective, these 5 key factors for survival and success can be identified:

1) Disabling and Denying Russian Operations

◾️Ukraine must continue to paralyze Russian offensive capacity through drone warfare, remote mining, and attacks into the strategic operational depth of the adversary

◾️Functional defeats of enemy capabilities, such as disabling a bomber base or oil infrastructure, can shift the war from attrition to operational insignificance of that Russian capability

2) Sovereignty of the Defense Industry

◾️Ukraine started in a very difficult situation. It could rely only on limited supplies from the Soviet era, a weakened defense industry, and foreign aid

◾️Today, it can produce up to 52% of its needs itself, and this share is rising despite Russian bombing

◾️Domestic production of drones, artillery, and air defense systems is essential

◾️European partners are financing Ukrainian weapons production to reduce dependence

3) Civil-Military Integration

◾️In war, not only the armed forces but the entire country is involved. Not only because rockets and drones fall everywhere, but mainly because Ukraine correctly introduced the concept of total defense and resilience

◾️Territorial defense forces, volunteer battalions, and civilian mobilization form the backbone of Ukraine’s resilience

◾️Protection of critical infrastructure and maintaining societal continuity are as important as success on the battlefield

◾️For example, the ability to quickly repair damaged railways and the inability of Russians to hit moving targets deep in Ukrainian territory were the main reasons why the Russians failed to stop growing foreign aid

4) Strategic Deterrence

◾️Ukraine’s victory plan has partly fallen by the wayside, especially after the advent of the Trump administration in the US

◾️But it correctly proposes a package of non-nuclear deterrence including capabilities for long-distance strikes and joint defense operations with future partners

◾️Deterrence must be credible, sustainable, and anchored in Ukraine’s post-war security architecture

5) International Support and Political Unity

◾️Continued Western assistance – financial, military, and diplomatic – is essential

◾️Ukraine’s survival depends on maintaining global attention and fighting war fatigue, especially amid changing US politics

This applies not only within Ukraine but also in Slovakia and the West. In Ukraine, our security and free existence are being fought for. If Russia succeeds, the chance that we will find ourselves under Russian control again or live in constant fear of what the Russians will do will dramatically increase. Such a state would not only have political and psychological impacts but would mainly significantly cut into our resources. It would be the end of our security and relative prosperity.

Peace is Still Not in Sight and Democracy in Crisis

„It was supposed to be resolved within 24 hours.“ It’s hard to estimate whether Donald Trump’s pre-election statements were just conscious populist lies or the self-indulgent naivety of a politician whom the Russians bailed out of problems several times as a businessman.

No one expected President Trump to actually end the war in one day, but the US administration’s approach so far has been a huge disappointment and hasn’t brought the end of the war closer. It’s nowhere in sight.

Ukrainians so far cannot push the Russians out, and they cannot defeat Ukraine. But they can cause increasing suffering to civilians. This is due to the increasingly exhausted Ukrainian air defense, periodic blocking of American aid, and the inability of Americans and the West to produce more means to combat Russian missiles, drones, and heavy bombs.

Bad American Strategy

The Americans chose a very bad strategy. Despite knowing for decades that only a tough stance works against the Russians and their expansionism, they tried to buy the Russians at the cost of unilateral pressure on Ukraine.

If it had worked, Ukrainians might not have liked it, but at least it could be said that the end justifies the means. But the exact opposite happened. Putin stopped taking the Americans and their president seriously. Behind polite diplomatic phrases is mockery and even greater arrogance and brutality from the Russians. They rejected all of Ukraine’s offers for a ceasefire and negotiation and indicate that they only accept complete capitulation of Ukraine and humiliated forgiveness from the West.

Instead of stopping the war, long-time allies quarreled because of it. Europe is putting together a coalition of the willing in case it’s no longer possible to count on the Americans. But without American capabilities, Europeans will still be players in a supporting role for a long time if it comes to direct confrontation with Russia.

NATO in Crisis

Meanwhile, the Americans are giving them (Russians) too much space. It’s not just about American pragmatism and focusing more on China as the main competitor, but also about the inability, even after more than three years, to increase production of critical systems and missiles for air defense.

The recent NATO summit thus threatened a major dispute or even catastrophe. Some European politicians like Fico and Orbán were even prematurely celebrating Russian victory and new orders in Europe.

President Trump eventually had his way. NATO countries committed to increasing defense spending up to 5% of GDP. The crisis was temporarily averted. But the commitment to increase defense spending has no clear timeline and also includes a lot of room for creative accounting. So real strengthening of defense may not come quickly enough.

Moreover, Russia’s 5th column in NATO, led by Fico, has already made it known that they won’t give an extra cent for their defense. On the contrary, even from the current 2% of GDP for defense, they will significantly cut for explicitly civilian projects and openly talk about leaving NATO.

This was founded not only for defense against the aggressive Soviet Union and today’s Russia, but was also built on common values. How long this alliance will last in times of business politics and permanent trade and tariff war between the US and the rest of the allies is unclear.

Ukraine Must Help Itself

Ukraine, fighting for its survival, will primarily have to help itself. Just as it spontaneously did from the first day and hope that then others will help it too.

Battle to the End?

Under the given circumstances, it’s important for Ukrainians and for all of us not to lose attention and not to get tired. If a solution to the conflict doesn’t come on the diplomatic field, Ukraine must endure it militarily as well.

The current situation is extremely complex. The Russians cannot significantly advance on land, but they attack all the more from the air. The intensity of Russian attacks on civilian targets and critical infrastructure is constantly rising.

Ukrainians have eliminated part of the strategic bombers, and then they have many long-range missiles from flat flight paths, but the Russians can compensate with ballistic missiles and especially long-range drones. They modernized originally Iranian drones and today can produce hundreds of them daily. In June alone, Russians launched more than 5,400 drones at Ukraine.

At the same time, the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defense is gradually declining. In 2022, they could eliminate 95% of drones and 74% of missiles. Today it’s only 79% and 50%.

Situation at the Front

The Russians still have tactical and operational initiative and are pushing practically across the entire front. Fortunately, they have so far failed to capture any major city except Vuhledar. The second year, there is fighting for Kupiansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk. The Russians have also approached Kostiantynivka and penetrated the edge of the Dnipropetrovsk region.

The question arises whether Ukrainians still have a chance to endure. According to my estimate and the estimate of colleague experts, they still have a chance, and mainly they have no other option.

Transformation of Warfare

Ukrainians, aware of this, are not resting on their laurels. Both sides are coming up with innovations. The character of combat has fundamentally changed. It’s not just a solution out of necessity. It’s rather a fundamental transformation of warfare.

What otherwise takes years has been shortened to months. The innovation cycle, for example, in the field of drones, lasts only 3 months. Today’s tactical advantage may be marginal or completely irrelevant by the end of the year.

Although the Russians have an apparent advantage in the amount of personnel, they are not without problems either. They cannot just deploy conscripts in operations on Ukrainian territory. Training new contracted or called-up soldiers is complicated on both sides, and neither side has enough instructors.

Ukraine is more vulnerable in that training takes place in a war zone, but it can compensate for this with training from its allies and supporters.

Ukrainian Capabilities

Ukraine still has approximately 1 million men and women in arms, who are tired from long-term deployment but also have greater motivation.

Ukraine can produce more and more weapons systems by itself. For example, they can produce up to 250 self-propelled howitzers annually, which is more than all of NATO combined. Despite the massive use of drones, heavy equipment and artillery are still needed. Only the way they are used is changing.

Ukraine is gradually increasing the capacity of its air force with donated F-16 fighters and French Mirage 2000-5F fighters. The fact that they have already lost three of them is not a catastrophe but proof that they are using them more frequently and riskily.

Technological Edge

Despite significant Russian numerical, economic, raw material, and technological superiority, Ukrainians manage to keep pace with them and achieve technological excellence.

Ukraine is today a global leader in the production and use of drones. They have achieved absolute excellence with the help of Western companies in the field of artificial intelligence utilization.

An innovative way of processing data in the cloud and digitalizing the use of relatively outdated technology has brought a dramatic change in the field of target determination, targeting, and their destruction. Even with a smaller number of weapons systems of varying quality, they can achieve extremely effective fire destruction.

Strategic Asymmetry

The greatest advantage of Ukrainians lies in their strategic approach to changing doctrine. Aware of Russian numerical superiority and the unavailability of some strategic weapons and means with operational reach, Ukrainians focused on strategic asymmetry in their military operations.

They focus on mobility, deep precise strikes, and increasingly use guerrilla warfare and special forces operations deep in Russian territory. They have made the protection of air and sea routes and the long-term building of their own capabilities and capacities a strategic priority.

Despite long-term political fatigue from the war and the unpredictability of Americans, they can still rely on their allies. Support from countries of the Ramstein format continues to function, and partners help finance Ukrainian armament programs or technology transfer.

Self-Preservation Instinct and Will of the Nation

The instinct of self-preservation can mobilize and stimulate heroic performances. This applies equally to nations as to individuals.

Ukrainians are fighting an existential struggle. Every single Russian drone strike, every single rocket in the city center brings destruction. But instead of the depression and defeatism expected by the Russians, these motivate Ukrainians and mobilize the civilian population.

If before the invasion Putin dared to claim that Ukrainians don’t even exist and everyone has always belonged to the „Russian world,“ today he has a consolidated and confident nation before him.

The will of a nation to fight has been one of the main sources of strength of nations and the key to success in all long and great wars so far.

All these are factors that don’t make Ukrainians doomed to defeat by any means. The Russians experienced three strategic surprises right at the beginning. If Putin today relies on lasting longer in this war, he may experience a fourth and final strategic surprise.

Ukrainians can still withstand Russian aggression, but meanwhile, it may happen that we won’t withstand it, here in Slovakia.

Lessons from the War for Us in the West

Regardless of how Russian aggression and Ukraine’s fight for survival eventually end, we must learn from this war. It revealed the fragility of European security assumptions, the urgency of civil defense, and the need for strategic clarity and mobilization.

Slovakia and Europe as a whole – this conflict is not a distant crisis but a mirror reflecting our own vulnerability and choices.

Hundreds of treatises have already been written about this war today, although not all are fully understood and especially accepted by politicians who decide and citizens whom it concerns. Many assumptions will change, as will their final evaluations. But the main trends are clear today.

This war is already fundamentally changing views on warfare and military-political competition, as well as concepts of state survival. The long-term consequences of the Ukrainian conflict are extensive and deeply transformative – regionally and globally. Together they create a whole series of domino effects.

Main Consequences of the War

Let’s mention at least some:

Geopolitical Realignment

◾️Geopolitical realignment is occurring, and a new cold war dynamic is emerging

◾️The war has cemented the gulf between Russia and Western democracies

◾️NATO and the EU are strengthening ties and expanding military capabilities

◾️Russia is increasingly aligning with China and other non-Western powers, potentially reshaping global alliances and trade routes

◾️Countries that were traditionally non-aligned are reassessing their positions and balancing economic interests with security concerns

Security and Military Changes

◾️European countries are increasing defense budgets and weapons production. This applies not only to the Baltic states and Poland but also to Germany or Sweden

◾️NATO has rapidly expanded as a result of the war. Finland and Sweden’s entry into NATO represents a significant strategic shift in Northern Europe

◾️The conflict has accelerated the use of artificial intelligence, drones, and cyber tools in modern warfare, creating new precedents for future conflicts

Economic and Energy Disruption

◾️Sanctions, disrupted supply chains, and energy shortages have triggered inflation and economic instability worldwide

◾️Europe is rapidly diversifying away from Russian oil and gas, investing in renewable energy sources and alternative suppliers

◾️Even after the conflict ends, many sanctions against Russia will likely persist, changing global trade and investment flows

Human Rights and Social Consequences

◾️Massive casualties, emigration, and declining birth rates are accelerating Russia’s demographic crisis

◾️Widespread human rights violations, including torture and forced deportations, will leave lasting scars and complicate future reconciliation

◾️With millions of displaced Ukrainians, rebuilding communities and infrastructure will likely take decades

Strategic Uncertainty

◾️Frozen conflicts will continue to haunt the world. Even if active fighting ceases, unresolved territorial disputes and political enmity can persist for years

◾️New arms races are coming, and the importance of deterrence is growing. The war has renewed interest in hypersonic weapons, cyber capabilities, and nuclear deterrence strategies

◾️Global governance and cooperation are failing

The war in Ukraine is also bringing a completely new revolution in warfare. Doctrine and tactics are completely changing. The view of the right mix of military capabilities, strategic deterrence, defense, civil defense, and country resilience is fundamentally changing.

Views on the professional army and compulsory service are changing. Concepts of comprehensive mobilization of society await a fundamental revision.

These issues and their impact on Europe and Slovakia will be addressed in the second part of the podcast.

And that’s all for today. I look forward to listening to the second part of the podcast. Thank you for your attention.

The post Ukrainian War for Existence appeared first on Pavel Macko - Bezpečnosť, Technológie, Stratégie.

#Eurofighter Typhoon #Musk #Nemecko #Španielsko #Spojené kráľovstvo #Tesla #Trump #Turecko #USA

Tesla padá voľným pádom

Robiť biznis a politiku súčasne, najmä keď verejne napádate svojich partnerov, či sa spájate s extrémistami, sa môže vypomstiť aj najbohatším ľuďom ako Elon Musk. Ten nielenže kontroverzným spôsobom a bez serióznej analýzy opravuje americký štát a spôsobuje masívne prepúšťanie a fatálne omyly. Následne po ňom súdy či iní členovia administratívy opravujú škody, ktoré napácha. Jeho spoločnosť Tesla vyrástla aj vďaka umelého ošiaľu z elektrických vozidiel, ktoré si kupovali fajnšmekri a hlavne progresívna a liberálnejšia časť populácie, citlivo vnímajúca pokračujúce globálne klimatické zmeny.

Lenže súčasná vláda USA, v ktorej má výrazný vplyv práve majiteľ Tesly, nielenže spochybňuje klimatickú krízu. Vo veľkom ruší ekologické opatrenia, odstupuje od Kjótskeho protolu, podporuje masívnu ťažbu a spotrebu fosílnych palív. Hlavným heslom sa stalo „Drill, Baby, Drill!“, voľne preložené „Ťaž koľko sa len dá!“. Ak do toho prídu Elonove arogantné vyjadrenia, neonacistické pózy, miešanie sa do vnútornej politiky a volieb iných štátov a priama podpora ultrapravicových síl, vyvoláva to pochopiteľne negatívnu spätnú reakciu.

Začína sa bojkot výrobkov Tesly v Amerike, Kanade, škandinávskych krajinách, Nemecku, ale aj vo vzdialenej Austrálii. Prepad predajov za posledné dva mesiace je ohromujúci. V niektorých krajinách poklesol predaj vozidiel Tesla aj o viac ako 70 %, v Nemecku to bolo 46 %. Poškodenie reputácie v takomto rozsahu bude dlhodobé. Naviac, Tesla už nemá exkluzivitu, na trhu je množstvo lacnejších a lepších elektromobilov.

Spoločnosť Tesla bola extrémne nadhodnotená na burze. Napríklad skutočná automobilka General Motors, mnohonásobne väčšia ako Tesla, má kapitalizáciu 48 mld. USD (14.3.), zatiaľ čo nepomerne menšia Tesla aj po prepade 30 % za posledný mesiac má trhovú kapitalizáciu (hodnotu na burze) 804 mld. USD (14.3.). Teraz táto bublina praská ako svojho času digitálna bublina dot.com. Tesla padá voľným pádom a hlavnou príčinou je strata dôvery vo firmu vlastnenú a riadenú Elonom Muskom. Celkovo od svcjho vrcholu zo 17. decembra 2024 Tesla za posledné tri mesiace padla už o 48 %.

Strata dôvery v USA môže znamenať stratu zákazníkov a novú konkurenciu

Po posledných opatreniach americkej vlády voči Ukrajine a v dôsledku neustále sa meniacej rétoriky vo vzťahu ku svojim spojencom, sa niečo podobné môže stať aj s dôverou spojencov a americkým exportom zbraní. Ten je prísne regulovaný ministerstvom zahraničných vecí a Kongresom USA, ale je to aj mimoriadny zdroj príjmov amerických zbrojoviek.

Tie síce už dávno nie sú chrbticou americkej ekonomiky a tvoria len jej veľmi malú časť. Ale profitabilita a dobrá kondícia amerických zbrojoviek sa priamo odzrkadľuje v americkej národnej bezpečnosti aj v schopnosti rozumne financovať rozvoj zbrojárenských technológií a udržať si technologickú špičku. To všetko v čoraz nebezpečnejšom svete, v ktorom čoraz väčšiu úlohu hrá Čína. Tá už aj v oblasti zbrojných technologií už dávno nie je len najvýkonnejšou kopírkou už známych riešení na svete.

Spojené štáty po predstavení v Oválnej pracovni pri návšteve prezidenta Zelenského zastavili materiálnu vojenskú pomoc pre Ukrajinu. To ale mnohí z nás čakali, obávali sa toho aj Ukrajinci. Na druhej strane, Trumpova administratíva zatiaľ žiadnu pomoc pre Ukrajinu ani nemala v pláne. Došlo k zastaveniu dobiehajúcej pomoci z predchádzajúceho balíčka celkovej pomoci vo výške 60 mld. USD. Ten bol schválený po dlhých obštrukciách Republikánov minulý rok v apríli. Veľká časť z toho bola vojenská pomoc, pričom zostávalo dodať zbrane a muníciu za cca 3 a pol miliardy. Ak by Biden neváhal, tak táto pomoc by bola už dávno vyskladnená a dodaná na Ukrajinu.

No skutočný šok nastal po tom, čo USA nielen obmedzili, či dokonca zastavili výmenu spravodajských informácií a prístup k satelitným snímkam, ale zablokovali aj efektívne používanie už viacerých dodaných zbraní. Nejde len o zablokovanie prístupu k presnejšej vojenskej GPS navigácii. Veľa zariadení má v sebe kryptozariadenia na utajovanú komunikáciu a riadenie operácií.

Na spojenie sa používajú v 27 krajinách NATO rádiostanice Harris, spojenie medzi stíhačkami vo vzduchu, prostriedkami včasnej výstrahy, PVO a pozemnými riadicimi centrami ide cez dátový protokol Link-16. Tieto systémy sú bez tzv. kľúčového hospodárstva nepoužiteľné, alebo nedokážu meniť šifrovanie a stávajú sa zraniteľnými.

Podobne je tomu so stíhačkami a ich systémami rádioelektronického boja, kde sa frekvencie a charakteristiky prostriedkov protivníka často menia. K tomu sa musí prispôsobovať softvér a charakteristiky aktívnych prvkov. V prípade lietadiel F-35 Lightning II sa špekuľuje, že Američania by v nich mohli mať zabudované aj tzv. kill switche. Teda, že by Američania vedeli diaľkovo v prípade potreby vypnúť kritické systémy. Po tom, čo USA predviedli smerom k Ukrajine, ale aj po čoraz agresívnejšej rétorike, v mnohých hlavných mestách zavládlo zdesenie. Nik si síce nepripúšťa nejaký rýchly rozpad vzťahov s USA, ale 100 % dôveru už asi nemá nik.

Spojené štáty dlhú dobu tlačili na svojich spojencov a to celkom oprávnene, aby výrazne zvýšili v rámci NATO podiel na svojej bezpečnosti. Transakčne orientovaný Donald Trump tlačil na výrazné zvýšenie výdavkov európskych partnerov na zbrojenie a v zápätí hovoril, že spojenci by mali nakupovať americké zbrane a znížiť tak obchodný deficit USA. Niektoré systémy aj dlho ešte budeme musieť nakupovať od Američanov, lebo iné nie sú k dispozícii. Ale zostať silne závislí na čoraz nepredvídateľnejšom a cynickom partnerovi začínajú európski spojenci vnímať ako bezpečnostné riziko.

Poliaci masovo zbroja, v najbližších rokoch ich to bude stáť 400 miliárd eur. Veľkú časť berú od USA, zvyšok z vlastnej výroby alebo z kapacitných dôvodov aj od ostatných partnerov vrátane Južnej Kórei. Ani Američania neboli schopní rýchlo dodať požadované objemy. Predstava, že dávate 5 % HDP na obranu, vynaložíte stovky miliárd na nové Patrioty, THAAD, desiatky stíhačiek F-35 a 470 súprav HIMARS a nemáte istotu, či Vám ich niekto v kritickej situácii nevypne musí byť desivá. Aj keď sa Poliaci spoliehajú na to, že majú kontrakty priamo s výrobcom a nič im nehrozí, vedia, že to nemusí byť tak.

Poliaci zrejme už príliš veľa možností na zmenu nemajú a vzťahy s USA dlhodobo posilňujú. Preto aj nedávna účasť prezidenta Dudu na kontroverznej konferencii konzervatívcov dáva zmysel. Ostatné krajiny majú ešte čas a hlavné obranné nákupy pred sebou. Začínajú váhať a na verejnosti sa ozývajú prvé kuvičie hlasy západných politikov. Prezidentovi Trumpovi sa tak môže podariť dosiahnuť cieľ zvýšenia výdavkov a prebudiť spojencov. Avšak budíček šokom môže podobne ako Muskove výkriky na X a pred kamerami viesť k odklonu od nákupu amerických zbraní.

Nejde len o nemeckých, francúzskych a britských politikov. Nedávno sa nechal počuť portugalský minister obrany, že Portugalsko nenakúpi zamýšľané americké stíhačky F-35. Následne prišla zo strany vlády korekcia, že minister sa unáhlil a že Portugalsko len zvažuje aj iné alternatívy, ale nevylučuje nákup F-35. Podobné fámy sa začínajú šíriť aj o Fínsku. Ale zatiaľ ide skôr o fámy alebo spravodajské hry na rozhádanie spojencov. V každom prípade, pokiaľ sa bude americká administratíva správať ako slon v porceláne, tak síce popichne Európu na vyššie zbrojenie, ale americké zbrojovky až taký osoh z toho mať nebudú.

Turecko potrebuje a chce nové stíhačky

Turecko sa ocitlo v trochu odlišnej situácii. Na nákup najmodernejších amerických zbraní mohlo zabudnúť už po predchádzajúcej roztržke, aj kvôli svojej nekoordinovanej intervencii v Sýrii, či po nákupe ruského systému PVO S-400 Triumf. Turecko bolo zo strany USA vyradené z programu F-35 a dokonca aj z podpory F-16. Erdoganovi sa obštrukciami rozšírenia NATO o Fínsko a Švédsko a blokovaním vstupu Švédska do NATO podarilo odblokovať podporu a dodávky F-16. Ale to bolo maximum, čo mohlo dosiahnuť.

Aj preto malo Turecko už dlhšiu dobu záujem o stíhačky Eurofighter Typhoon, ktoré boli vyvinuté a sú vyrábané európským konzorciom firiem zo Spojeného Kráľovstva, Nemecka, Španielska a Talianska. Aj tento obchod bol dlhšie blokovaný, najmä kvôli jasnému odmietavému postoju Nemecka. Teraz by sa mohla situácia zmeniť. S exportom do krajín mimo konzorcia musia súhlasiť všetci štyria partneri v konzorciu. Spojené kráľovstvo, Taliansko a Španielsko nemajú s predajom stíhačiek Turecku žiadny problém.

Teraz prichádzajú signály, že aj postoj Nemecka by sa mohol zmeniť. Nie je to síce garantované, ale veci sa dali do pohybu a spojené kráľovstvo sa bude veľmi o to snažiť. Nemecko blokovalo predaj okrem iného aj kvôli tureckým protiizraelským postojom a pozíciou ku konfliktu Hamasu s Izraelom.

Turecko má záujem o kúpu 40 ks Eurofighter Typhoon 4. emisie (iterácie) a ich integráciu do tureckých vzdušných síl. Táto verzia je vybavená najmodernejším a špičkovým radarovým systémom AESA CAPTOR-E. Štvrtá generácia (emisia) Eurofighterov by mala byť podľa odhadov prevádzkovateľná minimálne do roku 2060. Dodávateľom pre Turecko by malo byť Spojené kráľovstvo. Podľa najnovších informácií, britské ministerstvo obrany už aj predložilo svojmu tureckému náprotivku podrobný návrh kontraktu. Turci ho teraz detailne posudzujú. Samotní Nemci chcú v najbližšej dobe nakúpiť 38 kusov týchto stíhačiek, čo podčiarkuje dlhodobú strategickú prespektívu a udržateľnosť tohto typu stíhacích strojov.

V súvislosti s rastúcou vojenskou spoluprácou medzi Spojeným kráľovstvom a Tureckom, v decembri minulého roku na leteckej základni Murted pri Ankare pristáli aj dve stíhačky Eurofighter Typhoon britského Kráľovského letectva. Tureckí predtavitelia si tak mohli ohmatať a pozrieť lietadlo priamo na mieste. Spojené kráľovstvo, ktoré už nie je v EÚ, môže zohrať kľúčovú úlohu spojky pri udržaní transatlantického partnerstva. Súčasne je lídrom koalície ochotných nielen pre podporu Ukrajiny, ale aj pre výrazné posilnenie európskej obrany schopnosti.

Turecké letectvo tak nakoniec môže dostať zelenú na posilnenie o namodernejšie európske stíhačky a samotné Turecko na posilnenie svojich väzieb s Európou. Prípadný obchod v tomto prípade prospeje aj európskemu obrannému priemyslu.

//Edit (17.3.2025).

Podľa vyjadrenia The defence news (Canada Reconsiders F-35 Fighter Jet Deal, Explores European Alternatives ) a The Aviationist (Canada Reconsidering $13.2 Billion F-35 Purchase Amid Growing Tensions With The U.S. – The Aviationist), Kanada zvažuje prehodnotenie svojho zámeru na obstaranie stíhačiek F-35 Lightning II a hľadá čiastočnú náhradu v podobe strojov z Európy. Namiesto pôvodných 88 ks F-35 v objeme 13,2 mld USD teraz Kanaďania uvažujú o nákupe maximálne 32 kusov a namiesto zvyšných F-35 zvažuje nákup minimálne 60 ks stíhačiek JAS 39 Gripen verzia E/F od švédskej spoločnosti SAAB. Švédsko v tejto súvislosti ponúklo aj možnosť kompletácie JAS 39 Gripen priamo v Kanade, čo v prípade F-35 Lightning II nie je na základe amerických postupov možné.

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#Čína #hybridná vojna #Informačné operácie #meta #Rusko #Vplyvové operácie

Na základe vyšetrovania a poznatkov mety, išlo v obidvoch prípadoch o koordinované multidoménové ovplyvňovacie operácie.

⛔️čínska sieť ovplyvňovala americkú domácu politiku a českú zahraničnú politiku vo vzťahu k Číne a Ukrajine
⛔️rozsiahla ruská sieť sa zameriavala predovšetkým na Nemecko, Francúzsko, Taliansko, Spojené kráľovstvo a Ukrajinu v súvislosti s ruskou agresiou na Ukrajine a jej dopady.

Rusko a Čína dlhodobo organizujú vplyvové operácie po celom svete. Zatiaľ čo Čína sa prevažne snaží o získavanie pozitívnych vzťahov ku svojej krajine a politike čínskej vládnej moci, v prípade Ruska ide o systematickú hybridnú vojnu s cieľom podvratnej činnosti a oslabenia rozhodovacích schopností v cieľových krajinách, majúcu charakter nepriateľských aktivít.

Jedným zo základných pilierov ruskej štátnej doktríny je vnímanie medzinárodných vzťahov ako permamentného konfliktu a neľútostného súperenia, ktoré v rôznych fázach prebieha v odlišných formách. Ale stále ide o konflikt, ktorý sa trvale prejavuje v diplomatickej, informačnej, vojenskej a ekonomickej oblasti.

Preto je treba vnímať rozdiel medzi náhodnou činnosťou konšpiračnej a dezinformačnej scény, ktorá vzniká prirodzenými aktivitami ľudí s rôznymi pohnútkami od zárobkovej činnosti až po šarlatánstvo a cieľavedomými a koordinovanými, ale dobre maskovanými aktivitami cudzej moci.

Zatiaľ čo nad prvými stačí mávnuť rukou a budovať v ľuďoch kritické myslenie, v druhom prípade ide o systematickú aktivitu s nepriateľskými úmyslami, ktorej sa musíme aktívne brániť.

Zdroj: https://about.fb.com/news/2022/09/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-china-and-russia/

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#Colonial pipeline #Irán #kritická infraštruktúra #kybernetická bezpečnosť #kybernetický útok

Kybernetický útok vyradil rozsiahlu potrubnú sústavu

Hackeri minulý týždeň ukázali svoju silu. V spojených štátoch napadli počítačové siete operátora potrubných systémov Colonial pipeline. V Írsku sa nabúrali do zdravotného systému a v Nemecku sa tiež museli vysporiadať s kybernetickým útokom. Útok na Colonial pipeline v Spojených štátoch bol jednoznačne historicky najväčším kybernetickým útokom na kritickú infraštruktúru. V tomto prípade ide o takmer 9 tisíc kilometrový (5500 míl) systém potrubnej prepravy hotových ropných produktov (benzín, nafta, letecké palivo a vykurovacie oleje) z rafinérií v Mexickom zálive v okolí Houstonu cez celé východné pobrežie USA až do New Jersey.

Podľa portálu foxbusiness.com, spoločnosť denne prepravuje 380 miliónov litrov palív, čo predstavuje 45 % celovej spotreby palív v dotknutých štátoch na východnom pobreží USA. Takže dosah výpadku dodávok palív bol obrovský. Negatívne dopady boli naviac umocnené nákupnou panikou, ktorú informácie o poruchách systému sprevádzali. Za útokom boli kriminálne živly napojené na hackerskú sieť Darkside z Východnej Európy. Požadovali od operátora výpalné 5 miliónov dolárov. Po pár dňoch váhania nakoniec Colonial pipeline toto „výkupné“ zaplatila. Jeho výška totiž neprekročila ani zaokrúhľovaciu chybu vo výške ročných tržieb spoločnosti. Aj keď boli dohady, že za útokmi by mohla byť oficiálna ruská stopa, tieto dohady sa nepotvrdili.

Skutočný problém je totiž niekde inde. Americké spoločnosti využili relatívne mäkké pravidlá pre kybernetickú bezpečnosť pre súkromné firmy. Náklady na kvalitnú kybernetickú bezpečnosť nie sú malé. Na druhej strane, skutočné spôsobené škody majú ďaleko väčší presah než škody u samotného poskytovateľa služieb. Podľa Hillary Vaughn väčšinu škôd nesie verejnosť a to v dôsledku zrušených aktivít, narušenia prepravy tovarov a podobne. Vo svojom článku Hillary Vaungh vo FOXBusiness uvádza, že v minulom desaťročí vrátane roku 2020 sa stalo viac ako stovka podobných, aj keď menších útokov. U mála z nich sa podarilo zistiť útočníka. Väčšina objasnených útokov mala pôvod v Číne.

Nová legislatíva a opatrenia proti kybernetickým útokom

Oslovení experti sa zhodli, že úspešný spektakulárny útok, ako ten na Colonial pipeline, povzbudí ďalších útočníkov. Vzhľadom na stav kybernetickej ochrany proti sofistikovaným hrozbám je možné očakávať desiatky až stovky podobných pokusov. Zastupujúci riaditeľ Agentúry pre kybernetickú bezpečnosť a bezpečnosť kritickej infraštruktúry (CISA) Brandon Wales tieto obavy nepriamo potvrdil v odpovedi na otázky výboru Senátu USA pre vnútornú bezpečnosť.

V dôsledku útokov budú v rámci iniciatívy Pipeline Security Initiative v rámci Národného centra manažmentu rizík vykonávané hodnotenia potrubných systémov vo formáte privátno-štátnych partnerstiev (PPP). Očakáva sa aj rýchla legislatívna reakcia, ktorá sprísni podmienky kybernetickej bezpečnosti. Dovtedy môže situáciu riešiť prezident Biden svojimi dekrétmi. Podobne ako v Európe, aj v USA ide o citlivú politickú záležitosť. Podstatou je, do akej miery môže štát regulovať a nariaďovať kybernetické bezpečnostné štandardy súkromným firmám. Zatiaľ, čo v USA volili trocha liberálnejší prístup, v Európskej únii panuje zhoda, že ak tieto súkromné služby majú veľký dosah na zákazníkov, môžu podliehať regulácii.

Kybernetické hrozby sú čoraz nebezpečnejšie a už dávno nie sú len záležitosťou vo virtuálnom kybernetickom priestore. Majú čoraz väčšie fyzické dopady. Aj keď ide väčšinou o aktivity individuálnych hackerov alebo kriminálne gangy, posledné útoky naznačili, aké veľké škody môžu napáchať. Na mieste je však otázka, aké kapacity môžu mať vlády krajín, ktoré investovali do spôsobilostí kybernetickej vojny. Nedávny útok na iránske jadrové zariadenie naznačuje mnohé.

Preto je dobre, že obrana proti kybernetickým hrozbám našla svoje miesto aj v našej novej bezpečnostnej stratégii. Európska únia začala s implementáciou novej stratégie kybernetickej bezpečnosti a koncom minulého roka uviedla do platnosti novú smernicu pre kybernetickú bezpečnosť. V mesiaci apríl 2021 dala Európska rada zelenú vzniku nového kompetenčného centra kybernetickej bezpečnosti v Bukurešti. Na Slovensku je práve teraz v Národnej rade SR na prerokovanie novela zákona o kybernetickej bezpečnosti. Ide o dobre pripravený kompromisný návrh, ktorý umožňuje prípadnú korekciu vo svetle posledných udalostí.

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S postupujúcou informatizáciou spoločnosti budú spravodajstvo a spravodajská komunita čeliť stále väčším výzvam. Masívna digitalizácia nášho každodenného života prináša nové príležitosti, ale aj nové výzvy. Kybernetický priestor nie je už len nejakým transportným médiom, či prostredím cez ktoré prebieha komunikácia medzi osobami, inštitúciami a štátmi.  Postupne sa stal skutočným priestorom každodenného života jednotlivca a spoločnosti.

V kybernetickom priestore prebieha obrovské množstvo transakcií a udalostí. Mnohé z ich v tomto priestore vznikajú aj zanikajú. Zásadným rozdielom oproti iným sféram ľudského pôsobenia ako zem, vzduch, voda a vesmír je to, že kybernetický priestor je priestorom sám o sebe a súčasne priamo preniká do všetkých ostatných sfér.

Žijeme v zosieťovanom svete. Vedci odhadujú, že až 97 % všetkých informácií je už niekde v kybernetickom priestore. Cez tento priestor prebieha koordinácia  a riadenie ľudských aktivít. Na spoľahlivosti a stabilite kybernetického priestoru sme už dnes životne závislí. V súčasnosti máme k dispozícii takzvaný internet ľudí. Na internet je v ňom pripojených viac ako 5 miliárd osôb, niektorí viacnásobne.

V súvislosti s pokračujúcou robotizáciou a nasadzovaním autonómnych systémov, ako aj zmenou prístupu k takým aktivitám ako je napríklad pozáručný servis spotrebičov, postupne prechádzame do obdobia internetu vecí. V priebehu pár rokov bude okrem ľudí na internet pripojených okolo 200 miliárd ďalších zariadení. Tento exponenciálny rast objemu transakcií a informácií obsiahnutých na internete sa ešte ďalej exponenciálne zvýši s plošným zavedením sietí 5. generácie.

Piaty rozmer: digitálny svet a spravodajstvo

Zatiaľ čo význam ostatných, fyzických sfér života sa nijako nemení, určujúcou sférou sa stáva práve kybernetický priestor. Toto má priamy dopad aj na všetky otázky súvisiace s národnou bezpečnosťou. Zákonite, ak sa väčšina informácií nachádza v kybernetickom priestore, toto sa musí adekvátnym spôsobom premietnuť aj do oblasti spravodajstva.  Kybernetický priestor sa stáva aj kľúčovým priestorom súperenia štátov a mocenských skupín.

Na tento vývoj reagujú viaceré štáty. Reagovalo aj NATO, ktoré na samite vo Varšave v roku 2016 uznalo kybernetický priestor za piatu vojenskú doménu. Stalo sa to aj napriek tomu, že v súvislosti s konfliktom prebiehajúcim v kybernetickom priestore máme neujasnený celý rad medzinárodno-právnych, morálnych a etických otázok. Súperenie v tomto priestore je totiž realitou a jeho účastníkmi nie sú len štátni aktéri. Práve rozvoj internetu a digitalizácia umožnili povýšiť hybridné hrozby na novú úroveň. Do značnej miery sa vyrovnali šance medzi rôznymi aktérmi bez ohľadu na ich fyzickú silu. 

Digitalizácia priniesla celý rad špecifík. Tradičný koncept národnej suverenity alebo možnosť uplatnenia článku 5 Washingtonskej zmluvy nie je možné v plnom rozsahu uplatniť v kybernetickom priestore. Postupne sa vytráca význam alebo vplyv tradičnej hierarchickej štruktúry usporiadania štátu, firiem, ale aj vojenstva. Ako napísal Thomas L. Friedman, svet sa sploštil. [1]

Digitalizácia je fakt vo vývoji spločnosti, ktorý sa nedá zmeniť. Prináša celý rad možností, výziev, ale aj rizík. Od toho, ako ich zvládneme respektíve využijeme, bude závisieť aj úroveň našej obrany a odolnosť voči hrozbám, či účinnosť včasného varovania pred nimi.

Dovoľte mi pozastaviť sa pri troch najväčších výzvach do blízkej budúcnosti a z nich vyplývajúcich požiadavkách na spravodajské zložky

1. Veľké možstvo dát

Dobré spravodajstvo znamená dobrý zber informácií, ich správnu analýzu a interpretáciu a návrh účinných opatrení na rozhodnutie. Najväčšou výzvou súčasnosti nie je ani tak informácie a údaje získať. Najdôležitejšie je nájsť tú podstatnú či kritickú informáciu pre správne rozhodnutie.

Postupným prechodom na internet a rozvojom nových technológií máme dnes k dispozícii obrovské množstva dát. Nejde len o klasické dáta a citlivé informácie ako texty. Podstatne sa zmenili možnosti v získavaní a spracovaní satelitných obrázkov, geografických údajov, obrazovo-zvukových záznamov, biometrických údajov. Výrazne sa rozšírili sociálne siete a množstvo aktivít na nich.

Na jednej strane nám dostupnosť týchto nástrojov, údajov a silná komunikačná sieť poskytujú účinné nástroje na urýchlenie a spresnenie rozhodovacieho cyklu. Platí to rovnako pre biznis, politiku, aj pre vedenie ozbrojeného konfliktu, či bezpečnostných a vojenských operácií.  Na druhej strane sa na týchto údajoch a technológiách stávame čoraz závislejší a zraniteľnejší. Narušenie satelitného navigačného systému alebo vyradenie našich komunikačných sietí môže vyradiť aj značnú časť nášho obranného potenciálu.

Závislosť na informáciách pôsobí našťastie obojstranne. Všetko toto poskytuje aj obrovskú príležitosť pre získavanie informácií pre spravodajskú komunitu. Odhliadnuc od právnych a technických otázok zberu informácií, hlavným problémom však je, že dát máme až príliš veľa. Pohybujeme sa v oblasti tzv. big data, kde sa ich klasický zber, ukladanie a spracovanie nedajú účinne použiť.

Vyšetrovanie pozadia útokov  11. septembra 2001 okrem iného ukázalo, že informácie a indície o možnom útoku boli niekde v systéme. Ale chýbal im kontext a správne vyhodnotenie a preto sa stali zrejmými až po samotných útokoch.

Ak má byť spravodajstvo účinné, bude musieť presunúť svoje ťažisko zo zberu utajovaných informácií k zberu a vyhodnocovaniu neutajovaných informácií. Napríklad z komunikácie vojakov na sociálnych sieťach pred nasadením alebo počas neho sa dá získať podstatne viac informácií, ako si chceme pripustiť.

Spravodajské služby sa budú musieť naučiť s obrovskými súbormi neštruktúrovaných dát. To si bude vyžadovať úplne iné analytické postupy a nástroje ako aj prípravu personálu, než na aké sme boli zvyknutí. Problémom pre menšie krajiny môže byť dostupnosť príslušných technológií pre spracovanie veľkých objemov dát.

2. Umelá inteligencia a kvantové počítače

Rozumné využívanie prvkov umelej inteligencie a zachovanie kľúčovej úlohy človeka v rozhodovacom cykle je najväčšou výzvou pre nasledujúce generácie. Pre spravodajskú komunitu predstavuje najväčšiu príležitosť a hrozbu súčasne.

S rozvojom technológie veľmi rýchlo postupuje rozvoj umelej inteligencie a kvantových počítačov. Bez ohľadu na kontroverznosť a etické otázky súvisiace s umelou inteligenciou, jej rozvoj rýchlo napreduje. Už dnes často krát na sociálnych sieťach komunikujeme s „botom“ – samo učiacim sa programom. Softvéroví asistenti nás sprevádzajú komunikáciou s bankami, ale aj pri vyhľadávaní údajov.

Aj keď toto má ešte ďaleko do umelej inteligencie, predznamenáva to budúci vývoj. Súčasne prebieha intenzívny vývoj na úseku kvantových počítačov. Prvý skutočný kvantový počítač definitívne vyradí všetky súčasné šifrovacie mechanizmy.

Umelá inteligencia v serióznejších oblastiach použitia dosiahla  významný pokrok. Už dnes dokáže napríklad diagnostikovať množstvo chorôb lepšie ako skúsení lekári. Veľký výkonnostný skok je možné očakávať pri spracovaní zvukových a zvukovo-obrazových záznamov. Už dnes dokážu algoritmy sociálnych sietí, bežne dostupné ľuďom, pomerne spoľahlivo rozpoznávať tváre osôb podľa pár referenčných fotografií.

Komplexné expertné systémy s prvkami umelej inteligencie sa stanú výkonným nástrojom nielen spravodajcov, ale napríklad aj kriminalistov. Tieto systémy už existujú dnes a postupne sa zdokonaľujú. Avšak zavádzanie umelej inteligencie má v sebe množstvo rizík a výziev.

Možné aplikácie prvkov umelej inteligencie v oblasti obrany sú podľa najnovšej správy pre americký kongres nasledovné [2]:

✅ spravodajstvo, sledovanie a prieskum

✅ logistika

✅ operácie v kybernetickom priestore

✅ informačné operácie a klamné produkty (“Deep Fake”)

✅ velenie a riadenie

✅ poloautonómne a autonómne vozidlá a prostriedky

✅ smrtiace autonómne zbraňové systémy (LAWS – Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems)

Americká spravodajská komunita pracuje na projektoch umelej inteligencie na základe strategického dokumentu spracovaného bývalým riaditeľom „National Intelligence“ Danom Coatsom  pod názvom „AIM iniciatíva“ (Augmenting Intelligence using Machines Initiative).

Okrem morálno-etických, majú ozbrojené sily a bezpečnostné zložky pred sebou niekoľko výziev v súvislosti s prvkami umelej inteligencie:

🔻 dostupné technológie

🔻 zmena procesov

🔻 adekvátny personál

🔻 inštitucionálna kultúra

1️⃣ Autonómnosť

Tá je výhodou, pokiaľ dokáže odbremeniť ľudí od náročných mechanických a opakujúcich sa činností a sústrediť sa na rozhodovací proces. Problémom je nájsť rovnovážny stav medzi morálnou dilemou a výkonnosťou, teda ako veľa autonómnosti môžeme dovoliť systémom.

2️⃣ Rýchlosť a výdrž

Tieto systémy nepodliehajú únave a môžu výrazne zvýšiť operačné tempo. Ma druhej strane limitujúcim prvkom v operačnom tempe zostáva človek a jeho schopnosť vykonávať rýchle kognitívne rozhodnutia.

3️⃣ Umocňujúci účinok (Scaling)

Ten umožňuje podstatne rozšíriť možnosti a výkonnosť súčasných systémov. Na úrovni krajín môže umožniť zmazať rozdiely vo veľkosti a ekonomickej či vojenskej sile.

4️⃣ Informačná prevaha

Nasadenie autonómných prvkov pre zber a vyhodnocovanie informácií umožňuje exponenciálny rast objemu dát, ale aj vyhodnotených informácií.

5️⃣ Predvídateľnosť výsledkov

Problémom umelej inteligencie je, že k záverom či výsledkom môže dospieť aj neočakávaným spôsobom. Nefunguje ako mechanický systém, kde je presne definovaný priebeh deja. Teda tieto systémy môžu aj fatálnym spôsobom zlyhať aj pri pomerne ľahkej úlohe.

6️⃣ Vysvetliteľnosť procesov

Najvýkonnejšie algoritmy umelej inteligencie nevedia hodnoverne vysvetliť svoj vlastný proces. Otázkou teda zostáva ich spoľahlivosť a hodnovernosť.

7️⃣ Zneužiteľnosť

Všetko, čo poskytuje obrovské  množstvo dát a je autonómne, je súčasne aj napadnuteľné a zneužiteľné protivníkom.

Využívanie prvkov umelej inteligencie a zvyšujúci sa výpočtový výkon sú faktom a budú ich mať k dispozícii nielen štáty, ale aj silní neštátni aktéri.

3. Zmena paradigmy spravodajstva: od podpory k „bojovej“ sile

Hybridný konflikt z veľkej časti môže prebiehať v kybernetickom  a informačnom priestore. Klasická úloha spravodajstva je v pozícii podporného prvku rozhodovacieho procesu alebo podpory exekúcie (combat enabler). Maximálne môže byť prvkom umocňujúcim účinnosť bojových prvkov, letálnych aj neletálnych (force multiplier).

Prechodom do online konfliktu vedenému priamo v kybernetickom priestore  sa postupne stáva priamou „bojovou silou“. Teda mení sa paradigma z klasickej podpory rozhodovacieho procesu a podpory operácií na priame vedenie operácií.

Táto zmena paradigmy zo sebou prináša celý rad výziev a rizík, ako aj požiadavky na zmenu legislatívneho rámca. Najme v stave bezpečnosti tak proti sebe stoja dva záujmy. Tým prvým je zvýšenie účinnosti spravodajstva a skrátenie reakčného času vyžadujúce si priamu aktívnu angažovanosť spravodajských zložiek v obrane alebo protiútoku. Na druhej strane je to potreba ochrany spoločnosti pred zneužitím spravodajských zložiek.

Záverečné odporúčania:

V dôsledku zmien v spoločnosti v súvislosti s digitalizáciu, spravodajské služby budú musieť prejsť zásadnou obsahovou a štrukturálnou reformou. Vhhľadom na stav slovenského bezpečnostného prostredia a spravodajskej komunity týmto sdystémovým zmenám bude musieť predchádzať aj zásadný očistný proces vo vnútri inštitúcií a vymedzenie pôsobnosti medzi jednotlivými zložkami spravodajskej komunity.

1️⃣ Analyzovať úlohy spravodajských zložiek a zmeniť ich poslanie a legislatívne prostredie.

2️⃣ Zásadným spôsobom zmeniť výchovu a prípravu spravodajského personálu a zaisťovanie jeho lojality voči štátu.

3️⃣ Investovať do nových technológií.

4️⃣ Posilniť verejnú a parlamentnú kontrolu spravodajských služieb bez zníženia ich výkonnosti.

Použité zdroje a referencie:

[1] Thomas L. Friedman: The World is Flat, New York, 2005, Farrar, Straus and Giroux

[2] Artificial Intelligence and National Security, Updated November 21, 2019, správa pre kongres USA, dostupná na https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf

[3] https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/cyber-security-and-intelligence-community

[4] https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1582.html

[5] https://www.c4isrnet.com/intel-geoint/2019/08/19/4-big-problems-the-intelligence-community-faces-moving-to-a-new-data-system/

[6] https://www.c4isrnet.com/artificial-intelligence/2019/11/26/heres-how-a-national-intelligence-watchdog-is-improving-ai-oversight/

[7] https://fas.org/irp/dia/vector21/index.html

[8] https://www.afcea.org/content/great-power-competition-defines-defense-intelligence

[9] https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195375886.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195375886-e-0026

[10] https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Article/621113/defense-intelligence-analysis-in-the-age-of-big-data/

[11] https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/02/19/adapting-nato-to-an-unpredictable-and-fast-changing-world/index.html

[12 https://www.dia.mil/News/Articles/Article-View/Article/1601186/big-data-and-the-future-of-war/

[13] https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf

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